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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

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+ **CRL.M.C. 2900/2025 & CRL.M.A. 12956/2025,**
CRL.M.A. 14594/2025

ASHA DEVI BHARECH & ANR.Petitioners
Through: Mr. Kapil Madan and Mr.
Shivek Rai Kapoor, Advs.
Both the petitioners in
person.

versus

STATE NCT OF DELHI & ANR.Respondents
Through: Mr. Sunil Kumar Gautam,
APP for the State with SI
Rakesh Kumar, PS Sector
23 Dwarka.
R-2 / complainant in
person.

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+ **CRL.M.C. 1566/2025 & CRL.M.A. 7032/2025**

ARPIT BEDIPetitioner
Through: Mr. A.K. Tripathi, Adv.

versus

THE STATE NCT OF DELHI AND ANRRespondents
Through: Mr. Sunil Kumar Gautam,
APP for the State with SI
Rakesh Kumar, PS Sector
23 Dwarka.
R-2 / complainant in
person.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

ORDER
25.08.2025

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1. The present petitions are filed seeking quashing of FIR No. 276/2024 dated 14.10.2024, registered at Police Station Sector 23 Dwarka, for offences under Sections 420/468/471/120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ('IPC'), including all consequential proceedings arising therefrom. The said FIR was registered on a complaint filed by Respondent No. 2.

2. Briefly stated, it is alleged that Respondent No. 2 in both the petitions (hereafter '**the complainant**') had purchased a property bearing No. 189, falling in Khasra No. 53/7, Village Dhulsiras, New Delhi (hereafter '**subject property**') on 22.06.2021 from one Shri Durgesh Kumar. It is alleged that the complainant was in unhindered possession of the subject property from 22.06.2021. Thereafter in December, 2023, the complainant was served summons in a case filed by Petitioner No.1 in CRL.M.C. 2900/2025 seeking a decree of declaration, possession temporary and permanent injunction, mesne profits and eviction action the complainant in respect of the subject property. Subsequently, the complainant also filed a counter-claim against Petitioner No. 1 in CRL.M.C. 2900/2025 seeking decree of declaration over the subject property. Subsequently, the complainant also filed an application under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which led to the registration of the subject FIR. It is the case of the complainant that the petitioners in the respective petitions have conspired with each other to usurp the subject property belonging to the complainant.

3. The present petition is filed on the ground that the matter is amicably settled between the parties by way of Settlement Deed



dated 06.03.2025, out of their own free will without any undue influence, pressure or coercion.

4. Petitioner No. 1 in CRL.M.C. 2900/2025 had filed a suit seeking declaration, possession, temporary and permanent injunction, mesne profits and injunction against the complainant.

5. The complainant in the said suit had also filed a counter claim seeking declaration over the subject property. It is pointed out that pursuant to the settlement, the said proceedings have also been withdrawn by the parties.

6. The petitioner in CRL.M.C. 1566/2025 is stated to be the erstwhile owner of the subject property who sold the subject property to the petitioners in CRL.M.C. 2900/2025 on 08.12.2011.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioners in CRL.M.C. 2900/2025 submits that the parties have amicably resolved all their disputes. He submits that pursuant to the settlement the petitioners have voluntarily renounced all their rights, titles and interest in the subject property in favour of the complainant. He submits that the petitioners, pursuant to the settlement, shall not claim any right, title or interest in the subject property and that they have unequivocally admitted that the complainant is the sole and absolute owner of the subject property.

8. The learned counsel for the petitioner in CRL.M.C. 1566/2025 states that the petitioner was merely the erstwhile owner of the subject property and had already sold the same to the petitioners in CRL.M.C. 2900/2025.

9. Both the petitioners in CRL.M.C. 2900/2025 and



Respondent No. 2/complainant are present in person in Court today and have been duly identified by the Investigating Officer.

10. On being asked, the complainant states that he has amicably settled all the disputes and does not wish to pursue any proceedings arising out of the present FIR. He further states that he has no objection if the FIR and the proceedings emanating therefrom are quashed.

11. Offence under Section 420 of the IPC is compoundable whereas offences under Sections 468/471 of the IPC are non-compoundable.

12. It is well settled that the High Court while exercising its powers under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 ('BNSS') [erstwhile Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973] can quash offences which are non-compoundable on the ground that there is a compromise between the accused and the complainant. The Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down parameters and guidelines for High Court while accepting settlement and quashing the proceedings. In the case of **Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr. : (2014) 6 SCC 466**, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had observed as under :-

“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power



which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

- (i) ends of justice, or**
- (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.**

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have



resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.”

(emphasis supplied)

13. Similarly, in the case of ***Parbatbhai Aahir & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Anr. : (2017) 9 SCC 641***, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had observed as under :-

“16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:

16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.

16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482,



the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.

16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.

16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.

*16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. **Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.***

16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.

16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate



situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.

16.9. *In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and*

16.10. *There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.”*

(emphasis supplied)

14. It is pertinent to note that Petitioner No. 1 in CRL.M.C. 2900/2025 had filed a suit seeking declaration, possession, temporary and permanent injunction, mesne profits and injunction against the complainant in respect of the subject property. Further, the complainant in the said suit had also filed a counter claim seeking declaration over the subject property. It is pointed out that pursuant to the settlement, the said proceedings have been withdrawn by the parties.

15. The complainant has also stated before this Court that he has settled all the disputes and has no pending grievances against the petitioners in the respective petitions.

16. Keeping in view the nature of dispute and that the parties have amicably entered into a settlement, this Court feels that no



useful purpose would be served by keeping the dispute alive and continuance of the proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of Court. I am of the opinion that this is a fit case to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS.

17. However, keeping in mind the fact that the State machinery has been put to motion, ends of justice would be served if the petitioners are put to cost.

18. In view of the above, FIR No. 276/2024 and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed subject to payment of cost of ₹5,000/- by each petitioner, to be deposited with the Delhi Police Martyrs' Fund, within a period of twelve weeks from date.

19. Let the proof of deposit of cost be submitted with the concerned SHO.

20. The present petitions are allowed in the aforesaid terms. Pending applications also stand disposed of.

21. A copy of this order be placed in both the matters.

AMIT MAHAJAN, J

AUGUST 25, 2025

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