



CRM-M-42700-2025 (O&M)

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**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH**

CRM-M-42700-2025 (O&M)

Date of decision:15.09.2025

Surinder Kaur

...Petitioner

V/s

State of Punjab and others

...Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL

Present: Mr. Ankur Malik, Advocate for the petitioner.

Mr. Jaypreet Singh, DAG Punjab.

Mr. Naveen Batra, Advocate for respondent Nos.2 and 3.

SUMEET GOEL, J.**CRM-33849-2025**

Present application has been filed under Section 528 of BNS, 2023 seeking to place on record reply on behalf of respondent Nos.2 and 3.

For the reasons mentioned in the application, the same is allowed. Reply on behalf of respondent Nos.2 and 3 is taken on record, subject to all just exceptions. Registry to paginate the paper-book accordingly.

CRM-M-42700-2025

1. Present petition has been filed under Section 483(3) of BNSS, 2023, for cancellation of anticipatory bail granted to respondent Nos.2 and 3 vide order 15.07.2025 passed by this Court in FIR No.36 dated 30.03.2025 registered for offences punishable under Sections 406 and 420 of IPC at Police Station Nurpur Bedi, District Rup Nagar.



2. The gravamen of the FIR pertains to defrauding the family of the complainant (petitioner herein) namely Surinder Kaur, who alleged that the accused private respondents (respondent Nos.2 and 3 herein), working as travel agents, conspired and cheated her daughter namely Satwant Kaur @ Preeti and son-in-law namely Taranjit Singh, residents of Kuralan Kalan, Tehsil Dasuha, District Hoshiarpur. The accused-private respondents took a total of Rs.25,02,000/- from the family of the complainant (son Gurwinder Singh, daughter Satwant Kaur, son-in-law Taranjit Singh and his father Sardar Kishan Singh) on the pretext of arranging Canada work permits and visitor visas. The money was deposited into the accounts provided by the accused-private respondents i.e. Mrs. Renu Sood – A/c No.10059113911, IDFC First Bank, Ludhiana and The making World A/c No.10128494739, IDFC First Bank, Ludhiana. It was alleged that despite taking the money, the accused-private respondents neither provided the visas/work permits nor shared any visa file details (FC Key ID, receipts or documents). Instead, they stopped responding to calls and refused to refund the money. It was further alleged that the accused claimed office i.e. The Making World, Field Ganj, Ludhiana does not exist which further proved their fraudulent intentions. Furthermore, the complainant alleged that only a sum of Rs.30,000/- was later returned by the accused through one Navdeep Kumar. The complainant has alleged that the accused-private respondents deliberately cheated her family, misappropriated the money and wasted the valuable time of her daughter and son-in-law. Based on these set of allegations, the instant FIR was registered and investigation ensued.



3. Vide order dated 02.05.2025 passed by Coordinate Bench of this Court, the respondent Nos.2 and 3 were granted the concession of interim anticipatory bail and the same was confirmed vide impugned order dated 15.07.2025 and the same reads as under:

“1. This petition has been filed under Section 482 of BNSS, 2023, seeking anticipatory bail to the petitioners in FIR No.36 dated 30.03.2025, registered under Sections 406, 420 IPC at Police Station Nurpur Bedi, District Rupnagar.

2. On 20.05.2025, the following order was passed:-

“Status report dated 19.05.2025 in the form of an affidavit of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Sri Anandpur Sahib, District Rupnagar, has been filed. The same is taken on record. Copy thereof has been supplied to learned counsel for the petitioner.

2. ASI Malkeet Singh, P.S. Noorpur Bedi, Rupnagar is present in Court.

3. After hearing the arguments, it transpires that no alleged payment has been made to the petitioners by the complainant but is in favour of one Renu Sood-non petitioner.

4. Be it the case, without commenting on the merits, the petitioners are directed to join the investigation within seven days from today and in the event of their arrest, they are ordered to be released on interim bail on their furnishing personal/surety bonds to the satisfaction of the Arresting Officer/Investigating Officer. They shall also abide by conditions as envisaged under Section 482(2) of BNSS, 2023.

5. List on 29.05.2025.

6. Investigating Officer of the case to remain present in Court along with record on that date.”

3. Learned State counsel assisted by learned counsel for the complainant and on instructions from ASI Malkit Singh, at the very outset, informs the Court that the petitioners have joined the investigation and their custodial interrogation is not required.

4. In view of the statement of learned State counsel, order dated 20.05.2025 is hereby made absolute. The petitioners shall abide by the terms and conditions envisaged under Section 482(2) of BNSS (erstwhile Section 438(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973).

5. The petition stands disposed of.”



4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the respondent Nos.2 and 3 (herein) have obtained the concession of anticipatory bail by misleading this Court. According to learned counsel, the impression created before this Court was that the complainant-petitioner has not deposited any money in the account(s) of respondent Nos.2 and 3 and they have not received a single penny. Learned counsel has further iterated that the complainant-petitioner has deposited substantial amount(s) in the account of co-accused Renu Sood, who in turn transferred the said amount(s) to the account of respondent No.2 and respondent No.2 further transferred it to respondent No.3. The bank transactions reflecting these transfers are annexed as Annexure P-5 with the present petition which clearly demonstrate that respondent Nos.2 and 3 are direct beneficiaries of the misappropriated amount. Learned counsel has further iterated that despite the availability of such clear documentary evidence, the investigating agency failed to bring these facts into the notice of this Court and deliberately chose to ignore the same. Based on the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel has argued that the concession of anticipatory bail earlier granted to them ought to be cancelled.

5. Learned counsel appearing for the State has filed status report dated 19.08.2025 by way of affidavit of Ajay Singh, PPS, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Sri Anandpur Sahib, District Rupnagar, Punjab and has raised submissions in tandem with the said status report; relevant whereof reads as under:

“6. That it is further submitted that during investigation of the case, witnesses acquainted with facts and circumstances of the case were



examined by the Investigating Officer and their statements under Section 180(3) of the BNS have been recorded. It is revealed during investigation that the respondent No.2 and 3 have Introduced the Petitioner-Surinder Kaur, her daughter-Satwant Kaur and son-in-law-Taranjit Singh to Renu Sood Le. proprietor of The Making World, and respondent No.2 and 3 induced them to deliver Rs.25,02,000/- to Renu Sood. It is further submitted that both respondent No.2 and 3 asked and forced the Petitioner, her daughter and son-in-law by sending messages on their whatsapp numbers and by making phone calls to them, to transfer amount in the account of Renu Sood.

7. That it is respectfully submitted that during investigation of the present case, the account statements of the respondent No.2 and 3- Damini and Harish Chand were obtained from their respective banks and from the perusal of the same, it has been established that the respondent No.2 and 3 and their co-accused namely Renu Sood have shared the amount amongst themselves after the Complainant party transferred an amount of Rs 25,02,000/- to Renu Sood in her two accounts as mentioned above.

8. That it is respectfully submitted that from the perusal of account statements of Account No.10128494739 of IDFC bank, in the name of The Making World and Account No. 10059113911 of IDFC bank in the name Renu Sood, (both maintained by Renu Sood), 01.12.2023, an amount of Rs.18,50,000/- was transferred by the complainant party from their three different accounts and very next day ie. on 02.12.2023, Renu Sood further transferred an amount of Rs.2,59,950/- in Account No.20802122001431 of Punjab National Bank, maintained by respondent No.2-Damini. It is further submitted that on perusal of statement of account No.05930110090930 maintained by respondent No.3-Harish Chand in UCO Bank, it has been found that between 02.12.2023 and 04.12.2023, respondent No.2-Damini further transferred Rs.2,08,050/ in the aforementioned account of respondent No.3- Harish Chand.

9. That it is further submitted that Renu Sood further received. Rs.6,52,000/- on different dates in her aforementioned accounts from complainant party and she further transferred Rs.2,49,000/- on different dates in the account No.20802122001431 of Punjab National Bank, maintained by respondent No.2-Damini. It is further submitted that on further perusal of statement of account No.05930110090930 maintained by respondent No.3-Harish Chand in UCO Bank, it has been found that during the same period (in those dates when she received amount from Renu Sood), on different dates respondent No.2-Damini further



transferred Rs.1,50,000/- in the aforementioned account of respondent No.3- Harish Chand.

10. That it is further submitted that during investigation of the case, witnesses acquainted with facts and circumstances of the case have been examined by the Investigating Officer and their statements under Section 180(3) of the BNSS have been recorded. It is further submitted that from the investigation carried out so far it has been established that the respondent No.2 and 3-Damini and Harish Chand were connived with their co-accused Renu Sood and they all have duped the complainant party for Rs.25,02,000/- for sending Satwant Kaur and Taranjit Singh to Canada of Work Visa. It is further submitted that both respondent No.2 and 3-Damini and Harish Chand asked and forced and induced the Petitioner- Surinder Kaur, her daughter-Satwant Kaur and son-in-law-Taranjit Singh by sending messages on their whatsapp numbers and by making phone calls to them, to transfer amount in the account of Renu Sood.”

6. Learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.2 and 3 has iterated that the present petition is misconceived as no recovery is pending against respondent Nos.2 and 3 and the investigating agency has not filed any supplementary challan showing their direct complicity. It has been further argued that the transfer of funds from the account of co-accused does not *ipso facto* establish that the respondent Nos.2 and 3 were part of the alleged conspiracy. Learned counsel has urged that this Court while granting the anticipatory bail to respondent Nos.2 and 3 took into consideration all the relevant factors. Moreover, once the anticipatory bail has been granted by the Court, the same will only be cancelled upon showing cogent and overwhelming circumstances. Thus, dismissal of the instant petition is entreated for.

7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the available records of the case.



8. It would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment passed by this Court titled as ***Dinesh Madan vs. State of Haryana and another*** in ***CRM-M-9029-2023***, decided on 17.05.2024; relevant whereof reads as under:-

“12. The concept of “cancellation of bail” is statutorily manifested in terms of Section 439 (2) of 1973 Code. This concept was embodied in the earlier statute i.e. 1898 Code as well albeit with difference(s). The ratio decidendi of judgment in case of ***Gurcharan Singh*** (supra) makes it clear that, in the 1898 Code, the bail granted by the High Court could be cancelled only by it & bail granted by a Sessions Court could be cancelled by such Sessions Court only. However, Section 439(2) of 1973 Code has vested power to cancel bail which has been granted “under this chapter” upon both the High Court as also the Sessions Court. The words “under this Chapter” relates to Chapter XXXIII of Cr.P.C. of 1973 & hence the unequivocal result thereof is that the High Court as also the Sessions Court have requisite powers to cancel “any bail” granted by “any Court” by way of powers vested under this Chapter. In other words; the High Court is well empowered to cancel a bail granted by itself or by a Sessions Court or by the Court of a Magistrate while the Sessions Court is empowered to cancel a bail granted by High Court or by itself or by a Magistrate. However, a Sessions Court can cancel bail granted by High Court only on account of supervening/new circumstances or on account of misconduct of such accused or on account of violation of any condition(s) imposed by the High Court while granting bail. The Magistrate can, of course, cancel bail granted by him but he cannot cancel a bail granted by High Court or Sessions Court except when such accused has violated/contravened any condition(s) imposed upon by such High Court or Sessions Court while granting bail to such accused. This position, is indubitable, as a Magistrate has been vested with powers for cancellation of bail only in terms of Section 437(5) of 1973 Code whereas the High Court and Sessions Court have been vested with powers under Section 439 of Cr.P.C., of 1973 to cancel “any bail granted under Chapter XXXIII of 1973 Code”.

12.1 Section 439(2) of Cr.P.C., 1973 deals with “any person who has been released on bail under this Chapter” i.e. Chapter XXXIII of 1973 Code, which engirths in itself, Section 438 of the Code (provision envisaging anticipatory bail/pre-arrest bail) as well. Hence such power operates in realm of all kinds of bails, whether regular bail or anticipatory bail. Ergo,



there is no conceptual difference between cancellation of regular bail and cancellation of anticipatory bail except that a Magistrate will not have statutory power to cancel an anticipatory bail granted by High Court or Sessions Court.

12.2. *At this juncture, it would be profitable to consider an issue often springing up before Courts. Petition(s) labelled as plea(s) for “cancellation of bail” are filed in Court(s), more often than not, whether such applicant is actually seeking “cancellation of bail” on account of the accused misusing the grant of bail or on account of any supervening developments disentitling such accused to remain on bail OR where the plea raised is that, the bail ought not to have been granted at all vide the impugned order, in the factual conspectus of such case. The 1973 Code neither stipulates the words “cancellation of bail” nor “setting-aside of a bail order” but only stipulates the words “any person who has been released on bail be arrested and committed to custody”. There is no gainsaying that there is a foundational difference between “cancellation of bail” and “setting-aside of a bail order”; a difference which, by way of simile, can be said to be as stark as between chalk and cheese. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in cases of **Ranjit Singh** (supra) and **Neeru Yadav** (supra) has incontestably articulated that “cancellation of bail” is sought for on account of supervening circumstances/subsequent developments/misconduct of accused etc. whereas “setting-aside of a bail order” is sought for by laying challenge to the said bail order on ground of it being perverse or based on irrelevant material(s). The parameters for consideration of the two are, accordingly, different and contrastive.*

13. *The next aspect that craves attention is as to what are the factors relevant for considering of a plea for “cancellation of bail” or “setting-aside of a bail order.” At the very outset; it deserves to be noted that, it is too far well settled a principle to be ratiocinated upon, that consideration(s) for grant of bail vis.-a-vis. cancellation/setting-aside thereof are entirely different.*

14. *In a plea seeking “cancellation of bail”; such applicant ought to show, primarily, subsequent supervening circumstances such as accused having endeavored to influence/intimidate witness(s) or accused having violated bail condition(s) or accused having committed another offence(s) or accused having secured bail by misrepresenting/concealing material fact(s) or bail having been granted in ignorance/violation of statutory provisions and factors of akin nature. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of*



Himanshu Sharma (supra) has delineated the nature and kind of such factors as have been stated by this Court hereinabove.

14.1. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of **Sanjay Gandhi** (supra) has enounced regarding the nature and degree of burden upon the applicant (seeking cancellation of bail). The plea of such an applicant has to be tested on the anvil of preponderance of probabilities & such an applicant is not required to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, the facts pleaded by him in support of such a plea.

15. In a plea seeking "setting-aside of a bail order"; the factors required to be considered are as to whether bail has been granted on relevant consideration(s); grounds required to be evaluated for grant of bail have been duly factored into the order granting bail and other factors of akin nature. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of **Jagjit Singh** (supra) has held that the High Court or Sessions Court can set-aside an order granting bail passed by an inferior Court if such order is based on irrelevant considerations, order granting bail has resulted in miscarriage of justice etc. It goes without saying that the High Court or Sessions Court; while dealing a plea for setting-aside a bail order; sits in a jurisdiction, which is akin to appellate jurisdiction & hence it can look into the veracity and propriety of the order (granting bail) from all the perspectives. However, a Court while dealing with such a plea, ought not to substitute its own opinion with the one expressed in the impugned order.

16. It would not be pragmatic to even attempt to lay-down exhaustive parameters in this regard as every case, especially a criminal case, is sui generis. Such a quixotic attempt ought to be avoided as no inexorable formulae can be laid down in this regard.

17. As an epilogue to above discussion, the following principles emerge:

I. (i) There is a conceptual distinction, between "cancellation of bail" & "setting-aside of a bail order". In a plea seeking "cancellation of bail"; the factors required to be considered are akin to supervening circumstances/events or mis-conduct of accused whereas in a plea seeking "setting-aside of a bail order"; the factors required to be considered are akin to the order in question being unjustified or illegal or not based on relevant consideration(s). In other words, a plea seeking "setting aside of a bail order" is more in the nature of laying challenge to an order granting bail before a superior Court upon merits thereof.

(ii) It would be pragmatic as also desirable, for the cause of ease and clarity, that a plea filed under Section 439 of Cr.P.C., 1973 clearly states as



to whether the plea is for “cancellation of bail” or for “setting aside of a bail order.” or on both accounts.

II. Plea seeking cancellation of Regular Bail.

(i) A High Court has power to cancel regular bail granted by itself or by a Sessions Court or by a Magistrate’s Court.

(ii) A Sessions Court has a power to cancel regular bail granted by High Court or by itself or by a Magistrate’s Court. However, the Sessions Court can cancel regular bail granted by High Court only where the accused has violated any condition(s) imposed by the High Court (while granting bail) or on account of such accused having misused liberty granted to him by trying to influence witness(s) or having tried to delay trial by absenting himself or having committed another offence(s) while on bail and other factors of akin nature. In other words, a Sessions Court can cancel bail granted to an accused by High Court only on account of such like supervening/subsequent events but cannot adjudicate upon veracity of the High Court order (whereby bail was granted to such accused.)

(iii) A Magistrate does have the power to cancel a regular bail granted by him in terms of Section 437(5) of Cr.P.C. 1973. However, a Magistrate does not have the power to cancel regular bail granted by the High Court or Sessions Court except in a situation wherein the accused has violated any condition(s) imposed upon him when granted such bail by the High Court or the Sessions Court.

(iv) In case cancellation of a regular bail granted by the Sessions Court is sought for; such plea ought to be ordinarily filed before the Sessions Court itself. However, since there is concurrent jurisdiction of the High Court as also Sessions Court in terms of Section 439(2) of Cr.P.C. 1973, the filing of such a plea straight away before the High Court is not ipso facto barred. At the same time, it would be expedient that such a plea (filed straight away before the High Court) must show cogent reason(s) for not approaching the Sessions Court in the first instance.

(v) The factors for consideration in a plea for cancellation of a regular bail are whether the accused has misused liberty granted to him by trying to influence witness(s) or has tried to delay trial or has committed another offence(s) while on bail, whether the accused has flouted the cancellation of bail, whether bail was procured by misrepresentation or fraud or concealing relevant material and similar factors of akin nature. There is no gainsaying that above factors are only illustrative in nature as it is not axiomatic to exhaustively enumerate them.



(vi) *Where such plea raises ground(s) that bail has been granted on account of misrepresentation of facts or a fraud having been played on Court which has granted bail or concealment of material/relevant facts; it would be expedient that such plea be filed, in the first instance itself, before the Court which had granted bail in question.*

(vii) *The degree and nature of proof required to be shown by an applicant (seeking cancellation of regular bail) is that of preponderance of probabilities and not one of being beyond reasonable doubt.*

III. *Plea seeking setting-aside of regular bail order.*

(i) *A plea seeking “setting-aside of a bail order” has to be essentially filed in the Court, superior to the one which has granted bail.*

(ii) *In case setting-aside of a bail order granted by the Magistrate’s Court is sought for, such plea ought to be ordinarily filed before the Sessions Court. However, since there is concurrent jurisdiction of the High Court as also Sessions Court in terms of Section 439(2) of Cr.P.C. 1973, the filing of such a plea straight away before the High Court is not ipso facto barred. At the same time, it would be expedient that such a plea (filed straight away before the High Court) must show cogent reason(s) for not approaching the Sessions Court in the first instance.*

(iii) *For setting-aside a bail order passed by a Sessions Court; such plea, but of-course, will have to be filed before the High Court.*

IV. *Plea seeking cancellation of anticipatory bail/pre-arrest order*

(i) *A High Court has power to cancel an anticipatory bail granted by it or by a Sessions Court.*

(ii) *A Sessions Court has power to cancel an anticipatory bail granted by High Court or earlier granted by it. However, the Sessions Court can cancel anticipatory bail granted by High Court only where the accused has violated any condition(s) imposed by the High Court (while granting such bail) or on account of such accused having misused liberty granted to him by trying to influence witness(s) or having tried to delay trial by absenting himself or having committed another offence(s) while on bail and other factors of akin nature. In other words, a Sessions Court can cancel anticipatory bail granted to an accused by High Court only on account of such likes supervening/subsequent events but cannot adjudicate upon veracity of the High Court order (whereby such bail was granted to such accused.)*

(iii) *In case cancellation of an anticipatory bail granted by Sessions Court is sought for; such plea ought to be filed ordinarily before Sessions Court itself. However, since there is concurrent jurisdiction of the High*



Court as also Sessions Court in terms of Section 439(2) of Cr.P.C. of 1973, the filing of such a plea straight away before the High Court is not barred. At the same time, it would be expedient that such a plea (straight away filed before High Court) must show cogent reasons for not approaching the Sessions Court in first instance.

(iv) The factors for consideration in a plea for cancellation of an anticipatory bail are whether the accused has misused liberty granted to him by trying to influence witness(s) or has tried to delay trial or has committed another offence(s) while on bail, whether accused has flouted the cancellation of bail, whether bail was procured by misrepresentation or fraud or concealing relevant material, and similar factors of akin nature. There is no gainsaying that above factors are only illustrative in nature as it is not axiomatic to exhaustively enumerate them.

(v) Where such plea raises ground(s) that bail has been granted on account of misrepresentation of facts or a fraud having been played on Court which has granted bail or concealment of material/relevant facts; it would be expedient that such plea be filed, in the first instance itself, before the Court which had granted bail in question.

(vi) The degree and nature of proof required to be shown by an applicant (seeking cancellation of an anticipatory bail) is that of preponderance of probabilities and not one of being beyond reasonable doubt.

V. Plea seeking setting aside of an anticipatory bail/pre-arrest bail order

(i) A plea seeking setting aside of an anticipatory bail/pre-arrest bail order by a Sessions Court has to be essentially filed before High Court.

(ii) The factor, required to be considered in a plea seeking setting aside of an anticipatory/pre-arrest bail order; is as to whether the impugned order (granting anticipatory bail/pre-arrest bail) has objectively dealt with nature and gravity of allegations against accused, role of accused in the crime(s) alleged, need for custodial interrogation, likelihood of accused influencing the investigation/witnesses, likelihood of the accused absconding from process of justice etc.

VI. Where a plea made under Section 439(2) of Cr.P.C. 1973 raises grounds regarding “cancellation of bail” as also for “setting aside of bail order”, such plea has to be essentially made before the superior Court.

9. The FIR in question was lodged on 30.03.2025 whereinafter investigation ensued and the respondent Nos.2 and 3 (herein) were granted



the concession of interim anticipatory bail on 02.05.2025 and the same was confirmed vide impugned order dated 15.07.2025. It is worthwhile to note herein that it is neither the stand of the petitioner nor of the State that the respondent Nos.2 and 3 have misused the concession of anticipatory bail granted by this Court by threatening/intimidating the witness(s) or by trying to influence the investigation/trial etc. It is well settled that the cancellation of bail stands on a different footing from the initial grant of bail. In the present case, it is not disputed that the anticipatory bail was granted after considering the FIR, allegations and the role attributed to respondent Nos.2 and 3. The petitioner now seeks cancellation of bail primarily on the ground of alleged bank transactions. However, whether such transactions conclusively establish culpability of respondent Nos.2 and 3 is a matter of trial. At this stage, such disputed questions of fact cannot be made the sole basis for cancelling the anticipatory bail. Moreover, there is nothing on record to suggest that the respondent Nos.2 and 3 have misused the concession of bail. It is trite law that anticipatory bail cannot be cancelled merely on re-appreciation of facts already considered at the time while granting the same unless there is abuse of the liberty so granted.

10. In the absence of any cogent material to show that respondent Nos.2 and 3 have misused the concession of anticipatory bail or interfered with the investigation, no case is made for cancellation of anticipatory bail. The order passed by this Court is a well-reasoned speaking order and cannot be said to be suffering from vice of non-application of judicial mind. This Court, keeping in view the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case(s) in hand, does not find any good ground to hold that this Court, while



passing the impugned order, has overstepped its jurisdiction or has not exercised the same in right perspective. Therefore, the petition in hand deserves rejection.

11. Keeping in view the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, no ground is made out to set-aside the anticipatory bail earlier granted to respondent Nos.2 and 3 vide the impugned order. Therefore, the petition in hand deserves rejection.

Decision

12. As a sequel to the above discussion, the present petition filed under Section 483(3) of BNSS, 2023, seeking cancellation of anticipatory bail order dated 15.07.2025 passed by this Court, is dismissed.

13. It, indubitably, goes without saying that nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.

(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE

September 15, 2025

Ajay

Whether speaking/reasoned:	Yes/No
Whether reportable:	Yes/No