



239/2 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH

Date of decision:07.05.2025

(i) CRM-M-3549-2025

Dheeraj ...Petitioner

vs.

State of Haryana ...Respondent

(ii) CRM-M-15188-2025

Suman ...Petitioner

vs.

State of Haryana ...Respondent

Coram : Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.S.Shekhawat

Present : Mr. Mohan Singh Chauhan, Advocate
for the petitioner (in CRM-M-3549-2025).

Mr. Sahil Choudhary, Advocate
for the petitioner (in CRM-M-15188-2025)

Mr. Rajiv Sidhu, DAG, Haryana.

N.S.Shekhawat J.(oral)

1. This order shall dispose off above-said two petitions i.e. CRM-M-3549-2025, titled as Dheeraj Vs. State of Haryana and CRM-M-15188-2025 titled as Suman Vs. State of Haryana, whereby the petitioners have prayed for grant of regular bail to them in case FIR No.194 dated 21.05.2021 registered under Sections 323, 302, 34 of IPC, at Police Station Ambala Cantt. District Ambala.

2. The FIR in the present case was registered on the basis of the



statement made by Anil son of late Shama and the same has been reproduced below:-

“ Statement of Anil son of late Shama resident of street number 3, Deha Colony, Ambala Cantt, age 34 years. Stated that I am a resident of the above address and work as a daily wage laborer. We are six brothers and one sister. Our youngest brother is Dheeraj alias Vati. I and my brother Dheeraj live together in separate houses. I have three sons and a daughter and my younger brother Vati has 2 sons. My wife Sapna and my brother Vati's wife Suman used to quarrel over the children earlier also and in this quarrel between the children, my brother Vati had caused injuries to me earlier also. On 20/05/2021 at around 7.30 pm, me and my brother Vati's children were at their respective homes. During this time, my brother Dheeraj @ Vati's children ate mangoes and threw the seeds towards my house, regarding which my wife Sapna went to Vati's house with a complaint, then Vati's wife Suman and Vati started abusing and beating my wife. At that time, I was in the upper room of my house and saw my brother Vati and his wife Suman beating my wife Sapna. When I was coming downstairs I saw that my brother Dheeraj @ Vati attacked my wife Sapna on the head with an axe (Gandasi) and while I was coming downstairs my sister-in-law Suman hit me with a brick which hit my head and blood started flowing from my head and my wife Sapna fell unconscious on the spot due to the axe (Gandasi) hitting her head. I put my wife Sapna in a cart (Rehdi) and brought her in an injured condition to Civil Hospital Ambala Cantt for treatment where the doctor examined my wife Sapna and declared her dead. My wife Sapna died due to the axe (Gandasi) injury hit by my brother Dheeraj Vati and my sister-in-law (Bhabhi) Suman also injured me on the head by hitting me with a brick. Legal action should be taken against my brother Dheeraj alias Vati and sister-in-law Suman, I have presented my MLR to you. Sd/- Anil.”



3. Learned counsel for the petitioners have argued that it has been wrongly alleged that the petitioners had caused injuries to Sapna (since deceased). In fact, the fight had taken place between the parties at the spur of the moment and there was no allegation that there was any premeditation to cause injuries for death of Sapna. Moreover, the motive alleged by the prosecution was apparently weak and could not be a ground for causing injuries to Sapna, since deceased in the present case. Learned counsel have further submitted that both the petitioners were arrested on 22.05.2021 and have undergone more than 03 years and 11 months of custody. The prosecution has examined 08 witnesses, out of total 16 witnesses and the next date of hearing before the trial Court is 27.05.2025. Learned counsel have further submitted that all the material witnesses have already been examined and there are no chances of tampering with the prosecution evidence.

4. On the other hand, learned State counsel has vehemently opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioners on the ground that both the petitioners had caused injuries to Sapna (since deceased) and Sapna had succumbed to the injuries caused by the present petitioners. Even the injuries were caused to the complainant as well.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record carefully.

6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the scope of speedy trial and emphasizing that the speedy trial is one of the most important facets of the fundamental rights to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21, held in the matter of **Kartar Singh Vs. State of Punjab and connect case, 1994(2)**



RCR 169 as follows:

Speedy Trial

89. *The right to a speedy trial is a derivation from a provision of Magna Carta. This principle has also been incorporated into the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 and from there into the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of United States of America which reads, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.....*

90. *It may be pointed out, in this connection, that there is a Federal Act of 1974 called 'Speedy Trial Act' establishing a set of time-limits for carrying out the major events, e.g., information, indictment, arraignment, in the prosecution of criminal cases. See Black's Law Dictionary, (Sixth Edition) p. 1400.*

91. *The right to a speedy trial is not only an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration, to minimise anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation and to limit the possibility of impairing the ability of an accused to defend himself but also there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial. This right has been actuated in the recent past and the courts have laid down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. In fact, lot of cases are coming before the courts for quashing of proceedings on the ground of inordinate and undue delay stating that the invocation of this right even need not await formal indictment or charge.*

92. *The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result from impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of the commission of the offence till*



it consummates into a finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be noted that the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial is properly reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

93. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, 1980 (1) SCC 81 at P. 89 while dealing with Article 21 of the Constitution of India has observed thus:

"No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21. Would he be entitled to be released unconditionally freed from the charge leveled against him on the ground that trying him after an unduly long period of time and convicting him after such trial would constitute violation of his fundamental right under Article 21."

94. See also (1) Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, 1979 (1) SCR 392; (2) Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, 1979 (3) SCR 169; (3) Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna, 1979 (3) SCR 532; (4) Hussainara Khatoon and others v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Govt. of Bihar, Patna 1979 (3) SCR 1276; (5) Kadra Pahadia v. State of Bihar, 1983 (2) SCC 104; (6) T. V. Vatheeswaran v. State of T.N., 1983(2) SCR 348; and (7) Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R. S. Nayak, 1992 (1) SCC 225.

7. Again, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down certain propositions,



which govern the basic human right to a speedy trial in a criminal prosecution in the matter of **Abdul Rehman Antulay and others Vs. R.S. Nayak and another 1992(2) RCR 634** as follows:-

54. In view of the above discussion, the following propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all situations. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rules. These propositions are :

1. Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the societal interest also, does not make it any-the-less the right of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances.

2. Right to Speedy Trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial. That is how, this Court has understood this right and there is no reason to take a restricted view.

3. The concerns underlying the Right to speedy trial from the point of view of the accused are :

(a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction; (b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal; and (c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise.



4. *At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that it is usually the accused who is interested in delaying the proceedings. As is often pointed out, "delay is a known defence tactic". Since the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution, delay ordinarily prejudices the prosecution. Non-availability of witnesses, disappearance of evidence by lapse of time really work against the interest of the prosecution. Of course, there may be cases where the prosecution, for whatever reason, also delays the proceedings. Therefore, in every case, where the Right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is who is responsible for the delay? Proceedings taken by either party in good faith, to vindicate their rights and interest, as perceived by them, cannot be treated as delaying tactics nor can the time taken in pursuing such proceedings be counted towards delay. It goes without saying that frivolous proceedings or proceedings taken merely for delaying the day of reckoning cannot be treated as proceedings taken in good faith. The mere fact that an application/petition is admitted and an order of stay granted by a superior court is by itself no proof that the proceeding is not a frivolous. Very often these stays obtained on ex-parte representation.*

5. *While determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of Right to Speedy Trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the work-load of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on-what is called, the systemic delays. It is true that it is the obligation of the State to ensure a speedy trial and State includes judiciary as well, but a realistic and practical approach should be adopted in such matters instead of a pedantic one.*

6. *Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. As has been observed by Powell, J. in Barker "it cannot be said how long*



a delay is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate". The same ideal has been stated by White, J. in U.S. v. Ewell, 15 Law Edn. 2nd 627, in the following words :

"the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative, is consistent with delays, and has orderly expedition, rather than more speed, as its essential ingredients; and whether delay in completing a prosecution amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon all the circumstances. However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become prosecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case.

7. We cannot recognize or give effect to, what is called the 'demand' rule. An accused cannot try himself; he is tried by the court at the behest of the prosecution. Hence, an accused's plea of denial of speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying that the accused did at no time demand a speedy trial. If in a given case, he did make such a demand and yet he was not tried speedily, it would be a plus point in his favour, but the mere non- asking for a speedy trial cannot be put against the accused. Even in U.S.A., the relevance of demand rule has been substantially watered down in Barker and other succeeding cases.

8. Ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors-'balancing test' or 'balancing process'-and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case.

9. Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion that Right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open. The nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of



proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it is open to the court to make such other appropriate order including an order to conclude the trial within a fixed time where the trial is not concluded or reducing the sentence where the trial has concluded-as may be deemed just and equitable in the circumstances of the case.

10. It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time limit for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one. Such rule cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of proving justification on to the shoulders of the prosecution. In every case of complaint of denial of Right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court of U.S.A. too as repeatedly refused to fix any such outer time limit in spite of the Sixth Amendment. Nor do we think that not fixing any such outer limit in effectuates the guarantee of Right to speedy trial.

11. An objection based on denial of Right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis”.

8. In the present case, the petitioners are stated to be in custody for the last about 04 years. The prosecution has already examined material witnesses and now only the official witnesses are left to be examined by the trial Court. Thus, there are no chances of early conclusion of the trial in the present case.

9. At this stage, without commenting on the merits of the case, the present petitions are allowed and the petitioners are ordered to be released on

bail subject to their furnishing bail bonds/surety bonds to the satisfaction of the trial Court/Duty Magistrate/Chief Judicial Magistrate, concerned, subject to the following conditions:-

- (i) *The petitioners shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case, so as to dissuade them to disclose such facts to the Court or to any other authority.*
- (ii) *The petitioners shall remain present before the Court on the dates fixed for hearing of the case.*
- (iii) *The petitioners shall not absent themselves from the Court proceedings except on the prior permission of the Court concerned.*
- (iv) *The petitioners shall surrender their passports, if any, (if already not surrendered), and in case they are not holder of the same, they shall swear an affidavit to that effect.*
- (v) *The petitioners shall also file their affidavits before the concerned Court, mentioning their ordinary place of residence and number of mobile phone, which shall be used by them during the pendency of the trial. In case of change of place of residence/mobile number, they shall share the details with the concerned Court/learned Trial Court.*
- (vi) *In case, the petitioners involve in any other criminal activity, during the pendency of the trial, it shall be viewed seriously.*
- (vii) *The concerned Court may insist on two heavy local sureties and may also impose any other condition, in accordance with law, while accepting the bails bonds and surety bonds of the petitioners.*

10. Pending applications, if any, stand also disposed of.

07.05.2025

hemlata

(N.S.SHEKHAWAT)
JUDGE

Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No