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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

+ **CRL.M.C. 3514/2025**

SHER SINGH AND ORS

.....Petitioners

versus

THE STATE GOVT. OF NCT
OF DELHI AND ANR.

.....Respondents

+ **CRL.M.C. 3520/2025 & CRL.M.A. 15509/2025**

SHAMBHU PRASAD AND ROS.

.....Petitioners

versus

THE STATE AND ANR NCT
OF DELHI AND ANR.

.....Respondents

Appearance:-

Mr. Lalit Kumar, Advocate for Petitioners in Item No. 14/Respondent Nos. 2 to 6 in Item No. 15.

Mr. Sanjay Kumar Singh, Advocate for Respondent No. 2 in Item No. 14/Petitioners in Item No. 15.

Mr. Hitesh Vali, APP for State with SI Mohit Chahar, P.S. South Rohini.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN

ORDER

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21.04.2026

1. The present petitions under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 ["BNSS"] (corresponding to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) seek quashing of cross-FIRs, being FIR No. 184/2019 for offences punishable under Sections



323/341/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, [“IPC”] [subject matter of CRL.M.C. 3514/2025]; and FIR No. 183/2019 for offences punishable under Sections 323/325/341/506/509/34 of the IPC [subject matter of CRL.M.C. 3520/2025], both dated 20.06.2019, and registered at Police Station South Rohini, New Delhi, alongwith all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom, on the basis of a settlement arrived at between the parties.

2. Issue notice. Mr. Hitesh Vali, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, accepts notice on behalf of the State. Mr. Sanjay Kumar Singh, learned counsel, accepts notice on behalf of respondent No. 2 in CRL.M.C. 3514/2025. Mr. Lalit Kumar, learned counsel, accepts notice on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 to 6 in CRL.M.C. 3520/2025.

3. The impugned FIRs have been lodged by neighbours, who are also related to one another, against each other. They were registered at the instance of respondent No. 2 in the respective petitions. It appears that the FIRs emanate from a scuffle between the parties concerning the parking of a bicycle.

4. During the pendency of the proceedings, and with the intervention of common friends, the parties have entered into a settlement, as recorded in Compromise Deeds dated 12.12.2024.

5. In light of the aforesaid, the parties seek quashing of the impugned FIRs.

6. The parties are present in Court, and have been duly identified by their respective learned counsel as well as the Investigating Officer.

7. The settlement does not involve any monetary consideration, and records that the parties do not wish to pursue criminal proceedings



against each other. Affidavits of the respective complainants, signifying their no-objection to the quashing of the impugned FIRs and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, have also been placed on record.

8. Although two of the injured persons in FIR No. 183/2019 [subject matter of CRL.M.C. 3520/2025] sustained fractures, the parties confirm that no permanent or lasting injuries ensued. Further, one of the accused persons in FIR No. 184/2019 [petitioner No. 3 in CRL.M.C. 3514/2025] has passed away during the pendency of the proceedings and is, therefore, not a party to the settlement.

9. The Supreme Court has clearly held that, in certain circumstances, the High Courts can quash criminal proceedings, even with respect to non-compoundable offences, on the ground that there is a compromise between the accused and the complainant, especially when no overarching public interest is adversely affected.

10. In *Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr.* [(2012) 10 SCC 303], the Supreme Court held as follows:

“58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude



under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, **where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated.** The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.”

[Emphasis supplied.]

Further, in *Narinder Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr.* [(2014) 6 SCC 466], the Supreme Court has also laid down guidelines for High Courts while accepting settlement deeds between parties and quashing the proceedings. The relevant observations in the said decision read as under:

“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or



(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.”

[Emphasis supplied.]

11. In the present case, the impugned FIRs arise out of a trivial neighbourhood dispute, the genesis whereof lies in the parking of a bicycle. Applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, it is material to note that the complainants have affirmed, before this Court, the voluntary nature of the settlement. The parties have also confirmed that no lasting injuries were sustained. In these circumstances, the continuation of the criminal proceedings would serve no useful purpose and is unlikely to result in conviction, amounting instead to an unwarranted expenditure of judicial time and resources.

12. The petitions are, therefore, allowed, and FIR No. 184/2019 for offences punishable under Sections 323/341/506/34 of the IPC; and FIR No. 183/2019 for offences punishable under Sections 323/325/341/506/509/34 of the IPC, both dated 20.06.2019, and



registered at Police Station South Rohini, New Delhi, alongwith all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom, are hereby quashed.

13. Accordingly, the petitions, alongwith pending application, stand disposed of.

PRATEEK JALAN, J

APRIL 21, 2026

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