



**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH**

(389)

CRM-M NO.6528-2025

DATE OF DECISION:14.05.2025

Arman through father Virender

.....Petitioner

VERSUS

State of Haryana and others

.....Respondents

CORAM HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE RAJESH BHARDWAJ

Present Mr.Parveen Sharma Advocate, for the petitioner.

Mr. Vijesh Sharma, Addl. AG, Haryana
assisted by ASI Narinder Kumar and ASI Naresh Kumar.

Mr.Pawan Kumar Hooda, Advocate and
Mr. Ankit Kumar, Advocate, for respondents no.2 to 4.

RAJESH BHARDWAJ J, (ORAL)

1. Instant petition has been filed under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 (482 Cr.P.C.) praying for quashing of FIR No.384 dated 05.09.2021, under Section 10 of POCSO Act 2012 and Sections 323, 506 and 509 IPC (Section 10 POCSO Act, 2012 and 509 IPC deleted lateron and challan presented under Sections 323 and 506 IPC), registered at Police Station Matlauda, District Panipat and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of the compromise dated 20.01.2025 (Annexure P-2) entered into between the parties.

2. FIR in question was got registered by complainant – respondent No.2 and the investigation commenced thereon. However, with the intervention of respectables, finally the parties arrived at settlement and they resolved their *inter se* dispute, which is apparent from Compromise Deed, annexed as Annexure P-2. On the basis of the compromise, petitioner is



invoking the inherent power of this Court by praying that continuation of these proceedings would be a futile exercise and an abuse of process of the Court and thus, the FIR in question and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom may be quashed in the interest of justice.

3. Status Report by way of an affidavit of Suresh Kumar, HPS, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Traffic, Panipat on behalf of respondent no.1 – State, filed by learned counsel for the State in Court today is taken on record.

4. This Court vide order dated 04.02.2025 directed the parties to appear before the trial Court/Illaq Magistrate for recording their statements, as contended before the Court, and the Trial Court/Illaq Magistrate was also directed to send its report.

5. In pursuance to the same, learned Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board, Panipat has sent the report dated 19.03.2025 to this Court. With the report learned Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board, Panipat has also annexed the original statement of respondent No.2/complainant-Sonu Kumar (father of injured Riya and Manav), statements of injured/respondents no.3 and 4, namely Riya and Manav recorded on 06.03.2025, statement of petitioner/Juvenile, namely, Arman recorded on 06.03.2025, statement of Virender father of petitioner/Juvenile recorded on 06.03.2025 and also statements of P/SI Bansi Lal and Inspector Nirmala were recorded. On the basis of the statements, learned Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board, Panipat has concluded in the report that the compromise effected between the parties is genuine and not the result of any fraud or misrepresentation, voluntary and without any coercion or undue influence. It has been mentioned therein that the petitioner was not declared as proclaimed offender in this case.



6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the record and the report sent by learned Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board, Panipat.

7. A bare perusal of statutory provision of the 482 Cr.P.C. would show that the High Court may make such orders, as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Section 320 Cr.P.C. is equally relevant for consideration, which prescribes the procedure for compounding of the offences under the Indian Penal Code.

8. Keeping in view the nature of offences allegedly committed and the fact that both the parties have amicably settled their dispute, the continuation of criminal prosecution would be a futile exercise. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a number of cases including **Narinder Singh and others Versus State of Punjab and another, 2014 (6) SCC 466; B.S.Joshi and others vs State of Haryana and another (2003) 4 Supreme Court Cases 675** followed by this Court in Full Bench case of **Kulwinder Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab and another, 2007(3) RCR 1052** have dealt with the proposition involved in the present case and settled the law.

9. Thereafter, Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Gian Singh vs State of Punjab and another (2012) 10 Supreme Court Cases 303** further dealt with the issue and the earlier law settled by the Supreme Court for quashing of the FIR in **State of Haryana vs Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335**. Para 61 of the judgment reads as under:-

“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and



different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise



between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

10. Applying the law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in plethora of judgments and this High Court, it is apparent that when the parties have entered into a compromise, then continuation of the proceedings would be merely an abuse of process of the Court and by allowing and accepting the prayer of the petitioner by quashing the FIR would be securing the ends of justice, which is primarily the object of the legislature enacting under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

11. As a result, this Court finds that the case in hand squarely falls within the ambit and parameters settled by judicial precedents and hence, FIR No. 384 dated 05.09.2021, under Section 10 of POCSO Act 2012 and Sections 323, 506 and 509 IPC (Section 10 POCSO Act, 2012 and 509 IPC deleted lateron and challan presented under Sections 323 and 506 IPC),

registered at Police Station Matlauda, District Panipat and all the subsequent proceedings arising thereto are hereby quashed qua the petitioner on the basis of compromise. Needless to say that the parties shall remain bound by the terms and conditions of the compromise and their statements recorded before the Court below.

11. Petition stands allowed.

14.05.2025
mamta

(RAJESH BHARDWAJ)
JUDGE

Whether speaking/reasoned	Yes/No
Whether reportable	Yes/No