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**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH**

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CRR-1509-2025 (O&M)

Date of decision: 21.08.2025

Harbans Singh

...Petitioner

V/s

The Gidderbaha Primary Agriculture
Development Bank Ltd. and another

...Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL

Present: Mr. TPS Makkar, Advocate for the petitioner.

Mr. Naginder Singh Vashist, Advocate
for respondent No.1-Bank.

Mr. Baljinder Singh Sra, Addl. A.G. Punjab.

SUMEET GOEL, J. (Oral)

1. The present petition has been filed impugning the judgment dated 25.02.2025 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Sri Muktsar Sahib as also judgment and order of sentence dated 23.01.2020 passed by the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Giddarbaha whereby the petitioner has been held guilty for committing an offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that, during the pendency of proceedings, the petitioner and the complainant-Bank have entered into a settlement/compromise and the petitioner has already deposited the cheque amount with the bank, in respect of which a certificate has been duly issued by the respondent-bank. Furthermore, the petitioner being an uneducated person hailing from a rural background was under a bona fide belief that the matter stood concluded with the respondent-Bank and, thus, discontinued appearing before the appellate Court. According to

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learned counsel, such conduct on the part of the petitioner has occasioned on account of a bona fide impression and not on account of any deliberate lapse or ulterior motive. Learned counsel has further submitted that since the parties have amicably settled their dispute(s), the matter may be compounded and the petitioner be acquitted. On the basis of aforesaid submissions, the grant of instant revision petition is entreated for.

3. Learned State counsel has submitted that on account of the petitioner not appearing before the learned Appellate Court, instant revision petition is not maintainable as the petitioner has failed to show any regard for the process of law, thereby, the learned appellate Court has very rightly dismissed the appeal preferred on behalf of the petitioner (herein).

4. Learned counsel appearing for the complainant-respondent has ratified the factum of compromise/settlement having been arrived at between the parties and has further vouched for the genuineness of the certificate dated 08.05.2025 issued by the bank (copy whereof has been appended as Annexure P-1 with the instant petition). Accordingly, he has iterated that the respondent-bank has no objection in case the offence is permitted to be compounded and the petitioner is ordered to be acquitted.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the rival parties and have perused the available record.

6. Dealing with the preliminary objection raised by the learned State counsel regarding maintainability of the instant revision petition, it would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment passed by this Court in ***Harcharan Singh vs. State of Punjab*** passed in ***CRR-1704-2025*** dated 05.08.2025, relevant whereof reads thus:



“12. As a sequitur to the above ratiocination, the following postulates emerge:

I. A criminal revision petition against the judgments of conviction (as also an application for suspension of sentence, etc.) is maintainable before this High Court, without the petitioner-accused having surrendered or being in custody, in the absence of any rule in the extant Punjab and Haryana High Court Rules/Orders proscribing such maintainability.

II (i) The mere maintainability of a revision petition (as also an accompanying application for suspension of sentence) does not, ipso facto, translate into its desirability; the latter is a matter of judicial discretion — which is inexorably linked to the bona fides and overall conduct of the petitioner-accused, including the sufficiency of reasons proffered for non-appearance before the Appellate Court.

(ii) Where the conduct of the petitioner-accused reflects evasion or contumacious disregard of process of law, the Court must lean against the grant of suspension of sentence, lest, it may tantamount to condoning inexplicable defiance of judicial process.

(iii) No universal guidelines or parameters can possibly be enumerated for exercise of this judicial discretion by this High Court while considering such an application for suspension of sentence.”

It is, thus, indubitable that the instant revision petition is maintainable, notwithstanding, the petitioner-accused having omitted to appear before the learned Appellate Court. In view of the explanation furnished for non-appearance of the petitioner before the learned Appellate Court as well as the *factum* of compromise having been arrived at between the rival parties, this Court deems it fit to further consider the instant revision petition.

7. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment passed by a Three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court titled as ***Damodar S. Prabhu vs. Sayed Babalal H., AIR 2010(SC) 1907***, relevant whereof reads thus:



“15. With regard to the progression of litigation in cheque bouncing cases, the learned Attorney General has urged this Court to frame guidelines for a graded scheme of imposing costs on parties who unduly delay compounding of the offence. It was submitted that the requirement of deposit of the costs will act as a deterrent for delayed composition, since at present, free and easy compounding of offences at any stage, however belated, gives an incentive to the drawer of the cheque to delay settling the cases for years. An application for compounding made after several years not only results in the system being burdened but the complainant is also deprived of effective justice. In view of this submission, we direct that the following guidelines be followed:-

THE GUIDELINES

(i) In the circumstances, it is proposed as follows:

(a) That directions can be given that the Writ of Summons be suitably modified making it clear to the accused that he could make an application for compounding of the offences at the first or second hearing of the case and that if such an application is made, compounding may be allowed by the court without imposing any costs on the accused.

(b) If the accused does not make an application for compounding as aforesaid, then if an application for compounding is made before the Magistrate at a subsequent stage, compounding can be allowed subject to the condition that the accused will be required to pay 10% of the cheque amount to be deposited as a condition for compounding with the Legal Services Authority, or such authority as the Court deems fit.

(c) Similarly, if the application for compounding is made before the Sessions Court or a High Court in revision or appeal, such compounding may be allowed on the condition that the accused pays 15% of the cheque amount by way of costs.

(d) Finally, if the application for compounding is made before the Supreme Court, the figure would increase to 20% of the cheque amount.

Let it also be clarified that any costs imposed in accordance with these guidelines should be deposited with the Legal Services Authority operating at the level of the Court before which compounding takes place. For instance, in case of compounding during the pendency of proceedings before a Magistrate's Court or a Court of Sessions, such costs should be deposited with the District Legal Services Authority. Likewise, costs



imposed in connection with composition before the High Court should be deposited with the State Legal Services Authority and those imposed in connection with composition before the Supreme Court should be deposited with the National Legal Services Authority.

xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx

17. We are also conscious of the view that the judicial endorsement of the above quoted guidelines could be seen as an act of judicial law-making and therefore an intrusion into the legislative domain. It must be kept in mind that Section 147 of the Act does not carry any guidance on how to proceed with the compounding of offences under the Act. We have already explained that the scheme contemplated under Section 320 of the CrPC cannot be followed in the strict sense. In view of the legislative vacuum, we see no hurdle to the endorsement of some suggestions which have been designed to discourage litigants from unduly delaying the composition of the offence in cases involving Section 138 of the Act. The graded scheme for imposing costs is a means to encourage compounding at an early stage of litigation. In the status quo, valuable time of the Court is spent on the trial of these cases and the parties are not liable to pay any Court fee since the proceedings are governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, even though the impact of the offence is largely confined to the private parties. Even though the imposition of costs by the competent court is a matter of discretion, the scale of costs has been suggested in the interest of uniformity. The competent Court can of course reduce the costs with regard to the specific facts and circumstances of a case, while recording reasons in writing for such variance. Bona fide litigants should of course contest the proceedings to their logical end. Even in the past, this Court has used its power to do complete justice under Article 142 of the Constitution to frame guidelines in relation to subject-matter where there was a legislative vacuum.”

7.1. Further the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled as ***M/s New Win Export & Anr. vs. A. Subramaniam 2024 INSC 535 : 2024(3) Law Herald (SC) 2098***, relevant whereof reads as under:

“6. At this juncture, we would also like to reiterate a few words regarding the principles of compounding of offences in the context of NI Act. It is to be remembered that dishonour of cheques is a regulatory offence which was made an offence only in view of public interest so that



*the reliability of these instruments can be ensured. A large number of cases involving dishonour of cheques are pending before courts which is a serious concern for our judicial system. Keeping in mind that the 'compensatory aspect' of remedy shall have priority over the 'punitive aspect', courts should encourage compounding of offences under the NI Act if parties are willing to do so. (See: **Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H. (2010) 5 SCC 663** (Para 18), **Gimpex Private Limited v. Manoj Goel (2022) 11 SCC 705** (Para 29), **Meters And Instruments Private Limited And Anr. v. Kanchan Mehta (2018) 1 SCC 560** (Para 18.2)''*

7.2. The statutory provision of Section 359 of BNSS, 2023 and Section 147 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 when examined alongwith Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 in the guiding light of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in cases of ***Damodar S. Prabhu*** (supra) and ***M/s New Win Export*** (supra), lead to the unequivocal conclusion that the offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can be compounded anytime, irrespective of the stage of litigation including when the matter has reached the High Court invoking the revisional jurisdiction, after having been conclusively dealt with by the Magisterial as also the Sessions Court. In other words, such an offence can be compromised/compounded even after the petitioner-accused has been convicted by the Court of learned Magistrate and his appeal against the same has been dismissed by the learned Sessions Court.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment of ***Damodar S. Prabhu*** case (supra) has also enunciated that, ordinarily, costs ought to be imposed when the offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881 is compounded at a stage when substantial proceedings have been undertaken by Courts so as to dissuade the unscrupulous litigant from



unduly delaying the compounding of such offences. However, discretion has been reserved in favour of the concerned Court to reduce/waive off such costs, in case facts/circumstances of a given case so warrant.

7.3. Further, the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 528 BNSS, 2023 is primarily aimed at preventing abuse of judicial process and securing the ends of justice. Thus, when the dispute is essentially personal in nature and a genuine compromise has been reached, the High Court may intervene to quash the conviction recognizing the continued proceedings would be non-productive and unjust in the given circumstances. The inherent powers of a High Court are powers which are incidental replete powers, which if they did not exist, would oblige the Court to sit still and helplessly watch the process of law and the Courts being abused for the purposes of injustice. In other words, such power(s) is intrinsic to a High Court, it is its very life-blood, its very essence, its immanent attribute. Without such power(s), a High Court would have form but lack substance. Hence, these powers of a High Court deserve to be construed with the widest possible amplitude. These inherent powers are in consonance with the nature of a High Court which ought to be, and has in fact been, invested with power(s) to maintain its authority to prevent the process of law/Courts being obstructed or abused. It is a trite posit of jurisprudence that though laws attempt to deal with all cases that may arise, the infinite variety of circumstances which shape events and the inherent limitations of language render it impracticable to formulate provisions governing every possible scenario. A High Court which exists for the furtherance of justice in an indefatigable manner, should therefore, have

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unfettered power(s) to deal with situations which, though not expressly provided for by the law, need to be dealt with, to prevent injustice or the abuse of the process of law and Courts. The juridical basis of these plenary power(s) is the authority; in fact the seminal duty and responsibility of a High Court; to uphold, to protect and to fulfill the judicial function of administering justice, in accordance with law, in a regular, orderly and effective manner. In other words; Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 reflects peerless powers, which a High Court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so, in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent vexation or oppression, to do justice nay substantial justice between the parties and to secure the ends of justice. Therefore, the High Court, in the exercise of its inherent power under section 528 BNSS, 2023 has the discretion to quash a conviction where the parties have reached an amicable settlement, provided such compromise does not impinge upon the public interest or undermine justice, as well as the substantial justice.

8. Reverting to the facts of the case in hand, it is not disputed by the concerned rival parties that an amicable settlement has been arrived at between them and, therefore, compounding of the offence and necessary further directions have been sought from this Court. In view of the compromise/settlement and the certificate which was duly issued by the respondent-bank (copy whereof has been appended as Annexure P-1) reflects that the parties have amicably resolved the dispute and at present, the respondent-Bank does not harbor any grievance against the petitioner. The learned ASJ, vide its judgment dated 25.02.2025, dismissed the appeal

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filed by the petitioner (herein), who was not present before the said Appellate Court to receive the judgment, as he was under the bona fide impression that the matter already stood resolved with the respondent-Bank. Subsequently, during the pendency of the present revision petition, the petitioner has filed two applications i.e. (CRM-23696-2025) seeking suspension of sentence and (CRM-23697-2025) seeking compounding the offence, on the ground that the dispute between the petitioner and the respondent-Bank now stands amicably settled and pursuant to such settlement and in acknowledgment thereof, the respondent-Bank has duly issued a certificate confirming the receipt of the amount in question. Thus, the substratum of the complaint no longer survives and the continuation of the proceedings would serve no fruitful purpose. In these circumstances and the interest of justice would be served if the sentence awarded is suspended and the offence is permitted to be compounded in light of the settlement already effected between the parties.

In view of the above as also the factual matrix of the case requires that the offence(s) ought to be permitted to be compounded and the petitioner deserves to be acquitted.

9. Keeping in view the entirety of attending facts/circumstances of the case; especially factum that the matter already stood between the rival parties, the petitioner having faced the wrath of criminal litigation since about the year 2017, the petitioner being a person aged about 68 years saddled with the responsibility of his family and the petitioner being an uneducated person hailing from a rural background and not belonging to

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affluent society; this Court does not deem it appropriate to saddle the petitioner with costs.

10. In view of the prevenient ratiocination, it is ordained thus: -

(i) The impugned judgment dated 25.02.2025 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sri Muktsar Sahib & the judgment as also the order of sentence dated 23.01.2020 passed by Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Gidderbaha, District Sri Muktsar Sahib are set-aside and the petitioner is acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

(ii) Pending application(s), if any, shall also stands disposed of.

(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE

August 21, 2025

Ajay

Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No

Whether reportable: Yes/No