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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**
+ **CRL.M.C. 2440/2025 & CRL.M.A. 10924/2025**
BHANU PRAKASH MISHRA ALIAS MONU & ORS.

.....Petitioners

Through: Mr. Rajmangal Kumar and Ms. Sangeeta Kumari, Advocates with Petitioners present.

versus

STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANR.Respondents

Through: Mr. Divakar Sharma and Mr. Somak Mukhopadhyay, Advocates for R-2 with R-2 (in-Person).

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA

ORDER
03.09.2025

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1. The present petition filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023¹ (formerly Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973²) seeks quashing of FIR No. 0048/2018³ registered under Sections 498A/406/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860⁴ at P.S. Nangloi, and all other proceedings emanating therefrom.

2. Petitioner No. 1 is the husband of Respondent No. 2. Petitioners No. 2 to 6 are the in-laws of Respondent No. 2. The marriage between Petitioner No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 was solemnized on 7th June, 2011 as per Hindu

¹ "BNSS"

² "Cr.P.C."

³ "the impugned FIR"

⁴ "IPC"



rites and ceremonies. Parties have a child from the said marriage. Due to matrimonial discord, the relationship between the parties deteriorated and parties have been living separately since 23rd March, 2019. Several efforts for reconciliation were made but to no avail.

3. Subsequently, Respondent No. 2 made a complaint against Petitioners, alleging that she was subjected to cruelty by them, which later culminated into the impugned FIR.

4. The present petition is filed on the ground that the matter is amicably settled between the parties on their own free will, without any coercion, pressure or undue influence. Pursuant thereto, Petitioner No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 executed a Settlement Agreement dated 16th March, 2023 before Delhi Mediation Centre, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi whereby Petitioner No. 1 has agreed to pay a total sum of INR 5,50,000/- to Respondent No. 2 as full and final settlement amount. Out of the total settlement amount, Petitioner No. 1 has undertaken to deposit INR 2,00,000/- in an FDR in their child's name, at the time of recording the first motion for divorce, with Respondent No. 2 as nominee until the child attains majority, on or before 31st March, 2023. Further, at the stage of recording the second motion for divorce, Petitioner No. 1 shall deposit a further sum of INR 1,00,000/- in an FDR in the child's name, and shall also pay a sum of INR 1,50,000/- to Respondent No. 2. Additionally, it has been agreed that Respondent No. 2 shall have the custody of the minor child. As per the settlement terms, Respondent No. 2 has agreed to withdraw all proceedings pending before various courts. Pursuant to the settlement, Petitioner No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 have obtained a decree of divorce by mutual consent through order dated 22nd May, 2024 passed by the Judge, Family Court-01, West, Tis



Hazari Courts, Delhi.

5. In light of the foregoing, counsel for the parties jointly pray for the quashing of the impugned FIR. Respondent No. 2, who is present before this Court and duly identified by the Investigating Officer, confirms her statement made to the Court and gives no objection to the quashing of the impugned FIR. She confirms that in terms of the Settlement Agreement, she has received a sum of INR 4,50,000/- out of the total settlement amount, out of which INR 3,00,000/- has been deposited in an FDR in the name of their child. Additionally, in accordance with the Agreement, the Petitioners have tendered the balance amount of INR 1,00,000/- by way of a DD bearing No. 399415 to Respondent No. 2. The same has been duly received and acknowledged by Respondent no. 2. Copy of the DD has been handover across the board and taken on record.

6. At this stage, counsel for Respondent No. 2 informs the Court about the failure on part of the Petitioners to adhere to the timelines stipulated under the Settlement Agreement. It is pointed out that the first instalment, due on or before 23rd March, 2023 under the settlement, was paid only on 21st September, 2023, with a delay of nearly six months, while the payment due at the stage of the second motion was made on 22nd May, 2024, over a year after the settlement agreement was executed. In view of this delay, counsel for Respondent No. 2 submits that the Petitioners ought to compensate Respondent No. 2. In response, counsel for the Petitioners tenders an additional sum of INR 20,000/- by way of online payment, which Respondent No. 2 accepts towards full and final settlement of her claims under the agreement.

7. The Court has considered the afore-noted facts. Notably, offence



under Section 498A of IPC is non-compoundable while offence under Section 406 of IPC is compoundable in certain cases.

8. It is well-established that the High Courts, in exercise of their powers under Section 528 of BNSS (formerly Section 482 of Cr.P.C.), can compound offences which are non-compoundable on the ground that there is a compromise between the accused and the complainant. In **Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr.**,⁵ the Supreme Court laid down guidelines for High Courts while accepting settlement deeds between parties and quashing the proceedings. The relevant observations in the said decision read as under:

“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which

⁵ (2014) 6 SCC 466



involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

9. Similarly, in the case of ***Parbatbhai Aahir & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Anr.***,⁶ the Supreme Court had observed as under:

“16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:

16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.

16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

⁶ (2017) 9 SCC 641



16.3. *In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.*

16.4. *While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.*

16.5. *The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.*

16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.

16.7. *As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.*

16.8. *Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.*

16.9. *In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and*

16.10. *There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act*



complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

10. Considering the nature of dispute and the fact that the parties have amicably entered into a settlement, this Court is of the opinion that the present case is fit to exercise jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNSS as no purpose would be served by keeping the dispute alive and continuance of the proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of Court.

11. In view of the above, the impugned FIR No. 0048/2018 and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom are hereby quashed.

12. For abundant caution, it is clarified that the settlement between the parties shall not affect the rights of their minor child, in view of the judgement of the Supreme Court in ***Ganesh v. Sudhi Kumar Shrivastava***.⁷

13. The parties shall abide by the terms of settlement.

14. The present petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

SANJEEV NARULA, J

SEPTEMBER 3, 2025

as

⁷ (2020) 20 SCC 787.