2026:AHC:208004

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

APPLICATION U/S 528 BNSS No. - 39822 of 2026

Amit Singh

.....Applicant(s)

Versus

State of U.P. and Another

.....Opposite Party(s)

Counsel for Applicant(s)	:	Vineet Kumar Singh
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)	:	G.A.

Court No. - 76

HON'BLE SAURABH SRIVASTAVA, J.

1. Heard learned counsel for applicant and learned AGA for the State.

2. The present application has been preferred for seeking quashing of entire proceeding of Case no. 2359 of 2020 (State vs. Rachit Wadhwa and Others) arising out of Case Crime no.932 of 2018, under sections 406, 407, 420 IPC, PS- Kotwali Orai, District- Jalaun, pending before learned court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalaun at Orai, including charge sheet dated 06.06.2020 along with cognizance/summoning order dated 17.10.2020 and other consequential orders dated 14.08.2024 and 29.06.2026.

3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of applicant has challenged the impugned charge-sheet along with cognizance/summoning order as well as other consequential orders and entire proceedings of the present case precisely on the ground that Sections 420 and 406 IPC cannot go together in the same breath as per the proposition of law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of **Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another reported in 2024 10 SCC 690**. The relevant portion of the said judgment is being reproduced hereinbelow:-

> *"38. In our view, the plain reading of the complaint fails to spell out any of the aforesaid ingredients noted above. We may only say, with a view to clear a serious misconception of law in the mind of the police as well as the courts below, that if it is a case of the complainant that offence of criminal breach of trust as defined under Section 405 IPC, punishable under Section 406 IPC, is committed by the accused, then in the same breath it cannot be said that the accused has also committed the offence of cheating as defined and explained in Section 415 IPC, punishable*

under Section 420 IPC.

41. The distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating is a fine one. In case of cheating, the intention of the accused at the time of inducement should be looked into which may be judged by a subsequent conduct, but for this, the subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right from the beginning of the transaction i.e. the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore, it is this intention, which is the gist of the offence.

43. There is a distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating. For cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time of making a false or misleading representation i.e. since inception. In criminal breach of trust, mere proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal breach of trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly misappropriated the same. Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver any property. In such a situation, both the offences cannot co-exist simultaneously.

55. It is high time that the police officers across the country are imparted proper training in law so as to understand the fine distinction between the offence of cheating vis-vis criminal breach of trust. Both offences are independent and distinct. The two offences cannot coexist simultaneously in the same set of facts. They are antithetical to each other. The two provisions of IPC (now BNS, 2023) are not twins that they cannot survive without each other."

4. On the other hand, learned A.G.A. has vehemently opposed the prayer sought through the instant application but unable to dispute the settled proposition of law as relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for applicant.

5. Since the legal issue has been raised by learned counsel for the applicant and as such process to issue notice to opposite party no.2 is hereby dispensed with.

6. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, going through the record of the case and the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of **Delhi Race Club (Supra)**, it is crystal clear that both the sections i.e. Sections 420 and 406 IPC cannot go in the same breath and as such,

cognizance/summoning order dated 17.10.2020 and other consequential orders is liable to be set aside. Although judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of **Delhi Race Club (Supra)** has been passed on 23.08.2024 and cognizance of offence in the present case, has been taken on dated 17.10.2020 and as per the judgment rendered by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of **Kanishk Sinha and another Vs. The State of West Bengal and another [2025 SCC Online SC 443]**, the judgment of Hon'ble the Apex Court will always be retrospective in nature unless the judgment itself specifically states that the judgment will operate prospectively.

7. In view thereof, cognizance/summoning order dated 17.10.2020 and other consequential orders dated 14.08.2024 and 29.06.2026 passed in Case no. 2359 of 2020 (State vs. Rachit Wadhwa and Others) arising out of Case Crime no.932 of 2018, under sections 406, 407, 420 IPC, PS- Kotwali Orai, District- Jalaun, pending before learned court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalaun at Orai, is **quashed, only in respect of applicant herein**. Matter is hereby remitted back to learned court concerned for passing fresh order of taking cognizance of offence, if required, in light of the proposition of law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of **Delhi Race Club (supra)** in respect of applicant herein.

8. Accordingly, the instant application stands **allowed in part**.

October 5, 2026
Saif

(Saurabh Srivastava,J.)

Digitally signed by :-
SHAIKH SAIF ABDIN
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad