

2025:PHHC:036954



IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH

238

CRM-M-10768-2025
DATE OF DECISION: 18.03.2025

GURDEEP SINGH

...PETITIONER

VERSUS

STATE OF PUNJAB

... RESPONDENT

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP MOUDGIL

Present: Mr. Prateek Pandit, Advocate
for the petitioner.

Mr. J.S. Rattu, DAG, Punjab.

SANDEEP MOUDGIL, J (ORAL)

1. **Prayer**

The jurisdiction of this Court has been invoked under Section 483 BNSS, 2023, seeking regular bail to the petitioner in FIR No.177, dated 18.09.2022, under Section 15 of NDPS Act, 1985, registered at Police Station City Rupnagar, District Rupnagar (Annexure P-1)-charges framed under Section 15 read with Section 29 of NDPS Act.

2. **Facts**

The facts as narrated in the FIR reads as under:-

“Copy of Ruka ” SHO P.S. Rupnagar Jai Hind. Today I SI alongwith ASI Sukhwinder Singh 621/R, HC Baljinder Singh 396/R, S/CT Amandeep Singh 529/R and PHG Rajinder Kumar 38/205 on private vehicles were present near park Regency Hotel, Rupnagar with regard to

patrolling when secret informer gave information to me that Gurmeet Singh, Manpreet Singh both sons of Nirmal Singh R/o Poth and Gurdeep Singh son of Hem Singh R/o Shergarh Mand P.S. Machhiwara District Ludhiana are habitual of selling and consuming poppy husk and today also have taken a house on rent in Shampura near Bhullar, Ropar and have stored poppy husk therein. If immediately raid is conducted then above said persons can be apprehended with heavy quantity of poppy husk. The information being reliable and credible fulfills the offence U/s 15/61/85 NDPS Act. Therefore, ruka is being sent against Gurmeet Singh, Manpreet Singh and Gurdeep Singh through PHG Rajinder Kumar for registration of case. Number of the case be informed. Special reports be issued. Incharge Control room Rupnagar and officers be informed. Competent officers be sent at the spot. I SI alongwith fellow officials shall proceed to the disclosed place. Sd/- Krishan Lal SI P.S. City, Rupnagar dated 18.09.2022. Today near Park Regency Hotel Rupnagar at 3:10 PM.”

3. Contentions

On behalf of petitioner

Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the present case stands registered on the basis of a secret information, which was never reduced into writing and transmitted to a senior officer, thus, provisions of Section 42 of NDPS Act has not been complied with in letter and spirit. He further contends that on raid being conducted 200 kg of poppy husk was recovered from the house situated in village Shampura District Rupnagar and the petitioner and his co-accused namely Gurmeet Singh were apprehended, who has

already been enlarged on regular bail by this Court vide order dated 09.02.2024 passed in CRM-M-6009-2024 (Annexure P-2).

On behalf of respondent-State.

Learned State counsel has filed the custody certificate of the petitioner, which is taken on record and according to same, the petitioner is behind the bars for the last 1 year, 3 months and 28 days. He prays for dismissal of the present petition stating that the petitioner is a habitual offender being involved in other cases of similar nature.

4. Analysis

Considering the fact that the co-accused of the petitioner namely Gurmeet Singh and Manpreet Singh have already been enlarged on regular bail by this Court vide orders dated 05.02.2024 and 09.02.2024 passed in CRM-M-57102-2023 and CRM-M-6009-2024 (Annexures P-3 and P-2 respectively) and added with the fact that conclusion of trial shall take sufficient time, as out of total 15 prosecution witnesses only 9 have been examined after the framing of charges on 15.03.2023, no useful purpose would be served by keeping the petitioner behind bars for uncertain period, which would also curtail his right to life and liberty, as enshrined under Article 21 of Constitution of India and is against the basic principle of criminal jurisprudence i.e, '***Bail is a rule and Jail is an exception***', while relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court passed in ***Dataram Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. 2018(2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 131.*** Relevant paras of the said judgment is reproduced as under:-

“2. A fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence is the presumption of innocence, meaning thereby that a person is believed to be innocent until found guilty. However, there are instances in our criminal law where a

reverse onus has been placed on an accused with regard to some specific offences but that is another matter and does not detract from the fundamental postulate in respect of other offences. Yet another important facet of our criminal jurisprudence is that the grant of bail is the general rule and putting a person in jail or in a prison or in a correction home (whichever expression one may wish to use) is an exception. Unfortunately, some of these basic principles appear to have been lost sight of with the result that more and more persons are being incarcerated and for longer periods. This does not do any good to our criminal jurisprudence or to our society.

3. There is no doubt that the grant or denial of bail is entirely the discretion of the judge considering a case but even so, the exercise of judicial discretion has been circumscribed by a large number of decisions rendered by this Court and by every High Court in the country. Yet, occasionally there is a necessity to introspect whether denying bail to an accused person is the right thing to do on the facts and in the circumstances of a case.

4. While so introspecting, among the factors that need to be considered is whether the accused was arrested during investigations when that person perhaps has the best opportunity to tamper with the evidence or influence witnesses. If the investigating officer does not find it necessary to arrest an accused person during investigations, a strong case should be made out for placing that person in judicial custody after a charge sheet is filed. Similarly, it is important to ascertain whether the accused was participating in the investigations to the satisfaction of the investigating officer and was not absconding or not appearing when required by the investigating officer. Surely, if an accused is not hiding from the investigating officer or is hiding due to some genuine and expressed fear of being victimised, it would be a factor that a judge would need to consider in an appropriate case. It is also necessary for the judge to consider whether the accused is a first-time offender or has been accused of other offences and if so, the nature of such offences and his or her general conduct. The poverty or the deemed indigent status of an accused is also an extremely important factor and even Parliament has taken notice of it by incorporating an Explanation to section 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. An equally soft approach to incarceration has been taken by Parliament

by inserting section 436A in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

5. To put it shortly, a humane attitude is required to be adopted by a judge, while dealing with an application for remanding a suspect or an accused person to police custody or judicial custody. There are several reasons for this including maintaining the dignity of an accused person, howsoever poor that person might be, the requirements of Article 21 of the Constitution and the fact that there is enormous overcrowding in prisons, leading to social and other problems as noticed by this Court in In Re-Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons, 2017(4) RCR (Criminal) 416: 2017(5) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 408 : (2017) 10 SCC 658

6. The historical background of the provision for bail has been elaborately and lucidly explained in a recent decision delivered in Nikesh Tara chand Shah v. Union of India, 2017 (13) SCALE 609 going back to the days of the Magna Carta. In that decision, reference was made to Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 in which it is observed that it was held way back in Nagendra v. King-Emperor, AIR 1924 Calcutta 476 that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. Reference was also made to Emperor v. Hutchinson, AIR 1931 Allahabad 356 wherein it was observed that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. The provision for bail is therefore age-old and the liberal interpretation to the provision for bail is almost a century old, going back to colonial days.

7. However, we should not be understood to mean that bail should be granted in every case. The grant or refusal of bail is entirely within the discretion of the judge hearing the matter and though that discretion is unfettered, it must be exercised judiciously and in a humane manner and compassionately. Also, conditions for the grant of bail ought not to be so strict as to be incapable of compliance, thereby making the grant of bail illusory.”

Therefore, to elucidate further, this Court is conscious of the basic and fundamental principle of law that right to speedy trial is a part of reasonable, fair and just procedure enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This constitutional right cannot be denied to the accused as is the mandate of the Apex court in “Hussainara Khatoon and ors (IV) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna”,

(1980) 1 SCC 98. Besides this, reference can be drawn upon that pre-conviction period of the under-trials should be as short as possible keeping in view the nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence, reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant.

As far as the pendency of other cases and involvement of the petitioner in other cases is concerned, reliance can be placed upon the order of this Court rendered in CRM-M-25914-2022 titled as ***“Baljinder Singh alias Rock vs. State of Punjab”*** decided on 02.03.2023, wherein, while referring Article 21 of the Constitution of India, this Court has held that no doubt, at the time of granting bail, the criminal antecedents of the petitioner are to be looked into but at the same time it is equally true that the appreciation of evidence during the course of trial has to be looked into with reference to the evidence in that case alone and not with respect to the evidence in the other pending cases. In such eventuality, strict adherence to the rule of denial of bail on account of pendency of other cases/convictions in all probability would lend the petitioner in a situation of denial the concession of bail.

5. Relief

In view of the discussions made hereinabove, the petitioner is hereby directed to be released on regular bail subject to his furnishing bail and surety bonds to the satisfaction of the trial Court/Duty Magistrate, concerned.

In the afore-said terms, the present petition is hereby allowed.

However, it is made clear that anything stated hereinabove shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.

(SANDEEP MOUDGIL)
JUDGE

18.03.2025
Sham

<i>Whether speaking/reasoned</i>	<i>Yes/No</i>
<i>Whether reportable</i>	<i>Yes/No</i>