



Crl.R.C(MD)No.1054 of 2025

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

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DATED: **20.11.2025**

CORAM

THE HONOURABLE **MR.JUSTICE SHAMIM AHMED**

CRL.R.C.(MD)No.1054 of 2025

The State of Tamil Nadu,  
Represented by its,  
The Inspector of Police,  
Keelavalavu Police Station,  
Madurai,  
Cr.No.225 of 2012.

...Revision Petitioner/Complainant

vs.

Chandralekha,  
W/o.P.Senthilkumar,  
379, Sarveshvar Kovil Street,  
Anna Nagar,  
Madurai.

... Respondent/Accused No.7

**PRAYER:** Criminal Revision Petition is filed under Section 438 r/w 442 of BNSS, 2023, to call for the records pertaining to the common order dated 27.03.2023 made in CrI.M.P.No.2349 of 2022 in Spl.S.C.No.37 of 2021 on the file of the learned Special Court to Deal with the Cases of Offences in Contravention of the Provisions of the Mines & Minerals (D&R) Act, Madurai and set aside the same against the discharged of the Respondent/Accused-A7, by allowing this Criminal Revision Petition.



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For Revision Petitioner : Mr.A.S.Abul Kalam Azad  
Government Side

For Respondent : Mr.Ananda Padmanabhan  
Senior Counsel  
Assisted by,  
Mr.R.Ramachandran

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### **ORDER**

Heard Mr.Abul Kalam Azad, learned Government Advocate (Crl.side) appearing for the Revision Petitioner and Mr.N.Anandha Padmanabhan, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr.R.Ramachandran, learned Counsel for the Respondent.

2. This Criminal Revision Petition has been filed by the Revision Petitioner/State to set aside the order dated 27.03.2023 made in CrI.M.P.No.2349 of 2022 in Spl.S.C.No.37 of 2021 on the file of the learned Special Court to Deal with the Cases of Offences in Contravention of the Provisions of the Mines & Minerals (D&R) Act, Madurai against the discharge of the Respondent/Accused-A7/Chandralekha.



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3. The facts of the case in a nutshell, led to filing of this Criminal Revision Petition and necessary for disposal of the same, are as follows:-

a) A complaint was lodged by Mr.Ibraam Shah, Jammatt Leader of the Kongampatty Muslim Community, stating that the accused, who had taken a property on lease to carry out quarrying operations, had illegally entered the land in Survey Nos. 9/10, 10/4, 11/1, 11/6, 12/2, and 13/10, covered under Patta No. 355, measuring 0.89 acres, belonging to the Jammatt, for which requisite taxes had been duly paid. PRP Granites firm had earlier approached for quarrying the said land and sought time to verify details with the Wakf Board. However, without the knowledge of the complainant, the accused persons unlawfully encroached on the property, blocked the Kanmai by placing large stones, damaged the water body, and obstructed the pathway, thereby restricting the complainant's access. When confronted, the accused claimed that they had purchased the land and told the complainant to do whatever they wished. This illegal act caused a loss estimated at Rs.50 lakhs to the complainant. Hence, the complainant has preferred this complaint seeking appropriate legal action.



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b) Based on the complaint, a case was registered in Crime No. 225/2012 under Sections 447, 430, 506(i) IPC r/w 3(1) TNPPDL Act, 1992 against the accused persons A1 to A25. After completion of a detailed and elaborate investigation, a final report was filed before the Judicial Magistrate, Melur, and the same was taken on file as P.R.C. No. 12/2013 dated 26.03.2013. Subsequently, the case was committed to the Learned Special Court to deal with offences in contravention of the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, Madurai, and was numbered as Spl.S.C. No. 37 of 2021. Thereafter, Accused persons Selvi/A5, Sivaranjani/A6 and Chandralekha/Respondent/Accused A-7 filed discharge petition before the said Special Court. By common order dated 27.03.2023 in CrI.M.P. No. 2349 of 2022 in Spl.S.C. No. 37 of 2021, the Court discharged only the Respondent/Accused A-7/Chandralekha.

c) The Trial Court, after considering the material before him, was pleased to discharge the Respondent/Accused A-7/Chandralekha from the offences framed against her in CrI.M.P. No. 2349 of 2022 in Spl.S.C. No. 37 of 2021, vide common order dated 27.03.2023. Hence, the present



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Revision Petition has been filed by the State against the common order passed in CrL.M.P. No. 2349 of 2022 in Spl.S.C. No. 37 of 2021, vide common order dated 27.03.2023, passed by the Learned Special Court to deal with cases of offences in contravention of the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, Madurai, whereby the Respondent/Accused A-7/Chandralekha, was discharged. The Revision Petitioner/State seeks to set aside the said common order of the Trial Court discharging the Respondent/Accused No.7/Chandralekha.

4. When the matter was taken up on 25.09.2025, on the request of both Counsel, the Court granted time to the learned Counsel for the Revision Petitioner as well as the learned Counsel for the Respondent to file a counter affidavit and a rejoinder affidavit in the present Criminal Revision Petition. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned on various dates to enable the filing of the counter and rejoinder affidavits. Today, when the matter was taken up, both the counter affidavit and the rejoinder affidavit have been filed, and the same are on record. The pleadings



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between the parties are thus complete and both the Counsel ready to argue the case finally today.

5. Mr.A.S.Abul Kalam Azad, learned Government Advocate for the Revision Petitioner/State, submits that the prosecution examined seven eyewitnesses and produced the final report along with the damage certificate issued by the competent authority. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are consistent, and their statements clearly establish the involvement of the Accused beyond all reasonable doubt. However, the learned Trial Court disregarded these testimonies altogether.

6. The learned Government Advocate further submits that the Trial Court, in its common order dated 27.03.2023 partly and wholly discharging the Accused, erred in stating that there was no specific overt act attributed to the Respondent. It is contended that all the Accused are partners of the accused firm and were present at the scene of occurrence. They had clearly instructed the other accused persons to carry out the



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illegal mining activities, encroach upon Government property, and damage the Kanmais, thereby obstructing agricultural operations. As the accused have delegated the task to their employees, no specific overt act in the actual commission is necessary for framing the charges in the trial.

7. The learned Government Advocate further submits that the learned Trial Court, by a common judgment and order dated 27.03.2023 in CrL.M.P.No.2349 of 2022 in Spl.S.C.No.37 of 2021 on the file of the learned Special Court to deal with cases of offences under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, Madurai, has, without proper application of mind, discharged the Respondent/Accused A-7 Chandralekha, from the aforesaid criminal case. The Trial Court failed to consider the entire evidence on record, including the statements of witnesses and other relevant materials available against the Respondent/Accused A-7 Chandralekha, despite clear indications of her involvement in the alleged crime.



8. He further contended that the complaint was rightly filed against the Respondent, as seven witnesses, who were eyewitnesses to the incident, spoke about her direct involvement in the offence alleged by the prosecution. In particular, the eyewitnesses, namely (L.W.1) Ibraamshah S/o.Kathar Mydeen, (L.W.2) Backiyam S/o.Buharudeen, (L.W.3) Sheik Dawuth S/o.Mohamed Ibrahim, (L.W.4), Mohamed Muruganantham S/o.Karuppaiah and (L.W.7) Nagaraj S/o.Veeraiah are concerned, stated that in the 2<sup>nd</sup> week of March, 2009 at about 11.00 hours, the Respondent/Accused No.7 Chandralekha, along with the other accused, came to the quarry situated at Veppankudi Kanmai and trespassed into jamat land situated near the quarry and encroached the same by dumping granite stone blocks therein and engaged in overt acts constituting the alleged offence.

9. Thus, the learned Government Advocate contended that the Respondent was clearly involved in the alleged crime, and the order passed by the Trial Court is erroneous, illegal, and liable to be set aside. The Trial Court wrongly discharged the Respondent/Accused-



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A-7/Chandralekha from the alleged offence, even though all the accused are equally liable under the principle of *vicarious liability*. The learned Government Advocate therefore submits that the Respondent/Accused-A7/Chandralekha, along with the other accused persons, are responsible for *vicarious liability* in connection with the commission of the alleged offence.

10. Mr.N.Anandha Padmanabhan, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent submits that the Trial Court has rightly passed the common order dated 27.03.2023 in Crl.M.P. No. 2349 of 2022 in Spl.S.C. No. 37 of 2021 on the file of the learned Special Court dealing with offences under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, Madurai, discharging the Respondent/Accused A-7/Chandralekha. The order of discharge passed in favour of Respondent/Accused A-7/Chandralekha, is reasoned and well-considered, having been made after examining the entire material on record. It is further contended by the learned Senior Counsel that the present Criminal Revision Petition filed by the State against the said order amounts to an abuse of the



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process of law. He further submits that no overt act connects the Respondent/Accused A-7/Chandralekha, with the alleged offence.

11. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently held that vicarious criminal liability cannot be fastened upon family members or nominal partners in the absence of proof of an active role or mens rea. Mere inclusion in a partnership deed, or a relationship with the main accused, by itself does not attract criminal liability. In the present case, the Respondent/Accused A-7/Chandralekha was inducted into the firm only due to her family status and social standing, and she has never taken part in the management, supervision, or day-to-day affairs of the business. Therefore, fastening criminal liability upon her would be wholly unjust and contrary to the settled principles of law.

12. It is further submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent that criminal law does not recognize vicarious liability merely on account of shareholding or formal partnership, unless there is



specific evidence of participation, knowledge, or consent in the alleged acts. The trial court has rightly appreciated this legal position and discharged the Respondent/Accused A-7/Chandralekha, since the prosecution materials are vague, general, and insufficient to establish the essential ingredients of the offences.

13. It was further submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that the Respondent/Accused A-7/Chandralekha has no role or connection to quarrying operations. Their induction into these proceedings is nothing but an attempt to harass the family by enlarging the scope of prosecution. Criminal liability is always personal, and it cannot be fastened merely on account of relationship or association. In the absence of any actus reus or mens rea attributable to the Respondent/Accused A-7/Chandralekha, they cannot be compelled to face trial based only on suspicion or vague allegations.

14. The learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent/Accused A-7/Chandralekha further submits that the allegations against her are



entirely false, fabricated, and vague, and are based on erroneous premises. The Respondent/Accused A-7/Chandralekha categorically deny having committed the alleged acts. It is further submitted that the complaint was lodged by an unauthorized person in the year 2012, after an unexplained delay of over seven years and eight months, thereby casting serious doubt on the credibility of the allegations.

15. It was further argued by the learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent/Accused A-7/Chandralekha that none of the alleged eye-witnesses were the originators of the complaint filed by the de-facto complainant. There is no material to show that these so-called eye-witnesses ever communicated with the inspecting team, nor is there any evidence indicating that they were identified during the inspection. The statements attributed to these witnesses surfaced years after the alleged incident; as such, they do not inspire confidence and appear to be subsequent, fabricated versions introduced merely to bolster the prosecution's case. Furthermore, it was contended that the prosecution has offered no explanation for the prolonged silence of these witnesses,



assuming their presence at the scene. This unexplained delay in bringing forth their statements further undermines the credibility of their evidence.

16. It was further argued by the learned Senior Counsel that the statements of the witnesses appear to be almost identical in language, structure, and narration, differing only with respect to the names and addresses of the witnesses. Such parroted and verbatim statements, which read as mere “copy-and-paste” reproductions, cannot, at the stage of framing of charges, be treated as credible material demonstrating independent recollection or establishing any specific role of the Respondent/Accused-A7/Chandralekha. This mechanical uniformity materially weakens the evidentiary foundation of the prosecution’s case and reinforces the absence of any distinct allegation attributable to the Respondent/Accused-A7/Chandralekha.

17. The learned Senior Counsel further argued that no action has ever been initiated under the Tamil Nadu Land Encroachment Act, 1905.



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The FIR does not mention any eyewitnesses, and even though it is stated that eyewitnesses were present, none of them lodged a complaint or served as the source of the FIR. Sivarajini, who was made as an accused in this case, was about 11 years old and present at the scene. She was seen nodding her head in response to her father's query and therefore cannot be held liable for prosecution. Although a complaint was made regarding the alleged encroachment over water channels and a reservoir, no action has been taken under the Tamil Nadu Land Encroachment Act, 1905 or under Tamil Nadu Act 8 of 2007. In the absence of the names of eyewitnesses in the FIR, it appears that the statements given by witnesses are identical except for their names and addresses. There are no other allegations against the Respondent/Accused-A7/Chandralekha, and the mere presence of the accused became the subject of a complaint only in 2012, following an unexplained delay of seven years and eight months.

18. Considering the submissions as advanced by the learned Government Advocate for the Revision Petitioner and learned Senior



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Counsel for the Respondent/Accused-A7/Chandralekha and perused the material on record.

19. It is relevant to extract the common order passed by the learned Trial Court dated 27.03.2023 made in Crl.M.P.No.2349 of 2022 in Spl.S.C.No.37 of 2021 on the file of the learned Special Court to Deal with the Cases of Offences in Contravention of the Provisions of the Mines & Minerals (D&R) Act, Madurai, whereby the Respondent/Accused A-7/Chandralekha was discharged from the alleged offence. The reference is given at paragraph no.34 of the common order dated 27.03.2023, which is reproduced hereunder:

*“34. In the case in Spl.S.C.No.37/2021, Seven witnesses have been referred to as eye witnesses who would speak about the involvement of all the accused in the offences alleged by the prosecution. So far as the statements of the eye witnesses namely (L.W.1) Ibraamshah S/o.Kathar Mydeen, (L.W.2) Backiyam S/o. Buharudeen, (L.W.3) Sheik Dawuth S/o. Mohamed Ibrahim, (L.W.4) Mohamed Ismail S/o. Asan Mydeen, (L.W.5) Ashokan S/o. Karuppanan, (L.W.6) Muruganantham S/o.Karuppaiah and (L.W.7) Nagaraj S/o. Veeraiah are concerned, it has been stated that one*



*day in the 2nd week of March, 2009 at about 11.00 hours the petitioners-accused along with the other accused came to the quarry situate in Veppankudi Kanmai and trespassed into the jamat land situate near the quarry and encroached the same by dumping granite stone blocks therein. All the eye witnesses except Dhanapal would state that these three petitioners trespassed and were standing along with other accused. So far as overt act is concerned only eye witnesses Dhanapal would implicate 1st petitioner Selvi and 3rd petitioner Sivaranjani. And the specific overt act on the part of the said petitioners 3 is concerned, the statement of eye witness Dhanapal is as follows: "To them Palanichamy his wife and son together told that we asked agricultural land for a price but the peasants did not give us therefore, the granite stones cut from Sirumanickam area to be dumped at the kanmai and at all the agricultural lands there by block the kanmai so as to prevent water flow to agricultural lands. Further. block the way to kanmai to open it. If we block water and raw-material to agricultural lands the agricultural work will get stopped therefore, there will not be any agricultural activity there by the lands will become barren lands. Therefore, they will sell their*



*lands for paltry sum to us." The above extracted statements would show that there is specific averment against the 1<sup>st</sup> petitioner Selvi 2<sup>nd</sup> petitioner Sivaranjani both being wife and daughter respectively. But there is no any specific overt act against 3<sup>rd</sup> petitioner Chandralekha. The witness LW.4 Mohamed Ismayil who is said to be an eye witness has not witnessed the 3<sup>rd</sup> petitioner Chandralekha getting herself involved in the offences, but would hearsay the involvement of all these petitioners. Anyhow when he witnessed, he did not see the 3<sup>rd</sup> petitioner Chandralekha getting involved. Added further LW.5 Ashokan, Village Assistant and L.W.6 Muruganantham village Assistant are also only hearsay witnesses who have not directly witnessed the commission of the offences. Therefore there is no specific overt act against 3<sup>rd</sup> petitioner and overt act is available only against the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> petitioners as mentioned above. Accordingly this court is of the considered view that the petition has to be dismissed against the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> petitioners whereas the petition has to be allowed as against the 3<sup>rd</sup> petitioner Chandralekha. Therefore this court is of the considered view that the discharge petition in Cr.M.P.No. 2349/2022 in Spl.S.C.No.*



*37/2021 is liable to be dismissed as against the 1st petitioner Selvi and 2nd petitioner Sivaranjani whereas it has to be allowed as against the 3rd petitioner Chandralekha.”*

20. After perusal of the order passed by the learned Trial Court, this Court finds that the learned Trial Court has given a reasonable findings that no overt act was committed by the Respondent/Accused-A7/Chandralekha. The above said overt act of the Respondent/Accused-A7/Chandralekha giving an opinion to start the work alone without involving herself in the illegal quarrying of granite stones in poromboke lands will not make out an offence.

21. Considering all the material on record and the Statements of witnesses, the learned Trial Court rightly by the common order dated 27.03.2023 discharged the Respondent/Accused-A7/Chandralekha from the alleged offence.



22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of ***Sajjan Kumar Vs***

***Central Bureau of Investigation*** reported in ***(2010) 9 SCC 368*** was pleased to lay down the following principles governing discharge and framing of charges:

*“17) Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 & 228 of Cr.P.C.*

*On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Section 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:-*

*(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.*

*ii) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been*



*properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.*

*iii) The Court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.*

*iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the Court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.*

*v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but*



*before framing a charge the Court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.*

*vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value discloses the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.*

*vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to*



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*discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal."*

23. *The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of **Union of India vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal** reported in AIR 1979 SC 366 has held as under:-*

*"(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out.*

*(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.*

*(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. **By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the***



*evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused.*

24. Even considering the principle of vicarious liability as argued by the learned Government Advocate for the Revision Petitioner/State, the further question that arises for consideration before this Court in the present case is whether the Respondent/Accused-A7/Chandralekha, can be held liable for the offence, even if the allegations in the complaint are taken on their face value to be correct in entirety. Vicarious criminal liability of its Directors, Partners and Shareholders would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the statute. The Statute must contain provision fixing such a vicarious liability. Even for the said purpose, it would be obligatory on the part of the complainant and the investigating agency to make requisite allegations and collect evidence in support thereof which would attract provisions constituting vicarious liability and in the case of the Respondent/Accused-A7/Chandralekha,



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no such material was available with the prosecution to establish and attract provisions constituting the vicarious liability.

25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of ***Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI***, reported in ***(2015) 4 SCC 609*** while dealing with the issue of vicarious liability of the Officers, Directors, Managing Directors, Chairman of the Company was pleased to observe in paras- 42 to 44 and 48 to 50 of the aforesaid judgment, which read as under:-

*"42. No doubt, a corporate entity is an artificial person which acts through its officers, Directors, Managing Director, Chairman, etc. If such a company commits an offence involving mens rea, it would normally be the intent and action of that individual who would act on behalf of the company. It would be more so, when the criminal act is that of conspiracy. However, at the same time, it is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides so.*

*43. Thus, an individual who has perpetrated the commission of an offence on behalf of a company can be made an accused, along with the company, if there is sufficient evidence of his active role coupled with*



*criminal intent. Second situation in which he can be implicated is in those cases where the statutory regime itself attracts the doctrine of vicarious liability, by specifically incorporating such a provision.*

*44. When the company is the offender, vicarious liability of the Directors cannot be imputed automatically, in the absence of any statutory provision to this effect. One such example is Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. In Aneeta Hada [Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 350 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 241] , the Court noted that if a group of persons that guide the business of the company have the criminal intent, that would be imputed to the body corporate and it is in this backdrop, Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has to be understood. Such a position is, therefore, because of statutory intendment making it a deeming fiction. Here also, the principle of "alter ego", was applied only in one direction, namely, where a group of persons that guide the business had criminal intent, that is to be imputed to the body corporate and not the vice versa. Otherwise, there has*



*to be a specific act attributed to the Director or any other person allegedly in control and management of the company, to the effect that such a person was responsible for the acts committed by or on behalf of the company."*

*48. Sine qua non for taking cognizance of the offence is the application of mind by the Magistrate and his satisfaction that the allegations, if proved, would constitute an offence. It is, therefore, imperative that on a complaint or on a police report, the Magistrate is bound to consider the question as to whether the same discloses commission of an offence and is required to form such an opinion in this respect. When he does so and decides to issue process, he shall be said to have taken cognizance. At the stage of taking cognizance, the only consideration before the court remains to consider judiciously whether the material on which the prosecution proposes to prosecute the accused brings out a prima facie case or not.*

*49. Cognizance of an offence and prosecution of an offender are two different things. Section 190 of the Code empowered taking cognizance of an offence and not to deal with offenders. Therefore, cognizance can*



*be taken even if offender is not known or named when the complaint is filed or FIR registered. Their names may transpire during investigation or afterwards.*

*50. Person who has not joined as accused in the charge-sheet can be summoned at the stage of taking cognizance under Section 190 of the Code. There is no question of applicability of Section 319 of the Code at this stage (see SWIL Ltd. v. State of Delhi [(2001) 6 SCC 670 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1205] ). It is also trite that even if a person is not named as an accused by the police in the final report submitted, the court would be justified in taking cognizance of the offence and to summon the accused if it feels that the evidence and material collected during investigation justifies prosecution of the accused (see Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja [(2003) 6 SCC 195 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1314] ). Thus, the Magistrate is empowered to issue process against some other person, who has not been charge-sheeted, but there has to be sufficient material in the police report showing his involvement. In that case, the Magistrate is empowered to ignore the conclusion arrived at by the investigating officer and apply his mind independently on the facts*



*emerging from the investigation and take cognizance of the case. At the same time, it is not permissible at this stage to consider any material other than that collected by the investigating officer."*

26. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also in the case of ***Shiv Kumar Jatia Vs. State of NCT of Delhi*** reported in ***(2019) 17 SCC 193*** while dealing with vicarious liability of Managing Director of the Company was pleased to observe in paras-21 and 22 as under:-

*"21. By applying the ratio laid down by this Court in Sunil Bharti Mittal [Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI, (2015) 4 SCC 609 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 687] it is clear that an individual either as a Director or a Managing Director or Chairman of the company can be made an accused, along with the company, only if there is sufficient material to prove his active role coupled with the criminal intent. Further the criminal intent alleged must have direct nexus with the accused. Further in Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat [Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 5 SCC 668 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 692] this Court has examined the*



*vicarious liability of Directors for the charges levelled against the Company. In the aforesaid judgment this Court has held that, the Penal Code does not contain any provision for attaching vicarious liability on the part of the Managing Director or the Directors of the Company, when the accused is a company. It is held that vicarious liability of the Managing Director and Director would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the statute. It is further held that statutes indisputably must provide fixing such vicarious liability. It is also held that, even for the said purpose, it is obligatory on the part of the complainant to make requisite allegations which would attract the provisions constituting vicarious liability.*

*22. In the judgment of this Court in Sharad Kumar Sanghi v. Sangita Rane [Sharad Kumar Sanghi v. Sangita Rane, (2015) 12 SCC 781 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 159] while examining the allegations made against the Managing Director of a Company, in which, company was not made a party, this Court has held that when the allegations made against the Managing Director are vague in nature, same can be the ground for quashing the proceedings under Section 482 CrPC. In the case on hand principally the*



*allegations are made against the first accused company which runs Hotel Hyatt Regency. At the same time, the Managing Director of such company who is Accused 2 is a party by making vague allegations that he was attending all the meetings of the company and various decisions were being taken under his signatures. Applying the ratio laid down in the aforesaid cases, it is clear that principally the allegations are made only against the company and other staff members who are incharge of day-to-day affairs of the company. In the absence of specific allegations against the Managing Director of the company and having regard to nature of allegations made which are vague in nature, we are of the view that it is a fit case for quashing the proceedings, so far as the Managing Director is concerned."*

27. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of ***Sham Sunder and Others Vs. State of Haryana [(1989) 4 SCC 630]*** laid emphasis on paragraphs 9 and 10, which are extracted hereunder :

*"9. But we are concerned with a criminal liability under penal provision and not a civil liability. The penal provision must be strictly construed in the first*



*place. Secondly, there is no vicarious liability in criminal law unless the statute takes that also within its fold. Section 10 does not provide for such liability. It does not make all the partners liable for the offence whether they do business or not.*

*10. It is, therefore, necessary to add an emphatic note of caution in this regard. More often it is common that some of the partners of a firm may not even be knowing of what is going on day to day in the firm. There may be partners, better known as sleeping partners who are not required to take part in the business of the firm. There may be ladies and minors who were admitted for the benefit of partnership. They may not know anything about the business of the firm. It would be a travesty of justice to prosecute all partners and ask them to prove under the proviso to sub-section (1) that the offence was committed without their knowledge. It is significant to note that the obligation for the accused to prove under the proviso that the offence took place without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent such offence arises only when the prosecution establishes that the requisite condition mentioned in sub-section (1) is established. The requisite condition is that the*



*partner was responsible for carrying on the business and was during the relevant time in charge of the business. In the absence of any such proof, no partner could be convicted. We, therefore, reject the contention urged by counsel for the State.”*

28. Thus, the initiation of criminal proceedings against the Respondent/Accused-A7/Chandralekha lacks any substantive basis, as the Respondent/Accused-A7/Chandralekha has no direct control over the alleged matter. Therefore, the impugned proceedings initiated by the prosecution against the Respondent/Accused-A7/Chandralekha amount to an abuse of the process of law, and the Trial Court has rightly passed the impugned common order dated 27.03.2023 discharging the Respondent/Accused-A7/Chandralekha from the present case.

29. This Court is also of the view that the Respondent/Accused-A7/Chandralekha was summoned by the Trial Court on the basis of the final report to face the trial, was also on the erroneous consideration as the summoning of the accused in a criminal case is a serious matter.



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30. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of ***Pepsi Foods Ltd. v.***

***Judicial Magistrate*** reported in ***(1998) 5 SCC 749*** has been pleased to observe in paragraph No.28, which is reproduced hereinunder:-

*"28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers*



*to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused."*

32. Further the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also laid down the guidelines where the criminal proceedings could be interfered and quashed in exercise of its power by the High Court in the following cases:- ***(i) R.P. Kapoor Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 S.C. 866, (ii) State of Bihar Vs. P.P. Sharma, 1992 SCC (CrI.)192, (iii) Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. Vs. Mohd. Saraful Haq and another, (Para-10) 2005 SCC (Cri.) 283 and (iv) Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2021 SC 1918.***

31. Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and in the light of the observations and discussions made above and keeping in view of the fact and circumstances of the case and from perusal of the common order dated 27.03.2023 made in CrI.M.P.No. 2349 of 2022 in Spl.S.C.No.37 of 2021 on the file of the learned Special Court to Deal with the Cases of Offences in Contravention of the Provisions of the Mines & Minerals (D&R) Act, Madurai, is a reasoned



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and speaking order and rightly discharged the Respondent/Accused-A7/Chandralekha from the alleged offence, do not require any interference by this Court. The present Criminal Revision is liable to be dismissed.

32. Accordingly, for the reasons discussions above, the instant Criminal Revision Petition filed by the Revision Petitioner/State stands **dismissed** and the common order passed by the Trial Court, dated 27.03.2023 made in Crl.M.P.No.2349 of 2022 in Spl.S.C.No.37 of 2021 on the file of the learned Special Court to Deal with the Cases of Offences in Contravention of the Provisions of the Mines & Minerals (D&R) Act, Madurai, in respect of discharging the Respondent/Accused-A7/Chandralekha from the alleged offence, is hereby **confirmed**.

There is no order as to costs. File is consigned to record.

Index :Yes / No  
Internet :Yes / No  
NCC :Yes / No  
Nsr

**20.11.2025**



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To:

- 1.The Principal Special Court for Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act Cases, Madurai.
- 2.The Additional Public Prosecutor,  
Madurai Bench of Madras High Court,  
Madurai.



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**SHAMIM AHMED, J.**

Nsr

Order made in  
Crl.R.C(MD)No.1054 of 2025

20.11.2025