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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

+ CRL.M.C. 6633/2025

KU NANDAN

.....Petitioner

Through: Mr. S.K.Gill, Mr. Vipin Rana, Mr. Vinay Panwar and Mr. Vishal Gill, Advocates along with petitioner in person.

versus

THE STATE GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI

& ANR.

.....Respondents

Through: Mr. Raj Kumar, APP for the State with W/SI Rekha Rani and ASI Sant Kumar, PS NSP Metro Station. Ms. Ritu and Mr. Vishu Verma, Advocates for complainant along with complainant in person.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

ORDER

17.09.2025

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1. The present petition is filed seeking quashing of FIR No. MRD-NSP-000058 dated 24.02.2021, registered at e-Police Station (Netaji Subhash Place Metro) for the offence under Sections 379 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ('IPC'), including all consequential proceedings arising therefrom.

2. The FIR was registered pursuant to a complaint given by the complainant/ Respondent No.2 alleging that while he was travelling in metro, his mobile phone was stolen. During investigation, the phone number was found to be active at the petitioner's address. During interrogation, the petitioner

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disclosed that she had bought the phone for a paltry amount from an unknown man in market, who had told her that he was in dire need of funds to buy a ticket to go to his village. She further disclosed that she later grew suspicious and threw the phone in Loni drain. Chargesheet has been filed in the present case under Sections 379/411/201 of the IPC.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the FIR was registered against an unknown person, who could not be traced by the police. He submits that the petitioner has been erroneously implicated in the present case solely because she had purchased the said stolen mobile phone from the market, however, she was unaware of the theft. He submits that thereafter, suspecting something to be amiss, the petitioner threw the mobile phone.

4. The present petition has been filed on the ground that the disputes have been settled between the parties by way of Settlement and Compromise Deed dated 21.04.2025, out of their own free will, without any coercion, pressure or threat.

5. The petitioner and Respondent No.2 are present in person and have been duly identified by the Investigating Officer.

6. On being asked, Respondent No.2 states that he has no grievance against the petitioner. He submits that he does not wish to pursue any proceedings of the present FIR and he has no objection if the same is quashed.

7. Offences under Section 379/411 of the IPC are compoundable in nature whereas the offence under Section 201 of the IPC is non-compoundable in nature.

8. It is well settled that the High Court while exercising its powers under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
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Sanhita, 2023 ('BNSS') [erstwhile Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973] can quash offences which are non-compoundable on the ground that there is a compromise between the accused and the complainant. The Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down parameters and guidelines for High Court while accepting settlement and quashing the proceedings. In the case of **Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr. : (2014) 6 SCC 466**, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had observed as under :-

"29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

- (i) ends of justice, or*
- (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.*

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having



overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.”

(emphasis supplied)

9. Similarly, in the case of **Parbatbhai Aahir & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Anr. : (2017) 9 SCC 641**, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had observed as under :-

“16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:

16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.

16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.

16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.

16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the



offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.

16.6. *In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. **Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.***

16.7. *As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.*

16.8. *Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.*

16.9. *In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and*

16.10. *There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.”*

(emphasis supplied)

10. Although the offence under Section 201 of the IPC is serious in nature, in the facts of the present case, considering that Respondent No.2 does not wish to pursue the case and since it



appears that the petitioner had thrown the phone out of suspicion and fear on realising that she had made a mistake in purchasing the phone from a stranger, this Court feels that no useful purpose would be served by keeping the dispute alive and continuance of the proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of Court. I am of the opinion that this is a fit case to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS.

11. In view of the above, FIR No. MRD-NSP-000058 and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed.

12. The present petition is allowed in aforesaid terms. Pending applications also stand disposed of.

AMIT MAHAJAN, J

SEPTEMBER 17, 2025

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