



**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH**

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CRM-M No.41963 of 2025 (O & M)
Date of decision : 4.9.2025

Gurpreet Singh**.....Petitioner****Versus****State of Punjab****.....Respondent****CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL**

Present: Mr. Abhaysher Singh, Advocate, for the petitioner

Mr. Jaypreet Singh, DAG, Punjab

SUMEET GOEL, J. (ORAL)

1. Present petition has been filed under Section 483 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, for grant of regular bail to the petitioner in case bearing FIR No.73 dated 18.6.2023, registered for the offences punishable under Section 22(C) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short 'NDPS Act') at Police Station Sangat, District Bathinda.
2. The gravamen of the allegations against the petitioner is that he is an accused of being involved in an FIR pertaining to NDPS Act involving 5500 intoxicant pills of tramadol hydrochloride IP 100 mg SR from a swift car bearing No.HR-66A-8458, of which, the petitioner and other co-accused were the occupants.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is



in custody since 18.6.2023. Learned counsel has further argued that the petitioner has been falsely implicated into the FIR in question. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act have not been complied with, and thus, the prosecution case suffers from inherent defects. Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the trial is delayed and the liability thereof cannot be fastened upon the petitioner. Learned counsel has further iterated that the petitioner was seated on the rear side of the car in question, from where the alleged contraband was recovered, and that the petitioner had no knowledge thereof. Learned counsel has iterated that, in any case, the prosecution evidence is at the fag end, and thus, the petitioner is not in a position to influence the trial. Learned counsel has further iterated that the petitioner has suffered incarceration for more than 2 years. Thus, regular bail is prayed for.

4. Learned State counsel has opposed the present petition by arguing that the allegations raised against the petitioner are serious in nature and, thus, he does not deserve the concession of the regular bail. Learned State counsel has further submitted that the instant bail plea is restricted by the rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and thus, the same ought to be dismissed. Learned State counsel seeks to place on record custody certificate dated 3.9.2025 in Court, which is taken on record.

5. I have heard counsel for the rival parties and have gone through the available records of the case.

6. The petitioner was arrested on 18.6.2023 whereinafter,



investigation was carried out and the challan was presented on 16.10.2023. Total 15 prosecution witnesses have been cited out of which 7 have been examined and 6 have been given up till date. There is yet another aspect, *namely* vital aspect of the matter that the entire prosecution evidence is at the fag end as only 2 prosecution witnesses are stated to have remained to be examined. The rival contentions raised at Bar give rise to debatable issues shall be ratiocinated upon during the course of trial. This Court does not deem it appropriate to delve deep into these rival contentions, at this stage, lest it may prejudice the trial. Nothing tangible has been brought forward to indicate the likelihood of the petitioner absconding from the process of justice or interfering with the prosecution evidence.

6.1 Indubitably, the present petition is the 3rd attempt by the petitioner to secure regular bail. The last bail plea preferred by the petitioner was dismissed as withdrawn on 25.10.2024. However, keeping in view further incarceration of the petitioner for a period of about 10 months and no substantial progress in trial, this Court is inclined to favourably consider the instant plea for bail. A profitable reference, in this regard, can be made to a judgment of this Court passed in ***CRA-S-2332-2023*** titled as ***Rafiq Khan versus State of Haryana and another***; relevant whereof reads as under:

“10. As an epilogue to the above discussion, the following principles emerge:

I. Second/successive regular bail petition(s) filed is maintainable in law & hence such petition ought not to be rejected solely on the ground of maintainability thereof.



II. Such second/successive regular bail petition(s) is maintainable whether earlier petition was dismissed as withdrawn/dismissed as not pressed/dismissed for non-prosecution or earlier petition was dismissed on merits.

III. For the second/successive regular bail petition(s) to succeed, the petitioner/applicant shall be essentially/pertinently required to show substantial change in circumstances and showing of a mere superficial or ostensible change would not suffice. The metaphoric expression of seeking second/successive bail plea(s) ought not be abstracted into literal iterations of petition(s) without substantial, effective and consequential change in circumstances.

IV. No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down as to what would constitute substantial change in circumstances as every case has its own unique facts/circumstance. Making such an attempt is nothing but an utopian endeavour. Ergo, this issue is best left to the judicial wisdom and discretion of the Court dealing with such second/successive regular bail petition(s).

V. In case a Court chooses to grant second/successive regular bail petition(s), cogent and lucid reasons are pertinently required to be recorded for granting such plea despite such a plea being second/successive petition(s). In other words, the cause for a Court having successfully countenanced/entertained such second/successive petition(s) ought to be readily and clearly decipherable from the said order passed.”

6.2 At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer to the judgment passed by this Court in **CRM-M-62189-2024** titled **Harjinder Singh alias Raj alias Rajinder Singh versus State of Punjab**, decided on 16.07.2025 (2025:PHHC:086951), relevant part thereof reads thus:

*“As the prosecution evidence nears its fag end, the very premise for the continued incarceration of the petitioner is significantly attenuated. The apprehension of the petitioner influencing or tampering with the prosecution witnesses, a common ground for denial of bail, is rendered largely moot in such circumstances. As the venerable legal maxim goes ‘**Cessante razione legis, cessat ipsa lex**’ – when the reason for the law ceases, the law itself ceases—duly encapsulates within its ambit, the factual milieu of the instant case. The primary rationale for pre-trial detention, securing the integrity of the prosecution's case and ensuring the accused's presence at trial, is substantially diminished when the evidentiary phase of the prosecution is virtually complete. Furthermore, it is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the right to a fair trial is paramount, an indispensable facet of which is the accused's opportunity to present a robust defense. Although the right to lead by an accused is regulated by sec 233 Cr.P.C.,*



*nonetheless, it is one of the most valuable rights. A criminal trial is not a one-sided affair; it embodies the adversarial system where both the prosecution and the defense must be afforded an equal, if not greater, opportunity to substantiate their respective cases. To effectively exercise this inalienable right to lead defense evidence, the physical liberty of the accused is often an essential factor. A person confined to custody faces considerable impediments in consulting with legal counsel, gathering defense witnesses, and preparing their strategy. Denial of liberty at this advanced stage, when the prosecution's evidentiary edifice is almost complete, can severely cripple the defense, thereby striking at the very root of a fair trial. **Audi alteram partem** – hear the other side – is a fundamental dictate of natural justice, and denying bail when there's no palpable risk of witness tampering would be to render this maxim nugatory. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in '**Gudikanti Narasimhulu and others versus Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh**', 1978 AIR (SC) 429, relevant part thereof reads as*

"11. We must weight the contrary factors to answer the test the reasonableness, subject to the need for securing the presence of the bail applicant. It makes sense to assume that a man on bail has a better chance to prepare of present his case than one remanded in custody. And if public justice is to be promoted, mechanical detention should be demoted."

6.3. The trial is indeed procrastinating and folly thereof cannot be saddled upon the petitioner. As per custody certificate dated 3.9.2025 filed by the learned State counsel, the petitioner has already suffered incarceration for a period of 2 years, 2 month and 14 days & is not shown to be involved in any other case/FIR. In this view of the matter, the rigor imposed under Section 37 of the NDPS Act stands diluted in light of the Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

6.4. This Court in a judgment titled as ***Kulwinder versus State of Punjab*** passed in ***CRM-M-64074-2024*** (2025:PHHC:002695); after relying upon the *ratio decidendi* of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar* (1980) 1 SCC 81; *Abdul Rehman Antulay vs R.S. Nayak* (1992) 1 SCC 225; *Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra and another*, 2024(3) RCR



(Criminal) 494; Mohd Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported as 2023 INSC 311; Criminal Appeal No.245/2020 dated 07.02.2020 titled as “Chitta Biswas Alias Subhas vs. The State of West Bengal”; “Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan vs. The State of West Bengal”, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.5530-2022 dated 22.08.2022 titled as “Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh vs. The State of Gujarat”; Criminal Appeal No.1169 of 2022 dated 05.08.2022 titled as Gopal Krishna Patra @ Gopalrusma vs. Union of India, and Ankur Chaudhary vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024(4) RCR (Criminal) 172; has held, thus:

“7.8. *The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a vital safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration; to mitigate anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation as well as to curtail any impairment in the ability of an accused to defend himself, but there is an overarching societal interest paving way for a speedy trial. This right has been repeatedly actuated in the recent past and the ratio decidendi of the above-referred to Supreme Court’s judgments have laid down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. The concept of speedy trial is amalgamated into the Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty, guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed at the time of the arrest of the accused and consequent incarceration which continues at all stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result due to impermissible and avoidable delay since the time of the commission of the offence till the criminal proceedings consummate into a finality, could be averted. The speedy trial, early hearing and quick disposal are sine qua non of criminal jurisprudence. The overcrowded Court-dockets, the heavy volume of work and the resultant pressure on the prosecution and the Police, indubitably keeps the entire criminal jurisprudential mechanism under stress and strain. However, this cannot be an excuse for keeping the sword of Damocles hanging on the accused for an indefinite period of time. It does not serve any credit to the criminal justice system, rather it makes for a sad state of affairs. The guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and prevent delay by imposing on the Court and the prosecution an obligation to proceed with the trial with a reasonable dispatch. The guarantee serves a threefold purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused against oppressive pre-trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the accused of the anxiety and public suspicion due to unresolved criminal charges and lastly, it protects against the risk that evidence will be lost or memories dimmed by the passage of time, thus, impairing the ability of the accused to defend himself. It goes without saying that the consequences of pre-trial detention are grave. Accused, presumed*



innocent, till proven otherwise, are subjected to psychological and physical deprivations of jail-life, usually under onerous conditions. Equally important, the burden of detention of such an accused frequently falls heavily on the innocent members of his family.

There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves consideration at this stage. The allegations in the present case relate to accused being involved in an FIR relating to commercial quantity of contraband under the NDPS Act, 1985. While considering a bail petition in a case involving commercial quantity, the Court has to keep in mind the rigours enumerated under Section 37 of NDPS Act, 1985 which mandates that Courts can grant bail to an accused only after hearing the public prosecutor and after having satisfied itself of twin conditions which are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged/alleged and that, he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The stringent rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 must be meticulously scrutinized against the backdrop of accused's fundamental right to a speedy trial. The right to life and personal liberty cannot be rendered nugatory by unwarranted delays in the judicial process, particularly where such delay(s) is neither attributable to the accused nor justified at the end of the prosecution by cogent reasons. An individual cannot be kept behind bars for an inordinate period of time by taking refuge in rigours laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985. The legislature in its wisdom, in order to ensure speedy and timely disposal of the cases under the Act, has provided for the constitution of special Courts under Section 36-A of the Act. However, this Court cannot turn Nelson's eye to the protracted delays and systematic inefficiency that frustrate this legislative purpose. A Court of law is duty-bound to ensure that it does not become complicit in violation of an individual's fundamental rights, notwithstanding anything contained in a statute. While dealing with bail petition in a case governed by the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985, the Court must strike a judicious balance between the legislative intent to curb the menace of drugs and the sacrosanct right of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial. Prolonged incarceration, without justifiable cause, risks transforming pre-trial detention into punitive imprisonment, an outcome antithetical to the principle of justice and equity.

Ergo, the unequivocal inference is that where the trial has failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged incarceration, it militates against the precious fundamental rights of life and liberty granted under the law and, as such, conditional liberty overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In other words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity, on the ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985."

Suffice to say, further detention of the petitioner as an undertrial is not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.

7. In view of above, the present petition is allowed. Petitioner is



ordered to be released on regular bail on his furnishing bail/surety bonds to the satisfaction of the Ld. concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate. However, in addition to conditions that may be imposed by the concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate, the petitioner shall remain bound by the following conditions:

- (i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.
- (ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral or documentary, during the trial.
- (iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before the trial.
- (iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail.
- (v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with the trial Court.
- (vi) The petitioner shall give his cellphone number to the Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station and shall not change his cell-phone number without prior permission of the trial Court/Illaq Magistrate.
- (vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the trial.
- (viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of every month, an affidavit, before the concerned trial Court, to the effect that he has not been involved in commission of any offence after being released on bail. In case the petitioner is found to be involved in any offence after his being enlarged on bail in the present FIR, on the basis of his affidavit or otherwise, the State is mandated to move, forthwith, for cancellation of his bail which plea, but of course, shall be ratiocinated upon merits thereof.



8. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those which may be imposed by concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate as directed hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the State/complainant shall be at liberty to move cancellation of bail of the petitioner.
9. Ordered accordingly.
10. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.
11. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, stand disposed of accordingly.

(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE

4.9.2025
Ashwani

Whether speaking/reasoned:	Yes/No
Whether reportable:	Yes/No