

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.1201 of 2026

Ranjeet Singh S/o Kameshwar Singh, Resident of Vill Tola Telwa Bazar,
Durga Temple Road, PS Simultala, District Jamui, Bihar.

... .. Petitioner/s

Versus

1. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Patna.
2. The District Magistrate, Jamui, Bihar.
3. The Land Acquisition Officer, Jamui.
4. The Deputy Collector, Land Reforms (DCLR), Jamui, Bihar.
5. The Circle Officer, Jhajha, District Jamui, Bihar.
6. The Executive Engineer, Minor Irrigation Division, Jamui.
7. Kartik Yadav, Resident of Vill Taraun, PS Sono, Distt Jamui.

... .. Respondent/s

Appearance :

For the Petitioner/s	:	Mr. Waliur Rahman, Advocate Mr. Ranjeet Kumar Singh, Advocate
For the State	:	Mrs. Divya Verma, AC to AAG-3

CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PURNENDU SINGH
ORAL JUDGMENT

Date : 29-01-2026

Heard Mr. Waliur Rahman along with Mr. Ranjeet Kumar Singh, learned counsels appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mrs. Divya Verma, learned AC to AAG-3 for the State.

2. The petitioner in paragraph no. 1 of the present writ petition has sought, *inter alia*, following relief(s), which is reproduced hereinafter:-

"(i) For issuance of any appropriate writ/writs, rule/rules or direction especially in the nature of Mandamus, directing the respondent concern i.e state authority to restrain from constructing the Govt Aahar over the Raiyatti land of the petitioner for which vide letter No. 4180 dated 04/12/2025 has been issued under the pen and Signature of the Executive Engineer Minor Irrigation Division Jamui, (Respondent No.6) whereby and where under direction has been issued to the selected contractor (Respondent No.7) to construct Govt. Aahar with immediate effect in the light of agreement No. 55F2/2023-24.



(ii) For issuance of any appropriate writ/writs, rule/rules or direction in the nature of Mandamus, restrain the concerned respondents to take any sort of activity pertaining to the land in question till the final adjudication of the present writ application, Petitiones further prays for direction to the respondent authorities to act and consider upon the representation submitted by the Petitioner pursuant to his legitimate Claim along with all relevant documents submitted by him, within the reasonable time at this Hon'ble court found fit and proper.

(iii) For issuance of any appropriate writ/writs, rule or direction especially in the nature of mandamus, directing the respondent authorities not to take the forceful possession of the land in question without following the due process of law as described in view of Artic 300 A of the Constitution of India.

(iv) For issuance of any appropriate writ/writs, rule direction as your lordships may found fit and proper to the facts and circumstances of the case."

3. Brief facts of the case is that the petitioner claims right, title, and possession over raiyati land situated at Mauza Telwa, Thana Simultala, Anchal Jhajha having Khata No. 95, Khesra Nos. 834 and 835, appertaining to Jamabandi No. 44. According to the petitioner, the land originally belonged to her great-grandmother, Late Asodevi Thakurain, had came into possession through a hukumnama in 1943 issued by the then landlord of the estate, and whose name was duly recorded in the revenue records; after vesting. The State of Bihar recognized the tenancy, opened rent demand, and rent receipts were issued for decades. The petitioner claims succession to the property along with other descendants and their long-standing possession supported by genealogy records and revenue documents. The



cause of action arise when the excavation work was undertaken by the contractor of the Minor Irrigation Division, who were allotted work order vide Letter No. 4180 dated 04.12.2025 for the construction of an aahar under the Jal Jeevan Hariyali Yojana. The petitioner continuation in that without acquisition proceedings or following the due process of law, no one can be dispossessed of the property. The petitioner had submitted several representations before the authorities requesting that no forcible possession be taken. Alleging violation of her constitutional right to property under Article 300A of the Constitution of India and absence of any alternative efficacious remedy, the petitioner has approached this Court seeking protection of her claimed title and possession over the land in question.

4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner informs that for the relief(s) as prayed for in the present writ petition, the petitioner has already filed objection/representation before the District Land Acquisition Officer, Jamui and the District Magistrate-cum-Collector, Jamui, however, both the officers are sitting tight over the objection/representation of the petitioner and the petitioner has been deprived from his rightful claim of due compensation for



the land, which has been acquired for the purpose of execution of a project of Irrigation Department. The petitioner is concerned for due payment of compensation in respect of his land measuring total area of 10 acre 32 dismil appertaining to different *khatas*.

5. *Per contra*, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State submitted that the petitioner himself is responsible for not receiving due compensation. Petitioner has not denied the fact that other persons in the vicinity have not been paid the due compensation. Petitioner has himself delayed and has directly approached this Hon'ble Court. Accordingly, the writ petition is not maintainable.

6. Heard the parties.

7. It is commonly seen that the officers having quasi judicial power on their administrative side often delay in considering the representation filed by the aggrieved person or they deliberately delay to even adjudicate those cases where they exercise their adjudicatory power, while, it is well settled principle of law that High Courts should not exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if an effective and efficacious remedy is available. Taking into the circumstances of the present case where



fundamental/constitutional right of a citizen is infringed, this Court must not fail to exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

8. It is also well settled principle of law that every administrative action in want of reason is not sustainable as has been held by the Apex Court in the case of ***Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan*** reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496.

The relevant paragraph is reproduced hereinbelow:

“47. Summarising the above discussion,

this Court holds:

(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.

(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.

(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.

(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.

(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.

(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.

(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts.

(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts.



This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.

(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.

(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency.

(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.

(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process.

(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor³²).

(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija vs. Spain³³ EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford³⁴, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions."

(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "due process".



9. The law in this regard has been laid down by the Apex Court in the Case of ***M/s Magadh Sugar & Energy Ltd. Versus The State of Bihar & Ors.*** reported in ***LL 2021 SC 495***, paragraphs no. 19 and 28 would be relevant in this regard, which is as under:-

“ 19. While a High Court would normally not exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective and efficacious alternate remedy is available, the existence of an alternate remedy does not by itself bar the High Court from exercising its jurisdiction in certain contingencies. This principle has been crystallized by this Court in Whirpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai¹⁹ and Harbanslal Sahni v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd²⁰. Recently, in Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors²¹ a two judge Bench of this Court of which one of us was a part of (Justice DY Chandrachud) has summarized the principles governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court in the presence of an alternate remedy. This Court has observed:

“28. The principles of law which emerge are that: (i) The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well; (ii) The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person; (iii) Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged; (iv) An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law; (v) When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of



statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion; and (vi) In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with.” (emphasis supplied)

10. The principle of alternative remedies and its exceptions was also reiterated in ***Assistant Commissioner of State Tax v. M/s Commercial Steel Limited (Civil Appeal No. 5121 of 2021)***. In State of ***HP v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd & Anr., reported in (2005) SCC 6 499*** this Court has held that a writ petition is maintainable before the High Court if the taxing authorities have acted beyond the scope of their jurisdiction. This Court observed:

*“23. Where under a statute there is an allegation of infringement of fundamental rights or when on the undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess can be the grounds on which the writ petitions can be entertained. But normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions unless it is shown that there is something more in a case, something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer, something which would show that it would be a case of palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to adopt the remedies provided by the statute. It was noted by this Court in *L. Hirday Narain v. ITO [(1970) 2 SCC 355: AIR 1971 SC 33]* that if the High Court had entertained a petition despite availability of alternative remedy and heard the parties on merits it would be ordinarily unjustifiable for the High Court to dismiss the same on the ground of non-exhaustion of statutory remedies; unless the High Court finds that factual disputes are involved and it would not be desirable to deal with them in a writ petition.”*

11. It is also to be taken note of the Article 300A of the Constitution of India, which tends to safeguard the



invaluable right to property.

“300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law

No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.”

12. As per the constitutional mandate also, the State cannot dispose a citizen of his property except in accordance with law and procedure prescribed. The obligation to pay compensation is not expressly included in Article 300-A of the Constitution of India can be inferred in that Article. The law in this regard is well settled by the Apex Court in case of ***Vidaya Devi Vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.*** reported in ***2020(2) SCC 569***, I find it proper to quote the para-12.1 and 12.2 of the said judgment, which are *inter alia* reproduced hereinafter;

“12.1. The appellant was forcibly expropriated of her property in 1967, when the right to property was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to private property [State of W.B. v. Subodh Gopal Bose, (1953) 2 SCC 688 , which could not be deprived without due process of law and upon just and fair compensation.

12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right [Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that Article. [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1”



13. The above proposition of law has again been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Dharnidhar Mishra (D) and Another vs. State of Bihar and Others, in Civil Appeal No. 6351 of 2024, reported in (2024) 10 Supreme Court Cases 605, is relevant. The paragraph is reproduced as under:—

“ 16. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that Article. [See: K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1.”

14. In such circumstances, when the question of right to property as per the provision of Article 300 A of the Constitution of India comes to the knowledge of this Court, this Court has no alternative than to direct the concerned authority to forthwith take action and see that the grievance of the petitioner is redressed well within a period of one week in accordance with law from the date of communication of this order.

15. The District Land Acquisition Officer, Jamui, is directed to call for the revenue records, in respect of the lands acquired, from the office of the Circle Officer, Jhajha.



16. The Circle Officer is directed to forthwith appear before the District Land Acquisition Officer along with all the revenue records relating to the land, which has been acquired for the project, which has been undertaken by the Irrigation Department.

17. The District Land Acquisition Officer, Jamui, is directed to make the required forms available to the petitioner and see that all the formalities in applying for the compensation is fulfilled and if any assistance is required to the petitioner, he must provide all the assistance to the petitioner in that regard.

18. The District Land Acquisition Officer, Jamui, after making payment of required compensation amount forthwith to the petitioner as per the present value in the area on the basis of MVR determined in that regard, give information to the District Magistrate-cum-Collector, Jamui well within a period of three weeks from the date of communication of this order that he has made payment of entire required amount of compensation to the petitioner in accordance with law so that the petitioner may not be harassed.

19. The District Magistrate-cum-Collector must ensure that Land Acquisition Officer make payment of the compensation to the petitioner well within a period of three



weeks from the date of communication of this order, or the District Magistrate-cum-Collector will be held solely responsible for not complying with the order of this Court.

20. With aforesaid observation/direction, the present writ petition stands disposed of.

(Purnendu Singh, J)

Niraj/-

AFR/NAFR	A.F.R.
CAV DATE	N/A
Uploading Date	05.02.2026
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