

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
CRIMINAL APPEAL (DB) No.949 of 2022**

Arising Out of PS. Case No.-85 Year-2020 Thana- BARHAT District- Jamui

Manish Paswan Son Of Pyare Paswan Resident Of Village - Kajiyajor, P.S.-
Barhat, District - Jamui, Bihar Appellant

Versus

1. The State of Bihar
2. XXX C/O [REDACTED] R/O Vill- Badrot, P.S- Laxmipur, Distt.- Jamui.
... .. Respondent/s

Appearance :

For the Appellant : Mr. Arbind Kumar, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Dilip Kumar Sinha, Addl.P.P.

**CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJEEV RANJAN PRASAD
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK KUMAR PANDEY
ORAL JUDGMENT
(Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJEEV RANJAN PRASAD)**

Date : 24-04-2025

Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned
Additional Public Prosecutor for the State.

2. We had issued notice to the informant/victim which
has been validly served upon her and she has entered appearance
through her advocate but no one has appeared on her behalf to
oppose the present appeal.

3. This appeal has been preferred for setting aside the
judgment of conviction dated 04.11.2022 (hereinafter referred to as



‘the impugned judgment’) and the order of sentence dated 07.11.2022 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the impugned order’) passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge -cum- Special Judge (POCSO Act), Jamui (hereinafter called ‘the learned trial court’) in POCSO Case No. 37 of 2020 (arising out of Barhat P.S. Case No. 85/2020).

4. By the impugned judgment, the learned trial court has been pleased to hold the appellant guilty of the charges under Section 4(2) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (in short ‘POCSO’) Act and Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘the IPC’). The trial court held that no cogent evidence has come against the accused for the offence punishable under Section 8 of the POCSO Act. Hence, he has been acquitted for the said charge. The appellant has then ordered to undergo a sentence of 20 years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 25,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 4(2) of the POCSO Act. In default of payment of fine, the convict-appellant shall further undergo simple imprisonment of 4 months. The fine, so realised, shall be given to the victim under Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 42 of the POCSO Act has been invoked and the learned trial court has said that no sentence is awarded to the convict for the offence punishable under



Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code as the sentence prescribed under Section 4(2) of the POCSO Act is greater in degree.

Prosecution Case

5. The prosecution is based on a written application dated 29.06.2020 submitted by the prosecutrix to the officer in-charge of Barhat police station in the district of Jamui. In the said written application, the prosecutrix has alleged that she being resident of village Badrot, P.S.-Laxmipur, District- Jamui had visited the village of her '*mousi*' in Kajiyajor, P.S.- Barhat, District- Jamui on 27.06.2020. On the same day, in the evening at about 3:00 'O' clock, she had gone to defecate outside the house of her '*mousi*', near the bank of a river where this appellant came by applying force, he committed rape on her and then left her in her conditions. The prosecutrix further alleged that somehow she reached the house of her '*mousi*' and told about the occurrence to all. On the basis of the written application dated 29.06.2020, a First Information Report giving rise to Barhat P.S. Case No. 85/2020 was registered under Section 376 of 'IPC' and Section 4 and 8 of the POCSO Act. A formal FIR has been drawn on 29.06.2020 at 16:50 hours.



6. Upon completion of investigation, police submitted a charge sheet against the accused-appellant on 26.08.2020, on which cognizance was taken by the Court on 21.09.2020. Thereafter, police papers were supplied to the accused.

7. The charges were explained to the accused-appellant which he denied and claimed to be tried whereafter charges were framed against the appellant for the offence under Section 376 of 'IPC' and also under Section 4 and 8 of the POCSO Act vide order dated 06.02.2021.

8. To prove the charges against the appellant, the prosecution examined as many as 9 witnesses and got exhibited some documentary evidences. The list of witnesses and the list of documents which have been marked exhibits on behalf of the prosecution are as under:-

List of Prosecution Witnesses

P.W.-1	Mahendra Manjhi
P.W.-2	Sita Devi
P.W.-3	Babli Devi
P.W.-4	Panchnand Manjhi
P.W.-5	Father of the Victim
P.W.-6	X (victim)
P.W.-7	Mother of the Victim
P.W.-8	Dr. Kabita Singh
P.W.-9	Gyan Bharti (I.O.)



List of Exhibits on behalf of Prosecution

Ext.-P1	Signature of the victim on the written statement
Ext.-P2	Signature of the victim on her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
Ext.-P3	Medical Report bearing signature of Dr. Kabita Singh
Ext.-P4	Handwriting and signature of S.I. Gyan Bharti (I.O.) on the chargesheet

Findings of the Learned Trial Court

9. The learned trial court analysed the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and took a view that the prosecution in this case has successfully proved the charges. The learned trial court has rejected the contention of the defence that there is a delay in lodging of the F.I.R. saying that in the present case, the parents of the victim were in some other village and the offence was committed in the village of her ‘*aunt*’ and then when the parents of the victim reached there on the next day, they reported the matter to the police. The trial court, therefore, took a view that the delay in registration of the FIR has been properly explained by the prosecution.

10. As regards the age of the victim and the question raised in this regard by the defence, the learned trial



court has relied upon the statement of the victim (PW.-6) who deposed that her date of birth is 08.07.2007.

11. The learned trial court has taken a view that the evidence of the victim would not require any corroboration in material particular and if the evidence of the victim/prosecutrix inspired confidence of the court, a conviction may be recorded on the basis of the sole testimony of the victim/prosecutrix.

Submissions on behalf of the Appellant

12. Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently submitted that the learned trial court has failed to appreciate the materials available on the record of the trial court. It is submitted that on the point of age of the victim girl when the defence was examining the victim (PW.-6), she was asked to disclose the age of her two sisters, who were married but the victim did not disclose the age of her sisters and clearly said that she cannot say the age of any of her sisters. She further made a false statement in her deposition in paragraph- '23' that she had provided the T.C. (Transfer Certificate) of the concerned school relating to her date of birth to police but she did not remember the date. Contrary to her claim, the Investigating Officer (PW.-9) has stated in his



evidence that he had not received any certificate of any school with regard to the age of the victim. He has stated to have recorded in paragraph- '44' of the case diary that he had requested the parents of the informant to provide the date of birth certificate of Utkramit Badrot School but no certificate was provided by the informant and her parents. The Investigating Officer had not gone to the said school to gather information with regard to the age of the victim. It is submitted that PW.-6 has, therefore, made a false statement that the age related certificate was made available to police.

13. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that as per the written application of the prosecutrix, the occurrence took place on 27.06.2020 i.e. the same day on which she reached the house of her '*mousi*' in village Kajiyajor. She has stated that in the same evening at about 3 'O' clock, which is in fact an afternoon period and not evening, she had gone towards the bank of the river and evidence has come that it is at a distance of at least half kilometer from the house of her '*mousi*'. It is this place where the appellant is said to have arrived and forcibly committed rape on her. She has stated that she tried to raise her voice, shouted but no one came to save her and after the occurrence,



she somehow reached the house of her '*mousi*' but again the falsity of her statement may be gathered from her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the learned Judicial Magistrate wherein she has stated that after the occurrence, her cousin brother arrived and he took her to the house of the '*mousi*'. Who is this cousin brother, how he arrived at the place of occurrence and took her to the house of her '*mousi*' remained a mystery. No cousin brother of the informant has been examined in this case to instill confidence of this court in the story. This is a material deviation with regard to the circumstances which immediately happened after the occurrence.

14. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that there is a delay of two days in lodging of the F.I.R. which is important to take note of, particularly, when the victim of this case is not a sterling witness. She has stated in her deposition that she had reported the occurrence to her '*mousi*' on the same day. In her written application also, she has stated that she had returned home and there she had told about the occurrence to all. Despite this, the occurrence was not reported to the police station which is situated at a distance of only four kilometers from the village Kajiyajor. It



is further submitted that the father of the victim has deposed that his statement was not recorded by the police. He has, however, stated in his deposition that the occurrence had taken place in another village (paragraph- '8' of the deposition of PW.-5). He got information of the occurrence on the mobile phone from his wife but he cannot say the mobile number of his wife. He has stated that he returned home on the next day and then he went to the police station on third day. PW.-5 has stated that he has got four daughters and the second daughter is married in village Kaduatari with one Dilip Murmu. Lalo Murmu is the brother of Dilip Murmu. Kaduatari village is situated at a distance of 4-5 kilometers from his village. The victim was going to the house of her sister intermittently and his son-in-law, Dilip Murmu, his brother Lalo Murmu used to visit his house. PW.- 5 was suggested by defence that his daughter was seen in objectionable position with Lalo Murmu which was seen by the accused and he made it known to others, for this reason, he has been falsely implicated in this case. PW.-5 has stated that with regard to the occurrence whatever talk he had, was with his wife.

15. It is further submitted that from the evidence of the mother of the victim (PW.-7), it would appear that she was



in her village on 27.06.2020. The occurrence had taken place with her daughter at the bank of the river where she had gone to defecate. She has stated that her daughter had disclosed about the occurrence to the sister of this witness and her sister had given a telephone call to her. Her husband was not present in the house and when her husband came then she disclosed it to him and thereafter, they went to village Kajiyajor. It is submitted that it is evident that the victim did not talk to her mother over telephone to narrate the occurrence. This cannot be a natural conduct. It is further submitted that if the information with regard to the occurrence was available with the sister of the informant but it was not reported to police and even on the second day i.e. 28.06.2020, the occurrence was not brought to the notice of the nearest police station but written application was submitted only on 29.06.2020, the prosecution cannot be said to have explained the delay and this would prove fatal to the prosecution.

16. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the conduct of the prosecutrix (PW.-6) may be noticed from the evidence of the I.O (PW.-9). PW.-9 has stated that in paragraph- '24' of the case diary, the statement of witness Ashok Kumar has been recorded, he had disclosed



that the informant had gone towards the river in village Kariyajor with Lalo Murmu who is brother of her '*bahnoi*', Dilip Murmu. I.O. has further stated that in paragraph- '22' of the case diary, he has recorded about his effort to search out Lalo Murmu but he had not taken second attempt to search him. I.O. (P.W.-6) has further deposed that in paragraph- '27' of the case diary, it has come that the informant had gone with Lalo Murmu towards the Kariyajor river. It is pointed out that the I.O. has categorically stated that the victim/prosecutrix was asked to provide her clothes which she was wearing on the date of occurrence but she did not provide the clothes. (paragraph- '13' of PW.-9) .

17. It is further submitted that the doctor (PW.-8), who examined the prosecutrix on 29.06.2020 has stated in her deposition that the victim had changed her clothes and taken bath after the incident, no mark of injury, nor any sign of resistance was found on the victim's lips, cheeks, mammae, genitalia or any other body parts. The hymen was ruptured and the vaginal swab smear examination suggested absence of spermatozoa or RBCs. In her conclusion, PW.-8 has recorded that victim might have undergone sexual intercourse but she was not sure about it.



18. In her cross-examination, she has stated that she did not find any mark of injury on any part of the body of the victim and from examination of victim she was not sure whether victim had undergone on sexual intercourse or not. The report of PW.-8 has been exhibited as Ext.-P3.

19. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the trial Court has not even determined the age of the victim despite questioned by the defence and then that the victim/prosecutrix is not a sterling witness in this case has missed the attention of the learned trial court. It is also pointed out that the '*mousi*' of the victim who has been examined as PW.-2 has become hostile. Pws. 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this case have been declared hostile and in their examination in-chief they have stated that this appellant has been falsely implicated. It is also pointed out that in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. the appellant has categorically stated that he had seen the prosecutrix and she was having an affair with the brother of her brother-in-law (*bahnoi*) which he had disclosed to her '*mousi*' whereafter he has been falsely implicated in this case.

Submissions on behalf of State

20. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State has, though, initially opposed the appeal but in course of



argument, learned Additional Public Prosecutor admits that the defence had raised issues relating to age of the victim and in this regard, the defence had put questions to the victim as well as to her mother. Her mother (PW.-7) was specifically suggested that her daughter was major at the time of occurrence and she had been falsely deposing in this case.

21. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor further submits that learned trial court seems to have gone by the principle that the victim of the crime cannot depose falsely and for that reason, the trial court has relied upon the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of **State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh and others** reported in **1996 (2) SCC 384**.

Consideration

22. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State as also perused the trial court records.

23. On going through the materials available on the record, we find that in this case, PW-1 to PW-4 all have turned hostile. The '*mousi*' of the victim girl has been examined as PW.-2 and even she has made statement in her examination-



in-chief that this appellant had not committed the occurrence and she had given this statement to '*Darogaji*'.

24. The whole prosecution case rests upon the statement of the victim (PW.-6). The victim was cross-examined in respect of her date of birth, on which she has stated that she had handed over the school T.C. (Transfer Certificate) related to her date of birth to the police but the I.O. PW.-9 has stated that despite asking for the certificate relating to the age of the school, neither the informant nor her parents provided the same. This Court therefore finds that before the learned trial Court there was no educational certificate of the school for determination of the age of the prosecutrix. The medical evidence was required to be obtained with regard to the age of the victim but that was not done. The Doctor (PW.-8) who prepared Ext.-P/3 had not examined the prosecutrix with respect to her age, therefore, no opinion with regard to age of the victim has been recorded by her.

25. Section 34 of the POCSO Act provides for the determination of age in accordance with the Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Care and Protection of Children Act, 2015. According to sub-section 2 of Section 34 if any question arises in any proceeding before the Special Court whether a



person is a child or not, such question shall be determined by the Special Court after satisfying itself about the age of such person and it shall record in writing its reason for such determination.

26. This Court finds that both PW.-6 as well as her mother (PW.-7) have been making misleading statements in course of their cross-examination that they had provided the age related certificate to the I.O. The I.O. has contradicted the statements of the PW.-6 and PW.-7. We therefore find that the trial court has missed out on a very important aspect of the matter before concluding the trial and convicting the appellant for the offence under the POCSO Act.

27. This Court has further noticed material discrepancy in the evidence of the prosecutrix. Initially, she stated that after the occurrence of rape, she somehow reached her '*mousi's*' place and told the occurrence to all but in her 164 Cr.P.C. statement, she has stated that after the occurrence, her cousin brother came there and he brought her to the house of her '*mousi*'. In course of investigation, the said so called cousin brother of the informant has not appeared and there is no examination of the said cousin brother in course of trial.



This creates huge doubt over the veracity of the statement of PW.-1.

28. This court further finds that the another conduct of PW.-6 would raise huge doubt over her story of rape. The I.O. PW.-9 has stated that he had asked for the clothes of the victim which she was wearing at the time of occurrence but the victim did not provide the same. This would go against the prosecution case. The doctor has found that the victim had taken bath, and then in her medical examination the doctor did not find any sign of resistance either on her lips, cheeks, mammae, genitalia or any other body parts. In fact, the medical report (Ext.-P/3) completely rules out the prosecution story based on solitary statement of PW.-1 that she was subjected to rape. Ext.-P/3 is being extracted hereunder for a ready reference.

“Examined [REDACTED], D/o Mr. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] resident of village [REDACTED] dist-
[REDACTED] at 8:16 p.m. on 29/06/2020 vide
emergency no – 5754 & emergency registration
no- 63920 E016001 by order of Deputy
Superintendent of Sadar Hospital, Jamui in
presence of A grade staff Sunita Kumari.
Written consent for medical examination was
taken from victim before examining her. She
was brought to me by lady constable Punam Kr
no. 261 of 15 Mahila P.S. Jamui.

**DETAILS OF PHYSICAL EXAMINATION
OF VICTIM:-**

Marks of identification :- (1) A mole above
upper lip (2) A mole about 1 cm below left eye.



- victim does not remember date of her last menstrual period.

- Victim has changed clothes & taken bath after the incident.

Axillary and pubic hair were sparse, breasts were develop.

- No marks of injury, nor any signs of resistance were found on victim's lips, cheeks, mammae, genitalia or any other body parts.

- Per abdominal examination-Abdomen was soft, bowel sound was present.

- Per vaginal examination- Vagina admitted 2 fingers tight.

. Hymen old ruptured.

. Mild whitish discharge P/V was present.

LABORATORY FINDINGS :-

(1.) Urine test for pregnancy was negative.

(2.) Vaginal swab smear examination done by Dr. S.N. Ahmad Sir, suggested absence of spermatozoa or RBCs, though few epithelial cells were present.

(3.) Ultrasonography of whole abdomen and pelvis suggested normal study.

- All reports are attached.

- CONCLUSION :- Victim might have undergone sexual intercourse but I'm not sure about it."

[The identity of the victim has been masked by this Court.]

29. We have further noticed from the evidence of the I.O. that at one stage, Lalo Murmu was also under investigation and police had gone in search of him but thereafter police did not take further attempt to find him and submitted the charge sheet both under Section 4 and Section 8 of the POCSO Act. I.O has stated that he submitted charge sheet under both the sections of the POCSO Act because



during investigation, he could not make it clear, therefore, the charge sheet was filed under both the provisions. We take note of it only because we are of the opinion that while submitting a charge sheet under the provisions of the POCSO Act, no casual approach on the part of the I.O. may be expected because the consequences of prosecution of a person under POCSO Act are serious on his life and liberty.

30. In the kind of materials which we have discussed hereinabove, the delay in lodging of the FIR gains importance. While it is true that mere ground of delay in lodging of the FIR would not result in throwing away the whole prosecution case, the fact remains that in the kind of quality of evidence coming in this case, the delay in lodging of the FIR would further lead to a conclusion that the prosecution case is not trustworthy. In this regard, this court would rely upon the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of in the case of **Meharaj Singh (L/Nk.) versus State of U.P.** reported in **(1994) 5 SCC 188** has held in paragraph '12' as under:-

“12. FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of appreciating the evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest information regarding the circumstance in which the crime was committed, including the



names of the actual culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, if any, used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, danger also creeps in of the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story. With a view to determine whether the FIR was lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for certain external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of the copy of the FIR, called a special report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late it can give rise to an inference that the FIR was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, unless, of course the prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching or receipt of the copy of the FIR by the local Magistrate. Prosecution has led no evidence at all in this behalf. The second external check equally important is the sending of the copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report. Even though the inquest report, prepared under Section 174 CrPC, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact that the prosecution story was still in an embryo state and had not been given any shape and that the FIR came to be recorded later on after due deliberations and consultations and was then ante-timed to give it the colour of a promptly lodged FIR. In our opinion, on account of the infirmities as noticed above, the FIR has lost its value and authenticity and it appears to us that the same has been ante-timed and had not been recorded till the inquest proceedings were over at the spot by PW-8.



31. We would also record that PW.-6 in this case is not a sterling witness and it would not be safe to sustain the conviction of the appellant on the sole testimony of PW.-6. Who will be called a sterling witness has been lucidly discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of **Rai Sandeep @ Deepu versus State (NCT of Delhi)** reported in **(2012) 8 SCC 21**, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered as to who may be called "sterling witness". Paragraph '22' of the judgment in the case of **Rai Sandeep** (supra) is as under:-

"22 In our considered opinion, the "sterling witness" should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the



persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.”

32. In the light of the aforesaid discussions, we are of the considered opinion that in this case, the learned trial Court has not applied the first principle of law enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various cases in the facts of the present case. The facts of the case would determine as to which judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is to be cited.



Reliance placed by the learned trial court on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Gurmit Singh** (supra) to take a general view that the prosecutrix cannot come forward to make a humiliating statement but the learned trial Court missed out the important part of the judgment where their Lordships observed "... unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature...". This judgment in **Gurmit Singh** (supra) and the judgment in case of **Rai Sandeep** (supra) in which who will be a sterling witness are required to be read together for taking a correct view. Unfortunately, the trial court has convicted the appellant in this case without there being any cogent evidence.

33. This Court, therefore, sets aside the judgment of conviction and order of the sentence of the learned trial court and acquits the appellant on finding that it is a case of no evidence. This has to be taken as a clean acquittal of the appellant.

34. We are conscious that the appellant has been acquitted as there is no evidence on the record to take a view for his conviction, he has remained in jail for several years, therefore, it will be open for the appellant to seek his remedy,



if any, available to him with regard to malicious prosecution in accordance with law.

35. This appeal is allowed.

36. The appellant is said to be in custody. He shall be released forthwith if not wanted in any other case.

37. Let the trial court records with the copy of this judgment be sent down to the trial court.

38. This Court has been informed that the release order which has been issued by this Court immediately after the delivery of judgment in the Court is sent through registered post/speed post which takes some time and because of this procedure to communicate the judgment of this Court to the trial court and the Superintendent of concerned jail, an acquitted person remains in jail for next few days. In the opinion of this Court, the release order(s) is/are required to be communicated through FAX/E-mail to the learned trial court as well as the concerned Jail Superintendent, else the release order should be communicated through a Special Messenger at the cost of the High Court. This would only be in consonance with the fundamental right of the accused to get released immediately after he is found not guilty. Accordingly, this Court directs that in this case, the release order shall be



sent through FAX/E-mail or the Special Messenger at the cost
of the High Court.

(Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, J)

(Ashok Kumar Pandey, J)

Jagdish/-
Shubham/-

AFR/NAFR	
CAV DATE	
Uploading Date	30.04.2025
Transmission Date	30.04.2025

