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2025:PHHC:159848



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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH

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Guddi Kaur

....Petitioner

versus

State of Punjab

....Respondent

Date of decision: November 18, 2025

Date of Uploading: November 18, 2025

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL

Present:- Mr. Hitesh Verma, Advocate for the petitioner.

Mr. Baljinder Singh Sra, Additional AG Punjab.

SUMEET GOEL, J. (ORAL)

Present petition has been filed under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short 'BNSS') for grant of regular bail to the petitioner in case bearing FIR No.261 dated 18.06.2025, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 21 & 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short 'NDPS Act') (Section 29 of the NDPS Act added later on), at Police Station City Barnala, District Barnala.

2. The gravamen of the allegations against the petitioner is that he is an accused of being involved in an FIR pertaining to NDPS Act involving 14 bottles of intoxicant syrup, labeled WINGS PHARMA, each bottle containing 100 ML and intoxicant powder (Heroin), weighing 90 grams,

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allegedly recovered from the co-accused of the petitioner, namely, Chamkaur Singh, and said co-accused nominated the present petitioner in his disclosure.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the petitioner is in custody since 07.07.2025. Learned counsel has further argued that the petitioner has been falsely implicated into the FIR in question. Learned counsel has argued that mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act have not scrupulously been complied with, and thus, the prosecution case suffers from inherent defects. Learned counsel has further iterated that assuming *arguando*, the prosecution version is taken to be correct, prime prosecution evidence available against the petitioner is in the shape of disclosure statement of co-accused, namely, Chamkaur Singh. Learned counsel has further iterated that the petitioner has suffered incarceration for more than 04 months. Thus, regular bail is prayed for.

4. Learned State counsel has opposed the present petition by arguing that the allegations raised against the petitioner are serious in nature and, thus, the petitioner does not deserve the concession of the regular bail. Learned State counsel seeks to place on record custody certificate dated 17.11.2025, in the Court today, which is taken on record.

5. I have heard counsel for the rival parties and have gone through the available records of the case.

6. The petitioner was arrested on 07.07.2025 and is in continuous custody since then. The culmination of investigation as also trial emanating therefrom, in case occasion so arises, will take its own time. The petitioner has been implicated as an accused in the FIR in question solely on the basis

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of disclosure statement of co-accused, namely, Chamkaur Singh from whom the alleged contraband was recovered. As per the prosecution version, there is no other material available to connect the petitioner with the contraband except for the said disclosure statement. It is pertinent to note that such disclosure statements, in the absence of corroborative evidence hold limited evidentiary value and cannot be sole basis for implicating the petitioner. The reliance on this unsubstantiated statement raises serious doubts about the fairness and objectivity of the investigation. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was not present at the spot. The veracity and weightage required to be attached to the disclosure statement made by the co-accused will be fully tested at the time of trial. The rival contentions raised at Bar give rise to debatable issues, which shall be ratiocinated upon during the course of trial. This Court does not deem it appropriate to delve deep into these rival contentions, at this stage, *lest* it may prejudice the trial. Nothing tangible has been brought forward to indicate the likelihood of the petitioner absconding from the process of justice or interfering with the prosecution evidence.

6.1. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer to a judgment passed by this Court in *Anshul Sardana versus State of Punjab*, passed in **CRM-M-65094-2024** (2025: PHHC:004198), wherein, after relying upon the *ratio decidendi* of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tofan Singh versus State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2020 Supreme Court 5592; Smt. Najmunisha, Abdul Hamid Chandmiya @ Ladoo Bapu versus State of Gujrat, Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 INSC 290; State by (NCB) Bengaluru vs. Pallulabid Ahmad Arimutta & Anr.', 2022 (1) RCR (Criminal) 762; and Vijay Singh vs. The State of Haryana, bearing Special

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Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.(s) 1266/2023, decided on 17.05.2023, has held thus:

“6.3 *It is a well established principle of law that a confession made by a co-accused under Section 67 of the NDPS Act is inherently a very weak piece of evidence. Such statement(s), by themselves, cannot form the sole basis for the conviction of an individual and must be scrutinized with utmost caution in conjunction with other substantive evidence. Moreover, no recovery has been effected from the possession of the petitioner, who has been subsequently implicated as an accused solely on the basis of disclosure statement of the co-accused. However, as regular bail pertains to life and liberty of individual, Courts are obligated to strike a balance between safeguarding personal liberty and ensuring the effective administration of justice as also investigation. The final evidentiary value and admissibility of the disclosure statement made by a co-accused fall within the domain of the trial Court and are to be adjudicated during the course of the trial in accordance with established principles of law. However, while adjudicating a plea for regular bail, this Court cannot remain oblivious to the circumstances under which the petitioner has been arraigned or implicated, including the nature of the allegations, the evidence linking the petitioner to the offence as well as the specific role attributed to the petitioner in the commission of the alleged offence. A prima facie examination of these factors is essential to ensure that the process of law is not misused, abused or misdirected.*”

6.2. Further, this Court in the case of ***Jaswinder Singh alias Kala versus State of Punjab*** passed in ***CRM-M-33729-2025*** (2025:PHHC:089161) has held thus:

“14. *As a sequitur to above-said rumination, the following postulates emerge:*

(I) (i) *A bail plea on merits; in respect of an FIR under NDPS Act of 1985 involving offence(s) under Section 19 or Section 24 or Section 27-A thereof and for offence(s) involving commercial quantity; is essentially required to meet with the rigour(s) of Section 37 of NDPS Act.*

(ii) *The rigour(s) of Section 37 of NDPS Act do not apply to a bail plea(s) on medical ground(s), interim bail on account of any exigency including the reason of demise of a close family relative etc.*

(iii) *The rigour(s) of Section 37 of NDPS Act pale into oblivion when bail is sought for on account of long incarceration in view of Article 21 of the Constitution of India i.e. where the bail-applicant has suffered long under-trial custody, the trial is procrastinating and folly thereof is not attributable to such bail-applicant.*

II. *The twin conditions contained in Section 37(1)(b) of NDPS Act are in addition to the conditions/parameters contained in Cr.P.C./BNSS or any other applicable extant law.*

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- III. *The twin conditions contained in Section 37(1)(b) of NDPS Act are cumulative in nature and not alternative i.e. both the conditions are required to be satisfied for a bail-plea to be successful.*
- IV. *For consideration by bail Court of the condition stipulated in Section 37(1)(b)(i) of NDPS Act i.e. “there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence”:*
- (i) *The bail Court ought to sift through all relevant material, including case-dairy, exclusively for the limited purpose of adjudicating such bail plea.*
- (ii) *Such consideration, concerning the assessment of guilt or innocence, should not mirror the same degree of scrutiny required for an acquittal of the accused at the final adjudication & culmination of trial.*
- (iii) *Plea(s) of defence by applicant-accused, if any, including material/documents in support thereof, may be looked into by the bail-Court while adjudicating such bail plea.*
- V. *For consideration of the condition stipulated in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) i.e. ‘he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail’:*
- (i) *The word ‘likely’ ought to be interpreted as requiring a demonstrable and substantial probability of re-offending by the bail-applicant, rather than a mere theoretical one, as no Court can predict future conduct of the bail-applicant.*
- (ii) *The entire factual matrix of a given case including the antecedents of the bail-applicant, role ascribed to him, and the nature of offence are required to be delved into. However, the involvement of bail-applicant in another NDPS/other offence cannot ipso facto result in the conclusion of his propensity for committing offence in the future.*
- (iii) *The bail-Court may, at the time of granting bail, impose upon the applicant-accused a condition that he would submit, at such regular time period/interval as may stipulated by the Court granting bail, an affidavit before concerned Special Judge of NDPS Court/Illaq (Jurisdictional) Judicial Magistrate/concerned Police Station, to the effect that he has not been involved in commission of any offence after being released on bail. In the facts of a given case, imposition of such condition may be considered to be sufficient for satisfaction of condition enumerated in Section 37(1)(b)(ii).*
- VI. *There is no gainsaying that the nature, mode and extent of exercise of power by a Court; while satisfying itself regarding the conditions stipulated in Section 37 of NDPS Act; shall depend upon the judicial discretion exercised by such Court in the facts and circumstances of a given case. No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down as to what would constitute parameters for satisfaction of requirement under Section 37 (ibid) as every case*

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has its own unique facts/circumstances. Making such an attempt is nothing but a utopian endeavour. Ergo, this issue is best left to the judicial wisdom and discretion of the Court dealing with such matter.”

6.3. In this view of the matter, the rigor imposed under Section 37 of the NDPS Act stands diluted.

6.4. The petitioner is a lady aged about 54 years (as per memo of parties), hence, bail petition ought to be considered in view of proviso to Section 480(2) BNSS. It is pertinent to mention herein that the proviso to Section 480 BNSS, 2023, is *pari materia* with proviso to Section 437 Cr.P.C., 1973. In this regard, it would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment passed by this Court on 14.03.2024 in **CRM-M-11503-2024** titled as **‘Ravinder Kaur Vs. State of Punjab’** (dealing with proviso to Section 437 Cr.P.C.), relevant thereof reads as under:

“It would be apposite to refer herein to the dicta of a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case of ‘Satender Kumar Antil Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr., 2022(10) SCC 51’, which held as under: 51. Proviso to Section 437 of the Code mandates that when the accused is under the age of sixteen years, sick or infirm or being a woman, is something which is required to be taken note of. Obviously, the court has to satisfy itself that the accused person is sick or infirm. In a case pertaining to women, the court is expected to show some sensitivity. We have already taken note of the fact that many women who commit cognizable offenses are poor and illiterate. In many cases, upon being young they have children to take care of, and there are many instances when the children are to live in prisons. The statistics would show that more than 1000 children are living in prisons along with their mothers. This is an aspect that the courts are expected to take note of as it would not only involve the interest of the accused, but also the children who are not expected to get exposed to the prisons. There is a grave danger of their being inherited not only with poverty but with crime as well.

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58. Section 437 of the Code empowers the Magistrate to deal with all the offenses while considering an application for bail with the exception of an offense punishable either with life imprisonment or death triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions. The first proviso facilitates a court to conditionally release on bail an accused if he is under the age of 16 years or is a woman or is sick or infirm, as discussed earlier. This being a welfare legislation, though introduced by way of a proviso, has to be applied while considering release on bail either by the Court of Sessions or the High Court, as the case may be. The power under Section 439 of the Code is exercised against an order rejecting an application for bail and

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against an offence exclusively decided by the Court of Sessions. There cannot be a divided application of proviso to Section 437, while exercising the power under Section 439. While dealing with a welfare legislation, a purposive interpretation giving the benefit to the needy person being the intendment is the role required to be played by the court. We do not wish to state that this proviso has to be considered favourably in all cases as the application depends upon the facts and circumstances contained therein. What is required is the consideration per se by the court of this proviso among other factors.”

7. As per custody certificate dated 17.11.2025 filed by the learned State counsel, the petitioner has already suffered incarceration for a period of 04 months and 09 days. Further, as per the said custody certificate, the petitioner is stated to be involved in other FIR(s). However, this factum cannot be a ground sufficient by itself, to decline the concession of regular bail to the petitioner in the FIR in question when a case is made out for grant of regular bail *qua* the FIR in question by ratiocinating upon the facts/circumstances of the said FIR. Reliance in this regard can be placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ***Maulana Mohd. Amir Rashadi v. State of U.P. and another, 2012 (1) RCR (Criminal) 586***, a Division Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in case of ***Sridhar Das v. State, 1998 (2) RCR (Criminal) 477*** & judgments of this Court in CRM-M No.38822-2022 titled as ***Akhilesh Singh v. State of Haryana***, decided on 29.11.2021, and ***Balraj v. State of Haryana, 1998 (3) RCR (Criminal) 191***.

Suffice to say, further detention of the petitioner as an undertrial is not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.

8. In view of above, the present petition is allowed. Petitioner is ordered to be released on regular bail on her furnishing bail/surety bonds to the satisfaction of the Ld. concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate. However,

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in addition to conditions that may be imposed by the concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate, the petitioner shall remain bound by the following conditions:

- (i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.
- (ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral or documentary, during the trial.
- (iii) The petitioner shall not absent herself on any date before the trial.
- (iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail.
- (v) The petitioner shall deposit her passport, if any, with the trial Court.
- (vi) The petitioner shall give her cellphone number to the Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station and shall not change her cell-phone number without prior permission of the trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate.
- (vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the trial.
- (viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of every month, an affidavit, before the concerned trial Court, to the effect that she has not been involved in commission of any offence after being released on bail. In case the petitioner is found to be involved in any offence after her being enlarged on bail in the present FIR, on the basis of her affidavit or otherwise, the State is mandated to move, forthwith, for cancellation of her bail which plea, but of course, shall be ratiocinated upon merits thereof.

9. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those which may be imposed by concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate as directed hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the State/complainant shall be at liberty to move cancellation of bail of the petitioner.

10. Ordered accordingly.

11. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.

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12. Since the main case has been decided, pending miscellaneous application, if any, shall also stands disposed off.

(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE

November 18, 2025
mahavir

Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No

Whether reportable: Yes/No