



IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.

WRIT PETITION NO. 6163 OF 2022

Sumedh s/o Ishwarrao Aloney

Vs.

State Information Commission, Maharashtra State, Amravati Bench and another

Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram,
appearances, Court's orders of directions Court's or Judge's orders.
and Registrar's Orders.

Mr. M.I. Dhatrak, Advocate for the petitioner.

Mr. U.R. Phasate, AGP for respondent No.1/State.

CORAM : SACHIN S. DESHMUKH, J.

DATE : 11/07/2025

Heard.

2. The order rendered by State Information Commissioner is under challenge. The issue is squarely covered in the light of order of this Court in W.P.No.2980/2021 (*Sunil s/o Dajiba Ballal Vs. State Information Commission, Maharashtra State Amravati through its Commissioner and another*). **Reproduce paragraph 2 and 2:-**

“ The order dated 15th October, 2020 passed by the respondent No.1 Commissioner, State Information Commission, Maharashtra State, Amravati Bench, Amravati directing to initiate disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner as a First Appellate Officer under the Right to Information Act, is under challenge on the ground that no such order can be passed against the First Appellate Authority. For this purpose learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Delhi High Court, delivered on 29th August, 2018 in L.P.A. No.369 of 2018 in a case of R.K. Jain vs. Union of India. In this Judgment para No.9 reads thus :

“ 9. From the above, it is clear that Section 19(1) makes a provision for filing of an appeal if a person is aggrieved by

a decision or inaction of the CPIO. The Appellate Authority in sub-section (1) of Section 19 is classified as an officer senior in rank to the CPIO meaning thereby that under the scheme of RTI Act, the CPIO is a different authority or officer different from an Appellate Authority to whom an appeal lies under sub-Section (1) of Section 19. If the legislative intent, as can be made out on a combined reading of various provisions are taken note of, it would be seen that the legislature only proposes for taking action against CPIO, and not against any other authority like the Appellate Authority or officer to whom the appeal lies. That being so, the legislative intent was that the penal provisions are to be implemented or enforced only against the CPIO and not against any other authority like the senior ranking officer or the Appellate Authority who decides the appeal under Section 19(1). If this was not the legislative intention, the words appearing in Sections 19(1) and (2) would have been differently worded and the construction of the statutory provision would have been entirely different. If the argument canvassed by the petitioner was to be accepted then by that interpretation, we would be expanding the meaning of a CPIO and we would be adding something more into the definition of CPIO than the one as was conceived by the legislature. This is not permissible under law and when the CPIO is only indicated to be officer against whom penal action can be taken under Section 20, we cannot read into the said statutory provision anything more by supplying words or meaning which would enlarge the scope of the penal provisions under Section 20. That apart, the CPIO being custodian of the information or the documents sought for, is primarily responsible under the scheme of the RTI Act to supply the information and in case of default or dereliction on his

part, the penal action is to be invoked against him only. The Appellate Authority is not the custodian of the information or the document. It is only a statutory authority to take a decision on an appeal with regard the tenability or otherwise of the action of the CPIO and, therefore, there is a conscious omission in making the Appellate Authority liable for a penal action under Section 20 of the RTI Act and if that be the scheme of the Act and the legislative intention, we see no error in the order passed by the learned writ Court warranting reconsideration.”

2. Though the above judgment is not binding on this Court but since it has a persuasive value and further since I am agreeable with the view taken by the Single Bench of the Delhi High Court, I find substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order is illegal and liable to be quashed and set aside. Accordingly, I pass the following order.

i. Writ petition is allowed;

ii. The impugned order dated 15th October, 2020 passed by the respondent No.1 Commissioner, State Information Commission, Maharashtra State, Amravati Bench, Amravati is hereby quashed and set aside.”

3. Even learned AGP fairly concedes the said legal position.

4. In view of the above, petition is partly allowed.

(i) The clause 2 of the order dated 31.07.2008 rendered by the Commissioner State Information, Amravati, is quashed and set aside.

(SACHIN S. DESHMUKH, J.)