

Amberkar

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY**  
**CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION**  
**CRIMINAL BAIL APPLICATION NO. 2741 OF 2024**

Shahrukh Hasan Pathan .. Applicant  
**Versus**  
The State of Maharashtra and Anr. .. Respondents

- .....
- Mr. Shabnam Shaikh a/w. Mr. Mushahid Khan, Advocates for Applicant.
  - Mr. Balraj Kulkarni, APP for Respondent No. 1 – State.
- .....

**CORAM : MILIND N. JADHAV, J.**

**DATE : FEBRUARY 05, 2025.**

**P. C.:**

1. Heard Mr. Shaikh, learned Advocate for Applicant and Mr. Kulkarni, learned APP for Respondent No.1 - State.

2. This is an Application under Section 439 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short '**Cr.PC.**') seeking Bail in connection with First Information Report No. 1091 of 2021 (for short '**FIR**') registered with Malwani Police Station for offences punishable under Sections 376, 376 (2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 4, 8 and 12 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short '**POCSO**'). Applicant is incarcerated for the past 3 years 6 months and 10 days.

3. Gist of the prosecution case is that Applicant and victim are acquainted to each other as childhood friends and neighbors. Thereafter in the year 2019 both of them confessed their love for each

other. It is alleged that victim used to skip classes to meet Applicant and they also developed physical relations. It is prosecution case that Applicant forcefully developed physical relationship with the victim. Thereafter Applicant demanded money on multiple occasions from the victim by giving death threats and threatened her to disclose their relationship. It is alleged that victim paid a total sum of Rs. 32,500/- to the Applicant. On 25.07.2021 upon being questioned by her mother regarding missing money, the victim disclosed the payments made and her relationship with the Applicant following which a complaint was lodged by the victim and her parents.

4. Mr. Shaikh, learned Advocate for Applicant would submit that victim has admitted that she was in a love relationship with the Applicant since the year 2019 and developed physical relationship despite victim being below the age of 18 years as stated by the victim in her own statement given to the Medical Officer. He would submit that victim has multiple opportunities in the span of two years to inform her parents about the alleged forceful actions of the Applicant but failed to do so. He would submit that she infact took money from her house and paid Applicant and also invited Applicant to her house in the absence of her family members, which itself shows no sign of force and she being aware of her own actions.

4.1. He would also submit that the Applicant does not have any criminal antecedents. He was 21 years old. He would submit that Applicant is arrested on 27.07.2021 and has been incarcerated for the past 3 years 6 months and 10 days. He would submit that investigation has been completed, chargesheet has been filed however trial has not yet commenced. Hence he would request the Court to allow the present Application.

5. Mr. Kulkarni, learned APP would persuade me to consider the case of victim since she was a minor at the time of the incident and it would be possible that victim was lured into this relationship by Applicant considering her immature age of understanding and her prior acquaintance with the Applicant as a childhood friend. He would submit that Applicant also extorted money from the victim, at times by threatening her. He would further submit that victim did not disclose the said forceful actions as she was threatened by the Applicant. He would therefore urge the Court to reject the Application.

6. It is *prima facie* seen that admittedly victim then 17 years old and Applicant were known to each other and in fact as per victim's own statement in the FIR and the statement recorded by the Medical Officer show that they both were in a relationship for the past two years prior to the FIR being lodged despite victim being below the age of 18 years. This clearly shows and reflects that the acts between the

parties were consensual in nature. In regard to the demand of money by the Applicant it is seen that victim on multiple occasions paid Applicant by taking money from her house over a period of two years without the consent of her parents. This clearly shows that she was clear about her actions and decisions. These allegations shall be a matter of trial.

7. In so far as the present case in hand is considered it is seen that victim was 17 years old and Applicant was 21 years old and it clearly appears from the record namely statement of victim herself that she was in love with the Applicant and therefore developed physical relations.

8. In this regard attention is drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of *S. Varadarajan Vs. State of Madras*<sup>1</sup> and other decisions down the line thereafter looking at the evolution of the impressionable age of girls and boys who may tend to get provoked into compelling demand of a relationship laid down the aforesaid principle which needs to be considered.

9. Attention is drawn to the decision of this Court (Coram: Ms. Mridula Bhatkar, J.) in the case of *Sunil Mahadev Patil Vs. The State of Maharashtra*<sup>2</sup> to contend that consensus of the prosecutrix

---

<sup>1</sup> AIR 1965 SC 942.

<sup>2</sup> Bail Application No. 1036 of 2015, decided on 03.08.2015.

who is below the age of 18 years is a mitigating circumstance for trial Court to consider, especially while dealing with bail Applications. The relevant paragraph Nos. 8,9 and 11 of the said decision read thus:-

*“8. It is to be noted that the case of S. Varadarajan was decided in the year 1967 when the women were not enjoying the freedom which today the women have. Albeit the Hon'ble Supreme Court then has taken a pragmatic view and has acquitted Varadarajan. Now we come across such cases everyday. If a girl is a minor between the age group of 15 to 18 years and if it can be safely inferred that her consent was obvious, then it is a mitigating circumstance. Some trial Courts dealing with such Bail Applications, especially after Nirbhaya case, started taking a strict approach and the accused are denied the bail only on the ground that the prosecutrix being minor below 18 years, her consent is immaterial, therefore, in the case of rape on such minor, no bail can be granted. This is a matter of concern.*

*9. In view of the increasing offences against the women especially of rape, the legislature and judiciary both found it obligatory to deal these offences with severe punishment and women can be protected if the laws are made rigorous. Therefore, report of Justice Verma Committee was accepted and necessary and significant amendments were made in these two sections. A wrong doer is to be punished, guilty is to be convicted. However, at the stage of bail, the Court has to consider prima facie under what circumstances the offence is committed by the accused. In the Criminal law, the Court cannot ignore the intention or motive behind the act and that is an important factor in the commission of offence so also to decide the quantum of sentence at the end of trial, so in the case of bail.*

*10. xxx*

*11. Today teenagers are exposed to more sex related issues and lot of material is also available to them to know the sexual relationship between a man and a*

*woman. Because of their impressionable age, girls and boys both may tend to get provoked and there can be a curious and very compelling demand of the body to get into such kind of relationship. Sexual urge differs from person to person and there cannot be any mathematical formula in respect of sexual behavioral pattern of teenagers, as biologically whenever the child turns into puberty, the child starts understanding his or her sexual needs. The nature of response depends on the upbringing, peer pressure, how civilized the environment is etc. Sex requires proper physical and emotional preparation, as it results in many physical and emotional consequences. This is all considered as a sexual maturation. Therefore, some sects with view to regularize sexual behaviour of the community have acknowledged this biological factor and therefore, the early age marriages are performed in some religions or communities. Taking into consideration this social and biological factors, the law makers have considered the age of 15 as a age of consent when the marriage is performed. Taking into consideration this background, the trial Judge has to pass an order of bail in such cases.”*

10. In the present case before me it is crucial to consider whether the act between the parties is violent or otherwise and in present case it is not. Another mitigating factor is whether there are any criminal antecedents which in the present case are none. The aforesaid mitigating facts and Applicant's long incarceration persuade me to consider Applicant's case.

11. It is settled law that a Court while deciding a Bail Application has to keep in mind the principal rule of bail which is to ascertain whether the Accused is likely to appear before the Court for

trial. There are other broad parameters also like gravity of offence, likelihood of Accused repeating the offence while on bail, whether he would influence the witnesses and tamper with the evidence, his antecedents are required to be considered in such cases.

**12.** It is seen that while dealing with Bail Applications the material available for consideration and adjudication is limited. It is brought to the notice of the Court that trials are taking perpetuity to conclude and prisons are also simultaneously overcrowded in some segments. This Court regularly deals with Bail Applications of undertrials who have been in custody for long period and is also equally aware of the conditions of our prisons. To give an example in the city of Mumbai, recently in one of the cases before me, a Report dated 12.12.2024 made by the Superintendent of Mumbai Central Prison addressed to the Chief Government Pleader was placed before me by the Public Prosecutor which stated that the Mumbai Central Prison (Arthur Road Jail) is overcrowded beyond its sanctioned capacity by more than 5 – 6 times and every barrack sanctioned to house 50 inmates as on date houses anywhere between 220 – 250 inmates. Such an incongruity leads us to answer the Question: **“How can Courts find a balance between the two polarities?”**

**13.** Argued before me is a case concerning liberty of an under-trial who has been incarcerated for 3 years 6 months 10 days, a

situation impacting the right of under-trial conferred by Article 21 of Constitution to speedy justice as also personal liberty. In so far as the power of High Court to grant bail is concerned, when the case is such that involves a question of personal liberty of an under-trial who is incarcerated for a very long period, the powers are wide and unfettered by conditions, the principle rule being that bail is the rule and refusal is the exception, allowing accused persons to better prepare their defence should be applied.

14. In the case of *Emperor vs H.L. Hutchinson*<sup>3</sup> the Allahabad High Court, as far back as in the year 1931 held that power of granting bail conferred on High Court is entirely unfettered by any conditions. It held that legislature has given the High Court and the Court of Session discretion unfettered by any limitation other than that which controls all discretionary powers vested in a Judge, viz. that the discretion must be exercised judiciously. The Court has given primacy to the fact that accused person if granted bail will be in a much better position to defend himself. In this very case, it was delineated that grant of Bail is the Rule and refusal is an exception. This was in the famous Meerut Conspiracy case. Justice Mukherjea writing for the Bench in paragraph No.9 held as under:-

*“9. Speaking for myself, I think it very unwise to make an attempt to lay down any particular rules for the guidance of the*

---

3 AIR 1931 ALL 356

*High Court, having regard to the fact that the legislature itself left the discretion of the Court entirely unfettered. The reason for this action on the part of the legislature is not far to seek. The High Court might be safely trusted in this matter and it goes without saying that it would act in the best interests of justice whether it decides in favour of the prosecution or the defence. The variety of cases that may arise from time to time cannot be safely classified and it will be dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases and to say that in particular classes a bail may be granted but not in other classes.”*

15. In the case of ***Satender Kumar Antil Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation***<sup>4</sup>, in paragraph Nos.6 to 15 the Supreme Court considered the prevailing situation of prisons in India, definition of trial and bail, principle of presumption of innocence and reiterated the well recognised principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception in bail jurisprudence on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Paragraph Nos.6 to 15 of the said judgement read as under:-

**“Prevailing situation**

*6. Jails in India are flooded with undertrial prisoners. The statistics placed before us would indicate that more than 2/3rd of the inmates of the prisons constitute undertrial prisoners. Of this category of prisoners, majority may not even be required to be arrested despite registration of a cognizable offence, being charged with offences punishable for seven years or less. They are not only poor and illiterate but also would include women. Thus, there is a culture of offence being inherited by many of them. As observed by this Court, it certainly exhibits the mindset, a vestige of colonial India, on the part of the investigating agency, notwithstanding the fact arrest is a draconian measure resulting in curtailment of liberty, and thus to be used sparingly. In a democracy, there can never be an impression that it is a police State as both are conceptually opposite to each other.*

**Definition of trial**

*7. The word “trial” is not explained and defined under the Code. An extended meaning has to be given to this word for the*

---

4 (2022) 10 SCC 51

purpose of enlargement on bail to include, the stage of investigation and thereafter. Primary considerations would obviously be different between these two stages. In the former stage, an arrest followed by a police custody may be warranted for a thorough investigation, while in the latter what matters substantially is the proceedings before the court in the form of a trial. If we keep the above distinction in mind, the consequence to be drawn is for a more favourable consideration towards enlargement when investigation is completed, of course, among other factors.

8. Similarly, an appeal or revision shall also be construed as a facet of trial when it comes to the consideration of bail on suspension of sentence.

#### **Definition of bail**

9. The term “bail” has not been defined in the Code, though is used very often. A bail is nothing but a surety inclusive of a personal bond from the accused. It means the release of an accused person either by the orders of the court or by the police or by the investigating agency.

10. It is a set of pre-trial restrictions imposed on a suspect while enabling any interference in the judicial process. Thus, it is a conditional release on the solemn undertaking by the suspect that he would cooperate both with the investigation and the trial. The word “bail” has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 9<sup>th</sup> Edn., p. 160 as:

“A security such as cash or a bond; esp., security required by a court for the release of a prisoner who must appear in court at a future time.”

11. Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14<sup>th</sup> Edn., p. 105 defines “bail” as:

“to set at liberty a person arrested or imprisoned, on security being taken for his appearance on a day and at a place certain, which security is called bail, because the party arrested or imprisoned is delivered into the hands of those who bind themselves or become bail for his due appearance when required, in order that he may be safely protected from prison, to which they have, if they fear his escape, etc. the legal power to deliver him.”

#### **Bail is the rule**

12. The principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception has been well recognised through the repetitive pronouncements of this Court. This again is on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This Court in *Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India* [*Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India*, (2018) 11 SCC 1 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 302], held that : (SCC pp. 22-23 & 27, paras 19 & 24)

*“19. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab [Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] , the purpose of granting bail is set out with great felicity as follows : (SCC pp. 586-88, paras 27-30)*

*‘27. It is not necessary to refer to decisions which deal with the right to ordinary bail because that right does not furnish an exact parallel to the right to anticipatory bail. It is, however, interesting that as long back as in 1924 it was held by the High Court of Calcutta in Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In re [Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In re, 1923 SCC OnLine Cal 318 : AIR 1924 Cal 476] , AIR pp. 479-80 that the object of bail is to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial, that the proper test to be applied in the solution of the question whether bail should be granted or refused is whether it is probable that the party will appear to take his trial and that it is indisputable that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. In two other cases which, significantly, are the “Meerut Conspiracy cases” observations are to be found regarding the right to bail which deserve a special mention. In K.N. Joglekar v. Emperor [K.N. Joglekar v. Emperor, 1931 SCC OnLine All 60 : AIR 1931 All 504] it was observed, while dealing with Section 498 which corresponds to the present Section 439 of the Code, that it conferred upon the Sessions Judge or the High Court wide powers to grant bail which were not handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding Section 497 which corresponds to the present Section 437. It was observed by the court that there was no hard-and-fast rule and no inflexible principle governing the exercise of the discretion conferred by Section 498 and that the only principle which was established was that the discretion should be exercised judiciously. In Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson [Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson, 1931 SCC OnLine All 14 : AIR 1931 All 356] , AIR p. 358 it was said that it was very unwise to make an attempt to lay down any particular rules which will bind the High Court, having regard to the fact that the legislature itself left the discretion of the court unfettered. According to the High Court, the variety of cases that may arise from time to time cannot be safely classified and it is dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases and to say that in particular classes a bail may be granted but not in other classes. It was observed that the principle to be deduced from the various sections in the Criminal Procedure Code was that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. An*

*accused person who enjoys freedom is in a much better position to look after his case and to properly defend himself than if he were in custody. As a presumably innocent person he is therefore entitled to freedom and every opportunity to look after his own case. A presumably innocent person must have his freedom to enable him to establish his innocence.*

28. *Coming nearer home, it was observed by Krishna Iyer, J., in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor [Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115] that : (SCC p. 242, para 1)*

*“1. ... the issue [of bail] is one of liberty, justice, public safety and burden of the public treasury, all of which insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is integral to a socially sensitised judicial process. ... After all, personal liberty of an accused or convict is fundamental, suffering lawful eclipse only in terms of “procedure established by law”. The last four words of Article 21 are the life of that human right.”*

29. *In Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) [Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41] it was observed by Goswami, J., who spoke for the Court, that : (SCC p. 129, para 29)*

*“29. ... There cannot be an inexorable formula in the matter of granting bail. The facts and circumstances of each case will govern the exercise of judicial discretion in granting or cancelling bail.”*

30. *In American Jurisprudence (2nd Edn., Vol. 8, p. 806, para 39), it is stated:*

*“Where the granting of bail lies within the discretion of the court, the granting or denial is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Since the object of the detention or imprisonment of the accused is to secure his appearance and submission to the jurisdiction and the judgment of the court, the primary inquiry is whether a recognizance or bond would effect that end.”*

*It is thus clear that the question whether to grant bail or not depends for its answer upon a variety of circumstances, the cumulative effect*

*of which must enter into the judicial verdict. Any one single circumstance cannot be treated as of universal validity or as necessarily justifying the grant or refusal of bail.'*

\* \* \*

*24. Article 21 is the Ark of the Covenant so far as the Fundamental Rights Chapter of the Constitution is concerned. It deals with nothing less sacrosanct than the rights of life and personal liberty of the citizens of India and other persons. It is the only article in the Fundamental Rights Chapter (along with Article 20) that cannot be suspended even in an emergency [see Article 359(1) of the Constitution]. At present, Article 21 is the repository of a vast number of substantive and procedural rights post Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248]."*

**13.** *Further this Court in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI [Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 26 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 397], has observed that : (SCC p. 52, paras 21-23)*

*"21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty.*

*22. From the earliest times, it was appreciated that detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some unconvicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, "necessity" is the operative test. In this country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances.*

*23. Apart from the question of prevention being the object of refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content and it would be improper for any court to*

*refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the purpose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson.”*

**Presumption of innocence**

14. *Innocence of a person accused of an offence is presumed through a legal fiction, placing the onus on the prosecution to prove the guilt before the court. Thus, it is for that agency to satisfy the court that the arrest made was warranted and enlargement on bail is to be denied.*

15. *Presumption of innocence has been acknowledged throughout the world. Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 and Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 acknowledge the presumption of innocence, as a cardinal principle of law, until the individual is proven guilty.”*

16. The Supreme Court in a landmark decision of 1978 in the case of ***Gudikanti Narasimhulu & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh***<sup>5</sup> observed as under:-

*“6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true principle around which other relevant factors must revolve. When the case is finally disposed of and a person is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be liberated, to take judgment and serve sentence in the event of the court punishing him with imprisonment. In this perspective...”* (emphasis supplied)

17. Thereafter the Supreme Court in a plethora of judgements have discussed the rights conferred by Article 21 qua grant of bail and that such rights cannot be taken away unless the procedure is reasonable and fair and in cases where there is unreasonable delay in trial it would undoubtedly impact the rights of an undertrial. Some of

---

5 1978 (1) SCC 240

the important decisions of the Supreme Court and some of the High Courts are discussed hereinafter:-

18. In the landmark judgment of ***Maneka Gandhi V. Union of India***<sup>6</sup>, Supreme Court held that the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 is not limited to mere animal existence but includes the right to live with dignity. The court emphasized that the procedure established by law must be fair, just, and reasonable, and it cannot be arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable.

19. In the case of ***Hussainara Khatoon Vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar***<sup>7</sup> the Supreme Court held as under:-

*“Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of liberty cannot “reasonable, fair or just” unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21.”*

20. The Supreme Court in the case of ***Shaheen Welfare Association vs Union Of India***<sup>8</sup> dealing with a Public Interest Litigation seeking relief for undertrial prisoners charged under the Terrorist and

---

6 1978 (1) SCC 248

7 (1980) 1 SCC 81

8 1996 SCC (2) 616

Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 due to gross delay in disposal of cases qua Article 21 of the Constitution of India held as under:-

*“10. Bearing in mind the nature of the crime and the need to protect the society and the nation, TADA has prescribed in Section 20(8) stringent provisions for granting bail. Such stringent provisions can be justified looking to the nature of the crime, as was held in Kartar Singh’s case (supra), on the presumption that the trial of the accused will take place without undue delay. No one can justify gross delay in disposal of cases when undertrials perforce remain in jail, giving rise to possible situations that may justify invocation of Article 21.”*

21. The Supreme Court in the case of ***Union of India v. K. A. Najeer***<sup>9</sup> while commenting upon the possibility of early completion of trial and extended incarceration held as under:-

*“12. Even in the case of special legislations like the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 or the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (“the NDPS Act”) which too have somewhat rigorous conditions for grant of bail, this Court in Paramjit Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), Babba v. State of Maharashtra and Umarmia v. State of Gujarat enlarged the accused on bail when they had been in jail for an extended period of time with little possibility of early completion of trial. The constitutionality of harsh conditions for bail in such special enactments, has thus been primarily justified on the touchstone of speedy trials to ensure the protection of innocent civilians.”*

22. Applicant in present case has been in custody for almost 3 years 6 months and 10 days. There is no possibility of the trial commencing in near future. Detaining an under-trial prisoner for such an extended period further violates his fundamental right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution. At this juncture I

---

9 Criminal Appeal No. 98 of 2021

deem it appropriate to list certain observations of the Supreme Court shedding light on concerns underlying the “Right to speedy trial” from the point of view of an accused in custody whose liberty is affected. In the case of *Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors. Vs R.S. Nayak & Anr.*<sup>10</sup> the Supreme Court held as under:-

*“86. In view of the above discussion, the following propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all situations. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rules. These propositions are:*

*(1) Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the societal interest also, does not make it any-the-less the right of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances.*

*(2) Right to Speedy Trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial. That is how, this Court has understood this right and there is no reason to take a restricted view.*

*(3) The concerns underlying the Right to speedy trial from the point of view of the accused are:*

*(a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction;*

*(b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal; and*

*(c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise.”*

*(4) – (11) -----X----- (emphasis supplied)*

---

<sup>10</sup> 1992 (1) SCC 225

23. The Supreme Court has also held in a series of judgments and orders that in situations where the under-trial prisoner / accused persons have suffered incarceration rather long incarceration for considerable period of time and there is no possibility of the trial being completed within the foreseeable future, Constitutional Courts can exercise power to release the accused under-trial on bail, as bail is the rule and jail is the exception.

24. In the case of ***Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing undertrial prisoners) Vs. Union of India***<sup>11</sup> the Supreme Court has held that:-

*“17. We are conscious of the fact that the menace of drug trafficking has to be controlled by providing stringent punishments and those who indulge in such nefarious activities do not deserve any sympathy. But at the same time we cannot be oblivious to the fact that many innocent persons may also be languishing in jails if we recall to mind the percentage of acquittals. Since harsh punishments have been provided for under the Act, the percentage of disposals on plea of guilt is bound to be small; the State Government should, therefore, have realised the need for setting up sufficient number of Special Courts immediately after the amendment of the Act by Amendment Act 2 of 1989. Even after the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court refused to grant en bloc enlargement on bail on 1-2-1993 in Criminal Application No. 3480 of 1992 and B.D. Criminal No. 565 of 1992, no substantial improvement in the pendency is shown since new cases continue to pour in, and, therefore, a one-time exercise has become imperative to place the system on an even keel. We also recommend to the State Government to set up Review Committees headed by a Judicial Officer, preferably a retired High Court Judge, with one or two other members to review the cases of undertrials who have been in jail for long including those released under this order and to recommend to the State Government which of the cases deserve withdrawal. The State Government can then advise the Public Prosecutor to move the court for withdrawal of such cases. This will not only help reduce the pendency but will also increase the*

---

11 (1995) 4 SCC 695

*credibility of the prosecuting agency. After giving effect to this order the Special Court may consider giving priority to cases of those undertrials who continue in jail despite this order on account of their inability to furnish bail.”*

25. In view of the above observations and the long incarceration of Applicant over a period of 3 years 6 months and 10 days as delineated above and the trial not having commenced despite chargesheet being filed on 24.09.2021 and also possibility of the trial being completed in the foreseeable future is doubtful, the Applicant before me is entitled for bail.

26. In view of the above, Bail Application stands allowed on the following terms and conditions:-

- (i) Applicant is directed to be immediately released from prison in connection with C.R. No.1091 of 2021;
- (ii) Applicant is directed to be released on bail on furnishing P.R. Bond of Rs.25,000/- (Rs. Twenty Five Thousand only) with one or two surties of the like amount;
- (iii) Applicant shall report to the Investigating Officer at Malwani Police Station as and when called by the Investigating Officer;

- (iv) Applicant shall co-operate with the conduct of trial and attend the Trial Court on all dates, unless specifically exempted and will not take any unnecessary adjournments, if he does so it will entitle the prosecution to apply for cancellation of this order;
- (v) Applicant shall not leave the State of Maharashtra without prior permission of the Trial Court;
- (vi) Applicant shall not influence any of the witnesses or tamper with the evidence in any manner or influence or re-associate with the victim in any manner, either through a device or in-person;
- (vii) Applicant shall keep the Investigating Officer informed of his current address and mobile contact number and / or change of residence or mobile details, if any, from time to time, as applicable;
- (viii) Any infraction of the conditions shall entail prosecution to apply for cancellation of bail granted to the Applicant.

27. It is clarified that the above observations in this order are limited for the purpose of granting bail only and I have not made any observations on the merits of the case and the trial shall proceed uninfluenced by the present order.

28. Bail Application is allowed and disposed.

Amberkar

[ MILIND N. JADHAV, J. ]

Digitally  
signed by  
RAVINDRA  
MOHAN  
AMBERKAR  
Date:  
2025.02.14  
14:52:55  
+0530