



**115 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH**

CWP-20534-2025

Date of decision: 28.08.2025

Harmesh Singh

....Petitioner

Versus

State of Punjab and others

...Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR**Present:** Mr. Pankaj Mohan Kansal, Advocate
for the petitioner.

Mr. Vikas Arora, DAG, Punjab.

HARPREET SINGH BRAR, J. (ORAL)

1. The present civil writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in the nature of *mandamus* directing the respondents to grant the benefit of increments that was granted in the year 1997 w.e.f. 1992 in implementation of recommendation of Third Punjab Pay Commission along with all consequential benefits as has been granted to many others pursuant to Judicial Pronouncement dated 15.11.1992 passed in CWP No.15523 of 1990.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner *inter alia* contends that the petitioner is entitled to two increments on the promotion to Technician Grade IV in the year 1992 as per the 3rd Pay Commission and Rule 8 of the Punjab Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 1988. The petitioner has prayed for all consequential benefits (arrears, revised pension etc.) in accordance with the pay fixation with interest. This benefit was initially denied to same set of employees, however, this Court in the year 1992 and 1996 has confirmed the two increments on all promotions from 1986 onwards. Thereafter, the



respondent has withdrawn this benefit in the year 2006 by passing an office order by abolishing the post to which they were promoted. The aforementioned order of withdrawal was challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the year 2012 and ultimately the relief was granted to the affected employees who were entitled to notional pay and increments. The petitioner has now retired in the year 2020 and submits that he served a legal notice on 15.04.2025, however, the claim of the petitioner was not considered. He further relies upon the judgment passed by this Court in CWP No.17190 of 1997 titled as '**Ram Chand Chann Vs. State of Punjab and another**' decided on 09.07.2024.

3. The learned State counsel submits that the claim of the petitioner cannot be considered after an inordinate delay and the petition suffers from delay and laches. Further, the petitioner cannot be entitled to any relief as he has retired in the year 2020 and the present case is not covered under the principle of recurring cause of action.

4. It is trite law that the delay in approaching this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be condoned if sufficient cause is indicated or a reasonable explanation is provided for the same. However, the facts of the matter at hand indicate otherwise. Learned counsel petitioner has failed to specify any compelling or extenuating circumstance which prevented him from approaching this Court for such a long time. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by a three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Chairman/Managing Director, U.P. Power Corporation Limited and Others vs. Ram Gopal (2021) 13 SCC 225**, wherein, the following was held:

"16. Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to proceedings under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of



India, nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse of time. Consideration of unexplained delays and inordinate laches would always be relevant in writ actions, and writ courts naturally ought to be reluctant in exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have slept over wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester. **Fence-sitters cannot be allowed to barge into Courts and cry for their rights at their convenience, and vigilant citizens ought not to be treated alike with mere opportunists.** On multiple occasions, it has been restated that there are implicit limitations of time within which writ remedies can be enforced. In *SS Balu v. State of Kerala*, this Court observed thus:

“17. It is also well settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment.” (emphasis added)

5. Further, in *Mrinmoy Maity vs. Chhanda Koley and others 2024 AIR SC 2717*, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically observed that the High Courts must factor in the delay, while exercising its discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was further opined that undue and unexplained delay may be reason enough to dismiss a petition as indolent litigants ought not to be encouraged by writ Courts.

6. In *State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179*, while considering the issue regarding delay and laches and referring to earlier judgments on the issue, a Two-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court opined that repeated representations made will not keep the issues alive. A stale or a dead issue/dispute cannot be got revived even if such a



representation has either been decided by the authority or got decided by getting a direction from the court as the issue regarding delay and laches is to be decided with reference to original cause of action and not with reference to any such order passed. Delay and laches on the part of a government servant may deprive him of the benefit which had been given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India, in a situation of that nature, will not be attracted as it is well settled that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant.

7. Moreover, with regards to issues regarding fixation of pay, the position of law has been settled by a two-Judge Bench Hon'ble Supreme Court in *M.R. Gupta v. Union of India, (1995) 5 SCC 628* and has been reaffirmed by a full bench decision of this Court in *Saroj Kumari v. State of Punjab, 1998(3) SCT 664*. Accordingly, so long as an employee *is in service*, a petition claiming re-fixation of pay is not barred by limitation or the doctrine of laches, as the denial of benefit occurs every month when the salary is paid, thereby giving rise to a fresh cause of action, based on continuing wrong. Such a case is not a case of one time action like the case of termination or dismissal from service. However, payment of arrears can be restricted to a reasonable period. Three years and two months has been considered to be a reasonable period as that is the period for which a person can ask for the payment of arrears before a Civil Court.

8. However, once an employee *ceases to be in service*, the wrong fixation of pay can no longer be treated as a continuing wrong. Consequently, a petition seeking such fixation, if instituted after cessation of service and with substantial delay, is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. Reliance can be placed on the judgement of the co-ordinate bench of this Court in *Prem Nath v. State of Punjab, 2018(2) SCT 687*, wherein the petitioners



approached this Court seeking correct fixation of pay much subsequent to their superannuation. While dismissing the petition on the ground of delay and laches, the Court held as follows:

*“10. The reliance placed by counsel upon the judgment in Saroj Kumar's case, is wholly misplaced. **The observations and aspect of delay in Saroj Kumar's case, were in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.R. Gupta v. Union of India and others, 1996(1) S.C.T 8 : 1995(4) RSJ 502. In M.R. Gupta's case (supra), it had been categorically held that so long as an employee "is in service" a fresh cause of action arises every month when he is getting his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong calculation made contrary to rules.** It was further held that the claim to be awarded the correct salary on the basis of a proper pay fixation "is a right which subsists during the entire tenure of service"*

*11. **In the present case, however, the petitioners choose not to agitate their claim while in service. It is much subsequent to their superannuation that they have woken up and seek to gain impetus from certain decisions that may have been rendered in the case of similarly situated employees.**” (emphasis supplied)*

9. Indubitably, the petitioner in the present case is a fence-sitter who has chosen to approach this Court after an inordinate and unexplained delay. It is well settled that repeated representations or issuance of legal notices do not extend the period of limitation nor keep a stale claim alive. No cogent or satisfactory explanation has been advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner to justify the belated filing of the present petition. Furthermore, reliance on the judgment of this Court in CWP No.17190 of 1997, ***Ram Chand Chann v. State of Punjab and another*** is wholly misplaced, inasmuch as the petitioners therein were vigilant and diligent in asserting their rights by approaching this Court promptly in the year 1997.

10. In view of the discussion above, this Court does not find it



appropriate to invoke its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the present petition stands dismissed. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.

(HARPREET SINGH BRAR)
JUDGE

28.08.2025
Neha

Whether speaking/reasoned	:	Yes/No
Whether reportable	:	Yes/No