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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

+ **W.P.(C) 2701/2026, CM APPL. 13071/2026**

MRS PAWAN JASHIAL

.....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Nikhilesh Ramachandran,
Mr. Shubham Seth and Mr. Aditya
Krsihnan, Advocates.

versus

KHALSA MIDDLE SCHOOL & ORS.

.....Respondents

Through: Mr. Akshit Gupta, Advocate for R-6.
Mr. Yeeshu Jain ASC with Ms. Jyoti
Tyagi, Ms. Vishruti Pandey and Mr.
Sachin Garg, Advocates for R-4, 7.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA

ORDER

% **26.02.2026**

1. This petition under Articles 226 of the Constitution assails the order dated 22nd September, 2025, passed by the Delhi School Tribunal (“*Tribunal*”), in Appeal No. 34/2020, titled ***Mrs. Pawan Jashial v. Khalsa Middle School & Ors.***, whereby the Tribunal upheld the Petitioner’s removal from service as Yoga Teacher in Khalsa Middle School, Sarojini Nagar, New Delhi.

2. Stripped of unnecessary details, the controversy centres on whether the Petitioner secured appointment in a recognised aided school on the strength of a qualification which, upon verification, stood disowned by the University under whose recognition the diploma was projected; and, if so, whether the disciplinary proceedings and the Tribunal’s affirmation suffer from such illegality or perversity as to warrant interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction.



Factual Background and Procedural History

3. The Petitioner was appointed as a Yoga Teacher by the school management on the representation that she possessed a one-year “*Diploma in Yoga & Naturopathy*” from Respondent No. 5 (Bapu Nature Cure Hospital & Yogashram), stated to be recognised by Respondent No. 6 (Gujarat Ayurved University, Jamnagar). At the time of appointment, she furnished an undertaking/affidavit that her services could be terminated if any certificate was found fake or false.

4. In 2014, the school sought verification of her credentials. By communication dated 13th October, 2014, Gujarat Ayurved University stated that the Petitioner was not enrolled for the diploma course in the relevant year and that the “*Degree certificate*” and “*Mark statement*” were not issued by the University. The Communication reads as follows:

*“To
Jaspal Singh
Manager, Khalsa Middle School
Sarojini Nagar, New Delhi*

*Subject:- Regarding verification of certificate and mark statement of
Mrs. Pawan Jshial for the degree of Yoga & Naturopathy
Ref:- Your Letter dated. 14-8-14.*

Dear Sir,

With reference and subject cited above the name of Mrs. Pawan Jashial is not enrolled for the course of Diploma in Yoga & Naturopathy run by Bapu nature cure Hospital and yogashram, Gandhi Nidhi, Patparganj, Delhi – 110091 recognized by Gujarat Ayurved University, Jamnagar for the said year. As per our record this Degree certificate and Mark statement is not issued by this University.

This is for your kind information and necessary action in this regard.

Thanking you

*Yours faithfully
Sd/-*



(Dr. D.B. Vaghela)
I/c. Deputy Registrar
Academic Section"

5. A show cause notice dated 18th December, 2014, followed. The Petitioner responded *vide* letter dated 23rd December, 2014 asserting the genuineness of her documents and that they will be substantiated by Respondent No. 5. The Petitioner relied upon a letter issued by Respondent No. 5 on 27th December, 2014, which, according to her, affirms that she had completed the course.

6. The matter was simultaneously referred to the Respondent No. 4, Directorate of Education ("DoE"), for independent verification. DoE addressed a communication dated 4th September, 2015 to Gujarat Ayurved University seeking confirmation regarding the authenticity of the Petitioner's diploma and mark statement. In response, the Assistant Registrar of the University reiterated, *vide* letter dated 22nd September, 2015, that as per its records the Petitioner was not enrolled for the said course and that the certificate and mark statement relied upon by her were not issued by the University. Upon receipt of this information, the Deputy Director of Education, by letter dated 19th December, 2015, advised the school management to initiate action against the Petitioner in accordance with the provisions of the Delhi School Education Act and Rules, 1973. It was in this backdrop, and after considering the communications received from the University through the Directorate, that the Managing Committee resolved to initiate disciplinary proceedings.

7. Ultimately, the school issued a memorandum of charges dated 14th March, 2016 alleging that the Petitioner obtained appointment by fraud by submitting a false diploma and mark sheet/statement claimed to be



recognised by Gujarat Ayurved University.

8. The petitioner approached this Court in W.P.(C) 2854/2016 challenging the initiation of disciplinary proceedings on the footing that the action was not taken by a duly constituted disciplinary committee under Rule 118 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 (“DSE Rules”). By order dated 5th December, 2016, this Court rejected that challenge after reproducing the minutes of the meeting dated 12th March, 2016 and holding that the relevant requirements of Rule 118 of the DSE Rules stood satisfied. The writ petition was dismissed, with a clear observation that the merits were to be examined in the disciplinary proceedings. The said order reads as follows:

“1. This writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the petitioner, and who is a teacher in the respondent no.1/school, impugning the show cause notice dated 14.3.2016 by which it is proposed that disciplinary proceedings be taken against the petitioner for having obtained her employment with the respondent no.1/school by fraud because petitioner had represented that she had a diploma in Yoga and Naturopathy from the Gujarat Ayurved University, but, on verification from Gujarat Ayurved University, it was found that the name of the petitioner was not found to be enrolled for the course of diploma in Yoga and Naturopathy run by the Bapu Nature Cure Hospital & Yogashram, Gandhi Nidhi, Patparganj, New Delhi recognized by the Gujarat Ayurved University.

2. On behalf of the petitioner, to question the disciplinary proceedings it is argued that the impugned show cause notice dated 14.3.2016 is without jurisdiction because it is signed by the Manager of the school without their having been constituted a proper disciplinary committee under Rule 118 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 (hereafter referred to as 'the Rules'). It is argued that there is a requirement as per Rule 118 of the Rules that in the disciplinary committee, there must exist the nominee of the Director of Education as also the staff representatives, but, not only these persons are not found in the meetings of the managing committee of the respondent no.1/school dated 12.3.2016 as per which it was decided to initiate disciplinary proceedings, in fact the managing committee is not authorized to take disciplinary action as



it is only the disciplinary committee under Rule 118 which is authorized to take disciplinary action.

3. *For the sake of convenience. Rule 118 of the Rules is referred to as below:-*

"Rule 118. Disciplinary authorities in respect of employees:- the disciplinary committee in respect of every recognized private school, whether. The aided or not, shall consist of-

(i) the Chairman of the managing committee of the school:

(ii) the manager of the school;

(iii) nominee of the appropriate authority, in the case of an unaided school; a nominee of the Director, in the case of an aided school, or a

(iv) the head of the school, except where the disciplinary proceeding is against him and where the disciplinary proceeding is against the Head of the school, the Head of any other school, nominated by the Director,

(v) a teacher who is a member of the managing committee of the school, nominated by the Chairman of such managing committee."

4. *Since the issue is that whether certain requirements as alleged/argued by counsel for the petitioner of the provision of Rule 118 of the Rules have been complied with or not, let me reproduce the minutes of the meeting of the managing committee dated 12.3.2016 of the respondent no.1/school and these minutes of the meeting of the managing committee read as under:-*

"The meeting of the managing committee of Khalsa Middle School, Sarojini Nagar, New Delhi-110023, held on 12-03-2016 at 12.30 PM under the Presidentship of S. Sucha Singh in the school. The members who have signed against their name are present.

1. S. Sucha Singh (President) sd/-

2. S. Pritpal Singh(V. President)

3. S. Jaspal Singh (Manager) sd/-

4. S. Balvinder Singh (Asstt. Manager) sd/-

5. S. Charanjit Singh (Accountant) sd/-

6. Smt. Jasbir Kaur (Member) sd/-

7. S. Manjit Singh (Member)

8. S. S.P. Singh (Headmaster) sd/-

9. Principal S.K.V. No.1 (Ad. Board Nominee)

10. Smt. Sumanjit Kaur (Staff Representative) sd/-

11. Smt. Sukhjeevan Kaur (Staff Representative) sd/-

12. S. Hukam Singh (Parent Member)

13. Principal GGSSS No.3 (D.E's Nominee)

14. Vice Principal G.B.S.S. No.3(D.E's Nominee) J.S Dhama- sd/-

15. Vice Principal G.B.S.S. No.4 (Adv. B. Nominee) sd/-

Dr. Hitender Yadav.

Minutes of the Last meeting held on 26-12-2015 are



confirmed unanimously. It was decided that in the previous meeting S. Jaspal Singh should obtain the copy of letter written by the Education Department, Govt of NCT of Delhi to Gujarat Ayurvedic University for verification of Diploma and mark sheet submitted by Mrs. Pawan Jashial (Yoga teacher) at the time of her appointment and also obtain a copy of letter received by the Education Department from Gujarat Ayurvedic University, which were mentioned by the Deputy Education Officer Zone (19), South West (A), in her letter dated 05/19-12-2015 because in the absence of the Letters dated 05/19-12-2005 the Letter is incomplete. Accordingly S. Jaspal Singh (Manager) written a letter dated 31-12-2005 to Deputy Education Officer to send copies of the aforesaid Letter along with enclosure.

The Deputy Director sent the copies of both the above letters vide F.No.-2.19/DDE (SW) A 2016/08 dated 2/5-1-2016. S. Jaspal Singh placed both the above Letter before the Managing Committee.

The Managing Committee unanimous resolved and authorized S. Jaspal Singh (Manager) to issue a charge sheet to Mrs. Pawan Jashial (Yoga teacher) for submitting a false Diploma in Naturopathy and false mark sheet on which it is written Recognized by Gujarat Ayurvedic University. But on verification from the above said University verified that Mrs. Pawan Jashial was not enrolled for the course of Diploma in Yoga and Naturopathy by Baput Nature Cure Hospital And Yogashram Gandhi Nidhi, Patparganj Delhi-91 recognized by Gujarat Ayurvedic University for the said year.

The Managing Committee further authorized the Manager S. Jaspal Singh to appoint Shri B.S. Kapoor as enquiry officer to conduct enquiry on above charges against Mrs. Pawan Jashial (Yoga Teacher).

The Managing Committee also authorized S. Jaspal Singh Manager to award punishment if enquiry officer in his enquiry report found that the charges are proved or otherwise as per the findings of enquiry officer.

After thanks to the Chairman

The meeting disbursed."

Sd/- (underlining added)

5. A reference to the minutes of the meeting dated 12.3.2016 of the managing committee of the respondent no.1/school shows that the said meeting comprised of Chairman of the school, the Manager of the school, nominee of the Director of Education and the staff representatives of the school and which are the relevant four requirements of the Rule 118 of the Rules and hence it cannot be argued that Rule 118 is not complied with. At serial no.1 of the meeting dated 12.3.2016 is S. Sucha Singh, the President and



Chairman of the respondent no.1/school. At serial no.3 is S. Jaspal Singh who is the Manager of the school. The nominee of the Director is Sh. J.S. Dhama who is at serial no.14 of the list of persons and the staff representatives are found at serial nos.10 and 11 of the minutes of the meeting dated 12.3.2016. All these persons are signatories to the minutes of meetings dated 12.3.2016. Therefore, the minutes of the meeting dated 12.3.2016 show that all persons who ought to be part of the disciplinary committee under Rule 118 of the Rules were very much part of the meeting/resolution dated 12.3.2016 and who authorized taking of disciplinary action against the petitioner and for the Manager of the school to issue the show cause notice dated 14.3.2016.

6. **Therefore, in my opinion, it is incorrect for the petitioner to contend and argue that Rule 118 of the Rules has been violated, because, it is found that in fact the minutes of the meeting dated 12.3.2016 show that the meeting/committee comprised of persons who are to be the members of the disciplinary committee as per Rule 118 of the Rules.**

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that it is only the disciplinary committee properly constituted as per Rule 118 of the Rules which is authorized to take action, and action cannot be taken by the managing committee of the respondent no.1/school, however, this argument urged is an argument of desperation because the managing committee is a larger and higher body than the disciplinary committee and once the necessary members of the disciplinary committee are a part of the members of the managing committee in the meeting dated 12.3.2016, it cannot be argued that disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner are liable to be faulted with because of the violation of Rule 118 of the Rules. Obviously, a larger and higher body will have all the powers of a smaller body which is constituted, and which is all the more so when the larger and higher body is found to have the necessary members who are to be comprised in the smaller body being the disciplinary committee as per Rule 118 of the Rules.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner then sought to draw attention of this Court to the counter affidavit filed by the Director of Education, and in which the Director of Education has stated that it has taken action against the respondent no.1/school because the proceedings initiated against the petitioner are by the managing committee and not the disciplinary committee, however, this argument and the relevant part of the counter affidavit of the respondent no.4 is without any substance for the reason that the counter affidavit cannot be final so far as the legal position is concerned, and the legal position which has to be examined has to be examined by this Court on the basis of facts as to whether the



managing committee can or cannot issue a show cause notice for the disciplinary committee when the managing committee comprises of members who ought to form part of the disciplinary committee. The Director of Education in law therefore is incorrect in taking its view that the managing committee could not have taken steps as per its minutes of meeting dated 12.3.2016 for initiating disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. In fact, I must note at this stage that the aforesaid last contention urged on behalf of the petitioner is only on convenient reading of the counter affidavit of the respondent no.4 because respondent no.4 in the same counter affidavit in para 6 of the preliminary submission has mentioned the fact that the respondent no. 4 had issued direction to the respondent no.2/Manager of the school in terms of respondent no.4's letter dated 19.12.2015 to initiate action against the petitioner because petitioner was found to have taken the employment by perpetuating fraud and by giving a false certificate. Also, in the counter affidavit of the respondent no.4 it has stated as per the paragraphs in reply to the grounds that even if the managing committee does not have the requisite powers, this technical objection should not allow the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner to fail because of the petitioner in fact being guilty of perpetuating fraud upon the school by filing a false certificate of qualification.

9. In view of the above, there is no merit in this writ petition, and the same is therefore dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs. All aspects of merits will be decided in the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner, in accordance with law."

[Emphasis supplied]

9. The Petitioner then preferred LPA No. 705/2016, which was dismissed as withdrawn on 14th November, 2017, with liberty to agitate legal issues at the appropriate stage and with a direction that the enquiry be proceeded with.

10. The Petitioner thereafter participated in the enquiry which culminated in a report dated 25th August, 2018, holding the charge proved. The Disciplinary Action Committee ("DAC") considered the Petitioner's representation and proceeded to propose the major penalty of removal from service. After further opportunity and consideration, the penalty was



imposed. The Petitioner appealed to the Tribunal under Section 11(6) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 (“*DSE Act*”). The Tribunal, by impugned order dated 22nd September, 2025, dismissed the appeal.

Submissions

11. The Petitioner challenges the impugned order on multiple grounds. It is contended that the disciplinary proceedings were vitiated for non-compliance with Rule 118 of the DSE Rules and allied safeguards, including the nomination requirement adverted to in the departmental notification dated 25th June, 2012, which mandates that the Director’s nominee must be an Education Officer or Deputy Education Officer of the concerned zone. It is further urged that Rule 120(2) of the DSE Rules was breached, as prior approval of the DoE was not obtained before imposition of the major penalty. In that regard, reliance is placed upon ***Sunil Kumar Agarwal v. Air Force School¹***. The Petitioner also assails the enquiry on grounds of violation of principles of natural justice and disputes the finding that her diploma was false.

12. Elaborating her submissions, the Petitioner contends that she possessed a genuine Diploma in Yoga & Naturopathy from Respondent No.5 for the academic session 2002-03, at a time when Respondent No. 5 was recognised by Respondent No. 6. The post in question required a diploma from a recognised institution and not necessarily a certificate issued directly by the University.

13. Reliance is placed on the letter dated 8th June, 2004 issued by the University to Respondent No. 5, which demonstrates that Respondent No. 5 was within the University’s recognition framework for the academic years



2003-04 and 2004-05. This, according to the Petitioner, supports the position that Respondent No. 5 was recognised when she pursued and completed her course.

14. Further reliance is placed on repeated and consistent affirmations from Respondent No. 5, including letters dated 27th December, 2014, 22nd April, 2015 and 16th May, 2015, stating that the Petitioner was a *bona fide* student, that she completed the diploma course, and that she appeared in the examinations conducted by Respondent No. 5. The Tribunal failed to appreciate the distinction between an institution being '*recognised/affiliated*' and the University itself '*issuing*' a certificate. An institute recognised to run a course may conduct examinations and issue certificates in its own name, and the Tribunal erred in treating the University's statement that it did not itself issue the certificate as conclusive proof of falsity, without examining whether Respondent No. 5 had authority to award the diploma during the relevant period.

15. On procedure, the Petitioner contends that the communications of the University, which form the foundation of the charge, were not proved through a competent witness and were not subjected to cross-examination. The appointment and authority of the Enquiry Officer were not properly communicated, and documents sought for her defence were not supplied. There was an unexplained delay between the show cause notice dated 18th December, 2014 and the charge memorandum dated 14th March, 2016. The Tribunal's appreciation of the record is stated to be perverse as it overlooks material defence evidence, including testimony from representatives of Respondent No. 5. Reliance is placed on *Ajmer Singh v. Director of*

¹ 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4348.



*Education*², wherein it was held that disciplinary findings based upon unproved documents and without proper opportunity to test the material relied upon would be unsustainable in law.

16. On the question of penalty, the Petitioner submits that removal from service is unduly harsh. The dispute is characterised as turning on the legal status of the diploma course run by Respondent No. 5 and documentation issued therefrom. Even assuming some irregularity, the circumstances did not warrant the severest civil consequence of removal.

17. The Respondents, on the other hand, support the impugned order. They contend that the Petitioner's appointment was founded upon a qualification which the University categorically disowned, and that the Petitioner failed to rebut that position. The Petitioner was afforded full opportunity in the enquiry; she cross-examined the management witness, led defence evidence, and submitted representations at every stage. Thus, the findings are based on material on record and do not suffer from perversity, and writ jurisdiction cannot be converted into a re-appreciation of evidence or a re-trial on facts.

Analysis

Scope of judicial review

18. The contours of judicial review in disciplinary matters are well settled. Interference is justified where the enquiry is vitiated by breach of natural justice, patent procedural illegality causing prejudice, findings based on no evidence, or perversity of the kind that no reasonable person could reach on the record. The Court does not reweigh evidence or substitute its own view on factual sufficiency merely because another view may be

² 2024 DHC 9269.



possible.³

19. In a domestic enquiry, the strict rules of evidence under the Evidence Act do not apply. The enquiry must still be fair, and the material relied upon must have a reasonable nexus to the charge, but proof is tested on preponderance of probability, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.⁴

Whether the Petitioner can re-open the Rule 118 challenge

20. The Petitioner's foundational challenge to initiation under Rule 118 has already been adjudicated by this Court in W.P.(C) 2854/2016 by order dated 5th December, 2016, reproduced in extenso in the earlier part of this order. The order examined minutes of the meeting dated 12th March, 2016 and returned a categorical finding that the constituents contemplated by Rule 118 were present and that the action could not be faulted on that ground.

21. The subsequent withdrawal of LPA No. 705/2016 does not dilute the binding effect of the said order. The liberty recorded on 14th November, 2017 cannot be read as a licence to re-agitate an issue already conclusively determined between the same parties on the same record. At the highest, the Petitioner could assail the conduct of the enquiry or the legality of the penalty imposed thereafter. The initiation of proceedings under Rule 118, having been upheld, cannot now be reopened.

Natural justice and the complaint of "unproved" University letter

22. Considerable emphasis was laid on the submission that the letters of the University dated 13th October, 2014 and subsequent communications were not proved through a witness from the University and therefore could not be treated as evidence.

³ See: *Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava* (2021) 2 SCC 612.

⁴ See also: *Union of India and Ors. v. Dalbir Singh* 2021 SCC OnLine 768.



23. The submission proceeds on an erroneous premise. First, domestic enquiries are not bound by the formal proof requirements applicable to civil or criminal trials. The enquiry is guided by principles of fairness, not by technical rules of admissibility. Second, the Petitioner was not without remedy. If her case was that the University's communication was incorrect or based on a misunderstanding regarding the recognition status of Respondent No. 5 during 2002-03, it was open to her to summon a competent official of the University or to produce primary material from University records to establish her enrolment and issuance of the diploma within the recognised framework.

24. Against the University's categorical position, the material relied upon by the Petitioner consists essentially of affirmations from Respondent No. 5. The University has stated in clear terms that the Petitioner was not enrolled for the diploma course and that the degree certificate and mark statement were not issued by it. A verification emanating from the statutory/recognising University regarding enrolment and issuance cannot be equated with an affirmation from the institute whose documents are under scrutiny. The Enquiry Officer and the Tribunal were therefore justified in treating the University's verification as decisive on the central factual issue. That approach cannot be characterised as irrational or perverse.

25. The Petitioner's attempt to negate this conclusion by invoking '*recognition/affiliation*' of the institute does not advance her case. Even assuming Respondent No. 5 enjoyed recognition for certain academic years, recognition in the abstract does not establish the Petitioner's enrolment in the relevant session, nor does it validate the particular diploma and mark statement produced at the time of appointment. Recognition determines the



institutional status; it does not, by itself, prove that a specific candidate was admitted, examined and issued a credential in the manner represented. The enquiry and the Tribunal addressed the narrower and determinative question: whether the Petitioner's enrolment and the issuance of her diploma/mark statement were borne out from the University record. The finding returned is in the negative. Once supported by the University's verification, *post-facto* affirmations from the institute cannot, by bare assertion, displace that conclusion.

26. The reliance placed on *Ajmer Singh* is misplaced. That decision turned on its own facts, founded on serious procedural infirmities and a mechanical reliance on material without affording meaningful opportunity to the delinquent. In the present case, the Petitioner participated in the enquiry, cross-examined the management witness, led defence evidence including witnesses from Respondent No. 5, and submitted detailed representations. The Tribunal has independently examined the record and upheld the findings.

Alleged non-supply of documents

27. The Petitioner asserts that she sought 14 documents by letter dated 17th March, 2016 and that the same were not supplied. Non-supply of documents does not automatically vitiate an enquiry. The Court must examine whether the documents were relevant, whether they were relied upon against the delinquent, and whether non-supply caused demonstrable prejudice.

28. The Tribunal has recorded that the Petitioner was afforded adequate opportunity to defend herself. She examined defence witnesses and contested the management's material. In the absence of specific prejudice



shown to have resulted from non-supply, this Court would not interfere in writ jurisdiction with the Tribunal's factual assessment.

Prior approval for major penalty

29. The Petitioner's reliance on **Sunil Kumar Agarwal** is on the principle that Section 8(2) of the DSE Act mandates prior approval of the DoE before imposition of dismissal or removal. That proposition is not in dispute.

30. The issue, however, is factual: whether such approval was obtained prior to imposition of the penalty. The Tribunal has proceeded on the basis that the statutory requirement stood complied with. The Petitioner has not placed material before this Court to demonstrate that the penalty order preceded the grant of approval. In the absence of a clear record dislodging the Tribunal's finding, this Court cannot presume non-compliance.

Question of Delay

31. The show cause notice is dated 18th December, 2014 and the charge memorandum 14th March, 2016. The intervening period involved verification by the University, correspondence, and reference to the Directorate of Education. In service jurisprudence, delay is assessed not merely by chronology, but by prejudice. The timeline in the present case cannot be termed inordinate so as to vitiate the proceedings, particularly when the Petitioner continued in service and has not demonstrated how the delay impaired her defence.

Findings on fraud and proportionality of penalty

32. The charge pertains to the eligibility at the stage of appointment. Where an appointment is obtained by misrepresentation or by reliance upon a qualification that is not borne out by the verifying authority's records, the misconduct goes to the root of entry into service.



33. Once the Enquiry Officer's conclusion that the qualification, as represented, was not supported by the University record is sustained, the penalty of removal cannot be characterised as disproportionate. In such matters, the issue is not merely financial but institutional integrity. A school is entitled to insist that its teachers possess qualifications that are genuine and verifiable.

34. The attempt to re-characterise the dispute as one concerning the semantic distinction between "*diploma*" and "*degree*", or between recognition and issuance, does not dilute the finding of misconduct.

Conclusion

35. The impugned order of the Tribunal does not disclose perversity, jurisdictional error, or breach of principles of natural justice warranting interference under Article 226.

36. The writ petition is dismissed, along with any pending application(s).

SANJEEV NARULA, J

FEBRUARY 26, 2026/nk