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\* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

+ **W.P.(CRL) 695/2024**

**ATUL CHAWLA**

..... Petitioner

Through: Mr. Bhavneet Singh, Advocate along  
with Petitioner in person.

versus

**THE STATE & ANR.**

..... Respondents

Through: Mr. Sanjay Lao, Standing Counsel  
(Crl.) with Mr. Shivesh Kaushik and Mr. Abhinav  
Arya, Advocates for State with SI Narender Singh,  
PS: Chitranjan Park.

Ms. Shreya Singhal, Advocate for Complainant  
along with Complainant (through Video  
Conferencing).

**CORAM:**

**HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE JYOTI SINGH**

**ORDER**

**20.03.2024**

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**CRL.M.A. 6443/2024 & CRL.M.A.6444/2024 (exemptions)**

1. Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
2. Applications stand disposed of.

**W.P.(CRL) 695/2024**

3. This petition has been filed on behalf of the Petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of FIR No. 209/2019 dated 24.12.2019 registered under Sections 498A/406 IPC at PS: Chitranjan Park, including proceedings emanating therefrom.
4. Marriage between Petitioner and Respondent No. 2 was solemnized on 03.12.2014, according to Hindu rites and ceremonies at Delhi. No child



was born from the said wedlock. On account of disputes and differences arising between Petitioner and Respondent No. 2, they have been living separately. Respondent No. 2 made a complaint against the Petitioner which culminated into registration of the present FIR. Petitioner had filed a petition under Section 13(1)(ia) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the Family Court, South-East, Saket Court, Delhi praying for a decree of divorce against Respondent No.2. Respondent No.2 had preferred an application under Section 10 of the Family Courts Act. Petitioner had also preferred an appeal under Section 28 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 against final order and decree dated 24.09.2022, passed by learned Principal Judge (South-East), Family Courts, Saket New Delhi in HMA No.280/2019.

5. It is an admitted position obtaining between the parties that Division Bench of this Court in MAT.APP.(F.C.) 206/2022, decided on 18.05.2023, recorded settlement between the parties, and relevant part of the judgment reads as under:-

*“3. Appellant submits that he accepts and acknowledges the decree of divorce granted by the Court on 24.09.2022 and henceforth does not wish to impugn the same. He undertakes that he shall not % challenge or impugn the decree of divorce dated 24.09.2022 under any circumstances in future.*

*4. The undertaking is accepted.*

*5. In view of the above undertaking given by the appellant, the respondent, who is present in person, submits that she shall withdraw, compound and give 'no objection' to the quashing of the FIR No.209/2019 under Sections 498A/406 IPC, Police Station C.R. Park.*

*6. Respondent submits that in view of the fact that the appellant had impugned the order, she has also filed a petition seeking divorce and she undertakes to withdraw the said petition.*

*7. Both the parties undertake that they have no claim against each other of any nature inter alia maintenance/alimony past, present or future, dowry, streedhan. Both the parties agree that all their inter se disputes of every nature are fully and finally settled and they shall not file any claim or*



*petition against each other in future.*

*8. The undertakings are accepted. Parties are bound down to the undertakings given to Court.”*

6. From a reading of the aforesaid order of the Division Bench, it is palpably clear that both parties had amicably settled their *inter-se* disputes and undertaken that they will have no claim against each other of any nature *inter alia* maintenance/alimony past, present or future, dowry, streedhan. Parties agreed that all disputes of every nature are fully and finally settled and they shall not file any claim or petition against each other in future. The undertakings were accepted by the Court and parties were bound down to the undertakings given in Court. Marriage between Petitioner and Respondent No. 2 has been dissolved by a Decree of Divorce dated 24.09.2022 by mutual consent and copy of the judgment/decreed has been annexed with the present petition.

7. Issue notice.

8. Learned Standing Counsel accepts notice on behalf of the State.

9. Ms. Shreya Singhal, learned counsel accepts notice on behalf of Respondent No.2.

10. Petitioner and Respondent No.2 are present in Court and are identified by their counsels as well as Investigating Officer SI Narender Singh, PS: Chitranjan Park. Respondent No. 2 submits that she has no objection to the FIR being quashed as undertaken before the Division Bench. Learned Standing Counsel also has no objection to the quashing of the FIR, in view of the settlement between the parties.

11. The Supreme Court in ***Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Another, (2012) 10 SCC 303***, observed that while exercising inherent powers under



Section 482 Cr.P.C. in respect of quashing of an FIR where parties have entered into amicable resolution of the disputes, one of the considerations would be whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue the criminal proceedings despite the compromise and if the answer to the question is in the affirmative, the High Court would be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings, in order to ensure that the disputes are put to an end and peace is restored as securing the ends of justice is the ultimate guiding factor. This was of-course with a caveat that heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, dacoity etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or the victim's family settles the disputes with the offender. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment are as follows:-

*“55. In the very nature of its constitution, it is the judicial obligation of the High Court to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice or to prevent continuation of unnecessary judicial process. This is founded on the legal maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id sine qua res ipsa esse non potest. The full import of which is whenever anything is authorised, and especially if, as a matter of duty, required to be done by law, it is found impossible to do that thing unless something else not authorised in express terms be also done, may also be done, then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise; the whole idea is to do real, complete and substantial justice for which it exists. The power possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is of wide amplitude but requires exercise with great caution and circumspection.*

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*58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the*



*crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.*

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**61.** *The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus : the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. : (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such*



*offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”*

12. The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed this view and in the context of matrimonial disputes, it would be relevant to refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in ***Jitendra Raghuvanshi and Others v. Babita Raghuvanshi and Another*, (2013) 4 SCC 58**, relevant paragraphs of which are as follows:-

*“15. In our view, it is the duty of the courts to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes, particularly, when the same are on considerable increase. Even if the offences are non-compoundable, if they relate to matrimonial disputes and the Court is satisfied that the parties have settled the same amicably and without any pressure, we hold that for the purpose of securing ends of justice, Section 320 of the Code would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing of FIR, complaint or the subsequent criminal proceedings.*

*16. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. The institution of marriage occupies an important place and it has an important role to play in the society. Therefore, every effort should be made in the interest of the individuals in order to enable them to settle down in life and live peacefully. If the parties ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of*



*fighting it out in a court of law, in order to do complete justice in the matrimonial matters, the courts should be less hesitant in exercising their extraordinary jurisdiction. It is trite to state that the power under Section 482 should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection only when the Court is convinced, on the basis of material on record, that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed. We also make it clear that exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it has to be exercised in appropriate cases in order to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. It is the duty of the courts to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes and Section 482 of the Code enables the High Court and Article 142 of the Constitution enables this Court to pass such orders.”*

13. In view of the settlement between the parties, which is recorded by the Division Bench in MAT.APP.(F.C.) 206/2022, decided on 18.05.2023, present FIR No. 209/2019 dated 24.12.2019 registered under Sections 498A/406 IPC at PS: Chitranjan Park is hereby quashed including proceedings emanating therefrom.

14. At this stage, learned counsel for Respondent No.2 states that Petitioner is continuing to post the marriage photographs of the parties on social media posts and be restrained from doing so. This fact is refuted by the Petitioner, who is present in Court. He states that these are old posts but nonetheless undertakes that all social media posts, of any kind whatsoever, containing any pictures of Respondent No.2 will be taken down by him within 24 hours and further pictures will not be posted. In case of any breach of the undertaking by the Petitioner, it will be open to the Petitioner to take recourse to appropriate remedies available in law.

15. Petition stands allowed and disposed of.

**JYOTI SINGH, J**

**MARCH 20, 2024/kks**