



2025:DHC:7274-DB



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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**+ **W.P.(C) 14716/2024 & CM APPL. 61833/2024****SAMSHER SINGH**

.....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Ankur Chhibber, Mr. Amrit Koul, Mr. Anshuman Mehrotra, Mr. Nikunj Arora, Mr. Arjun Panwar Mr. Prahil Sharma, Ms. Muskaan Dutta and Ms. Anushka Sharma, Advs.

versus

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS

.....Respondents

Through: Mr. Nishant Gautam, CGSC with Mr. Chetan Jadon, Adv. with Mr. Harshul Mehta, (GP)

CORAM:**HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR****HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA****JUDGMENT (ORAL)**

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20.08.2025**C. HARI SHANKAR, J.**

1. In response to an Advertisement Notice issued by the Directorate General, Central Reserve Police Force¹ on 13 July 2024, for recruitment to the post of Head Constable (Ministerial) on compassionate grounds, the petitioner, whose father had been a Constable in the CRPF and had died in harness, applied. Under the head "Eligibility Criteria", it was specifically provided, with respect to the prescribed medical standard, that candidates who had undergone visual² correction of any kind, even with glasses, would not be eligible

¹ "CRPF" hereinafter

² *sic* vision



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for the post. Despite the fact that the petitioner had undergone vision correction using LASIK surgery, he applied. He cleared all rounds of the selection but was disqualified in his medical examination which took place on 21 August 2024 on the ground that he undergone vision correction using LASIK surgery in both eyes. He was referred to a Review Medical Board which concurred with the opinion. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has instituted the present writ petition.

2. According to the averments in the writ petition, the stipulation in the Advertisement, disqualifying candidates who had undergone visual correction, was based on a Circular issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs³, under the subject “Policy Guidelines on Visual Standards for recruitment/retention in respect of Central Armed Police Force (CAPF) and Assam Rifles (ARs) personnel”. The following paragraphs, from the said Circular, are relevant:

“Annexure - VI
CONFIDENTIAL

FNo.I-45024/1/2008-Pers.II
Government of India/Bharat Sarkar
Ministry of Home Affairs/GrihMantralaya
[Police-II Division]

North Block, New Delhi
May 18th, 2012

Sub: Policy Guidelines on Visual Standards for recruitment/retention in respect of Central Armed Police Force (CAPF) and Assam Rifles (ARs) personnel.

The issue regarding the visual standards to be set for the CAPF and Assam Rifles personnel had been under consideration in this Ministry particularly with regard to the cases of Colour

³ "MHA" hereinafter



Blindness, The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in WP No. 686/2011 and WP No. 1142/2011 had also directed the Government to notify the revised visual standards.

2. The said matter has been examined in this Ministry and it has been felt that there cannot be one standard for all the Force personnel who are recruited in various cadres. Furthermore, with the recent techniques and the advancement in the field of eye surgery, there are many methods now available for correction of distant vision like LASIK. Additionally, there has been a significant transformation in the job profile of the CAPF personnel and the methods of border guarding as well as the way warfare is conducted. The armamentarium of sophisticated detection and combat gadget has made redundant certain stringent visual standards hitherto considered essential. Furthermore, due to these stringent standards, the CAPFs and ARs are losing out on recruiting candidates. This coupled with the lack of attraction towards the Forces as a career option among the youth has led to a situation where there is a shortfall in the induction of officers, non-gazetted officers and personnel in other ranks.

4. The said board had submitted its recommendations wherein while stating that there is necessity to review the visual standards in CAPFs & ARs to avoid litigations, they have also observed that:

h. All the Direct Appointed Gazetted Officers (DAGOs) in CAPFs and ARs are graduate. LASIK is proposed as an acceptable method for vision correction for all DAGOs for selection in CAPFs/ARs. The acceptance standards for these surgeries are to be made uniform across the CAPFs as under:

- i) Uncomplicated surgery
- ii) Surgery atleast 6 months before examination
- iii) Axial length ≤ 26 or > 211 mm by IOL Master or A Scan
- iv) Residual corneal thickness 425 micron
- v) Residual refraction $\leq \pm 0.75$ D sph or cyl
- vi) Normal retinal examination. No evidence of laser, retinal detachment or peripheral retinal lesions requiring treatment. No suspicion of myopic maculopathy optic disc assessment to be unambiguously noted in terms of disc size, CD ratio, adherence to ISNT rule (inferior neuroretinal rim to be thicker than superior, followed by nasal and temporal rim being the thinnest) presence of Nerve fibre layer defects



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and peripapillary atrophy or nerve fibre layer hemorrhages. Family history of glaucoma must be mentioned. These standards are proposed based on the evidence that flap and refractive stability and quality of vision stabilization usually occur within six months in most cases. Studies in the US military have reported increased reports of glare, haze and haloes at night during the first month after treatment when compared with experiences with either glasses or contact lenses before LASIK. These complaints were higher in the treated compared with the untreated eyes at 1 month, but complaints were reduced by 3 months after treatment and indistinguishable from preoperative levels by 6 months.

7. In view of the above recommendations of the board, the complete report of the board was got vetted by the MoH&FW and now it is proposed that the visual standards for the various levels of personnel in the CAPFs & Assam Rifles shall be as detailed in Annexure-I as New Standards separately for:

- a. Direct Appointed Gazetted Officers (DAGOs) {Table-1}
- b. Other Gazetted Officers {Table-2}
- c. Direct Entry SOs&ORs {Table-3}
- d. Direct Entry Tradesmen/Followers (Table-4)
- e. Ex-Servicemen/Ex-CAPFs Ministerial/ Technical personnel / LDCE Groups of SOs/ORs/Followers {Table-5}

The LASIK standards for Gazetted Officers shall be as per Table-L of Annexure-I. The existing standards for each of the above category have also been shown in the said table alongwith the New Standards.

(Neeraj Kansal)
Director (Pers.)
Telefax: 2309 2933"

3. The petitioner's primary contention is that there is no justifiable reason to discriminate between gazetted and non-gazetted officers, insofar as their entitlement for recruitment to the post of Head Constable is concerned, once they have undergone vision correction



using LASIK surgery. Mr Chhibber submits that this distinction is invidious, and is not founded on any intelligible differentia and, therefore, infracts Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

4. The writ petition, therefore, prays that the Policy Guidelines dated 18 May 2012 issued by the MHA, to the extent they treat only gazetted officers who have undergone vision correction by LASIK surgery as eligible for recruitment to the post of Head Constable, be quashed and set aside. A declaration is sought, to the effect that the same benefit would be available to non-gazetted officers and, consequently, it is also prayed that the result of the Review Medical Examination of the petitioner be quashed and set aside, and that he be re-examined by a fresh Review Medical Board and, if found fit, be appointed as Head Constable.

5. We have heard Mr. Ankur Chhibber, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Nishant Gautam, learned Central Government Standing Counsel, at length.

6. We are constrained to observe that the counter-affidavit, filed by way of response to the writ petition, is profoundly unsatisfactory, as it does not even address the main bone of contention in the writ petition, which is that the discrimination between gazetted and non-gazetted officers, insofar as their entitlement to recruitment as Head Constable after they have undergone vision correction by LASIK surgery, is invidious. All that the counter-affidavit states, in this regard, is the following:



“II. That the policy of the Respondents allowing only gazetted officers to be selected after doing a LASIK surgery is a valid classification based on sound policy decision and *the Respondent craves leave to place on record the reasoning if required by this Hon’ble Court.*”

(Emphasis supplied)

We do not see why it requires an invitation from the Court for the respondents to meet the case set up by the petitioner in the writ petition. We, however, forbear from saying anything further.

7. The counter-affidavit, almost entirely, advances only one contention by way of challenge to the writ petition, which is that, having participated in the selection process in full knowledge of the delimiting condition stipulated in the Advertisement, the petitioner could not seek to challenge the condition itself, having failed to obtain selection. Mr. Nishant Gautam, learned CGSC, relies, for this purpose, on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in ***Dr Manu Banga v Indira Gandhi Delhi Technical University for Women***⁴, incidentally authored by one of us (C. Hari Shankar J).

8. Responding to the submission, Mr. Chhibber places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in ***Dr (Major) Meeta Sahai v State of Bihar***⁵, which holds that a candidate who participates in a selection does not consent to the illegalities in the selection process and cannot, therefore, be estopped from challenging the selection, even if he is not successful.

⁴ 2024 SCC OnLine Del 7315

⁵ (2019) 20 SCC 17



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9. Mr. Chhibber further submits that, in any case, the respondents could not have enforced the stipulation, in the Advertisement, disqualifying candidates who had undergone vision correction surgery, as the said condition was premised from the MHA Policy Guidelines dated 18 May 2012 which, to the extent they distinguished between gazetted and non-gazetted officers insofar as their entitlement for recruitment to the CAPFs after having undergone LASIK vision correction, is concerned, were struck down by the High Court of Meghalaya in *Naresh Kumari v UOI*⁶. He submits that a criterion which stands struck down by a Court of competent jurisdiction cannot be enforced by any executive authority in the country.

Analysis

10. Having heard learned Counsel and applied ourselves to the record, we regret our inability to come to the aid of the petitioner, for the following reasons:

- (i) The petitioner participated in the selection process following the Advertisement Notice dated 13 July 2024 with full knowledge of the fact that he was ineligible, in view of Clause 6 of the Advertisement, which sets out the applicable medical standards, and specifically stipulated that vision correction of refractive errors of any kind would not be permissible.

⁶ 2024 SCC OnLine Megh 144



(ii) The advertisement was limited only to one post of Head Constable (Ministerial). As such, having participated in the selection following the advertisement, with full knowledge that he was ineligible for selection, the petitioner cannot now seek to challenge the aforementioned stipulation. We may note that the advertisement does not deal with any other post, Gazetted or Non-Gazetted. The law in this regard stands settled by the decisions in *Rekha Sharma v Rajasthan High Court*⁷ and *Tajvir Singh Sodhi v State of J & K*⁸, from which the following paragraphs merit reproduction:

From *Rekha Sharma*

“16. As well settled, the candidates who consciously took part in the process of selection cannot be permitted to question *the advertisement or the methodology adopted by the respondents for making selection*, on their having been declared as unsuccessful in the Preliminary Examinations.”
(Emphasis supplied)

From *Tajvir Singh Sodhi*

“38.1. In *Manish Kumar Shahi v State of Bihar*⁹, this Court authoritatively declared that having participated in a selection process without any protest, it would not be open to an unsuccessful candidate to challenge the selection criteria subsequently.

38.2. In *Ramesh Chandra Shah v Anil Joshi*¹⁰, an advertisement was issued inviting applications for appointment for the post of Physiotherapist. Candidates who failed to clear the written test presented a writ petition and prayed for quashing the advertisement and the process

⁷ 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2109

⁸ (2023) 17 SCC 147

⁹ (2010) 12 SCC 576

¹⁰ (2013) 11 SCC 309



of selection. They pleaded that the advertisement and the test were ultra vires the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Medical Health and Family Welfare Department Physiotherapist and Occupational Therapist Service Rules, 1998. After referring to a catena of judgments on the principle of waiver and estoppel, this Court did not entertain the challenge for the reason that the same would not be maintainable after participation in the selection process. The pertinent observations of this Court are as under:

“24. In view of the propositions laid down in the abovenoted judgments, it must be held that by having taken part in the process of selection with full knowledge that the recruitment was being made under the General Rules, the respondents had waived their right to question the advertisement or the methodology adopted by the Board for making selection and the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court committed grave error by entertaining the grievance made by the respondents.”

38.3. Similarly, in *Ashok Kumar v State of Bihar*¹¹, a process was initiated for promotion to Class III posts from amongst Class IV employees of a civil court. In the said case, the selection was to be made on the basis of a written test and interview, for which 85% and 15% marks were earmarked respectively as per norms. Out of 27 (twenty-seven) candidates who appeared in the written examination, 14 (fourteen) qualified. They were interviewed. The committee selected candidates on the basis of merit and prepared a list. The High Court declined to approve the select list on the ground that the ratio of full marks for the written examination and the interview ought to have been 90 : 10 and 45 ought to be the qualifying marks in the written examination. A fresh process followed comprising of a written examination (full marks — 90 and qualifying marks — 45) and an interview (carrying 10 marks). On the basis of the performance of the candidates, results were declared and 6 (six) persons were appointed on Class III posts. It was thereafter that the appellants along with 4 (four) other unsuccessful candidates filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging the order of the High Court on the administrative side declining to approve the initial select list. The primary ground was that the

¹¹ (2017) 4 SCC 357



appointment process was vitiated, since under the relevant rules, the written test was required to carry 85 marks and the interview 15 marks. This Court dismissed the appeals on the grounds that the appellants were clearly put on notice when the fresh selection process took place that the written examination would carry 90 marks and the interview 10 marks. The Court was of the view that the appellants having participated in the selection process without objection and subsequently found to be not successful, a challenge to the process at their instance was precluded. The relevant observations are as under : (SCC p. 363, para 13)

“13. The law on the subject has been crystallised in several decisions of this Court. In **Chandra Prakash Tiwari v Shakuntala Shukla**¹², this Court laid down the principle that when a candidate appears at an examination without objection and is subsequently found to be not successful, a challenge to the process is precluded. The question of entertaining a petition challenging an examination would not arise where a candidate has appeared and participated. He or she cannot subsequently turn around and contend that the process was unfair or that there was a lacuna therein, merely because the result is not palatable. In **Union of India v S. Vinodh Kumar**¹³, this Court held that:

‘18. It is also well settled that those candidates who had taken part in the selection process knowing fully well the procedure laid down therein were not entitled to question the same (see also **Munindra Kumar v Rajiv Govil**¹⁴ and **Rashmi Mishra v M.P. Public Service Commission**¹⁵)’ ”

39. It is therefore trite that candidates, having taken part in the selection process without any demur or protest, cannot challenge the same after having been declared unsuccessful. The candidates cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time. In other words, simply because the result of the selection process is not palatable to a candidate, he cannot allege that the process of interview

¹² (2002) 6 SCC 127

¹³ (2007) 8 SCC 100

¹⁴ (1991) 3 SCC 368

¹⁵ (2006) 12 SCC 724



was unfair or that there was some lacuna in the process. Therefore, we find that the writ petitioners in these cases, could not have questioned before a court of law, the rationale behind recasting the selection criteria, as they willingly took part in the selection process even after the criteria had been so recast. Their candidature was not withdrawn in light of the amended criteria. A challenge was thrown against the same only after they had been declared unsuccessful in the selection process, at which stage, the challenge ought not to have been entertained in light of the principle of waiver and acquiescence.

40. This Court in *Sadananda Halo v Momtaz Ali Sheikh*¹⁶, has noted that the only exception to the rule of waiver is the existence of mala fides on the part of the Selection Board. In the present case, we are unable to find any mala fides or arbitrariness in the selection process and therefore the said exception cannot be invoked.”

(iii) The judgment in *Meeta Sahai*, on which Mr. Chhibber places reliance, does not deviate from the law as enunciated in the aforementioned decisions. The grievance of the petitioner Meeta Sahai, in that case, was with respect to Clause 5(iii) of the advertisement pursuant to which she had applied for recruitment to the post of General Medical Officer. Her contention was that the said clause, to the extent it mandated that only work experience in hospitals of the Bihar government would be considered for awarding marks for work experience was in contravention of the extant Rules, which did not prescribe any such limitation of work experience to be restricted to hospitals of the Bihar government. This contention is thus captured in para 4 of the said decision:

“4. The aggrieved appellant filed a writ petition before the Patna High Court challenging Clause 5(iii) of the

¹⁶ (2008) 4 SCC 619



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advertisement issued by the Commission to the extent it mandated that only work experience in hospitals of Government of Bihar shall be considered for awarding marks for "work experience". The appellant contended that this clause of the advertisement was in contravention of the Rules (which did not prescribe any such limitation of work experience only being in hospitals of the Government of Bihar). She was upset that her work experience in the Army Medical Corps Hospital had been disregarded while others who served in Bihar government hospitals were given due weightage. She felt that if not for this erroneous interpretation of the Rules, she would have been selected for the post of General Medical Officer. Similarly, some other candidates also approached the Patna High Court, agitating their exclusion pursuant to the non-consideration of work experience in non-private hospitals other than those administered by the Government of Bihar.”

While recording the contentions of the parties before the Court, in para 8, this contention is once again emphasised thus:

“8. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the Division Bench judgment was erroneous. He hammered Clause 5 (iii) of the advertisement and urged that the restriction of work experience to only hospitals of the Government of Bihar was arbitrary and contrary to Rule 5 and Rule 6(iii) of the Rules....”

It was in this background that the Supreme Court was concerned with the issue of whether the appellant before it could be non-suited on the ground that she had participated in the selection process. The Supreme Court has addressed this issue in the following passages from the judgment:

“15. Furthermore, before beginning analysis of the legal issues involved, it is necessary to first address the preliminary issue. The maintainability of the very challenge by the appellant has been questioned on the ground that she having partaken in the selection process cannot later challenge it due to mere failure in selection. The counsel for the respondents relied upon a catena of decisions of this



Court to substantiate his objection.

16. It is well settled that the principle of estoppel prevents a candidate from challenging the selection process after having failed in it as iterated by this Court in a plethora of judgments including *Manish Kumar Shahi v State of Bihar*¹⁷ observing as follows:

“16. We also agree with the High Court¹⁸ that after having taken part in the process of selection knowing fully well that more than 19% marks have been earmarked for viva voce test, the appellant is not entitled to challenge the Criteria or process of selection. Surely, if the appellant's name had appeared in the merit list, he would not have even dreamed of challenging the selection. The [appellant] invoked jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India only after he found that his name does not figure in the merit list prepared by the Commission. This conduct of the appellant clearly disentitles him from questioning the selection and the High Court did not commit any error by refusing to entertain the writ petition.”¹⁹.

The underlying objective of this principle is to prevent candidates from trying another shot at consideration, and to avoid an impasse wherein every disgruntled candidate, having failed the selection, challenges it in the hope of getting a second chance.

17. However, we must differentiate from this principle insofar as the candidate by agreeing to participate in the selection process only accepts the prescribed procedure and not the illegality in it. In a situation where a candidate alleges misconstruction of statutory rules and discriminating consequences arising therefrom, the same cannot be condoned merely because a candidate has partaken in it. The constitutional scheme is sacrosanct and its violation in any manner is impermissible. In fact, a candidate may not have locus to assail the incurable illegality or derogation of the provisions of the Constitution, unless he/she participates in the selection

¹⁷ (2010) 12 SCC 576

¹⁸ *Manish Kumar Shahi v State of Bihar*, 2008 SCC OnLine Pat 321

¹⁹ See also: *Madan Lal v State of J&K*, (1995) 3 SCC 486, *Marripati Nagaraja v State of A.P.*, (2007) 11 SCC 522, *Dhananjay Malik v State of Uttaranchal*, (2008) 4 SCC 171 and *K.A. Nagamani v Indian Airlines*, (2009) 5 SCC 515



process.

18. The question of permissibility of giving weightage for “work experience” in government hospitals is also not the bone of contention in this case. Medicine being an applied science cannot be mastered by mere academic knowledge. Longer experience of a candidate adds to his knowledge and expertise. Similarly, government hospitals differ from private hospitals vastly for the former have unique infrastructural constraints and deal with poor masses. Doctors in such non-private hospitals serve a public purpose by giving medical treatment to swarms of patients, in return for a meagre salary. Hence, when placing emphasis on the requirement of work experience, there is no dispute on such recognition of government hospitals and private hospitals as distinct classes. Instead such recognition ensures that the doctors recruited in not-so-rich States like Bihar have the requisite exposure to challenges faced in those regions.

19. The appellant has thus rightly not challenged the selection procedure but has narrowed her claim to only against the respondents' interpretation of "work experience" as part of merit determination. Since interpretation of a statute or rule is the exclusive domain of courts, and given the scope of judicial review in delineating such criteria, the appellant's challenge cannot be turned down at the threshold. However, we are not commenting specifically on the merit of the appellant's case, and our determination is alien to the outcome of the selection process. It is possible post what is held hereinafter that she be selected, or not.”

Thus, even while recognising, in para 16 of the report, the general principle that a candidate who participates in a selection, in full consciousness of the condition subject to which the selection is undertaken, cannot, after failing to get selected, turn round and challenge the terms and conditions of the selection itself, the Supreme Court has crafted out a distinction in a case in which the candidate alleges that the condition in the advertisement is contrary to the existing statutory rules and proceeds on a misconstruction thereof. There can be absolutely



no cavil with this proposition, in view of well-settled principle that statutory rules would override stipulations in advertisements and, if there is a conflict between the two, the rules would prevail. If, therefore, it is the contention of the petitioner before the Court that the stipulations in the advertisement are contrary to applicable statutory rules, the candidate can never be estopped from urging such a contention merely because she, or he, has participated in the selection process. In the present instance, however, it is not the case of the petitioner that the stipulation in the advertisement for the post of Head Constable (Ministerial) pursuant to which the petitioner participated, was violative of any statutory rules.

(iv) Faced with this situation, Mr. Chhibber seeks to contend that his case would be on a higher pedestal, as the stipulation in the advertisement was in turn based on a notification dated 18 May 2012 which, according to him, infracts Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. If this interpretation were to be accepted, it would result in complete undoing the law with respect to candidates who have participated in a selection not being permitted to challenge the rules of the selection after being unsuccessful, as it would be open to every candidate to come forward and say that the rules were violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

(v) Besides, we do not find, in the policy guidelines dated 18 May 2012, that it discriminates between Gazetted Officers and



Non-Gazetted Officers. It merely holds that Gazetted Officers of the CAPFs would be permitted to be recruited if they have undergone vision correction. As such, it cannot even be said that, *ex facie*, the notification dated 18 May 2012 infracts Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India so as to enable the petitioner to by-pass the law laid down in the decisions cited *supra*, and launch an attack on the express stipulation in the Advertisement pursuant to which he applied, on finding himself unsuccessful in getting selected.

(vi) The stipulation, in the table annexed to the notification, to the effect that LASIK surgery vision correction would be permissible only in the case of Gazetted Officers is also in sync with the notification.

(vii) Mr. Chhibber also sought to contend that the circular dated 18 May 2012 had been struck down by the High Court of Meghalaya, to the extent it distinguished between Gazetted and Non-Gazetted Officers who had undergone vision correction by LASIK surgery, in the matter of their entitlement for recruitment to the CAPFs. Having read the decision in ***Naresh Kumari*** thoroughly, it is clear that the High Court of Meghalaya was not even remotely considering a general question of whether there could be a distinction between Gazetted and Non-Gazetted Officers in the matter of eligibility for recruitment if they had undertaken vision correction using LASIK surgery. The High Court has been cautious and circumspect in restricting



its observation and findings to the challenge before it, at the instance of nurses, who contended that they could not be discriminated in the above aspect vis-à-vis doctors.

(viii) It is well-settled that a judgment is an authority only for what it states, and not for what may legitimately be felt as flowing from it. There is nothing, in the judgment of the High Court of Meghalaya, either of the learned Single Judge or of the Division Bench, which can be read as striking down or declaring as illegal the Circular dated 18 May 2012, insofar as it restricts the entitlement, in the matter of recruitment to the posts in the CAPFs, to Gazetted Officers who have undertaken vision correction by LASIK surgery and does not extend the benefit to Non-Gazetted Officers. The judgment of the High Court of Meghalaya can also, therefore, not come to the aid of the petitioner.

11. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the petitioner cannot maintain the present challenge at all, having participated in the selection process in full consciousness of the fact that he was not eligible, having undergone vision correction using LASIK surgery. Given the extant legal position, we cannot allow the petitioner to maintain such a challenge after having failed to secure selection.

12. Without, therefore, entering into the aspect of whether the distinction between Gazetted and Non-Gazetted Officers, who have undergone vision correction using LASIK surgery, in the matter of



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recruitment to the post of Head Constable is, or is not invidious, we dismiss this writ petition on the aforesaid preliminary ground.

C. HARI SHANKAR, J.

OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.

AUGUST 20, 2025

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