

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 6440 OF 2024

IN

FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 25315 OF 2022

**The Executive Engineer,
Raigad Irrigation, Kolad Division,
Taluka Roha, District Raigad**

..... Applicant

VERSUS

**Mahamad Daud Patankar
(since deceased through legal heirs)
Mamina Mahamad Patankar & Ors.**

..... Respondents

Mr.Mahesh Pawar i/b. Ms.Chaitrali Deshmukh for the Applicant.

Mr.A.R.Patil, Addl. G.P. for the Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 – State.

CORAM : RAJESH S. PATIL, J.

DATE : 20 SEPTEMBER, 2025

P.C. :-

- 1) This Interim Application is filed by the acquiring body to condone delay of 4 years and 119 days in filing the First Appeal.
- 2) The respondents have been duly served. Heard learned counsel for the applicant and respondent nos. 4 and 5 and I have gone through the contents of the application and more particularly para no.5 which runs around three pages.
- 3) Supreme Court in the judgment of *Collector, Land*

Acquisition, Anantnag and another Vs. Mst. Katji and Others reported in ***1987 SC 1353***, has held that:

“Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every house’s delay. Every second’s delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.”

4) Supreme Court in the case of ***S. Ganesharaju (Dead) through Lrs V. Narasamma (Dead) through Lrs*** reported in ***(2013) 11 SCC 341***, more specifically, paragraph Nos. 12 and 13, of the said judgment held that a liberal construction to the cause of delay should be given. The said paragraphs are reproduced herein below:

12. The expression “sufficient cause” as appearing in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has to be given a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. Unless the respondents are able to show malafides in not approaching the court within the period of limitation, generally as a normal rule, delay should be condoned. The trend of the courts while dealing with the matter with regard to condonation of delay has tilted more towards condoning delay and directing the parties to contest the matter on merits, meaning thereby that such technicalities have been given go-by.

13. The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy or foreclose the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly.

5) Bombay High Court in the judgment of ***Kamalbai Narasaiyya Shrimal and Another Vs. Ganpat Vithalrao Gavare*** reported in ***2007 (1) MH. L.J. 807***, paragraph Nos.13 and 15 has held:

13. The factual position is manifestly clear on bare perusal of the application for condonation filed by the petitioners before the learned District Judge. The only relevant statement in the application is thus:

“The delay caused in preferring the appeal is of six months. The caused delay is not intentional one. The appellants are poor and helpless persons. If the delay is not condoned appellant may cause irreparable loss which cannot be compensated in terms of money. The suit was for recovery of possession and present appellants are tenants. If the delay is not condoned then appellants will become shelterless.”

15. The expression “sufficient cause” cannot be erased from section of the Limitation Act by adopting excessive liberal approach which would defeat the very purpose of section 5 of the Limitation Act. There must be some cause which can be termed as a sufficient one for the purpose of delay condonation. I do not find any such “sufficient cause” stated in the application and as such no interference in the impugned order is called for.”

6) According to me, considering the submissions made in the Interim Application and the law laid down in above judgments, a case is made out to allow the Interim Application.

7) The Interim Application is allowed in terms of prayer clause (b) and disposed of accordingly.

[RAJESH S. PATIL, J.]