



CWP-18739-2026

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH**

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Date of Decision: 01.07.2026

CHARAN SINGH AND OTHERS

...Petitioners

Versus

STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS

...Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAGMOHAN BANSAL


Present:- Mr. Akash Chaudhary, Advocate with
Mr. Vipul Thakur, Advocate for petitioners

Mr. Priyavrat Parashar, AAG, Haryana

JAGMOHAN BANSAL, J. (ORAL)

1. The petitioners through instant petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India are seeking direction to official respondents to grant them full compensation under Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short '2013') with respect to land acquired by respondents for the purpose of construction of road from Village Thana to Village Mangra in District Kurukshetra vide Notifications dated 12.03.1987 and 29.12.1987 and award dated 21.09.1988.

2. The petitioners along with predecessors of private respondents were joint owners of land comprised in khewat No. 310/557, Khasra No. 93//14/2, 1 Kanal 12 Marla. They claim that compensation has been paid to private respondents with respect to their land. The official respondents ought to be directed to deduct land from the share of private respondent and hand over extra land to them as compensation w.r.t. their share measuring 27



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
Marla out of 32 Marla. They are also seeking direction to official respondents to pay them compensation with regard to 12 Marla land under the provisions of 2013 Act.

3. The respondent issued notifications under Sections 4 & 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on 12.03.1987 and 29.12.1987 respectively and award was passed on 21.09.1988. A period of more than 3 decades has passed away.

4. On being asked reason for inordinate delay, learned counsel for the petitioners could not furnish any plausible reason.

5. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. Where illegality is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred. State cannot deprive vested right because of a non-deliberate delay.

6. A two Judge Bench of Supreme Court recently in '**Mrinmoy Maity Vs. Chhanda Koley and Others**', 2024 SCC OnLine SC 551 has held that High Court ought to dismiss petition on the ground of delay and laches where there is no explanation of delay. An applicant who approaches the Court belatedly or in the other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by writ Courts. Delay defeats equity. High Court may refuse to invoke its writ jurisdiction if laxity



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on the part of applicant has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. Multiple communications cannot create cause of action. The relevant extracts of the judgment are reproduced as below:

“9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action.

10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled.

11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the



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extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court.”

7. The impugned award was passed on 21.09.1988. A period of more than 3 decades from the date of impugned award has passed away. There is no plausible explanation for inordinate delay.

8. In the wake of judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court and considering inordinate delay on the part of petitioners, this Court does not find it appropriate to invoke its extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction. The petition deserves to be dismissed and accordingly dismissed.

9. Pending Misc. application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

(JAGMOHAN BANSAL)
JUDGE

01.07.2026
SDK

Whether speaking/reasoned	Yes/No
Whether reportable	Yes/No