

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH**

2025:PHHC:104547



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CRM-M-43731-2025

Date of decision: 12.08.2025

Tanuj Verma

...Petitioner

V/s

Sanjeev Wadhwa and another

...Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL

Present: Mr. Lupil Gupta, Advocate &
Mr. Sandeep, Advocate for the petitioner.

SUMEET GOEL, J. (Oral)

1. The present petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., seeking quashing of the order dated 29.07.2025 (Annexure P-5) passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, SAS Nagar vide which the petitioner was ordered to be summoned through non-bailable warrants in CRA-15-2024 arising out of a judgment and order dated 06.01.2024 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Dera Bassi in NACT-412-2020 (Annexure P-1).

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that earlier the sentence awarded to the petitioner was ordered to be suspended for 30 days. Learned counsel has further submitted that the petitioner has preferred an appeal against the order of conviction before the learned Sessions Court where he has been appearing before the said Court on each and every date. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that since the delivery of petitioner's wife was due in first week of August, 2025 but on 23.07.2025 due to labour pain she was immediately taken to hospital and remained admitted till 25.07.2025 and on 30.07.2025 the petitioner's wife gave birth to a male

child. Learned counsel has, accordingly, submitted that due to this reason the petitioner could not appear before the said Court. Learned counsel has further iterated that due to his non-appearance the Sessions Court has summoned him through non-bailable warrants of arrest for 19.08.2025, while cancelling his bail orders. Learned counsel has iterated that the non-appearance of the petitioner before the concerned Court was not willful and unintentional but on account of admission of his wife in hospital. Learned counsel has contended that the procedure adopted by the learned Sessions Court in directly issuing the non-bailable warrants against the petitioner at the very first instance is contrary to the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence. It is well established position of law, as reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, that the Courts are required to adhere to due process while ensuring the presence of the accused. It has been submitted by the learned counsel that in the instant case, the learned trial Court has failed to issue any notice to the petitioner prior to resorting to the issuance of non-bailable warrants and hence such an approach is arbitrary, untenable and contrary to the procedural safeguard enshrined under the law. Learned counsel has further iterated that the petitioner unequivocally undertakes to enter appearance before the trial Court as also join the proceedings in accordance with law, the petitioner shall appear before the trial Court on each and every date of hearing and also cooperate therein, in accordance with law for a expeditious culmination of the trial.

3. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and have perused the available record.

4. Keeping in view the nature of the matter, especially the factum of the case in hand arising out of a criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881, this Court does not deem it appropriate to call upon the complainant/respondents, at this stage.

5. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court titled as ***Gudikanti Narasimhulu and others vs. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1978 SUPREME COURT 429***, relevant whereof reads as under:

“10. The significance and sweep of Article 21 make the deprivation of liberty a matter of grave concern and permissible only when the law authorising it is reasonable, even-handed and geared to the goals of community good and State necessity spelt out in Article 19. Indeed, the considerations I have set out as criteria are germane to the constitutional proposition I have deduced. Reasonableness postulates intelligent care and predicates that deprivation of freedom- by refusal of bail is not for punitive purpose but for the bi-focal interests of justice-to the individual involved and society affected.

11. We must weigh the contrary factors to answer the test of reasonableness, subject to the need for securing the presence, of the bail applicant. It makes sense to assume that a man on bail has a better chance to prepare or present his case than one remanded in custody. And if public justice is to be promoted, mechanical detention should be close to ours, the function of bail is limited, 'community roots' of the, applicant are stressed and, after the Vera Foundation's Manhattan Bail Project, monetary suretyship is losing ground. The considerable public expense in keeping in custody where no danger of disappearance or disturbance can arise, is not a negligible consideration. Equally important is the deplorable condition, verging on. the inhuman, of our sub-jails, that the unrewarding cruelty and expensive custody of avoidable incarceration makes refusal of bail unreasonable and a Policy favouring release justly sensible.

12. A few other weighty factors deserve reference. All deprivation of liberty is validated by social defence and individual correction along an anti-criminal direction. Public justice is central to the whole scheme of bail law. Fleeing justice must be forbidden but punitive harshness should be minimised. Restorative devices to redeem the man, even, through community service, meditative drill, study classes or other resources should be innovated, and playing foul with public peace by tampering with evidence, intimidating witnesses or committing offence while on judicially sanctioned 'free enterprise,' should be provided against. No seeker of justice shall play confidence tricks on the court or community. Thus, conditions may be hung around bail orders, not to cripple but to protect. Such is the holistic jurisdiction and humanistic orientation invoked by the judicial discretion correlated to the values of our constitution.”

5.1. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled as ***Gurcharan Singh vs. State (UT of Delhi) 1978 (1) SCC 118***, has held as under:-

*“Where the granting of bail lies within the discretion of the **court**, the granting or denial is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Since the object of the detention or imprisonment of the accused is to secure his appearance and submission to the jurisdiction and the judgment of the **court**, the primary inquiry is whether a recognizance or bond would effect that end.”*

5.2. Furthermore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled as ***Sanjay Chandra vs. CBI (2012) 1 SCC 40***, has held as under:

“21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it can be required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty.

22. From the earliest times, it was appreciated that detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some un-convicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, “necessity” is the operative test. In this country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances.”

6. A perusal of the record reveals that the learned Sessions Court, while cancelling the concession of bail, straight away proceeded to issue non-bailable warrants against the petitioner. In the considered opinion of this Court, the cancellation of bail orders amounts to an unjustifiable restriction on the procedural rights of the petitioner in the absence of any misconduct, lack

of bona fides, or a deliberate attempt to evade the proceedings on his behalf. The issuance of non-bailable warrants must not be exercised in a mechanical manner and the same must be adopted sparingly and only upon the recording of cogent reasons reflecting the necessity of adopting such a stringent course.

7. Keeping in view the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case; especially the factum of the prime object of cancellation of bail and forfeiture of bail bonds being securing the presence of the accused, the petitioner-accused having come forward himself to face trial, willingness shown by the petitioner-accused to appear before the trial Court on each and every date in accordance with law, the petitioner having submitted that he shall cooperate for an expeditious disposal of the appeal & there being no tangible material brought forward to indicate the likelihood of the petitioner to interfere with the prosecution evidence; this Court is the considered opinion that the petition in hand deserves to be allowed.

8. It is, thus, directed as follows:

- (i) The impugned order dated 29.07.2025 (Annexure P-5) passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, SAS Nagar is set-aside subject to the petitioner appearing before the trial/concerned Court on or before 19.08.2025 i.e. the next date of hearing fixed in the said Court & shall furnish an undertaking that the petitioner shall continue to appear before the trial/concerned Court on each and every date of hearing. It is clarified that the trial/concerned Court shall be at liberty to impose such other condition(s) upon the petitioner, as deemed appropriate by it in the facts and circumstances of the case.
- (ii) Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.

(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE

August 12, 2025

Naveen

Whether speaking/reasoned:	Yes/No
Whether reportable:	Yes/No