

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH**

2025:PHHC:147356



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CRM-M-34924-2025

Date of decision: 28.10.2025

Satpal Singh

....Petitioner

V/s

State of Punjab

....Respondent

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL

Present: Ms. Gagandeep Kaur, Advocate for the petitioner.

Mr. Amit Kumar Goyal, Addl. AG, Punjab.

SUMEET GOEL, J. (ORAL)

1. Present petition is the second attempt, which has been filed under Section 439 of Cr.P.C., on behalf of the petitioner for grant of regular bail in case bearing FIR No.84 dated 11.07.2022, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 22(c)/61/85 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short 'NDPS Act') at Police Station Sadar Kotkapura Khan, District Faridkot.

2. Vider order dated 22.07.2025 earlier passed by this Court, the petitioner was afforded the concession of interim regular bail, which reads thus:

"CRM-26869-2025

Application for placing on record the zimni orders, pursuant to order of the preceding date, is allowed. The same are taken on record. Registry to paginate the paper-book accordingly.

CRM-M-34924-2025

1. *Present petition, is the second attempt by the petitioner before this Court for grant of regular bail to the petitioner in case bearing FIR No.84 dated 11.07.2022, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 22(c)/61/85 of the NDPS Act at Police Station Sadar Kotkapura Khan, District Faridkot.*

2. *The gravamen of the FIR in question is that the petitioner is accused of consciously possessing 700 intoxicant tablets containing Tramadol Hydrochloride with total weight of 278.054 grams which falls under the commercial quantity.*

3. *Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner has been falsely implicated into the FIR in question. Learned counsel has further submitted that no recovery, as alleged in the prosecution case, has been effected from the petitioner. Learned counsel has further iterated that there was 08 days inordinate delay in sending the sample to FSL. Learned counsel has further argued that the mandatory provisions of Sections 50, 52-A and 57 of the NDPS Act have not been complied with which vitiates the prosecution case. Learned counsel has further referred, in extenso, to the zimni orders passed by the trial Court, especially orders 17.08.2023, 12.09.2023, 26.10.2023, 14.11.2023, 05.12.2023, 20.12.2023, 12.01.2024, 01.02.2024, 22.02.2024, 14.03.2024, 04.04.2024, 26.04.2024, 05.06.2024, 17.07.2024, 07.08.2024, 19.09.2024, 30.10.2024, 19.02.2025, 28.03.2025, 30.04.2025 and 16.05.2025 respectively; to argue that there is delay in culmination of the trial and the same is not attributable to the petitioner. Thus, learned counsel has prayed for grant of regular bail to the petitioner.*

4. *Learned State counsel has vehemently opposed the present petition arguing that the allegations raised are serious in nature and thus the petitioner is not entitle to the concession of regular bail. Learned State counsel has further submitted that the FIR in question pertains to recovery of contraband of commercial quantity and, therefore, the bar under Section 37 of the NDPS, 1985 is attracted. Learned State counsel has further submitted that as per the information available with him, no other FIR (including under NDPS Act) has been registered against the petitioner. He has, accordingly, entreated for dismissal of the instant petition.*

5. *I have heard counsel for the rival parties and have gone through the available records of the case.*

6. The petitioner was arrested on 11.07.2022 whereinafter investigation was carried out and challan was presented on 27.07.2023. 13 prosecution witnesses have been cited, which primarily involved official/police witnesses, but the entire prosecution evidence is yet to be concluded. The rival contention of learned counsel for the parties; as to whether the petitioner has been falsely implicated into the FIR in question, whether mandatory provisions of Sections 50, 52-A and 57 of the NDPS Act

have been complied with or not & the weightage/veracity of the evidence brought by the prosecution till date; are issues of contentious nature which are essentially required to be ratiocinated upon during the course of trial. The Court does not deem it appropriate to delve deep into these rival contentions, at this stage, lest it may prejudice the trial. Nothing tangible has been brought forward to indicate the likelihood of the petitioner absconding from the process of justice or interfering with the remaining prosecution evidence.

6.1. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment passed by this Court titled as **Kulwinder vs. State of Punjab : 2025: PHHC:002695**; relevant whereof reads as under:

“7.1. Long back, in **Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar** reported as (1980) 1 SCC 81, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had declared that the right to speedy trial of offenders facing criminal charges is “implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by the Court”. Remarking that a valid procedure under Article 21 is one which contains a procedure that is “reasonable, fair and just” it was held that:

“Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of liberty cannot be “reasonable, fair or just” unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an

integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of her liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long delayed trial in violation of her fundamental right under Article 21.”

7.2. *The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled as **Abdul Rehman Antulay vs R.S. Nayak** reported as (1992) 1 SCC 225 has re-emphasized the right to speedy trial, and further held that an accused, facing prolonged trial, has no option:*

“The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is, thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant, as the case may be, to proceed with the case with reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in their country, where the large majority of accused come from poorer and weaker sections of the society, not versed in the ways of law, where they do not often get competent legal advice, the application of the said rule is wholly inadvisable. Of course, in a given case, if any accused demands speedy trial and yet he is not given one, may be a relevant factor in her favour. But we cannot disentitle an accused from complaining of infringement of her right to speedy trial on the ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a speedy trial. ”

7.3. *The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled as **Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra and another, 2024(3) RCR (Criminal) 494** has held as under:*

“18. Criminals are not born out but made. The human potential in everyone is good and so, never write off any criminal as beyond redemption. Their humanist fundamental is often missed when dealing with delinquents, juvenile and adult. Indeed, every saint has a past and every sinner a future. When a crime is

committed, a variety of factors is responsible for making the offender commit the crime. Those factors may be social and economic, may be, the result of value erosion or parental neglect; may be, because of the stress of circumstances, or the manifestation of temptations in a milieu of affluence contrasted with indigence or other privations.

189. If the State or any prosecuting agency including the court concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution then the State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime.

20. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an accused; not a convict. The over-arching postulate of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly, howsoever stringent the penal law may be.

21. We are convinced that the manner in which the prosecuting agency as well as the Court have proceeded, the right of the accused to have a speedy trial could be said to have been infringed thereby violating Article 21 of the Constitution.”

*7.4. The Hon’ble Supreme Court; while dealing with a bail plea in respect of a case under NDPS Act pertaining to commercial quantity contraband; in a judgment titled as **Mohd Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT of Delhi)** reported as 2023 INSC 311, has observed as under:*

“21. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that laws which impose stringent conditions for grant of bail, may be necessary in public interest; yet, if trials are not concluded in time, the injustice wrecked on the individual is immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded and their living conditions, more often than not, appalling. According to

the Union Home Ministry's response to Parliament, the National Crime Records Bureau had recorded that as on 31st December 2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners were lodged in jails against total capacity of 4,25,068 lakhs in the country. Of these 122,852 were convicts; the rest 4,27,165 were undertrials.

22. *The danger of unjust imprisonment, is that inmates are at risk of "prisonisation" a term described by the Kerala High Court in A Convict Prisoner vs. State reported in 1993 Cri LJ 3242, as a "a radical transformation" whereby the prisoner:*

"loses her identity. He is known by a number. He loses personal possessions. He has no personal relationships. Psychological problems result from loss of freedom, status, possessions, dignity any autonomy of personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out to be dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary standards. Self-perception changes."

23. *There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to crime, "as crime not only turns admirable, but the more professional the crime, more honour is paid to the criminal" (also see Donald Clemmer's 'The Prison Community' published in 1940). Incarceration has further deleterious effect - where the accused belongs to the weakest economic strata: immediate loss of livelihood, and in several cases, scattering of families as well as loss of family bonds and alienation from society. The courts therefore, have to be sensitive to these aspects (because in the event of an acquittal, the loss to the accused is irreparable), and ensure that trials – especially in cases, where special laws enact stringent provisions, are taken up and concluded speedily."*

7.5. *The Hon'ble Supreme Court; in a bail plea under NDPS Act pertaining to commercial quantity; in **Criminal Appeal No.245/2020 dated 07.02.2020** titled as "**Chitta Biswas Alias Subhas vs. The State of West Bengal**" has held as under:-*

"Leave granted.

Ther appeal arises out of the final Order dated 30.7.2010 passed by the High Court of Calcutta in CRM No.6787 of 2019.

The instant matter arises out of application preferred by the appellant under Section 439 Cr.P.C. seeking bail in connection with Criminal Case No.146 of 2018 registered with Taherpur Police Station for offence punishable under Section 21-C of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

According to the prosecution, the appellant was found to be in possession of narcotic substance i.e. 46 bottles of phensydryl cough syrup containing codeine mixture above commercial quantity.

The appellant was arrested on 21.07.2018 and continues to be in custody. It appears that out of 10 witnesses cited to be examined in support of the case of prosecution four witnesses have already been examined in the trial.

Without expressing any opinion on the merits or demerits of the rival submissions and considering the facts and circumstances on record, in our view, case for bail is made out.”

7.6. *The Hon’ble Supreme Court; in a bail plea under NDPS Act pertaining to commercial quantity; titled as “**Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan Vs. The State of West Bengal**” has held as under:-*

“As per the office report dated 29.07.2022, copy of the show cause notice along with Special Leave Petition was supplied to the Standing Counsel for the State of West Bengal and separate notice has been served on the State also. However, no one has entered appearance on their behalf.

The petitioner seeks enlargement on bail in F.I.R. No.612 of 2020 dated 17.10.2020 filed under Section 21(c) and 37 of the NDPS Act, registered at Police Station Bongaon, West Bengal.

During the course of the hearing, we are informed that the petitioner has undergone custody for a period of

01 year and 07 months as on 09.06.2022. The trial is at a preliminary stage, as only one witness has been examined. The petitioner does not have criminal antecedents.

Taking into consideration the period of sentence undergone by the petitioner and all the attending circumstances but without expressing any views in the merits of the case, we are inclined to grant bail to the petitioner.

The petitioner is accordingly, directed to be released on bail subject to him furnishing bail bonds to the satisfaction of the Trial Court.”

7.7. To the similar effect is the ratio decidendi of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in **Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.5530-2022** dated 22.08.20223 titled as “**Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh vs. The State of Gujarat**”; **Criminal Appeal No.1169 of 2022** dated 05.08.2022 titled as **Gopal Krishna Patra @ Gopalrusma Vs. Union of India and Ankur Chaudhary vs. State of Madhya Pradesh 2024(4) RCR (Criminal) 172**

7.8. The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a vital safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration; to mitigate anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation as well as to curtail any impairment in the ability of an accused to defend himself, but there is an overarching societal interest paving way for a speedy trial. The right has been repeatedly actuated in the recent past and the ratio decidendi of the above-referred to Supreme Court’s judgments have laid down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. The concept of speedy trial is amalgamated into the Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty, guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed at the time of the arrest of the accused and consequent incarceration which continues at all stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry,

trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result due to impermissible and avoidable delay since the time of the commission of the offence till the criminal proceedings consummate into a finality, could be averted. The speedy trial, early hearing and quick disposal are sine qua non of criminal jurisprudence. The overcrowded Court-dockets, the heavy volume of work and the resultant pressure on the prosecution and the Police, indubitably keeps the entire criminal jurisprudential mechanism under stress and strain. However, there cannot be an excuse for keeping the sword of Damocles hanging on the accused for an indefinite period of time. It does not serve any credit to the criminal justice system, rather it makes for a sad state of affairs. The guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and prevent delay by imposing on the Court and the prosecution an obligation to proceed with the trial with a reasonable dispatch. The guarantee serves a threefold purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused against oppressive pre-trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the accused of the anxiety and public suspicion due to unresolved criminal charges and lastly, it protects against the risk that evidence will be lost or memories dimmed by the passage of time, thus, impairing the ability of the accused to defend himself. It goes without saying that the consequences of pre-trial detention are grave. Accused, presumed innocent, till proven otherwise, are subjected to psychological and physical deprivations of jail-life, usually under onerous conditions. Equally important, the burden of detention of such an accused frequently falls heavily on the innocent members of her family.

There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves consideration at this stage. The allegations in the present case relate to accused being involved in an FIR relating to commercial quantity of contraband under the NDPS Act, 1985. While considering a bail petition in a case involving commercial quantity, the Court has to keep in mind the rigours enumerated under Section 37 of

NDPS Act, 1985 which mandates that Courts can grant bail to an accused only after hearing the public prosecutor and after having satisfied itself of twin conditions which are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged/alleged and that, he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The stringent rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 must be meticulously scrutinized against the backdrop of accused's fundamental right to a speedy trial. The right to life and personal liberty cannot be rendered nugatory by unwarranted delays in the judicial process, particularly where such delay(s) is neither attributable to the accused nor justified at the end of the prosecution by cogent reasons. An individual cannot be kept behind bars for an inordinate period of time by taking refuge in rigours laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985. The legislature in its wisdom, in order to ensure speedy and timely disposal of the cases under the Act, has provided for the constitution of special Courts under Section 36-A of the Act. However, the Court cannot turn Nelson's eye to the protracted delays and systematic inefficiency that frustrate the legislative purpose. A Court of law is duty-bound to ensure that it does not become complicit in violation of an individual's fundamental rights, notwithstanding anything contained in a statute. While dealing with bail petition in a case governed by the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985, the Court must strike a judicious balance between the legislative intent to curb the menace of drugs and the sacrosanct right of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial. Prolonged incarceration, without justifiable cause, risks transforming pre-trial detention into punitive imprisonment, an outcome antithetical to the principle of justice and equity.

Ergo, the unequivocal inference is that where the trial has failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged incarceration, it militates against the precious fundamental rights of life and liberty granted

under the law and, as such, conditional liberty overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In other words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity, on the ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985.”

7. *Reverting to the facts of the case in hand; the petitioner was arrested on 11.07.2022. The petitioner was extended the concession of interim bail on 29.08.2022 as the report of the chemical examiner was not received. Thereafter, the petitioner was again sent to the custody on 26.07.2023. A perusal of the zimni orders passed by the trial Court ibid reflects that the trial is procrastinating but the conclusion thereof is not visible in near future and delay in culmination thereof cannot be saddled upon the petitioner. In-fact the zimni orders passed by the trial Court reflects that the repeatedly summons as alsoailable warrants have been issued against the Police officials/witnesses who repeatedly did not turn up to have their testimonies recorded. Ergo, the long inordinate custody of the petitioner as an undertrial, without his being responsible for procrastination thereof entitles him to grant the benefit of bail in the factual matrix of the case in hand, in the backdrop of the Article 21 of the Constitution of India.*

*Indubitably, the petition in hand is the second plea by the petitioner for securing regular bail. The first petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed as withdrawn, at that stage, i.e. on 24.03.2025. However, the fact remains that even after the said date i.e. 24.03.2025, the prosecution had failed in its sacrosanct duty to bring forth its evidence before the trial Court which factum is irrefutably reflected from the zimni orders dated 18.03.2025, 30.04.2025 & 16.05.2025, passed by the trial Court. Therefore, this Court is inclined to favorably consider the instant petition. A profitable reference in ther regard is being made to the dicta passed by this Court in **Rafiq Khan vs. State of Haryana and Anr.: 2024(2) RCR (Criminal) 819.***

8. *In view of the above, it is directed as under:*

(I) *The petitioner is ordered to be released on interim regular bail, till next date of hearing before this Court, on her furnishing bail/surety bonds to the satisfaction of the*

concerned Special Court, NDPS Act/Duty Magistrate. However, in addition to conditions that may be imposed by the concerned Special Court, NDPS Act/Duty Magistrate, the petitioner shall remain bound by the following conditions:-

- (i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.*
- (ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral or documentary, during the trial.*
- (iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before the trial.*
- (iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail.*
- (v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with the trial Court.*
- (vi) The petitioner shall give his cellphone number to the Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station and shall not change his cell-phone number without prior permission of the trial Court/Illaq Magistrate.*
- (vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the trial.*
- (viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of every month, an affidavit, before the concerned Special Judge of NDPS Court, to the effect that she has not been involved in commission of any offence after being released on bail. In case the petitioner is found to be involved in any offence after his being enlarged on bail in the present FIR, on the basis of his affidavit or otherwise, the State is mandated to move, forthwith, for cancellation of his bail which plea, but of course, shall be ratiocinated upon merits thereof.*

In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those which may be imposed by concerned Special Court, NDPS

Act/Duty Magistrate as directed hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the State shall be at liberty to move cancellation of bail of the petitioner.

9. *There is another aspect nay vital aspect of the matter which craves for attention of this Court.*

It has been repeatedly observed that official witnesses in NDPS cases—who, in most cases, comprise police personnel—are consistently failing to appear before the Court to tender their evidence, despite the issuance ofailable warrants and, in numerous instances, even non-ailable warrants. Alarmingl, there exist several cases where evenailable warrants remain unexecuted for extended periods, resulting in routine adjournments of trials under the NDPS Act solely on this count. This state of affairs reflects a deeply disturbing and systemic lapse in the prosecutorial mechanism, whereby the trial is stalled indefinitely due to the indifference or wilful non-cooperation of official witnesses. Such conduct not only frustrates the right of the accused—whether incarcerated or on bail—to a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, but also gravely undermines the administration of criminal justice. The abdication of duty by official witnesses, who are employees of the State, erodes public confidence in the justice delivery system and emboldens criminal elements by showcasing prosecutorial apathy. It sets a dangerous precedent where procedural laxity takes precedence over judicial efficacy. The resultant delay compromises deterrence and enables the recycling of narcotic offenders back into society during pendency of trial and obstructs the overarching objective of the NDPS Act—namely, the containment of the menace of drug trafficking and substance abuse. In effect, such dereliction by State officials, especially serving police officials, amounts to an affront to both rule of law and societal welfare. Senior police officials—in particular, at the helm of the police force at the district level, i.e. the concerned SSP/SP are also under a bounden duty to monitor the conduct of police officials and ensure their presence for tendering evidence before the concerned trial Court. This exhibition of laxity and apathy by the police officials deserves redressal. This seeming abdication of duty by the senior police officials, by not paying any heed to this conduct of police officials, under their supervision, is, thus, a malady to which this Court finds itself unable to turn a nelson’s eye. A

profitable reference in this regard is being made to the dicta passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case titled as **Hussainara Khatoon and Others versus Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna; 1980(1) SCC 98**, relevant whereof reads, thus:

“10. xxxx xxxx xxxx The State cannot avoid its constitutional obligation to provide speedy trial to the accused by pleading financial or administrative inability. The State is under a constitutional mandate to ensure speedy trial and whatever is necessary for this purpose has to be done by the State. xxxx xxxx xxxx”

The dicta has been further reiterated by a Five Judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Abdul Rehman Antulay and others versus R.S. Nayak and another; 1992(1) SCC 225**. Furthermore, in a case titled as **Ranjan Dwivedi versus C.B.I., Through the Director General; 2012(8) SCC 495**, it was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as under:

“The guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and prevent delay by imposing on the court and the prosecution an obligation to proceed with the trial with a reasonable dispatch. The guarantee serves a threefold purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused against oppressive pre- trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the accused of the anxiety and public suspicion due to unresolved criminal charges and lastly, it protects against the risk that evidence will be lost or memories dimmed by the passage of time, thus, impairing the ability of the accused to defend him or herself. Stated another way, the purpose of both the criminal procedure rules governing speedy trials and the constitutional provisions, in particular, Article 21, is to relieve an accused of the anxiety associated with a suspended prosecution and provide reasonably prompt administration of justice.”

10. In view of the state of affairs as emanating above, before delving further into the above malady, this Court deems it appropriate to direct, thus:

I. Senior Superintendent of Police, Faridkot is directed to bring forth, on affidavit, the relevant extant applicable SOP/Circulars, including those issued by the Home Secretary, Punjab as well as the Director General of Police, Punjab regarding the appearance of official witness, especially police witness, before trial Court(s) in the State of Punjab.

II. Senior Superintendent of Police, Faridkot is directed to look into the aspect of the culpability of police officials/witness(s) not coming forward to have their testimonies recorded in the trial in question especially even after the learned trial Court had repeatedly issued bailable warrants against them, the reason thereof and person(s) responsible for non-service of such bailable warrants. Senior Superintendent of Police, Faridkot is also directed to furnish details of requisite remedial measures, including the details of disciplinary action etc., if any, initiated against such delinquent official(s). An affidavit be filed by Senior Superintendent of Police, Faridkot delineating these details on or before the next date of hearing.

List on 07.08.2025.”

3. Learned State counsel has brought to the notice of this Court that the entire prosecution evidence stands examined and the case is now fixed for defence evidence.

4. There is no allegation against the petitioner of having misused the concession of interim regular bail earlier extended to him. Accordingly, in view of the above, the petition is allowed and the interim order dated 22.07.2025 is hereby confirmed, subject to the following conditions:

- (i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.
- (ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral or documentary, during the trial.
- (iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before the trial.

- (iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail.
- (v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with the trial Court.
- (vi) The petitioner shall give his cell phone number to the Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station and shall not change his cell-phone number without prior permission of the trial Court/Illaq Magistrate.
- (vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the trial.
- (viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of every month, an affidavit, before the concerned trial Court, to the effect that he has not been involved in commission of any offence after being released on bail. In case the petitioner is found to be involved in any offence after his being enlarged on bail in the present FIR, on the basis of his affidavit or otherwise, the State is mandated to move, forthwith, for cancellation of his bail which plea, but of course, shall be ratiocinated upon merits thereof.

5. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those which may be imposed by concerned CJM/Duty Magistrate as directed hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the State/complainant shall be at liberty to move cancellation of bail of the petitioner.

6. Ordered accordingly.

7. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.

8. Since the main case has been decided, pending miscellaneous application, if any, shall also stands disposed off.

(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE

October 28, 2025
Naveen

Whether speaking/reasoned:
Whether reportable:

Yes/No
Yes/No