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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

+ CRL.M.C. 5534/2025
SHAHID & ANR

.....Petitioners

Through: Mohd. Azeem and Mohd.
Muzzammil Hassan, Advocates.

versus

THE STATE GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI & ANRRespondents

Through: Mr. Hemant Mehla, APP for the State
along with SI Dinesh Kumar, PS
Nand Nagar.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA

ORDER

% **25.08.2025**

1. The present petition filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023¹ (erstwhile Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973²) seeks quashing of FIR No. 68/2004 registered under Sections 498A/406/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860³ at P.S. Nand Nagri and all other proceedings emanating therefrom.
2. The Petitioners are the brother-in-laws of Respondent No. 2. The husband of Respondent No. 2, Raseed, has deceased subsequent to the registration of the FIR. The marriage between Raseed and Respondent No. 2 was solemnized on 11th March, 2000 as per Muslim Rites and Customs. Parties have one child from this marriage.
3. Due to matrimonial discord, the relationship between the parties

¹ "BNSS"

² "Cr.P.C."

³ "IPC"



deteriorated, pursuant to which they started residing separately since 2004. Several efforts for reconciliation were made but to no avail. Subsequently, Respondent No. 2 made a complaint against Petitioners, alleging that she was subjected to cruelty by them, which later culminated into the impugned FIR. The husband, the father-in-law and the mother-in-law of Respondent No. 2 have since deceased and the proceedings against them stand abated.

4. The parties on their own free will, without any coercion, pressure or undue influence, have amicably resolved all their disputes and differences. Pursuant thereto, the parties have executed a Settlement Deed dated 28th September, 2024 before the Mediation Centre, Karkardooma Courts, whereby the Petitioners had agreed to pay a sum of INR 50,000/- to Respondent No. 2 as final settlement amount. As per the terms of the settlement, Respondent No. 2 has agreed to withdraw all proceedings pending before various Courts.

5. Respondent No. 2, who is present before this Court and duly identified by the Investigating Officer, gives no objection to the quashing of the impugned FIR. As per the terms of the settlement, a sum of INR 1,000/- has already been paid to her. Additionally, the balance amount of INR 49,000/- has been tendered to Respondent NO. 2 by way of a demand draft bearing DD No. 845587 drawn on UCO Bank. The same has been received and acknowledged by Respondent No. 2. In light of the foregoing, counsel for the parties jointly pray for the quashing of the impugned FIR.

6. At this juncture, Mr. Hemant Mehla, APP for the State, informs the Court that both Petitioners were declared proclaimed offenders, and consequently, the State initiated proceedings against them under Section 174 IPC, which are still pending. Counsel for the Petitioners submits that their



non-appearance was due to ill health and lack of knowledge regarding the said proceedings.

7. The Court has considered the afore-noted facts. Notably, the offences under Sections 498A and 174 of the IPC are non-compoundable while offence under Section 406 of IPC is compoundable in certain cases.

8. It is well-established that the High Courts, in exercise of their powers under Section 528 of BNSS (formerly 482 of Cr.P.C.), can compound offences which are non-compoundable on the ground that there is a compromise between the accused and the complainant. In **Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr.**,⁴ the Supreme Court laid down guidelines for High Courts while accepting settlement deeds between parties and quashing the proceedings. The relevant observations in the said decision read as under:

“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

⁴ (2014) 6 SCC 466



While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

9. Similarly, in the case of **Parbatbhai Aahir & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Anr.**,⁵ the Supreme Court had observed as under:

“16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:

16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.

16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal

⁵ (2017) 9 SCC 641



Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.

16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.

16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.

16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.

16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.

16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.

16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and



economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

10. Considering the nature of dispute and the fact that the parties have amicably entered into a settlement, this Court is of the opinion that the present case is fit to exercise jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNSS as no purpose would be served by keeping the dispute alive and continuance of the proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of Court.

11. However, considering that the Petitioners were declared proclaimed offenders and that proceedings under Section 174 IPC are currently pending against them, this Court is of the opinion that, since the State machinery was set into motion, the ends of justice would be adequately met if the Petitioners are subjected to the imposition of a cost.

12. At this stage, counsel for the Petitioners submits that both Petitioners come from economically weaker sections of society and earn their livelihood by operating battery-operated e-rickshaws. Taking into account their financial condition, both Petitioners are directed to deposit a sum of INR 1,500/- each with the Delhi Police Welfare Fund.

13. In view of the above, the impugned FIR No. 68/2004, P.S. Nand Nagri and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom are hereby quashed.

14. The present petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

SANJEEV NARULA, J

AUGUST 25, 2025/MK