



WP(MD).24706 of 2022

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BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

RESERVED ON : 06.02.2025

PRONOUNCED ON : 14.02.2025

CORAM:

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SHAMIM AHMED

WP(MD)No.24706 of 2022

C.Singaram

Petitioner(s)

Vs

1. The Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (KMB)
Limited, Kumbakonam 612001

2. The General Manager, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (KMB)
Limited, Karaikudi Region, Sivagangai Respondent(s)

Prayer:- This Writ Petition has been filed, under the Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to issue a Writ of Mandamus to direct the Respondents to promote the Petitioner as a Ticket Checking Inspector retrospectively from 2018 and on the basis of the same, to revise the Petitioner's terminal benefits and pension and to disburse all the difference arrears amount to the Petitioner.

For Petitioner(s) : Mr.K.Gokul

For Respondent(s) : Mr.K.Jagadeesh Balan

ORDER

1. This Writ Petition has been filed, under the Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to issue a Writ of Mandamus to direct the Respondents to promote the Petitioner as a Ticket Checking Inspector retrospectively from 2018 and on the basis of the same, to revise the Petitioner's terminal benefits and pension and to disburse all the difference arrears amount to



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the Petitioner.

2. The facts of case, in a nutshell, led to filing of this Writ Petition and necessary for disposal of same, are as follows:-

(a) The Petitioner joined in the Respondent Corporation as a Conductor on 01.04.1995 and he got a PG Degree in M.A (Economics) in 2007 and a Diploma in Labour Law in 2010. The Petitioner had retired from the service as a Grade IV Conductor on 31.03.2019 on attaining the age of superannuation. As per the promotion procedure in the Transport Corporation, Karaikudi Region, Conductors with a Post Graduate Degree and two review services, were eligible for promotion to the post of Ticket Checking Inspector. Despite meeting the said criteria and being called for certificate verification and an interview in the year 2008, he was never promoted. The Petitioner had made several representations, including a last representation, dated 17.08.2020, requesting retrospective promotion and its consequential retirement benefits, but no action was taken by the respondents. Hence, this Writ Petition has been filed, seeking the relief as stated supra.

3. In the counter affidavit filed by the 2nd Respondent, it is stated as follows:-

(a) The Petitioner sent a representation through RPAD on 17.08.2020, which was after 1½ years of his retirement on 31.03.2019. At the time of his appointment, the Petitioner only had an SSLC qualification. The persons, who possess a Post Graduate Degree through the Open University System, without obtaining a regular basic Degree, cannot be



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considered for appointment to public services. As per the G.O.Ms.No. 107, dated 18.08.2009 and G.O.Ms.No.116 dated 18.08.2010, Degrees obtained from the Open University Distance Education System cannot be taken into consideration for employment or promotion. Therefore, this Writ Petition is misconceived and time barred and accordingly, liable to be dismissed.

4. This Court heard Mr.K.Gokul, the learned counsel for the Petitioner and Mr.K.Jagadeesh Balan, the learned counsel for the Respondents.
5. The learned counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that since the Petitioner possessed the Post Graduate Degree and Diploma, during the period of his service, he was eligible to get promotion to the post of Ticket Checking Inspector and consequently, he is eligible to get the terminal benefits, etc. and that in spite of his representation, dated 17.08.2020, seeking such retrospective promotion and the consequential terminal benefits, the Respondents did not consider the same and hence, this Writ Petition has been filed.
6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the Respondents has submitted that though the Petitioner retired from the service on 31.03.2019, he sent a representation belatedly only on 17.08.2020, which was after 1 ½ year of his retirement and and thus, this Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed, on the ground of delay and laches.
7. I have given my careful and anxious consideration to the contentions put forward by the learned counsel on either side and also perused the entire



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materials available on record.

8. According to the Petitioner, the Petitioner joined in the Respondent Corporation as a Conductor on 01.04.1994 and he got a Post Graduate Degree in M.A (Economics) in 2007 and a Diploma in Labour Law in 2010. The Petitioner had retired from the service as Grade IV Conductor on 31.03.2019 on attaining the age of superannuation.
9. It is not in dispute that the Petitioner had made a representation, dated 17.08.2020, requesting retrospective promotion and consequential retirement benefits. Thus, it is clear that the said representation of the Petitioner was belatedly made after 1 ½ years of his retirement on 31.03.2019 and that the Petitioner filed the present Writ Petition for the relief claimed on 20.10.2022 almost 3 ½ years after his retirement from service.
10. After perusal of records, this court finds that there is no proper and satisfactory explanation for giving such a belated representation and also filing the present Writ Petition almost 3 ½ years after his retirement. Hence, the Petitioner's claim for retrospective promotion and its consequential retirement benefits is a time barred one and it cannot be sustained on the ground of laches.
11. The expression “sufficient cause” and satisfactory explanation has been held to receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally a delay in preferring a petition may be condoned in interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona



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fide is imputable to parties, seeking condonation of delay. In the case of **Collector, Land Acquisition Vs. Katiji**, reported in 1987(2) SCC 107, the Honourable Supreme Court said that when substantial justice and technical considerations are taken against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for, the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non deliberate delay. The Court further said that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds, but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

12. In the case of **P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala**, reported in AIR 1998 SC 2276, the Honourable Supreme Court was pleased to observe as under:-

“Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.”

13. The Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy rights of parties. They virtually take away the remedy. They are meant with the objective that parties should not resort to dilatory tactics and sleep over their rights. They must seek remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The statute relating to limitation determines a life span for such legal remedy for redress of the legal injury, one has suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time, newer causes would



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come up, necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the Courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The statute providing limitation is founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim *Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium* (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). It is for this reason that when an action becomes barred by time, the Court should be slow to ignore delay for the reason that once limitation expires, other party matures his rights on the subject with attainment of finality. Though it cannot be doubted that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing the suiter from putting forth his cause but simultaneously the party on the other hand is also entitled to sit and feel carefree after a particular length of time, getting relieved from persistent and continued litigation.

14. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the Court is always deliberate. No person gains from deliberate delaying a matter by not resorting to take appropriate legal remedy within time but then the words “sufficient cause” show that delay, if any, occurred, should not be deliberate, negligent and due to casual approach of concerned litigant, but, it should be bona fide, and, for the reasons beyond his control, and, in any case should not lack bona fide. If the explanation does not smack of lack of bona fide, the Court should show due consideration to the suiter, but, when there is apparent casual approach on the part of suiter, the



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- approach of Court is also bound to change. Lapse on the part of litigant in approaching Court within time is understandable but a total inaction for long period of delay without any explanation whatsoever and that too in absence of showing any sincere attempt on the part of suiter, would add to his negligence, and would be relevant factor going against him.
15. I need not to burden this judgment with a catena of decisions explaining and laying down as to what should be the approach of Court on construing “sufficient cause” and it would be suffice to refer a very few of them besides those already referred.
 16. In the case of **Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari, reported, AIR 1969 SC 575**, a three Judge Bench of the Court said that unless want of bona fide of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned.
 17. The Privy Council, in the case of **Brij Indar Singh Vs. Kanshi Ram reported in ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94**, observed that true guide for a court to exercise the discretion is whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal. This principle still holds good inasmuch as the aforesaid decision of Privy Council as repeatedly been referred to, and, recently in **State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok AO and others, AIR 2005 SC 2191**.
 18. In the case of **Vedabai @ Vijayanatabai Baburao Vs. Shantaram Baburao Patil and others, reported in JT 2001 (5) SC 608**, the Court said



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that under Section 5 of the Act, 1963, it should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. In the former case consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach but in the latter case no such consideration may arise and such a case deserves a liberal approach. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard and the basic guiding factor is advancement of substantial justice.

19. In the case of **Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRS. Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and Another**, reported in (2008) 17 SCC 448, in para 17 of the judgment, the Court said :-

“...The evidence on record suggests neglect of its own right for long time in preferring appeals. The court cannot enquire into belated and state claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The court helps those who are vigilant and “do not slumber over their rights.”

20. In the case of **Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai**, reported in 2012 (5) SCC 157, in para 18 of the judgment, the Court said as under:-

“What needs to be emphasized is that even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the Courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bonafides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the



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explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay. In cases involving the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the Court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision making process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and / or its agencies/instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest."

21. In my view, the kind of explanation rendered herein does not satisfy the observations of the Honourable Supreme Court that if delay has occurred for reasons, which does not smack of mala fide, the Court should be reluctant to refuse condonation. On the contrary, I find that here is a case, which shows complete careless and reckless long delay on the part of the Petitioner, which has remain virtually unexplained at all. Therefore, I do not find any reason to exercise my judicial discretion exercising judiciously so as to justify the condonation of delay in the present case.
22. Seeking retrospective promotion and its consequential benefits, at this stage is highly belated and lacks justification. Even though on merits, at the time of his appointment, the Petitioner only had an SSLC qualification. The persons, who possess a Post Graduate Degree through the Open University System, without obtaining a regular basic Degree, cannot be considered for appointment to public services. As per the G.O.Ms.No.107, dated 18.08.2009 and G.O.Ms.No.116 dated 18.08.2010, Degrees obtained from the Open University Distance Education System cannot be taken into consideration for employment or promotion. There are no



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merits whatsoever in this Writ Petition. Accordingly, the Petitioner's claim for retrospective promotion and its consequential retirement benefits is untenable for want of merits and on the ground of laches. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed.

23. In the result, in the light of the above said observations and discussions made above and in the light of the decisions referred to above, this Writ Petition is dismissed, as devoid of merits. There is no order as to costs.

14.02.2025

Index:Yes/No
Web:Yes/No
Speaking/Non Speaking
Neutral Citation
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To

1. The Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (KMB) Limited, Kumbakonam 612001
2. The General Manager, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (KMB) Limited, Karaikudi Region, Sivagangai



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SHAMIM AHMED, J.

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Pre-Delivery Order in
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