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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

+ **CRL.M.C. 5972/2024**

MOHAMMAD HASAN

.....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Jai Dev Sharma & Mr.
Ashish Dutt, Advocates
alongwith Petitioner-in-
Person.

versus

THE STATE NCT OF DELHI

.....Respondent

Through: Mr. Raj Kumar, APP for
the State.
SI Lalit Kumar (P.S.
Bindapur).
Mohammad Jamal &
Shakeela Khatoon-in-
Person.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

ORDER

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02.08.2024

CRL.M.A. 22809/2024 (*exemption from filing certified copies of annexures*)

1. Exemption allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
2. The application stands disposed of.

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1. The present petition is filed seeking quashing of FIR No. 326/2015 dated 05.03.2015, registered at Police Station Bindapur, for offences under Sections 323/354 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ('IPC'). The FIR was registered on a complaint given by Respondent No. 2.
2. The chargesheet has been filed under Sections 323/354/354B/506/509 of the IPC.

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3. It is alleged that on 05.03.2015, husband of Respondent No.2/victim was constructing a building where 'Badarpur' and 'sand' was lying outside the building and when labourers went to remove the same, the petitioner scolded the labourers and asked them to leave the spot.

4. It is further alleged that when Respondent No.2/victim went to the spot, the petitioner pushed and kicked Respondent No.2/victim, tore her clothes and hit her with a stick on her left leg, due to which she fell, and thereafter, her husband, came to spot and took her to the hospital. This led to the registration of the present FIR.

5. Petitioner is a senior citizen and the FIR was registered almost a decade back.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the dispute is essentially in regard to the construction activity and the petitioner had no intention to cause any injury to the victim.

7. The present petition has been filed on the ground that the parties have amicably settled all their disputes, with the intervention of elder members and common friends and have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding/Settlement Deed dated 16.07.2024, on their own free will, without any fear, pressure, threat or coercion. In terms of the settlement, the parties have agreed that they will approach and appear before this Court seeking quashing of the present FIR.

8. The learned counsel for the parties submits that the parties have settled their disputes, and the petitioner has also unconditionally apologized for his conduct.

9. The petitioner and Respondent No.2/victim are present in Court and have been duly identified by the Investigating Officer.

10. Respondent No.2/victim, on being asked, states that she



does not wish to pursue any proceedings arising out of the present FIR. She states that since the petitioner has tendered an unconditional apology, and she has no grievance against him.

11. She submits that she does not want to pursue any proceedings arising out of the present FIR and has no objection if the proceedings are quashed.

12. Offences under Sections 323/509 of the IPC are compoundable whereas offences under Sections 354/354B/509 of the IPC are non-compoundable.

13. It is well settled that the High Court while exercising its powers under Section 482 of the CrPC can compound offences which are non-compoundable under the Code on the ground that there is a compromise between the accused and the complainant. The Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down parameters and guidelines for High Court while accepting settlement and quashing the proceedings. In the case of **Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr. : (2014) 6 SCC 466**, the Hon'ble Apex Court had observed as under :-

“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this



power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

- (i) ends of justice, or***
- (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.***

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.”

(emphasis supplied)



14. Similarly, in the case of ***Parbatbhai Aahir & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Anr. : (2017) 9 SCC 641***, the Hon'ble Apex Court had observed as under :-

“16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:

16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.

16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.

16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.

16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no



exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.

16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.

16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.

16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.

16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act



complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.”

(emphasis supplied)

15. Keeping in view the aforesaid principle and the nature of dispute and the fact that the parties have amicably entered into a settlement, this Court feels that no useful purpose would be served by keeping the dispute alive and continuance of the proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of Court. I am of the considered opinion that it is a fit case where discretionary jurisdiction can be exercised and the proceedings are quashed.

16. However, keeping in mind the fact that chargesheet have already been filed in the FIR and the State machinery has been put to motion, this Court feels that the ends of justice would be served if the petitioner is put to cost.

17. In view of the above, FIR No. 326/2015 and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed, subject to payment of cost of ₹10,000/- to the Delhi Police Welfare Society within a period of eight weeks from the date.

18. Let the proof of deposit of cost be submitted to the concerned IO.

19. The petition is allowed in aforesaid terms.

AMIT MAHAJAN, J

AUGUST 2, 2024

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