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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

+ CRL.M.C. 1015/2025 & CRL.M.A. 4650/2025

PANKAJ KUMAR & ORS.

.....Petitioners

Through: Ms. Priyanka Verma, Advocate with
Petitioners in person

versus

STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANR.Respondents

Through: Mr. Ajay Vikram Singh, APP for the
State with ASI Inder Singh, PS Farsh
Bazar

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA

ORDER

% **25.07.2025**

1. The present petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023¹ (erstwhile Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973²) seeks quashing of FIR No. 145/2023 dated 18th April, 2023, registered under Sections 498A, 406 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860³ at P.S. Farsh Bazar and all other proceedings emanating therefrom. Subsequently, a chargesheet under Sections 498A, 406, 354 and 34 of IPC has also been filed against the Petitioners.

2. Petitioner No. 1 is the husband of Respondent No. 2. Petitioners No. 2 to 5 are the in-laws of Respondent No. 2. The marriage between Petitioner No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 was solemnized on 08th February, 2011 as per Hindu rites and ceremonies. They have one male child from the marriage.

3. Due to matrimonial discord and temperamental differences, the relationship between the parties deteriorated and they separated. Several

¹ "BNSS"

² "Cr.P.C."

³ "IPC"



efforts for reconciliation were made but to no avail. Subsequently, Respondent No. 2 filed a complaint against Petitioners, alleging that she was subjected to cruelty and harassment by them, which later culminated into the impugned FIR.

4. The present petition is filed on the ground that the matter has been amicably settled between the parties on their own free will, without any coercion, pressure or undue influence and a Deed of Settlement dated 11th January, 2024⁴ has been executed by Petitioner No. 1 and Respondent No. 2. As per the terms of the settlement, Respondent No. 2 has agreed to withdraw all proceedings pending before various Courts against the Petitioners. The parties also agreed that the custody of the minor child will remain with Respondent No. 2 and Petitioner No. 1 would have certain visitation rights. Moreover, pursuant to the settlement, Petitioner No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 have obtained a decree of divorce by mutual consent through order dated 07th September, 2024 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Courts, Shahdara, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.

5. In terms of the Settlement Deed, Petitioner No. 1 had agreed to pay a total sum of INR 8,50,000/- to Respondent No. 2 as full and final payment of all her claims/rights and entitlements arising from the marriage with Petitioner No. 1, including maintenance. Of the said amount, a sum of INR 50,000/- has been paid to Respondent No. 2 at the time of signing of the Settlement Deed. A sum of INR 3,00,000/- has been paid to Respondent No. 2 at the time of recording of first motion for seeking divorce under Section 13-B(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955⁵. A further sum of INR 2,50,000/-

⁴ "Settlement Deed"

⁵ "HMA"



has been given as a Fixed Deposit Receipt in the name of the minor son of the parties, at the time of recording of statement of second motion. The remaining amount of INR 2,50,000/- was agreed to be paid to Respondent No. 2 at the time of quashing of the impugned FIR. In light of the foregoing, counsel for the parties jointly prayed for the quashing of the impugned FIR.

6. The Court has considered the afore-noted facts and has perused the Settlement Deed. It is noted that as per the Settlement Deed, the parties have agreed that the amount of INR 8,50,000/- is full and final settlement of all claims of Respondent No. 2, including the claims of the minor child for maintenance. In this regard, it is pertinent to mention that the Supreme Court in ***Ganesh v. Sudhi Kumar Shrivastava***⁶ has observed as follows:

*“7. Before we part with, we must also express our reservation insofar as Para 6 is concerned, which was incorporated in the order on 8-11-2017 by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Aurangabad. **It was certainly open to the wife to give up any claim so far as maintenance or permanent alimony or stridhan is concerned but she could not have given up the rights which vest in the daughter insofar as maintenance and other issues are concerned.**”*

8. We, therefore, exercising our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, set aside Para 6 of the consent terms. Rest of the order stands unaltered and ought to be given effect to.”

[Emphasis supplied]

7. Thus, in light of the settled position of law, it is made clear that the Settlement Deed shall not affect the rights of the minor son of the parties.

8. Respondent No. 2, who is present before this Court and has been identified by her counsel confirms the statement and states that she has executed the same out of her own volition, without any force, coercion or undue influence. As regards the last payment which is supposed to be paid, the Petitioners, who are present before the Court in person and have been



identified by the concerned Investigating Officer, have handed over a copy of the demand draft bearing DD No. 622903, for the sum of INR 2,50,000/- drawn on Ujjivan Small Finance Bank dated 18th July, 2025 to Respondent No. 2. She confirms the receipt of the same and states that in light of the above, she has no objection if the impugned FIR is quashed. An affidavit to this effect is also on record.

9. The Court has considered the statements of the parties. Notably, the offence under Section 498A of IPC is non-compoundable while offence under Section 406 of IPC is compoundable in certain cases. It is well-established that the High Courts, in exercise of their powers under Section 528 of BNSS (formerly 482 of Cr.P.C.), can compound offences which are non-compoundable on the ground that there is a compromise between the accused and the complainant. In **Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr.**,⁷ the Supreme Court laid down guidelines for High Courts while accepting settlement deeds between parties and quashing the proceedings. The relevant observations in the said decision read as under:

“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

⁶ (2020) 20 SCC 787

⁷ (2014) 6 SCC 466



29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.”

[Emphasis supplied]

10. Similarly, in the case of **Parbatbhai Aahir & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Anr.**,⁸ the Supreme Court had observed as under:

“16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:

16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises

⁸ (2017) 9 SCC 641



and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.

16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.

16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.

16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.

16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.

16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.

16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for



quashing where parties have settled the dispute.

16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

11. Considering the nature of dispute and the fact that the parties have amicably entered into a settlement, this Court is of the opinion that the present case is fit to exercise jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNSS as no purpose would be served by keeping the dispute alive and continuance of the proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of Court.

12. In view of the above, the impugned FIR No. 145/2023 dated 18th April, 2023, registered under Sections 498A, 406 and 34 of the IPC at P.S. Farsh Bazar and all other proceedings emanating therefrom are hereby quashed.

13. Parties shall remain bound by the terms of the settlement.

14. The present petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

SANJEEV NARULA, J

JULY 25, 2025/ab