



CWP-7140-2026

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH**

133

CWP-7140-2026

Date of Decision: 10.03.2026

GURMEET SINGH

...Petitioner

Versus

UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

...Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAGMOHAN BANSAL

Present:- Mr. Arvind Kashyap, Advocate for petitioner

Mr. Aman Dhir, D.A.G., Punjab

Mr. N.K. Verma, Advocate
for respondent U.O.I.

JAGMOHAN BANSAL, J. (ORAL)

1. The petitioner through instant petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is seeking direction to the respondent to allot him 50 acres of land in the name of deceased Gajja Singh.

2. The petitioner is claiming that his father participated in World War II. He was adorned with medals including two George Medals. As per policy dated 06.06.1944 of Adjutant General of India, a soldier who has been awarded George Medal is entitled to 25 acres land. Gajja Singh participated in World War II and was adorned with two George Medals, thus, was entitled to 50 acres land. The respondent did not make entry of aforesaid medals in his service book, thus, he could not avail benefit of aforesaid policy.



CWP-7140-2026

3. On being asked reason on inordinate delay, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it was a substantive right which was not granted to petitioner's father, thus, petition is maintainable.

4. The petitioner is claiming that his father was adorned with two George Medals, thus, was entitled to 50 acres land. He is relying upon policy dated 06.06.1944. As per said policy, family members were entitled to land where decoration is posthumous. Gajja Singh remained alive till 1996. He did not lodge his claim during his lifetime. He remained alive for almost 5 decades after participating in World War II but did not lodge claim. The petitioner after 7 decades wants to encash his father's medals. There is no explanation for inordinate delay.

5. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. Where illegality is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred. State cannot deprive vested right because of a non-deliberate delay.

6. A two Judge Bench of Supreme Court recently in '***Mrinmoy Maity Vs. Chhanda Koley and others***' 2024 SCC OnLine SC 551 has held that High Court ought to dismiss petition on the ground of delay and laches where there is no explanation of delay. An applicant who approaches the Court belatedly or in the other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by writ Courts. Delay defeats equity. High



CWP-7140-2026

Court may refuse to invoke its writ jurisdiction if laxity on the part of applicant has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. Multiple communications cannot create cause of action. The relevant extracts of the judgment are reproduced as below:

“9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action.

10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends



CWP-7140-2026

upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled.

11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court.”

7. In the wake of judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court and considering inordinate delay on the part of petitioner, this Court does not find it appropriate to invoke its extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction. The present petition deserves to be dismissed and accordingly dismissed.

8. Pending Misc. application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

(JAGMOHAN BANSAL)
JUDGE

10.03.2026
SDK

Whether speaking/reasoned	Yes/No
Whether reportable	Yes/No