



IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH

FAO-2423 of 2009 (O&M)

Date of Decision: July 22, 2025

Smt. Raj Bala

.....Appellant

Vs.

Rajesh and ors.

.....Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SUDEEPTI SHARMA

Present: Mr. R.N. Lohan, Advocate
for the appellant.

Mr. Rajeshwar Singh Thakur, Advocate
for respondent No. 1 and 2.

Mr. Paul S. Saini, Advocate and
Mr. Vipul Sharma, Advocate
and for respondent No. 3-Insurance Co.

SUDEEPTI SHARMA J.

1. The case is listed before this Court for referral to the “Special Mediation Drive-Mediation ‘For the Nation’ List”.
2. Learned counsels for the parties contend that the matter cannot be referred to Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court.

FAO-2423-2009

3. The present appeal has been preferred against the award dated 05.12.2008 passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jind (“the Tribunal”), in a petition filed by the claimant under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for enhancement of compensation granted to the claimant/appellant to the tune of Rs.19,85,493/- along with interest @ 7.5% per annum, on account of injuries suffered by her in a Motor Vehicular Accident, occurred on 17.07.2006.



4. Learned counsel for the claimant-appellant submits that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is on the lower side. He further contends that the amount awarded under the heads of medical expenses, pain and suffering, attendant charges, and special diet is on the lower side and deserves to be enhanced, as per settled law. Therefore, he prays that the present appeal be allowed.

5. Per contra, learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company contends that the Tribunal erred in awarding a sum of ₹10,00,000/- towards medical expenses, despite the fact that the husband of the claimant, Randhir Singh (PW-19), failed to properly substantiate the said amount. He further argues that the amount awarded for pain and suffering, attendant charges, transportation charges etc. is also on higher side. Therefore, he prays that the present appeal be dismissed.

6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the whole record of this case.

SETTLED LAW ON COMPENSATION

7. Hon'ble Supreme Court has settled the law regarding grant of compensation with respect to the disability. The Apex Court in the case of **Raj Kumar Vs. Ajay Kumar and Another (2011) 1 Supreme Court Cases 343**, has held as under:-

General principles relating to compensation in injury cases

5. The provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ('Act' for short) makes it clear that the award must be just, which means that compensation should, to the extent possible, fully and adequately restore the claimant to the position prior to the accident. The object of awarding damages is to make good the loss suffered as a result of wrong done as far as money can do so, in a fair, reasonable and



equitable manner. The court or tribunal shall have to assess the damages objectively and exclude from consideration any speculation or fancy, though some conjecture with reference to the nature of disability and its consequences, is inevitable. A person is not only to be compensated for the physical injury, but also for the loss which he suffered as a result of such injury. This means that he is to be compensated for his inability to lead a full life, his inability to enjoy those normal amenities which he would have enjoyed but for the injuries, and his inability to earn as much as he used to earn or could have earned. (See C.K. Subramonia Iyer v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair, AIR 1970 Supreme Court 376, R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Ltd., 1995 (1) SCC 551 and Baker v. Willoughby, 1970 AC 467).

6. *The heads under which compensation is awarded in personal injury cases are the following :*

Pecuniary damages (Special Damages)

(i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization, medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure.

(ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would have made had he not been injured, comprising :

(a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment;

(b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability.

(iii) Future medical expenses. Non-pecuniary damages (General Damages)

(iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of the injuries.

(v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage).



(vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity).

In routine personal injury cases, compensation will be awarded only under heads (i), (ii)(a) and (iv). It is only in serious cases of injury, where there is specific medical evidence corroborating the evidence of the claimant, that compensation will be granted under any of the heads (ii)(b), (iii), (v) and (vi) relating to loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability, future medical expenses, loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage) and loss of expectation of life.

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

19. We may now summarise the principles discussed above :

(i) All injuries (or permanent disabilities arising from injuries), do not result in loss of earning capacity.

(ii) The percentage of permanent disability with reference to the whole body of a person, cannot be assumed to be the percentage of loss of earning capacity. To put it differently, the percentage of loss of earning capacity is not the same as the percentage of permanent disability (except in a few cases, where the Tribunal on the basis of evidence, concludes that percentage of loss of earning capacity is the same as percentage of permanent disability).

(iii) The doctor who treated an injured-claimant or who examined him subsequently to assess the extent of his permanent disability can give evidence only in regard the extent of permanent disability. The loss of earning capacity is something that will have to be assessed by the Tribunal with reference to the evidence in entirety.



(iv) *The same permanent disability may result in different percentages of loss of earning capacity in different persons, depending upon the nature of profession, occupation or job, age, education and other factors.*

20. The assessment of loss of future earnings is explained below with reference to the following

Illustration 'A' : *The injured, a workman, was aged 30 years and earning Rs. 3000/- per month at the time of accident. As per Doctor's evidence, the permanent disability of the limb as a consequence of the injury was 60% and the consequential permanent disability to the person was quantified at 30%. The loss of earning capacity is however assessed by the Tribunal as 15% on the basis of evidence, because the claimant is continued in employment, but in a lower grade. Calculation of compensation will be as follows:*

a) Annual income before the accident : Rs. 36,000/-.

*b) Loss of future earning per annum
(15% of the prior annual income) : Rs. 5400/-.*

c) Multiplier applicable with reference to age : 17

d) Loss of future earnings : (5400 x 17) : Rs. 91,800/-

Illustration 'B' : *The injured was a driver aged 30 years, earning Rs. 3000/- per month. His hand is amputated and his permanent disability is assessed at 60%. He was terminated from his job as he could no longer drive. His chances of getting any other employment was bleak and even if he got any job, the salary was likely to be a pittance. The Tribunal therefore assessed his loss of future earning capacity as 75%. Calculation of compensation will be as follows :*

a) Annual income prior to the accident : Rs. 36,000/- .



b) Loss of future earning per annum
(75% of the prior annual income) : Rs. 27000/-.

c) Multiplier applicable with reference to age : 17

d) Loss of future earnings : (27000×17) : Rs. 4,59,000/-

Illustration 'C' : The injured was 25 years and a final year Engineering student. As a result of the accident, he was in coma for two months, his right hand was amputated and vision was affected. The permanent disablement was assessed as 70%. As the injured was incapacitated to pursue his chosen career and as he required the assistance of a servant throughout his life, the loss of future earning capacity was also assessed as 70%. The calculation of compensation will be as follows :

a) Minimum annual income he would
have got if had been employed as an
Engineer : Rs. 60,000/-

b) Loss of future earning per annum
(70% of the expected annual income) : Rs. 42000/-

c) Multiplier applicable (25 years) : 18

d) Loss of future earnings : (42000×18) : Rs. 7,56,000/-

[Note : The figures adopted in illustrations (A) and (B) are hypothetical. The figures in Illustration (C) however are based on actual taken from the decision in **Arvind Kumar Mishra (supra)**].

8. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of **National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Pranay Sethi & Ors.** [(2017) 16 SCC 680] has clarified the law relating to Sections 166, 163-A and 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, on the following aspects:-

(A) Deduction of personal and living expenses to determine multiplicand;



- (B) *Selection of multiplier depending on age of deceased;*
- (C) *Age of deceased on basis for applying multiplier;*
- (D) *Reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses, with escalation;*
- (E) *Future prospects for all categories of persons and for different ages: with permanent job; self-employed or fixed salary.*

The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under:-

“ Therefore, we think it seemly to fix reasonable sums. It seems to us that reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs.15,000, Rs.40,000 and Rs.15,000 respectively. The principle of revisiting the said heads is an acceptable principle. But the revisit should not be fact-centric or quantum-centric. We think that it would be condign that the amount that we have quantified should be enhanced on percentage basis in every three years and the enhancement should be at the rate of 10% in a span of three years. We are disposed to hold so because that will bring in consistency in respect of those heads.”

9. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of **Erudhaya Priya Vs. State Express Tran. Corpn. Ltd. 2020 ACJ 2159**, has held as under:-

“ 7. There are three aspects which are required to be examined by us:

- (a) the application of multiplier of '17' instead of '18';***

The aforesaid increase of multiplier is sought on the basis of age of the appellant as 23 years relying on the judgment in National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and Others, 2017 ACJ



2700 (SC). In para 46 of the said judgment, the Constitution Bench effectively affirmed the multiplier method to be used as mentioned in the table in the case of *Sarla Verma (Smt) and Others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another*, 2009 ACJ 1298 (SC) . In the age group of 15-25 years, the multiplier has to be '18' along with factoring in the extent of disability.

The aforesaid position is not really disputed by learned counsel for the respondent State Corporation and, thus, we come to the conclusion that the multiplier to be applied in the case of the appellant has to be '18' and not '17'.

(b) Loss of earning capacity of the appellant with permanent disability of 31.1%

In respect of the aforesaid, the appellant has claimed compensation on what is stated to be the settled principle set out in *Jagdish v. Mohan & Others*, 2018 ACJ 1011 (SC) and *Sandeep Khanuja v. Atul Dande & Another*, 2017 ACJ 979 (SC). We extract below the principle set out in the *Jagdish* (supra) in para 8:

"8. In assessing the compensation payable the settled principles need to be borne in mind. A victim who suffers a permanent or temporary disability occasioned by an accident is entitled to the award of compensation. The award of compensation must cover among others, the following aspects:

- (i) Pain, suffering and trauma resulting from the accident;
- (ii) Loss of income including future income;
- (iii) The inability of the victim to lead a normal life together with its amenities;



- (iv) *Medical expenses including those that the victim may be required to undertake in future; and*
- (v) *Loss of expectation of life."*

[emphasis supplied]

The aforesaid principle has also been emphasized in an earlier judgment, i.e. the Sandeep Khanuja case (supra) opining that the multiplier method was logically sound and legally well established to quantify the loss of income as a result of death or permanent disability suffered in an accident.

In the factual contours of the present case, if we examine the disability certificate, it shows the admission/hospitalization on 8 occasions for various number of days over 1½ years from August 2011 to January 2013. The nature of injuries had been set out as under:

"Nature of injury:

- (i) *compound fracture shaft left humerus*
- (ii) *fracture both bones left forearm*
- (iii) *compound fracture both bones right forearm*
- (iv) *fracture 3rd, 4th & 5th metacarpals right hand*
- (v) *subtrochanteric fracture right femur*
- (vi) *fracture shaft femur*
- (vii) *fracture both bones left leg*

We have also perused the photographs annexed to the petition showing the current physical state of the appellant, though it is stated by learned counsel for the respondent State Corporation that the same was not on record in the trial court. Be that as it may, this is the position even after treatment and



the nature of injuries itself show their extent. Further, it has been opined in para 13 of Sandeep Khanuja case (supra) that while applying the multiplier method, future prospects on advancement in life and career are also to be taken into consideration.

We are, thus, unequivocally of the view that there is merit in the contention of the appellant and the aforesaid principles with regard to future prospects must also be applied in the case of the appellant taking the permanent disability as 31.1%. The quantification of the same on the basis of the judgment in National Insurance Co. Ltd. case (supra), more specifically para 61(iii), considering the age of the appellant, would be 50% of the actual salary in the present case.

(c) The third and the last aspect is the interest rate claimed as 12%

In respect of the aforesaid, the appellant has watered down the interest rate during the course of hearing to 9% in view of the judicial pronouncements including in the Jagdish's case (supra). On this aspect, once again, there was no serious dispute raised by the learned counsel for the respondent once the claim was confined to 9% in line with the interest rates applied by this Court.

CONCLUSION

8. The result of the aforesaid is that relying on the settled principles, the calculation of compensation by the appellant, as

set out in para 5 of the synopsis, would have to be adopted as follows:

Heads	Awarded
Loss of earning power (Rs.14,648 x 12 x 31.1/100	Rs. 9,81,978/-
Future prospects (50 per cent addition)	Rs.4,90,989/-
Medical expenses including transport charges, nourishment, etc.	Rs.18,46,864/-
Loss of matrimonial prospects	Rs.5,00,000/-
Loss of comfort, loss of amenities and mental agony	Rs.1,50,000/-
Pain and suffering	Rs.2,00,000/-
Total	Rs.41,69,831/-

The appellant would, thus, be entitled to the compensation of Rs. 41,69,831/- as claimed along with simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of application till the date of payment.

10. A perusal of the impugned award reveals that the contention raised by the that the sum awarded towards medical expenses is excessive, is devoid of merit.
11. A bare perusal of the record reflects that the claimant had suffered 100% permanent disability, as supported by the medical testimony of PW9, Dr. M.L. Kochar, and corroborated by the disability certificate (Ex. PW9/1). The claimant remained in coma for a substantial period and remained hospitalised for approximately six months. The claimant also continued to receive follow-up treatment. The nature of injuries, as stated, included multiple fractures (femur and humerus), cranioplasty (O.M.), tracheotomy, and contractures of multiple joints



accompanied by myositis ossification, thereby rendering her permanently incapacitated.

12. It is further evident that medical expenses were substantiated through oral and documentary evidence, including the testimony of PW19 (husband of the injured) and various medical bills. Although certain bills may not meet the strictest evidentiary standards, the overarching fact remains that an extensive amount was expended towards emergency and continued medical treatment, including the establishment of an ICU facility at home, physiotherapy, procurement of medical equipment, and consultations with multiple specialists. The Tribunal had rightly taken a holistic view of the evidence on record and arrived at a reasonable approximation of medical costs and future medical expenses.

13. This Court is also conscious of the practical reality that in cases of such traumatic injuries, where the claimant suffers 100% permanent disability, it is not always feasible for the family members who are often in a state of psychological and financial distress to preserve every receipt or document. It would, therefore, be unjust and hyper-technical to disallow or reduce compensation merely on the ground of incomplete documentation, particularly when the material placed on record indicates substantial expenditure.

14. Accordingly, this Court finds no justifiable reason to interfere with the findings of the learned Tribunal on medical expenses awarded to the claimant, which were based on a judicious evaluation of evidence. The award under this head is upheld.

15. Turning now to the plea of the claimant for enhancement of compensation under the head pain and suffering, this Court finds considerable force in the submission. As discussed above, the claimant suffered grievous, life-altering injuries resulting in 100% permanent disability, including severe



orthopedic and neurological impairments. The claimant remained in a vegetative or semi-conscious state for a prolonged duration, and the impact on her personal, social, and professional life is both irreversible and profound.

16. Reference at this stage may be drawn to the recent judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in a case of '**K.S. Muralidhar vs. R. Subbulakshmi & Anr., 2024 INSC 886**', wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court elaborated upon the intangible but devastating consequences of pain and suffering. The Apex Court highlighted that while these losses are non-pecuniary and incapable of precise calculation, judicial recognition must be given to the emotional, physical, and psychological trauma endured by the injured party. The relevant portion of the same is reproduced as under:-

"12. It is to be noted that both the Tribunal and the High Court have taken the disability suffered by the claimant-appellant to be at 100%. We find no ground to take a different view.

13. While acknowledging that 'pain and suffering', as a concept escapes definition, we may only refer to certain authorities, scholarly as also judicial wherein attempts have been made to set down the contours thereof.

13.1 The entry recording the term 'pain and suffering' in P. Ramanatha Iyer's Advanced Law Lexicon[9] reads as under:-

***"Pain and suffering.** The term 'Pain and suffering' mean physical discomfort and distress and include mental and emotional trauma for which damages can be recovered in an accident claim.*

This expression has become almost a term of art, used without making fine distinction between pain and suffering. Pain and suffering which a person undergoes cannot be measured in terms of money by any mathematical calculation. Hence the Court awards a sum which is in the nature of a conventional award [Mediana, The (1900) AC 113, 116]"

13.2 Eric Cassell[10], an American Physician and Bioethicist, defines 'pain' not only as a sensation but also 'as experience embedded in beliefs about causes and diseases and their consequences', and 'suffering' as 'the state of severe distress associated with events that threaten the intactness of person'.



13.3 In a recent article[11] published in the journal of the International Association for the Study of Pain, it has been recorded that there is no consensus on what exactly the concept of pain-related suffering includes, and it is often not precisely operationalised in empirical studies. The authors in their systematic review analysed 111 articles across a variety of disciplines such as bioethics, medical ethics, psycho-oncology, anaesthesiology, philosophy, sociology etc., we may refer to few of them:

13.3.1 Eugene V. Boisaubin[12], who is currently a Professor at the University of Texas, at Houston, in a 1989 article defined it as "Suffering is experienced by individual and arises from threats to the integrity of the individual as a complex social and psychological entity."

13.3.2 Andrew Edgar, who is currently a Reader Emeritus in Philosophy at Cardiff University at UK has defined, in a 2007 article suffering as an "experience of life never getting better, revealing in the sufferer only vulnerability, futility, and impotence."

13.3.3 Arthur W. Frank[13], Professor Emeritus, Department of Sociology, University of Calgary in his well-known article "Can We Research Suffering?", published in 2001, observed that "at the core of suffering is the sense that something is irreparably wrong with our lives, and wrong is the negation of what could have been right. Suffering resists definition because it is the reality of what is not."

13.3.4 Daryl Pullman[14] who currently serves as University research Professor, Bioethics at the Memorial University of Newfoundland, Canada in his 2002 article defined suffering as the "product of [physical], psychological, economic, or other factors that frustrate an individual in the pursuit of significant life projects."

13.4 The Judicial Studies Board, now known as the Judicial College in the United Kingdom, produced guidelines in 1992 to produce greater consistency of awards and make the judicial scale of values more easily accessible. They have been deduced from a study of past cases, examining the range of awards therein. The latest edition of these guidelines was published in 2021[15]. They record the difficulty of computing 'pain and suffering' as under :-

*[15 See : **Hassam and Anr. v. Rabot and Anr. (2024) UKSC 11**]
"It is widely accepted that making of an award of general damages for pain and suffering is a somewhat artificial task. It involves the Judge seeking to convert the pain and suffering of a given claimant into a monetary award which he or she considers to be reasonable by way of compensation. That is a difficult task and one which has historically led to judges*



making widely varying awards of damages in respect of relatively comparable injuries a result which not only offends the principle of equality before law but results in unnecessary appeals and the incurring of additional cost, apart altogether from the burden that such appeals place on the Court's own scarce resources."

13.5 In determining non-pecuniary damages, the artificial nature of computing compensation has been highlighted in **Heil v. Rankin [2001] QB 272**, as referred to in **Attorney General of St. Helena v. AB & Ors. Privy Council Appeal No. 0034 of 2018** as under:-

*"23. This principle of 'full compensation' applies to pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage alike. But, as Dickson J indicated in the passage cited from his judgment in **Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd, 83 DLR (3d) 452, 475-476**, this statement immediately raises a problem in a situation where what is in issue is what the appropriate level of 'full compensation' for non-pecuniary injury is when the compensation has to be expressed in pecuniary terms. There is no simple formula for converting the pain and suffering, the loss of function, the loss of amenity and disability which an injured person has sustained, into monetary terms. Any process of conversion must be essentially artificial. Lord Pearce expressed it well in **H West & Son Ltd v. Shephard [1964] AC 326, 364** when he said:*

'The court has to perform the difficult and artificial task of converting into monetary damages the physical injury and deprivation and pain and to give judgment for what it considers to be a reasonable sum. It does not look beyond the judgment to the spending of the damages.'

*24. The last part of this statement is undoubtedly right. The injured person may not even be in a position to enjoy the damages he receives because of the injury which he has sustained. Lord Clyde recognised this in **Wells v. Wells [1999] 1 AC 345, 394H** when he said: 'One clear principle is that what the successful plaintiff will in the event actually do with the award is irrelevant."*

13.6 In the context of the United States, the most important piece of legal literature regarding 'pain and suffering' is an article titled *Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling Pain and Suffering*, published in the year 1989. Relevant extracts thereof read as under :

"Pain and suffering and other intangible or non-economic losses are even more problematic. Physical pain and attendant suffering have for centuries being recognised as legitimate elements of damages, and "modern" tort law has seen a marked expansion of the rights to recover for forms of mental anguish. Some Courts have even permitted recovery for emotional



trauma unaccompanied by physical injury, including derivative losses stemming from injuries to family members. The precise elements of compensable non-economic loss vary by jurisdiction. Pain and suffering may be used as a catch-all category for the jury's consideration of all non-pecuniary losses in a case of a nonfatal injury, subsuming other qualitative categories such as mental anguish and humiliation. More commonly, though, other non-economic elements - such as "loss of enjoyment of life" are accorded independent standing ..."

Another important observation is that:

"Whatever the categories of non-economic damages allowed in a given jurisdiction, the law provides no objective benchmarks valuing them. As one commentator notes, "Courts have usually been content to say that pain and suffering damages should amount to 'fair compensation', or a 'reasonable amount', 'without any definite guide'."

13.7 Consideration of the above, underlines that while each discipline has its own conception of the meaning of pain/suffering, within its confines, the commonality that emerges is that a person's understanding of oneself is shaken or compromised at its very root at the hands of consistent suffering. In the present facts, it is unquestionable that the sense of something being irreparably wrong in life, as spoken by Frank (supra); vulnerability and futility, as spoken by Edgar, is present and such a feeling will be present for the remainder of his natural life.

*14. In respect of 'pain and suffering' in cases where disability suffered is at 100%, we may notice a few decisions of this **Court** :-*

*14.1 In **R.D Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) (P) Ltd. (1995) 1 SCC 551.** It was observed :*

*"17. The claim under Sl. No. 16 for 'pain and suffering' and for loss of amenities of life under Sl. No. 17, are claims for non-pecuniary loss. The appellant has claimed lump sum amount of Rs.3,00,000 each under the two heads. The High **Court** has allowed Rs.1,00,000 against the claims of Rs.6,00,000. When compensation is to be awarded for 'pain and suffering' and loss of amenity of life, the special circumstances of the claimant have to be taken into account including his age, the unusual deprivation he has suffered, the effect thereof on his future life. The amount of compensation for non-pecuniary loss is not easy to determine but the award must reflect that different circumstances have been taken into consideration. According to us, as the appellant was an advocate having good practice in different courts and as because of the accident he has been crippled and can move only on wheelchair, the High **Court** should have allowed an amount of Rs.1,50,000 in respect of claim for 'pain and suffering' and Rs.1,50,000 in*



respect of loss of amenities of life. We direct payment of Rs.3,00,000 (Rupees three lakhs only) against the claim of Rs.6,00,000 under the heads "pain and suffering" and "Loss of amenities of life".

(Emphasis Supplied)

14.2 This Judgment was recently referred to by this **Court** in **Sidram v. United India Insurance Company Ltd. (2023) 3 SCC 439** reference was also made to **Karnataka SRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty (2003) 7 SCC 197** (irrespective of the percentage of disability incurred, the observations are instructive), wherein it was observed :

"18. A person not only suffers injuries on account of accident but also suffers in mind and body on account of the accident through out his life and a feeling is developed that his no more a normal man and cannot enjoy the amenities of life as another normal person can. While fixing compensation for pain and suffering as also for loss of amenities, features like his age, marital status and unusual deprivation he has undertaken in his life have to be reckoned."

14.3 In **Kajal v. Jagdish Chand (2020) 4 SCC 413** considering the facts of the case, i.e., 100% disability, child being bedridden for life, her mental age being that of a nine-month-old for life - a vegetative existence, held that "even after taking a conservative view of the matter an amount payable for the 'pain and suffering' of this child should be at least Rs.15,00,000/-."

14.4 In **Ayush v. Reliance General Insurance (2022) 7 SCC 738** relying on **Kajal (supra)** the amount awarded in 'pain and suffering' was enhanced to Rs.10,00,000. The child who had suffered the accident was five years old and the **Court** noted in paragraph 2 that :

"As per the discharge certificate, the appellant is not able to move both his legs and had complete sensory loss in the legs, urinary incontinence, bowel constipation and bed sores. The appellant was aged about 5 years as on the date of the accident, hence has lost his childhood and is dependent on others for his routine work."

14.5 In **Lalan (supra)** cited by the claimant-appellant, the Tribunal awarded Rs.30,000/- which was enhanced to Rs.40,000/- by the High **Court**. Considering the fact that the appellant therein has suffered extensive brain injury awarded compensation under 'pain and suffering' to the tune of Rs.3,00,000/-.

15. Keeping in view the above-referred judgment, the injuries suffered, the 'pain and suffering' caused, and the life-long nature of the disability afflicted upon the claimant-appellant, and the statement of the Doctor as reproduced above, we find the request of the claimant-appellant to be justified and as such, **award Rs.15,00,000/-** under the



head ‘pain and suffering’, fully conscious of the fact that the prayer of the claimant–appellant for enhancement of compensation was 22 (2022) 7 SCC 738 15| SLP (C) NO. 18337 OF 2021 by a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/-, we find the compensation to be just, fair and reasonable at the amount so awarded.

17. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of ***Baby Sakshi Greola Vs. Manzoor Ahmad Simon and anothers, 2025(1) RCR (Civil) 238***, where the injured was a female child aged 7 years and had suffered grievous injuries, learned Tribunal awarded Rs.50,000/-towards pain and suffering, but the same was enhanced by the Hon'ble High Court to Rs. 12,00,000/-. When the matter reached to the Hon'ble Apex Court, the same was enhanced to Rs.15,00,000/-

18. In the present case, considering the grievous nature of injuries, the long-term and possibly lifelong dependency, and the complete loss of personal autonomy, this Court is of the considered view that the sum of ₹1,00,000/- awarded by the Tribunal under the head of pain and suffering is manifestly inadequate.

19. In the interest of justice and in consonance with judicial precedents, the compensation under the head pain and suffering is enhanced to **₹15,00,000/-**.

20. As regards attendant charges, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***Kajal vs. Jagdish Chand, (2020) 2 R.C.R. (Civil) 27***, has laid down that in cases of 100% permanent disability, the use of the multiplier method is appropriate to compute this head, considering that the injured would require 24/7 care, possibly by trained attendants.

21. In the instant case, given the total incapacity and the requirement for constant nursing care, including for physiotherapy and ICU-level support at home, this Court deems it appropriate to award a lump sum of **₹8,00,000/-** under this head, to reasonably compensate for past and anticipated future expenses on attendants.

22. Further, the award of the learned Tribunal under the heads of special diet, transportation expenses, and loss of amenities also appears to be on the lower side, particularly in view of the extended hospitalisation, nature of disability, and the resultant lifelong confinement and restrictions placed upon the life of the claimant.

23. Accordingly, these heads are also liable to be enhanced suitably, in accordance with settled law on compensation.

24. In light of the foregoing discussion and judicial precedents, the appeal is allowed, and the award dated 05.12.2008 passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jind is modified accordingly.

25. In view of the above, the appellant-claimant is held entitled to the enhanced amount of compensation amount as calculated below:

Sr. No.	Heads	Compensation Awarded
1.	Medical Expenses	Rs.10,00,000/-
2.	Attendant Charges	Rs.8,00,000/-
3	Pain and Sufferings	Rs.15,00,000/-
4	Special diet	Rs.1,00,000/-
5	Loss of Amenities of life	Rs.70,000/-
6	Permanent Disability	Rs.2,00,000/-
7	Loss of Income	Rs.5,58,493/-
8.	Transportation Charges	Rs.50,000/-
9.	Misc. Expenses	Rs.50,000/-
	Total Compensation	Rs.43,28,493/-
	Amount Awarded by the Tribunal	Rs. 19,85,493/-
	Enhanced amount	Rs.23,43,000/-(43,28,493-1985493)

26. So far as the interest part is concerned, as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in *Dara Singh @ Dhara Banjara Vs. Shyam Singh Varma* 2019 ACJ 3176



and **R.Valli and Others VS. Tamil Nandu State Transport Corporation** (2022) 5 **Supreme Court Cases 107**, the amount so calculated shall carry an interest @9% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition, till the date of realization.

27. Respondent No.3-Insurance Company is directed to deposit the enhanced amount along with interest with the Tribunal within a period of two months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. The Tribunal is directed to disburse the same to the appellant-claimant in her bank account. The appellant-claimant is directed to furnish her bank account details to the Tribunal.

28. Further Insurance Company is directed to disburse the current schedule fee to Mr. Paul S. Saini, Advocate, pursuant to order dated 18.07.2024 passed in FAO No.1682 of 2007 by this Court, within a period of twenty days from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment.

29. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

(SUDEEPTI SHARMA)
JUDGE

July 22, 2025
Gaurav Arora

Whether speaking/non-speaking : Speaking
Whether reportable : Yes/No