



IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH

CRA-S-3526-2024

Date of Decision:25.02.2025

Niranjan

...Appellant

vs.

State of Haryana and Anr.

...Respondents

Coram : Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.S.Shekhawat

Present : Mr. Mukesh Kumar Sharma, Advocate
for the appellant.

Mr. Rajinder Kumar Banku, Deputy Advocate General, Haryana.

N.S.Shekhawat J. (Oral)

1. The appellant has filed the present appeal under Section 14-A of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') against the impugned order dated 17.08.2024, passed by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Sonipat, whereby the bail application filed by the present appellant was ordered to be dismissed.

2. The F.I.R in the present case was registered on the basis of the statement made by Pyare Lal son of Diwan Singh and the same has been reproduced below:-

“To the S.H.O. PS Barauda (Sonipat), Sir, it is respectfully submitted that I Pyare Lal S/o Diwan Singh caste Valmiki resident of village Balhamba. I and Sham Lal S/o Teka Ram, who is my grandson in relation, both of us guard the agricultural land of the Zamindars for the last many years. On 14.02.2021 at around 10.30 I and Sham Lal were going to round the fields that

when we reached near Bambhewa Canal, we found that Lilla S/o Balwan and his driver and two other persons were drinking there who gave me and Sham Lal liquor to drink then a verbal fight arose with Lala and others. That Lilla and his associates attacked with the sticks in their hands and gave injuries on various parts of body with kicks and punches. Due to injuries caused in the quarrel, my relatives Anil and villagers got admitted at PGI Khanpur and the doctor referred us to PGI Rohtak from there and during treatment Shyam Lal S/o Tek Ram died at PGI Rohtak due to injuries caused due to quarrel. Legal proceedings be initiated against Lilla S/o Balwan resident of Bhawar and his associates. Sd/- Pyare Lal Applicant Pyare Lal S/o Diwan Singh village Balhamba”.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant was not initially named in the FIR, nor any allegations were levelled against him. In fact, all the allegations were primarily levelled against Lila and Mewa (Sarpanch) and the appellant was implicated later on, due to enmity in village. He further contends that during the course of investigation, it has been alleged that the co-accused of the appellant had suffered a statement in police custody and on the strength of the same, the appellant was also arrayed as an accused in the present case. He further contends that even no offence under Section 3 of the “Act” was made out against any of the accused as merely committing of an offence against the member of scheduled caste should not automatically invoke the provisions of the “Act”. It must be shown that the accused was aware of the caste of the victim and the offence was committed with an intention to target a victim belonging to scheduled caste. Learned counsel further contends that the appellant and his family members had moved several representations including the representation dated 26.04.2021 (Annexure P-2) to the higher police officers

to investigate the matter fairly as the appellant was involved in the crime, still no action was taken by the senior officers of the police. He further contends that in the present case, the appellant was arrested on 23.02.2021 and is in custody for the last about 04 years. The prosecution had initially examined only one witness and after his examination, the application under Section 319 Cr.P.C was filed. The prayer to summon the additional accused was partly accepted and Rajesh, co-accused was summoned to face trial along with the other accused. Now, the trial will start *de novo* and the custody of the appellant may not serve any meaningful purpose.

4. On the other hand learned State counsel has vehemently opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant on the ground that the appellant had actively participated in the commission of crime and had caused injuries to the deceased. Even, he was the driver of the car, which was used in the commission of crime and a bamboo *danda* and clothes of the deceased were recovered at the instance of the present appellant.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

6. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of **“Ranjan Dwivedi Vs. CBI, through the Director General, 2012(8) SCC 495; 2012 (4) RCR (Criminal) 880”** as follows:-

“14. In *Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab*, (supra), another Constitution Bench considered the right to speedy trial and opined that the delay is dependent on the circumstances of each case, because reasons for delay will vary. This Court held :

"84. The right to a speedy trial is a derivation from a provision of Magna Carta. This principle has also been incorporated into the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 and from there into the Sixth Amendment of the

Constitution of United States of America which reads, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial...". It may be pointed out, in this connection, that there is a Federal Act of 1974 called 'Speedy Trial Act' establishing a set of time-limits for carrying out the major events, e.g., information, indictment, arraignment, in the prosecution of criminal cases. [See Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edn. page 1400].

85. The right to a speedy trial is not only an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration, to minimise anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation and to limit the possibility of impairing the ability of an accused to defend himself but also there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial. This right has been actuated in the recent past and the courts have laid down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. In fact, lot of cases are coming before the courts for quashing of proceedings on the ground of inordinate and undue delay stating that the invocation of this right even need not await formal indictment or charge.

86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result from impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of the commission of the offence till it consummates into a finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be noted that the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial is properly reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

87. This Court in *Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary*, AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1360, State of Bihar while dealing

with Article 21 of the Constitution of India has observed thus: (SCC p. 89, para 5)

"No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21. Would he be entitled to be released unconditionally freed from the charge levelled against him on the ground that trying him after an unduly long period of time and convicting him after such trial would constitute violation of his fundamental right under Article 21."

See also (1) Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (I), (2) Hussainara Khatoon (I) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (3) Hussainara Khatoon (IV) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna, (4) Hussainara Khatoon (VI) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Govt. of Bihar, Patna, (5) Kadra Pahadia v. State of Bihar (II), (6) T.V. Vatheeswaran v. State of T.N., and (7) Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak. 88. Thus this Court by a line of judicial pronouncements has emphasised and re-emphasised that speedy trial is one of the facets of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21 and the law must ensure 'reasonable, just and fair' procedure which has a creative connotation after the decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi."

The Court further observed :

"92. Of course, no length of time is per se too long to pass scrutiny under this principle nor the accused is called upon

the show the actual prejudice by delay of disposal of cases. On the other hand, the court has to adopt a balancing approach by taking note of the possible prejudices and disadvantages to be suffered by the accused by avoidable delay and to determine whether the accused in a criminal proceeding has been deprived of his right of having speedy trial with unreasonable delay which could be identified by the factors - (1) length of delay, (2) the justification for the delay, (3) the accused's assertion of his right to speedy trial, and (4) prejudice caused to the accused by such delay. However, the fact of delay is dependent on the circumstances of each case because reasons for delay will vary, such as delay in investigation on account of the widespread ramification of crimes and its designed network either nationally or internationally, the deliberate absence of witness or witnesses, crowded dockets on the file of the court etc."

7. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in **Gudikanti Narasimhulu and others v. Public Prosecutor, AIR 1978 SC 429** has held as under:-

"Bail or Jail"- at the pre-trial or post-conviction stage - largely hinged on judicial discretion. The learned Judge held that personal liberty was too precious a value of our constitutional system recognised under Article 21 that the crucial power to negate it was a great trust exercisable not casually but judicially, with lively concern for the cost to the individual and the community. It was further held that deprivation of personal freedom must be founded on the most serious considerations relevant to the welfare objectives of society specified in the Constitution. The learned Judge quoted Lord Russel who had said that bail was not to be withheld as a punishment and that the requirements as to bail were merely to secure the attendance of the prisoner at trial. According to V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of

the applicant to take judgment and serve sentence in the event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. After holding that it makes sense to assume that a man on bail has a better chance to prepare and present his case than one remanded in custody the learned Judge observed that if public justice is to be promoted mechanical detention should be demoted.

8. In **Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia etc Vs The State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 1632**, Hon'ble the Supreme Court has observed as under:-

*“Judges have to decide cases as they come before them, mindful of the need to keep passions and prejudices out of their decisions. The Court has also observed that in which case bail should be granted and in which case it should be refused is a matter of discretion. The court found it interesting to note that as long back as in 1924 it was held by the High Court of Calcutta in Nagendra Vs. King Emperor, AIR 1924 Calcutta 476, that the object of bail was to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial, that the proper test to be applied in the solution of the question whether bail should be granted or refused was whether it was probable that the party would appear to take his trial and that it was indisputable that bail was not to be withheld as a punishment. The Supreme Court also referred to the observation of the Allahabad High Court in **K.N. Joglekar Vs. Emperor, AIR 1931 Allahabad 504**, that Section 498 of the Old Code which corresponds to Section 439 of the New Code, conferred upon the Sessions Judge or the High Court wide powers to grant bail which were not handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding Section 497 which corresponds to the present Section 437. The Allahabad High Court had also observed that there was no hard and fast rule and no inflexible principle governing the exercise of the discretion conferred by Section 498 and that the only principle which was established was that the discretion should be exercised judiciously. The Supreme Court referred also the decision of the Allahabad High Court in **Emperor Vs. H.L. Hutchinson, AIR 1931***

Allahabad 356, wherein it was held that the principle to be deduced from the various sections in the Cr.P.C. was that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception, that as a presumably innocent person, the accused person is entitled to freedom and every opportunity to look after his own case and to establish his innocence and that an accused person who enjoys freedom is in a much better position to look after his case and to properly defend himself than if he were in custody. The High Court had also held that it would be very unwise to make an attempt to lay down any particular rules which would bind the High Court, having regard to the fact that the legislature itself left the discretion of the Court unfettered. According to the High Court, the variety of cases that may arise from time to time cannot be safely classified and it is dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases and to say that in particular classes bail may be granted but not in other classes. The Supreme Court apparently approved the above views and observations and held (vide paragraph 30) as follows :

"It is thus clear that the question whether to grant bail or not depends for its answer upon a variety of circumstances, the cumulative effect of which must enter into the judicial verdict. Any one single circumstance cannot be treated as of universal validity or as necessarily justifying the grant or refusal of bail."

9. At this stage, it is observed that the object of the bail is to secure the presence of the accused at the trial only. It is also observed that the object of bail is neither punitive nor preventive and deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has observed in catena of judgments that when a person is punished by denial of bail in respect of any matter upon which he has not been convicted it would be

contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution except in cases where there is reason to believe that he may influence the witnesses. It is appropriate to say that pre-conviction detention should not be resorted to, except in cases of necessity to secure attendance at the trial or upon material that the accused will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty.

10. In the present case, the appellant is stated to be in custody for the last about 04 years and the prosecution has not been able to examine even a single witness, after the summoning of Rajesh, co-accused under Section 319 Cr. P.C. Even, the prosecution has relied upon 21 witnesses, but the trial is yet to formally commence again.

11. Without commenting on the merits of the case, the present appeal is allowed. The appellant is ordered to be released on bail pending trial on his furnishing bail bonds and surety to the satisfaction of the concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate/Chief Judicial Magistrate subject to the following conditions:-

(i) The appellant shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case, so as to dissuade him to disclose such facts to the Court or to any other authority.

(ii) The appellant shall remain present before the Court on the dates fixed for hearing of the case.

(iii) The appellant shall not absent himself from the Court proceedings except on the prior permission of the Court concerned.

(iv) The appellant shall surrender his passport, if any, (if already not surrendered), and in case he is not holder of the same, he shall swear an affidavit to that effect.

(v) The appellant shall also file his affidavit before the concerned Court, mentioning his ordinary place of residence and number of mobile phone, which shall be used by him during the pendency of

the trial. In case of change of place of residence/mobile number, he shall share the details with the concerned Court/learned Trial Court.

(vi) In case, the appellant is involved in any other criminal activity, during the pendency of the trial, it shall be viewed seriously.

(vii) The concerned Court may insist on two heavy local sureties and may also impose any other condition, in accordance with law, while accepting the bails bonds and surety bonds of the appellant.

12. In case, the appellant violates any of the conditions mentioned above, it shall be viewed seriously and the concession of bail granted to him shall be liable to be cancelled and the prosecution shall be at liberty to move an application in this regard.

25.02.2025
hitesh

(N.S.SHEKHAWAT)
JUDGE

Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No