



* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**
+ **CRL.M.C. 177/2025 & CRL.M.A. 957/2025**

Reserved on: 15th January, 2025
Date of Decision: 4th February, 2025

DR. JAIRAM & ANR.Petitioners

Through: **Mr. Rajeev Saini and Mr. Atul Sharma, Advocates**

versus

STATE (NCT OF DELHI)Respondent

Through: **Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal, APP for the State.**

CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA

% **J U D G M E N T**

MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J:

1. This petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 ('BNSS') read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ('CrPC') has been filed by Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 seeking quashing of FIR No. 0601/2021 dated 08.10.2021 registered at P.S. Seemapuri, Shahdara, Delhi for offences under Sections 406/34/498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ('IPC') and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 ('DP Act'). This petition also seeks cancellation of the charge-sheet dated 15.11.2022 filed in the aforesaid FIR.

2. Facts which are relevant to adjudicate the present matters are as under: -

2.1. It is stated that Petitioner No. 1/accused no. 1 is the father-in-law and Petitioner No. 2/accused no. 2 is the mother-in-law of Respondent No.



2/complainant. It is stated that marriage between Respondent No. 2 and Sh. Nikhil Kumar Bankhad [only son of the Petitioners herein] was solemnised on 17.11.2010 and two daughters were born from their wedlock. It is stated that unfortunately, Sh. Nikhil Kumar Bankhad ('deceased') passed away on 28.05.2021 due to Corona and thereafter, Respondent No. 2 along with her two (2) minor daughters went to her parental home.

2.2. It is stated that the Petitioners were shocked when they came to know that Respondent No. 2 has filed the aforesaid FIR on 08.10.2021 under Sections 498-A/406/34 of IPC and Section 4 of DP Act against the Petitioners herein.

2.3. In the subject FIR, Respondent No. 2 has alleged that the Petitioners disliked her, as the Petitioners were not satisfied with the presents given by the parents of Respondent No. 2 at the time of her wedding. It is alleged that the Petitioners blamed and tortured her for death of her husband during the pandemic.

2.4. It is stated in the FIR that Petitioner No. 2 is the nominee in the insurance policy, PPF Account, savings bank account etc. of the deceased husband of Respondent No. 2. It is stated that Respondent No. 2 and her two minor daughters are the Class-I legal heirs of the deceased and are legally entitled to receive their shares from the said funds. It is stated that however, Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 have denied transfer of the said funds. It is stated that Respondent No. 2 has approached the concerned insurance companies and banks by filing claims for releasing the amounts to Respondent No. 2 and her minor daughters. However, the insurance companies and banks have not processed the claim application due to the non-cooperation of the Petitioners herein. It is stated that the properties to which Respondent No. 2 along with her minor daughters and Petitioner No. 2 is entitled to inherit are enlisted at



Table B (enclosed with the subject FIR); however, the said properties are being withheld by Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 and they have failed to transfer the Respondent No. 2 and her minor daughter's shares.

2.5. It is stated that Petitioner No. 1 has applied to deceased Shri Nikhil Kumar Bankhad's employer with a demand that all compensation and EPF payable to the deceased be transferred to Petitioner No. 1. It is stated that Petitioner No. 1 is not a Class-I legal heir and therefore, he could not make the said request and collect the said amount. It is stated that the said funds should be received by Respondent No. 2 and her minor daughters, being the Class-I legal heirs of the deceased.

2.6. It is further alleged that the Petitioners did not allow Respondent No. 2 to work after the demise of Shri Nikhil Kumar Bankhad on ground that the Petitioners never wanted to take care of their grand-daughters. It is stated that Respondent No. 2 was forced to leave the matrimonial home on 07.07.2021 by the Petitioners and return to her parental home. It is stated that Respondent No. 2 was not permitted to bring her car to the parental home even though the said car was gifted by her parents. It is stated that the belongings of Respondent No. 2 lying at the matrimonial home have been enlisted in Table C (enclosed with the subject FIR). It is stated that Respondent No. 2 had approached the Petitioners, through an NGO named National Human Rights Organization on 24.07.2021 and 28.07.2021 to take back her belongings but the said request was not acceded to.

2.7. It is alleged that the Petitioners are neither allowing Respondent No. 2 in her matrimonial home nor allowing her to use or take her belongings which are kept in the matrimonial home.

2.8. It is stated that the Stridhan belonging to Respondent No. 2 including her car enlisted in Table A (enclosed with the subject FIR) and the same is



lying at the matrimonial home with Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2. It is stated that the said Table A consists of articles gifted at the time of marriage.

2.9. It is stated that in these facts, Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 have committed criminal breach of trust and have criminally misappropriated Respondent No. 2's property and are using the said property without Respondent No. 2's consent.

3. The charge-sheet dated 15.11.2022 filed in the subject FIR, records that during investigation Petitioner No. 1 had brought some of the dowry items to the police station and had handed over the same to Respondent No. 2. It is stated that the list of articles handed over was duly documented and photographed. It is stated that charge-sheet has been filed under Sections 498-A/406/34 IPC, as the same were found to be on clear merit and the challan was filed under these sections. It is stated that there was no evidence of commission of offence under Section 4 of DP Act and hence, the said section was removed.

4. The matter is listed before the Trial Court on 03.03.2025 for arguments on charge.

Submissions on behalf of the Petitioners

5. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners stated that the allegations levelled in the aforesaid FIR are vague, general in nature, non-specific, without mentioning of the precise time and location.

5.1. He stated that the said FIR has been filed after 11 years of the marriage and after the death of the Petitioners' son, as an afterthought to pressurize the Petitioners to succumb to the demands of Respondent No. 2 and to take away the hard-earned money as well as the self-acquired property of the Petitioners.



5.2. He stated that the present FIR is a total misuse of the Section 498-A IPC, as the essential ingredients to constitute the offence under Section 498-A IPC are not fulfilled and, therefore, the present FIR should be quashed by this Court. He stated that the Stridhan and all other items belonging to Respondent No. 2 have either already been taken by Respondent No. 2 or were returned to Respondent No. 2 by the Petitioners during the proceedings before Crime Against Women ('CAW') Cell.

5.3. He stated that the disputes relating to Petitioner no. 2's nominee status in the Life Insurance or the ownership of joint bank accounts of Petitioner No. 2 with the deceased son is a matter of civil nature and Respondent No. 2 has already initiated civil proceedings before the Civil Court for the same.

5.4. He stated that the Petitioners have paid considerable money to Respondent No. 2 to manage herself and their grand-daughters, before as well as after the death of their son.

5.5. He stated that the Petitioners are senior citizens, who are managing their medical and personal affairs independently and they are not legally obliged to provide financial support to Respondent No. 2 or their granddaughters. However, out of love and affection for their granddaughters, the Petitioners have continued to make payments despite the false allegations made against them.

5.6. He further stated that the Petitioners have made several attempts to reach an amicable settlement with Respondent No. 2, which have been rejected due to Respondent No. 2's desire to extract as much money as possible from the Petitioners.

5.7. He stated that the charge-sheet dated 15.11.2022 is an exact replica of the aforesaid FIR lodged by Respondent No. 2/complainant and it does not



provide any new insight into the allegations made by Respondent No. 2 in her complaint.

5.8. He fairly stated that Petitioner No. 2, who is the nominee in the PPF account of the deceased son and the joint account holder of the HDFC savings account held with the deceased son, has not remitted to Respondent No. 2 and the granddaughters their 3/4th share in the said amounts. He stated that in the joint bank account with HDFC, there is balance of Rs. 7.62 lakhs (approximately) and in the PPF account, there is a balance of Rs. 38.60 lakhs (approximately).

5.9. He stated that the subject FIR is liable to quashed as the allegations in the subject FIR do not prima facie constitute an offence. The allegations of harassment lack supporting evidence. He stated that FIR is motivated by bad faith to coerce the Petitioners to agree to the demands of Respondent No. 2 who has also filed proceedings under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and Civil proceedings for her claims in the estate of deceased Nikhil Kumar Bankhad.

5.10. In support of his submissions, he relied upon the judgments of Supreme Court in **Digambar v. State of Maharashtra**¹ and **Kailashben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Maharashtra**².

Analysis

6. This Court has considered the submission of the learned counsel for the Petitioners and perused the record.

7. In the facts of the present case, it is stated that the deceased Nikhil Kumar Bankhad died intestate and was survived by his father Petitioner No. 1, his mother Petitioner No. 2, his wife Respondent No. 2 and his two minor

¹ 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3836

² 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2621



daughters. It is stated that Petitioner No. 2, Respondent No. 2 and his two minor daughters are his only Class-I legal heirs.

Section 406/34 IPC

8. The Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 admits that deceased Nikhil Kumar Bankhad held monies in his HDFC savings bank account held jointly with Petitioner No. 2, in the PPF account, where Petitioner No. 2 is a nominee and insurance policies, where Petitioner No. 2 is a nominee. It is well settled that nominee does not have the absolute right of ownership to the monies and in fact holds the monies in trust for the natural legal heirs. The nominee, who has been nominated to receive the benefit of an asset on the death of the actual owner of the asset, can merely serve as a trustee, holding the position of responsibility rather than ownership over the asset of the deceased. At this juncture it would be apposite to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in **Shakti Yezdani v. Jayanand Jayant Salgaonkar**³, wherein the Apex Court has held that a nomination does not bestow absolute ownership of the nominated asset in favour of the nominee. Instead, the established principles of succession remain intact and unaffected by such nominations. Consequently, the legal heirs retain their rightful claims, undiminished by the act of nomination. The Supreme Court in the said judgment held as under: -

“41. A consistent view appears to have been taken by the courts, while interpreting the related provisions of nomination under different statutes. It is clear from the referred judgments that the nomination so made would not lead to the nominee attaining absolute title over the subject property for which such nomination was made. In other words, the usual mode of succession is not to

³ (2024) 4 SCC 642



be impacted by such nomination. The legal heirs therefore have not been excluded by virtue of nomination.

...

43. Similarly, there are variations with respect to the word “vest” being present in some legislations (the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952) and absent in others (the Insurance Act, 1939, the Cooperative Societies Act, 1912). Looking at the dissimilarities and the fact that uniform definition is not available relating to the rights of “nominee” and/or whether such “nomination” bestows absolute ownership over nominees, it is only appropriate that the terms are considered as ordinarily understood by a reasonable person making nominations, with respect to their movable or immovable properties. A reasonable individual arranging for the disposition of his property is expected to undertake any such nomination, bearing in mind the interpretation on the effect of nomination, as given by courts consistently, for a number of years. The concept of nomination if interpreted by departing from the well-established manner would, in our view, cause major ramifications and create significant impact on disposition of properties left behind by deceased nominators.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

9. The essential ingredients of constituting an offence of criminal breach of trust have been enunciated by the Supreme Court in its judgment in **Asoke Basak v. State of Maharashtra**⁴. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is as under: -

“21. It is plain that for constituting an offence of criminal breach of trust, the following ingredients must be satisfied:

(a) a person should have been entrusted with property, or entrusted with dominion over property;

(b) that person should dishonestly misappropriate or convert to his own use that property, or dishonestly use or dispose of that

⁴ (2010) 10 SCC 66



property or wilfully suffer any other person to do so;

(c) that such misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal should be in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract which the person has made, touching the discharge of such trust.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

10. In the instant case, it is a matter of fact that Respondent No. 2 and her two minor daughters, as well as Petitioner No. 2, all are Class-I legal heirs of the deceased, Nikhil Kumar Bankhad. And, there is sufficient indication in the subject FIR, as well as the charge-sheet that Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2, who have been entrusted with the benefits of the proceeds from the insurance policies, bank accounts, and PPF of the deceased, Nikhil Kumar Bankhad are trying to utilise the said proceeds for their own benefit and to the exclusion of Respondent No. 2 and her two minor daughters.

11. To the extent of the PPF account and the HDFC savings bank account there is no dispute that the said monies ought to be distributed equally between all the Class-I legal heirs; however, Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 have failed to distribute the said amount. Nikhil Kumar Bankhad died in May, 2021 and the Petitioners have till date failed to transfer the amounts due to Respondent No. 2 and her minor children. Furthermore, learned counsel for the Petitioners, during arguments was unable to justify the stance of Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 in withholding the amounts collected by them from PPF, savings bank account, insurance, etc. upon the death of Nikhil Kumar Bankhad, despite admitting that Respondent No. 2 and the minor children are entitled to 3/4th of the estate of the deceased.

In these admitted facts, this Court prima facie is of the opinion that the averments made in the subject FIR suggest that Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2



have committed the offence under Section 405 of IPC punishable under Section 406 of IPC and the contentions raised by the Petitioners for quashing the subject FIR do not provide a sufficient basis for this Court to quash the subject FIR.

12. The Supreme Court in **Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Limited and Others**⁵, while discussing the scope of jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 of CrPC, has held that where in the facts of a case, which may make out a case of a civil wrong as also a criminal offence, the availability of the civil remedy is not a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The Apex Court held that the test in that case is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow: -

“12. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. ...The principles, relevant to our purpose are:

(i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused.

For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint.

(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with *mala fides*/malice for wreaking

⁵ (2006) 6 SCC 736



vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.

(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.

(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence.

(v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

13. From the above understanding of the settled law, the contention of the Petitioners that Respondent No. 2 and the minor children have already availed their civil remedy for recovery of the said amounts before the Civil Court would not be a bar to pursue the criminal proceedings, as Petitioner No. 2's action in wrongfully withholding the amounts received by her in trust would certainly amount to a criminal breach of trust. Since, Petitioner No. 1 is also colluding with Petitioner No. 2 in withholding the said amount and thus, he as well would be liable by virtue of Section 34 IPC.



Section 498-A IPC

14. The Supreme Court in **U. Suvetha v. State**⁶, has laid down the ingredients to constitute the offence under Section 498-A IPC. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow: -

“7. Ingredients of Section 498-A of the Penal Code are:

- (a) The woman must be married;
- (b) She must be subjected to cruelty or harassment; and
- (c) Such cruelty or harassment must have been shown either by husband of the woman or by the relative of her husband.”

15. Further, the Supreme Court in **State of Andhra Pradesh v. M. Madhusudhan Rao**⁷, has held that for the purposes of Section 498-A IPC, that harassment amounts to cruelty, only when harassment is committed for the purpose of coercing a woman or any other person related to her to meet an unlawful demand for property, etc. The relevant portion of the judgment read as under: -

“16. In order to appreciate the rival stands, it would be useful to notice the statutory provisions. Section 498-A IPC makes “cruelty” by husband or his relatives a punishable offence. The word “cruelty” is defined in the Explanation appended to the said section.

17. Thus, providing a new dimension to the concept of “cruelty”, clause (a) of Explanation to Section 498-A IPC postulates that any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide would constitute “cruelty”. Such wilful conduct, which is likely to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman would also amount to “cruelty”. Clause (b) of the Explanation provides that harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand,

⁶ (2009) 6 SCC 757

⁷ (2008) 15 SCC 582



would also constitute “cruelty” for the purpose of Section 498-A IPC.

18. It is plain that as per clause (b) of the Explanation, which, according to learned counsel for the State, is attracted in the instant case, every harassment does not amount to “cruelty” within the meaning of Section 498-A IPC. The definition stipulates that the harassment has to be with a definite object of coercing the woman or any person related to her to meet an unlawful demand. In other words, for the purpose of Section 498-A IPC, harassment simpliciter is not “cruelty” and it is only when harassment is committed for the purpose of coercing a woman or any other person related to her to meet an unlawful demand for property, etc. that it amounts to “cruelty” punishable under Section 498-A IPC.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

16. The subject FIR as well as the charge-sheet filed therein, records the Respondent No. 2/complainant’s statement to the effect that on 07.07.2021, the Petitioners herein forced Respondent No. 2 to leave her matrimonial home and that Respondent No. 2 was further denied to take back her Maruti Zen Estilo car, which was gifted by Respondent No. 2’s father at the time of her marriage. The Respondent No. 2 has alleged that despite several requests by Respondent No. 2 to permit her stay in the matrimonial home, the Petitioners have not let her return to stay in her matrimonial home. It is alleged in the complaint that the Petitioners are making efforts to claim the money to be inherited upon the death of Nikhil Kumar Bankhad to which the Respondent No. 2 and her minors’ daughters are rightfully entitled to and this has led to disputes between the parties leading to her not being permitted to return to her matrimonial home. The said allegations in the FIR against the Petitioners including their action of wrongfully withholding the amounts which have been received by Petitioner No. 2 as a nominee of the deceased Nikhil Kumar Bankhad, and failing to transfer the said amounts to



Respondent No. 2, as per her legal rights and not returning the belongings of Respondent No. 2 to Respondent No. 2 would constitute cruelty and attract Explanation (b) of Section 498-A IPC.

17. The Respondent No. 2 in Table B (enclosed with the subject FIR) has furnished a list of properties which belonged to the deceased Nikhil Kumar Bankhad and to which she along with her two minor daughter is entitled to inherit, being the Class-I legal heirs of the deceased. There is no dispute in the entire petition with respect to the correctness of the said list. In the petition there is no dispute that Respondent No. 2 and her minor daughters have not been given their due share in the said properties.

18. The FIR and the charge-sheet refers to Table A being the list of articles which have been described by Respondent no. 2 as Stridhan, as well as Table C being the list of articles belonging to Respondent No. 2 and her minor daughters, which are still lying at the matrimonial home. As per the charge-sheet some of the dowry articles were returned by Petitioner No. 1 to Respondent No. 2. The issue of the existence and non-return of the remaining articles of Table A and Table C would be decided during trial, however, in these allegations it is not permissible for the Petitioner to contend that prima facie no offence under Sections 498-A/406/34 IPC has been made out.

19. The Petitioners herein have relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in **Digambar and Another v. The State of Maharashtra and Another** (supra) and **Kailashben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Maharashtra** (supra) to contend that since the essential ingredients to constitute the offence under Section 498-A IPC are not met in the present case, the subject FIR and the charge-sheet should be quashed; and to further



contend that the criminal proceedings can be quashed even after filing of the charge-sheet.

20. In **Digambar and Another v. The State of Maharashtra and Another** (supra), the complainant/wife had filed the complaint/FIR under Section 498-A/312/313/34 IPC against her husband and her parents-in-law alleging about the forced abortion and physical and mental cruelty. The Apex Court returned a finding that the said complaint was filed after the notice of Divorce was given by the complainant, however, the allegations made in the complaint were not even mentioned in the notice of Divorce. Based upon the said finding, the Apex Court held that the complainant had initiated the criminal proceedings with a motive to pressurise her husband into consenting to divorce as per the complainant's terms and to use the said proceedings as a tool in the ongoing personal conflict between the couple. The Apex Court also recorded that the facts stated in the complaint/FIR did not reveal any specific instance of cruelty committed against the complainant. In view of the said findings, the criminal proceedings initiated by the complainant/wife were quashed by the Apex Court.

The facts of the case in the **Digambar and Another v. The State of Maharashtra and Another** (supra) are different from the facts of the present case. In the present case, the facts stated in the subject FIR and the charge-sheet if taken at their face value indicates incidents of cruelty committed by the Petitioners herein against Respondent No. 2.

21. In **Kailashben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Maharashtra** (supra), the husband instituted a civil suit against defendants therein (his father, step-mother and step-brother), whereas, the complainant had made a deliberate choice to exclude her husband from the criminal proceedings initiated against the accused persons (father-in-law, step mother-in-law, step



brother-in-law and the Munim) particularly when all the allegations revolved around demand of dowry. The Apex Court in the said case decided to quash the FIR and charge-sheet on the ground that the provocation for the complaint/FIR was essentially the property dispute between father and son. Further, the Apex Court had returned a finding that none of the ingredients of Sections 498-A/323/504/506 read with Section 34 IPC were made out.

However, in the present case, as already stated hereinabove that the averments made in the subject FIR and contents of the charge-sheet dated 15.11.2022 taken at their face value, disclose the essential ingredients for commission of the offences under Sections 498-A/406/34 IPC.

22. Therefore, the judgment of the Supreme Court in **Digambar and Another v. The State of Maharashtra and Another** (supra) and **Kailashben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Maharashtra** (supra) relied upon by the Petitioners do not help the case of the Petitioners herein.

23. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in **State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others**⁸, has laid down the categories, wherein this Court can invoke its inherent jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings under Section 482 of CrPC. Keeping in view the aforesaid observations, this Court is of the opinion that the present matter is not a fit case, wherein such power could be exercised by this Court to quash the subject FIR.

Conclusion

24. In the overall conspectus of the facts and considering the acts done by the Petitioners, a prima facie case is made out that the offence has been committed by the Petitioners under Sections 406/34/498-A IPC, which finds mention in FIR No. 0601/2021 dated 08.10.2021 registered at P.S. Seemapuri, Shahdara, Delhi and charge-sheet dated 15.11.2022 filed in the

⁸ 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335



said FIR. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to grant the reliefs for quashing the subject FIR and the charge-sheet filed therein, as sought by the Petitioners herein.

25. Needless to state, but any observation made herein shall not be construed as an expression on merits of the matter before the Trial Court.

26. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.

MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J

February 04, 2025/mt/MG

Click here to check corrigendum, if any