

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.1333 of 2026

1. Devnandan Yadav Son of Pitambar Yadav, Resident of Village- Sahdi, P.S. Mahuli, District- Sheikhpura.
2. Baleshwar Yadav, Son of Vasudeo Yadav, Resident of Village- Sahdi, P.S. Mahuli, District- Sheikhpura.
3. Dhaneshwar Yadav, Son of Late Dashrath Yadav, Resident of Village- Sahdi, P.S. Mahuli, District- Sheikhpura.
4. Vilan Yadav, Son of Bhuwan Yadav, Resident of Village- Sahdi, P.S. Mahuli, District- Sheikhpura.
5. Prakash Yadav, Son of Jharkhandi Yadav, Resident of Village- Sahdi, P.S. Mahuli, District- Sheikhpura.
6. Brahmdeo Yadav, Son of Late Lal Chand Yadav, Resident of Village- Sahdi, P.S. Mahuli, District- Sheikhpura.
7. Ashok Yadav @ Aasho Yadav, Son of Late Munsu Das, Resident of Village- Sahdi, P.S. Mahuli, District- Sheikhpura.
8. Baldeo Yadav, Son of Late Prasadi Das, Resident of Village- Sahdi, P.S. Mahuli, District- Sheikhpura.

... .. Petitioner/s

Versus

1. The State of Bihar through Chief Secretary, Govt. of Bihar, Patna.
2. The Principal Secretary, Department of Revenue and Land Reforms, Govt. of Bihar, Patna.
3. The District Collector-cum-District Magistrate, at Sheikhpura.
4. The Addl. Collector, Sheikhpura, District- Sheikhpura.
5. The D.C.L.R., Sheikhpura.
6. The Circle Officer, Anchal Ariyari, District- Sheikhpura.

... .. Respondent/s

Appearance :

For the Petitioner/s	:	Mr. Hafiz Shahbaz Arif, Advocate Mr. Abdul Mannan Khan, Advocate
For the Respondent/s	:	AC to Additional Advocate General (12)

CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PURNENDU SINGH
ORAL JUDGMENT

Date : 31-01-2026

Heard Mr. Hafiz Shahbaz Arif, along with Mr. Abdul Mannan Khan, learned counsels appearing on behalf of the petitioners and learned AC to Additional Advocate General (12)



for the State.

2. The petitioners in paragraph no. 1 of the present writ petition have sought inter alia the following relief(s), which is reproduced hereinafter:-

“1. That this is an application for invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court for grant of the following relief or reliefs:-

(i) For issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction for quashing the order dated 19.11.2025 passed in Misc. Case no.01 of 2025-26 by the respondent circle Officer, Ariyari by which he has most arbitrarily and quite malafidely dismissed the claim of the Petitioners restraining the petitioners from obstructing the obstruct upon construction of building of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar 10+2 school Schedule Caste residential school upon the petitioner's raiyati land of Mauza Bhalua, Khata no.54, Khesra no.83, Area 11 Acres 22 decimals without acquisition of the same through the land acquisition proceeding.”

3. The brief facts of the case are that the land bearing Mauza Bhalua, Khata No. 54, Khesra No. 83, area 11 Acre 22 decimals is recorded as Parti Kadim/Gairmazarua Malik land, a substantial portion of which was lawfully settled in favour of the petitioners' ancestors in the years 1936 and 1944 vide Hukumnama settlements dated 15.03.1936, 16.03.1936 and 30.06.1944. After abolition of Zamindari, the land vested in the State, but raiyati rights of the petitioners' ancestors were duly recognized, and rent has continuously been accepted by the State Government. Subsequently, 8 Acres 75 decimals of land



was settled in favour of the petitioners' ancestors namely Jharkhandi Das, Somar Das and Doman Das, and rent receipts have been regularly issued. After the death of the ancestors, the petitioners have remained in peaceful, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the land for more than nine decades, and are regularly paying rent to the State through the Anchal Sarista. The Jamabandi/Register-II (Khata Pustika) continues to exist in the names of the petitioners and their ancestors. The Circle Officer, Ariyari, on the basis of a Nazri Naksha submitted by the Anchal Amin, proposed construction of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar 10+2 Residential Scheduled Caste Girls' School over 3 acres of the said land without initiating any land acquisition proceeding. Notices dated 28.04.2025 were issued to the petitioners asking them to produce settlement documents. The petitioners appeared on 03.05.2025 and again on 08.09.2025, submitting all relevant documents including Hukumnama, Zamindari receipts, and online rent receipts. Despite compliance with the directions of the Hon'ble High Court in CWJC No. 12671 of 2025 (order dated 07.08.2025), the Circle Officer illegally rejected the petitioners' claim vide order dated 19.11.2025 in Misc. Case No. 01/2025-26, without properly considering the documents on record. The petitioners later came



to know that the respondents are attempting to forcibly dispossess them and proceed with construction of the school on the petitioners' raiyati land, allegedly under political influence and without any valid acquisition process. The petitioners have also approached the District Magistrate, Sheikhpura, asserting their long-standing possession and legal rights over the land; however, the respondents are adamant in proceeding with construction, ignoring existing revenue records and rent receipts. The authorities have not disclosed any reason for not selecting an alternative site for construction and are acting in an arbitrary, unauthorized, and illegal manner, necessitating intervention of this Hon'ble Court to restrain further construction over the disputed land.

4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner submitted that the respondents instead of having interfered with the ongoing construction of building erected on the land of dispute have interfered with the fundamental right of the petitioners and the right under Article 300 A of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioners were served notice on 28.04.2025 contained letter no.410 by the Circle Officer, Ariyari (Annexure P/5) without giving the details of land in question over which the Government has earmarked



for construction of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar 10+2 Schedule Caste residential/Girls School. Learned counsel further submitted that the very action of the Circle Officer to proceed to obstruct the petitioners from their rightful possession over the land is without jurisdiction and he seeks to file a fresh representation before the District Collector- cum - Magistrate, Muzaffarpur for redressal of the grievances of the petitioners as prayed for in the present writ petition in accordance with law.

5. *Per contra*, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State submitted that the petitioner himself is responsible for not receiving due compensation. Petitioner has himself delayed and has directly approached this Hon'ble Court. Accordingly, the writ petition is not maintainable.

6. Heard the parties.

7. It is commonly seen that the officers having quasi judicial power on their administrative side often delay in considering the representation filed by the aggrieved person or they deliberately delay to even adjudicate those cases where they exercise their adjudicatory power, while, it is well settled principle of law that High Courts should not exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if an effective and efficacious remedy is available. Taking into the



circumstances of the present case where fundamental/constitutional right of a citizen is infringed, this Court must not fail to exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

8. It is also well settled principle of law that every administrative action in want of reason is not sustainable as has been held by the Apex Court in the case of ***Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan*** reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496.

The relevant paragraph is reproduced hereinbelow:

“47. Summarising the above discussion,

this Court holds:

(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.

(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.

(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.

(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.

(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.

(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.

(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts.

(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and



constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.

(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.

(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency.

(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.

(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process.

(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor³²).

(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija vs. Spain³³ EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford³⁴, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions."

(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is



virtually a part of “due process”.

9. The law in this regard has been laid down by the Apex Court in the Case of ***M/s Magadh Sugar & Energy Ltd. Versus The State of Bihar & Ors.*** reported in ***LL 2021 SC 495***, paragraphs no. 19 and 28 would be relevant in this regard, which is as under:-

“ 19. While a High Court would normally not exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective and efficacious alternate remedy is available, the existence of an alternate remedy does not by itself bar the High Court from exercising its jurisdiction in certain contingencies. This principle has been crystallized by this Court in Whirpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai¹⁹ and Harbanslal Sahni v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd²⁰. Recently, in Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors²¹ a two judge Bench of this Court of which one of us was a part of (Justice DY Chandrachud) has summarized the principles governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court in the presence of an alternate remedy. This Court has observed:

“28. The principles of law which emerge are that: (i) The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well; (ii) The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person; (iii) Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged; (iv) An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law; (v) When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under



Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion; and (vi) In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with.” (emphasis supplied)

10. Now question arises whether this Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the facts of the present writ petition in case respondents have acted without jurisdiction. Law in this regard is well settled by the Apex Court in the case of ***Assistant Commissioner of State Tax v. M/s Commercial Steel Limited (Civil Appeal No. 5121 of 2021)***. In State of ***HP v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd & Anr., reported in (2005) SCC 6 499*** this Court has held that a writ petition is maintainable before the High Court if the taxing authorities have acted beyond the scope of their jurisdiction. This Court observed:

*“23. Where under a statute there is an allegation of infringement of fundamental rights or when on the undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess can be the grounds on which the writ petitions can be entertained. But normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions unless it is shown that there is something more in a case, something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer, something which would show that it would be a case of palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to adopt the remedies provided by the statute. It was noted by this Court in *L. Hirday Narain v. ITO* [(1970) 2 SCC 355: AIR 1971 SC 33] that if the High Court had entertained a petition despite availability of alternative remedy and heard the parties on merits it would be ordinarily unjustifiable for the High Court to dismiss the same on the ground of non-exhaustion of statutory remedies; unless the High Court*



finds that factual disputes are involved and it would not be desirable to deal with them in a writ petition.”

11. It is also to be taken note of that Article 300A of the Constitution of India tends to safeguard the invaluable right to property.

“300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law
No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.”

12. As per the constitutional mandate also, the State cannot disposes a citizen of his property except in accordance with law and procedure prescribed. The obligation to pay compensation is not expressively included in Article 300-A of the Constitution of India can be inferred in that Article. The law in this regard is well settled by the Apex Court in case of ***Vidaya Devi Vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.*** reported in ***2020(2) SCC 569***, I find it proper to quote the para-12.1 and 12.2 of the said judgment, which are *inter alia* reproduced hereinafter;

“12.1. The appellant was forcibly expropriated of her property in 1967, when the right to property was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to private property [State of W.B. v. Subodh Gopal Bose, (1953) 2 SCC 688 , which could not be deprived without due process of law and upon just and fair compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right



[Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that Article. [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1”

13. The above proposition of law has again been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of ***Dharnidhar Mishra (D) and Another vs. State of Bihar and Others***, in Civil Appeal No. 6351 of 2024, reported in ***(2024) 10 Supreme Court Cases 605***, is relevant. The paragraph is reproduced as under:—

“ 16. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that Article. [See: K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1.”

14. In such circumstances, when the question of right to property as per the provision of Article 300 A of the Constitution of India comes to the knowledge of this Court, this Court has no alternative than to direct the concerned authority to forthwith take action and see that the grievance of the petitioner is redressed well within a period of one week in accordance



with law from the date of communication of this order.

15. Considering the aforesaid information, the District Collector- cum - Magistrate, Muzaffarpur, is directed to call the records from the Circle Officer and compare the same with the land which has been earmarked for construction of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar 10+2 Schedule Caste residential/Girls School. In case the land of the petitioners have been notified for construction of the said school then in that case the petitioners must be duly compensated under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (RFCTLARR).

16. Accordingly, the present application stands disposed of.

17. Interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.

(Purnendu Singh, J)

Ashishsingh/-

AFR/NAFR	NAFR
CAV DATE	NA
Uploading Date	07.02.2026
Transmission Date	NA

