

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA**  
**CRIMINAL APPEAL (SJ) No.4005 of 2025**

Arising Out of PS. Case No.-68 Year-2023 Thana- SARAN COMPLAINT CASE District-  
Saran

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1. Golu Kumar @ Golu Kumar Ray @ Nageshwar Ray Son of Raj Rai Resident Of Village- Maujampur, Po - Naraon, Ps- Awatar Nagar , Dist- Saran
  2. Mely Ray @ Bittu Rai son of Raj Rai Resident Of Village- Maujampur, Po - Naraon, Ps- Awatar Nagar , Dist- Saran
  3. Patarka Rai @ Rajeshwar Rai son of Raj Rai Resident Of Village- Maujampur, Po - Naraon, Ps- Awatar Nagar , Dist- Saran

... .. Appellant/s

Versus

1. The State of Bihar
2. Krishna Manjhi son of Yugeshwar Manjhi Resident Of Village- Maujampur, Po - Naraon, Ps- Awatar Nagar , Dist- Saran

... .. Respondent/s

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**Appearance :**

For the Appellant/s : Mr. Shiv Shankar Prasad Yadav, Advocate  
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Binay Krishna, Spl. P.P.

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**CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PURNENDU SINGH**  
**ORAL ORDER**

4      16-04-2026                      Heard Mr. Shiv Shankar Prasad Yadav, learned  
  
counsel for the appellants and Mr. Binay Krishna, learned Spl.  
  
PP for the State.

2. The appellants have preferred the appeal under  
Section 14(A)(2) of the SC/ST (POA) Act against the rejection  
of prayer for pre-arrest bail vide order dated 09.07.2025 passed  
by learned Special Judge, SC/ST Court, Saran at Chhapra in  
A.B.P. No. 2121 of 2025 arising out of Complaint Case No. 68  
of 2023 registered under Sections 341, 323, 504, 379, 34 of the



Indian Penal Code and Sections 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST (POA) Act.

3. As per the allegations made in the FIR, during a marriage ceremony at the complainant's residence, the appellants, along with other co-accused, had allegedly assaulted the complainant and his family members, including members of the *Barat* party, and further subjected them to social humiliation by invoking their caste name.

4. Learned counsels appearing on behalf of appellants submitted that general and omnibus allegation has been levelled against the appellants. The appellants are innocent and they have not abused the informant or his family members in public view. The allegation under Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST (POA) Act is ornamental, therefore, bar of Section 18 of SC/ST Act will not come in way. However, he further submitted that there is every possibility that the parties will enter into compromise to buy peace for all the time.

5. Learned A.P.P. for the State submitted that a chance be given to the parties to settle their dispute amicably.

6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, on instruction, submitted that the appellants have agreed to appear before the learned District Court on or before 27.04.2026.



7. Heard the parties.

8. Having heard the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties, as well as, considering the nature of allegation made in the F.I.R., I find that such incidence happens in the village and to maintain harmony between all sections of the society, the parties may enter into compromise in light of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of ***Naushey Ali & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.*** reported in (2025) 4 SCC 78 in paragraph nos. 11 to 20, which *inter alia* are reproduced hereinafter:

*“11. Before we apply this judgment to the facts, it will be worthwhile to recall the observations of Sikri, J. in Narinder Singh (supra):-*

*"26. Having said so, we would hasten to add that though it is a serious offence as the accused person(s) attempted to take the life of another person/victim, at the same time the court cannot be oblivious to hard realities that many times whenever there is a quarrel between the parties leading to physical commotion and sustaining of injury by either or both the parties, there is a tendency to give it a slant of an offence under Section 307 IPC as well..."*

*(Emphasis supplied)*

*12. Coming back to Laxmi Narayan (supra), this Court has held that mere mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge-sheet should not be the basis for adopting a hands-off approach. It has further held that it would be open for the court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or whether there is evidence to back it. It has been held that the courts may go by the nature of injuries sustained; as to whether the injuries are inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body and the nature of weapon used. It has also been clarified that such an exercise*



would be permissible after investigation and filing of chargesheet/framing of charges or during the trial. [See 15.4 of Laxmi Narayan (supra)].

**13.** Coming to the facts of the case, admittedly, there is a settlement between the parties. The case filed by the appellants' party which was prior in point of time and that too on the same day of occurrence, has been settled.

**14.** It should be recalled that, at the outset, after investigation, the police actually closed the case in its final report of 07.09.1991. It was the trial Court, which by its order of 05.09.1992, refused to accept the same and summoned the appellants. The incident is of 11.08.1991, i.e. about 33½ years back. No doubt, there is a reference to the firing in the FIR but admittedly there was no injury. The allegation is that firing was done by Abdul Waris. He is since deceased. The facts, assuming to be true, also do not make out a case of common object for the appellants under Section 149 IPC insofar as the offence of Section 307 is concerned.

**15.** The role attributed to the seven members, including the five appellants is not specific. General allegation was that they abused in filthy language and assaulted Mahmood with lathi and iron bars. The specific individual role was only attributed to Abdul Waris, who is since deceased.

**16.** In any event, the police who investigated disbelieved the entire story. No recoveries have been made of any pellets. What engaged the attention of the High Court was only the fracture of the head of the distal phalanx of left finger of respondent No.2.

**17.** We have seen the injuries sustained by Mahmood (R-2) from the medical evidence collected. From the injury report, it is clear that while the first four injuries were contusions and abrasions, injury Nos. 5, 6 and 7 pertained to incised lacerated wound and swelling on the middle finger of the left hand. We have also seen the x-ray report which shows that in the left hand there was a fracture of the head of distal phalanx of left ring finger. Assuming that this was the result of injury with lathis or iron bar, applying the test in Laxmi Narayan (supra), considering the injury and the nature of the weapon used, certainly no offence under Section 307 IPC is made out.

**18.** Section 307 of IPC reads as under:-

**"307. Attempt to murder.-**



*Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.*

*Attempts by life convicts.- When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death."*

*19. Keeping in mind the surrounding circumstances, the nature of the weapon and the nature of the injury, on facts, we are inclined to conclude that the overt act attributed to the appellants does not bring the case within the four corners of the Section 307 of IPC, either on a stand-alone basis or as held above with the aid of Section 149 of IPC.*

*20. We are also inclined to conclude that considering the overall circumstances, the nature of the weapon and the nature of the injury (fracture of the head of distal phalanx of left ring finger), the offence alleged, on facts, does not fall in that category of cases where the court should deny relief in the event of a settlement. At the highest, the offence alleged could be one under Section 326 of IPC. It could not be said, on facts, considering all the circumstances that this is a crime which has such an harmful effect on the public and that it has the effect of seriously threatening the well-being of the society. We make it clear that we are saying so on the facts of the present case. We are also firmly of the opinion that proceeding with the trial, when parties have amicably resolved the dispute in the present case, would be futile and the ends of justice require that the settlement be given effect to by quashing the proceedings. It would be a grave abuse of process to let this trial remain pending under the above circumstances, particularly when the dispute is settled and resolved."*

9. The Apex Court in the case of ***Ramawatar Vs.***

***State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (2022) 13 SCC 635,***

wherein similar circumstances, the Apex Court have observed



that nature of dispute and settlement has to be given due regard when the crime is not against the society. In the said case, the appellant was faced with the prosecution which attracts offence under SC/ST Act and the complainant has willingly entered into compromise.

10. The appellants have willingly desired to appear before the learned District Court on or before 27.04.2026, so that the matter can be referred to the District Mediation Centre.

11. Learned District Court is directed to take necessary steps to issue notices to the respective parties and upon their appearance, refer the matter before the learned Mediator of the District Mediation Center by fixing a date for appearance of the parties to give effect to “Mediation for the Nation 2.0”.

12. Learned Mediator of the District Mediation Center concerned, upon appearance of the parties, shall make his/her best efforts to settle the dispute amicably and thereafter submit his/her report before the concerned learned District Court, well within a period of three months, till then, no coercive action shall be taken against the appellants in connection with the aforesaid case.

13. In case, the parties resolve their dispute amicably



or arrive at a mutual settlement, in light of the law laid down by the Apex Court as referred hereinabove, the appellants are required to be released on pre-arrest bail on such terms and conditions as the learned District Court deems it fit and proper.

14. In case of failure on the part of the appellants to appear on 27.04.2026 before the learned District Court or any date fixed by the learned Mediator, the interim protection granted to the appellants shall automatically lose its force.

15. In case, it is deliberate on the part of the complainant to reconcile, then in that case, the interim protection granted to the appellants shall continue and the trial shall proceed in accordance with law.

16. In case, the parties fail to reconcile, then in that case, parties may avail appropriate remedy. Then also, appellants are directed to be released on pre-arrest bail on such terms and conditions as the learned District Court deems it fit and proper.

17. If both the parties arrive at amicable settlement, then they must withdraw the criminal cases, if any, which they have lodged against each other.

18. Accordingly, the impugned order is modified to the above extent.



19. The present application stands disposed of.

20. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the  
Member Secretary, Bihar State Legal Services Authority and the  
Patna High Court Mediation Centre for the purpose of record.

**(Purnendu Singh, J)**

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