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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

+ **CRL.M.C. 1146/2025**

ABDUL SALAM & ORS.

.....Petitioners

Through: Mr. Arshan Ahmad, Advocate with
Petitioners in person

versus

STATE THROUGH SHO PS WELCOME & ANR.

.....Respondents

Through: Mr. Ajay Vikram Singh, APP for the
State with SI Anugraha, PS Welcome
Mr. Salman Alam, Advocate for R-2
with R-2 in person

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA

ORDER

% **30.07.2025**

1. The present petition filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023¹ (erstwhile Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973²) seeks quashing of FIR No. 148/2017, registered under Sections 498A/406/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860³ and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, registered at P.S. Welcome and all other proceedings emanating therefrom.
2. The present FIR was registered pursuant to a complaint filed by Respondent No. 2 against her father-in-law (Petitioner No. 1), mother-in-law (Petitioner No. 2), and brother-in-law (Petitioner No. 3), alleging that they

¹ "BNSS"

² "Cr.P.C."



subjected her to physical and mental harassment and made unlawful demands for dowry. She further alleged that when her husband attempted to intervene and speak with the Petitioners regarding their conduct, they misbehaved with him and threatened to evict him from the house. Pursuant to the Complainant's statement, the subject FIR was registered.

3. The present petition is filed on the ground that the matter is amicably settled between the parties on their own free will, without any coercion, pressure or undue influence. Pursuant thereto, the parties have executed a Settlement Deed dated 25th April, 2023 before the Mediation Centre, Karkardooma Courts. A copy of the Settlement Deed is placed on record, and has been duly perused by the Court. As per its terms, Respondent No. 2 has agreed to give her no objection to the quashing of the FIR subject to the Petitioners withdrawing the debarment/*bedakhli* notice issued against the Complainant's husband.

4. Respondent No. 2, who is present before this Court and duly identified by the Investigating Officer, confirms that her decision to settle the matter is voluntary and made without any undue influence or coercion. She submits that she is presently residing happily with her husband, Faheem, and their daughter, Hafiza, in a separate accommodation. She further states that, pursuant to the settlement, Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have returned her *stridhan* and other personal articles, and have also withdrawn the '*bedakhli*' notice that had earlier been issued against her husband. In view of the amicable settlement, she states that she has no objection to the quashing of the impugned FIR. Accordingly, the Petitioners seeks quashing of the subject FIR and all proceedings arising therefrom.

³ "IPC"



5. The Court has considered the afore-noted facts. Notably, the offences under Section 498A of IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act are non-compoundable while offence under Section 406 of IPC is compoundable in certain cases.

6. It is well-established that the High Courts, in exercise of their powers under Section 528 of BNSS (formerly 482 of Cr.P.C.), can compound offences which are non-compoundable on the ground that there is a compromise between the accused and the complainant. In **Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr.**,⁴ the Supreme Court laid down guidelines for High Courts while accepting settlement deeds between parties and quashing the proceedings. The relevant observations in the said decision read as under:

“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on

⁴ (2014) 6 SCC 466



either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

7. Similarly, in the case of **Parbatbhai Aahir & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Anr.**,⁵ the Supreme Court had observed as under:

“16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:

16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.

16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even

⁵ (2017) 9 SCC 641



if the offence is non-compoundable.

16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.

16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.

16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.

16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.

16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.

16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.

16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the



domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

8. Considering the nature of dispute and the fact that the parties have amicably entered into a settlement, this Court is of the opinion that the present case is fit to exercise jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNSS as no purpose would be served by keeping the dispute alive and continuance of the proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of Court.
9. In view of the above, the impugned FIR No. 148/2017, P.S. Welcome and all other proceedings emanating therefrom are hereby quashed.
10. The present petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

SANJEEV NARULA, J

JULY 30, 2025/ab