



\$~6

\* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

+ **CRL.M.C. 119/2024**

**DIPTI GUPTA AND ANR**

..... Petitioners

Through: Mr. Anshul Mittal, Mr. Sarthak Tagra  
and Mr. Vikrant Chauhan, Advocates along with  
Petitioners in person.

versus

**STATE OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANR**

..... Respondents

Through: Mr. Digam Singh Dagar, APP for  
State with SI Vipin Rathi, P.S. Shalimar Bagh.  
Mr. Kartickay Mathur and Mr. Shanker,  
Advocates for R-2 along with R-2 in person.

**CORAM:**

**HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE JYOTI SINGH**

**ORDER**

**02.02.2024**

%

**CRL.M.A. 470/2024 (exemption)**

1. Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
2. Application stands disposed of.

**CRL.M.C. 119/2024**

1. This petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of FIR No.NWD-SB-000353/2022 dated 09.04.2022 under Section 379 IPC registered at PS: e-Police Station (Shalimar Bagh, North West) and consequential proceedings emanating therefrom.
2. Marriage between Petitioner No.1 and Respondent No. 2 was solemnized on 14.10.2021 according to Hindu rites and ceremonies at Delhi after the death of their respective spouses. No child was born out of the wedlock.



3. On account of temperamental differences and disputes between Petitioner No.1 and Respondent No. 2, they have been living separately. Respondent No.2, husband of Petitioner No.1 filed a complaint with e-Police Station Shalimar Bagh against the Petitioners regarding theft of some articles and belongings which culminated in the lodging of the present FIR.

4. It is stated in the petition that during the pendency of the proceedings, matter was referred to Mediation Centre, CAW Cell, Rani Bagh and with the efforts of the Mediator and the respective counsels, all disputes were amicably resolved between the parties and Settlement Agreement dated 09.06.2022 has been executed, copy of which is appended to the petition. Marriage between Petitioner No.1 and Respondent No.2 stands dissolved by mutual consent and copy of judgment/decreed dated 06.01.2024 is appended to the petition. Copy of the statement given by Petitioner No.1 before the CAW Cell, North West District, behind M2K Cinemas, Pitampura, Delhi withdrawing her complaint has also been placed on record. Settlement amount of Rs.2,00,000/- has been paid by Respondent No.2 to Petitioner No.1.

5. Issue notice.

6. Learned APP accepts notice on behalf of the State.

7. Mr. Kartickay Mathur, learned counsel accepts notice on behalf of Respondent No. 2.

8. Petitioners and Respondent No.2 are present in Court and are identified by their respective counsels and Investigating Officer SI Vipin Rathi, P.S. Shalimar Bagh. Petitioner No.1 acknowledges that she has received the money that was payable to her under the Settlement Agreement dated 09.06.2022 and that the marriage with Respondent No. 2 has been



dissolved by mutual consent. Respondent No.2 states that Petitioner No.1 has given a written statement before CAW cell withdrawing her complaint and all disputes are settled, hence he has no objection to the quashing of the present FIR. Learned APP appearing on behalf of the State also has no objection to quashing of the present FIR in view of the settlement between the parties.

9. The Supreme Court in ***Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Another, (2012) 10 SCC 303***, observed that while exercising inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in respect of quashing of an FIR where parties have entered into amicable resolution of the disputes, one of the considerations would be whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue the criminal proceedings despite the compromise and if the answer to the question is in the affirmative, the High Court would be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings, in order to ensure that the disputes are put to an end and peace is restored as securing the ends of justice is the ultimate guiding factor. This was of-course with a caveat that heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, dacoity etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or the victim's family settles the disputes with the offender. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment are as follows:-

*“55. In the very nature of its constitution, it is the judicial obligation of the High Court to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice or to prevent continuation of unnecessary judicial process. This is founded on the legal maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id sine qua res ipsa esse non potest. The full import of which is whenever anything is authorised, and especially if, as a matter of duty, required to be done by law, it is found impossible to do that thing unless something else not authorised in express terms be also done, may also be done, then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise; the whole idea is to do real, complete*



*and substantial justice for which it exists. The power possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is of wide amplitude but requires exercise with great caution and circumspection.*

xxx

xxx

xxx

*58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.*

xxx

xxx

xxx

*61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus : the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. : (i) to secure the*



*ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”*

10. The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed this view and in the context of matrimonial disputes, it would be relevant to refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in ***Jitendra Raghuvanshi and Others v. Babita Raghuvanshi and Another***, (2013) 4 SCC 58, relevant paragraphs of which are as follows:-



“15. In our view, it is the duty of the courts to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes, particularly, when the same are on considerable increase. Even if the offences are non-compoundable, if they relate to matrimonial disputes and the Court is satisfied that the parties have settled the same amicably and without any pressure, we hold that for the purpose of securing ends of justice, Section 320 of the Code would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing of FIR, complaint or the subsequent criminal proceedings.

16. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. The institution of marriage occupies an important place and it has an important role to play in the society. Therefore, every effort should be made in the interest of the individuals in order to enable them to settle down in life and live peacefully. If the parties ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law, in order to do complete justice in the matrimonial matters, the courts should be less hesitant in exercising their extraordinary jurisdiction. It is trite to state that the power under Section 482 should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection only when the Court is convinced, on the basis of material on record, that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed. We also make it clear that exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it has to be exercised in appropriate cases in order to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. It is the duty of the courts to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes and Section 482 of the Code enables the High Court and Article 142 of the Constitution enables this Court to pass such orders.”

11. In ***B.S. Joshi and Others v. State of Haryana and Another***, (2003) 4 SCC 675, the Supreme Court has observed that Section 320 Cr.P.C. would not be an impediment in quashing non-compoundable offences in exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. where the facts and circumstances of the case call upon the Court to do so in the interest of justice. It has been held in various judgments that power of compounding and quashing of criminal proceedings in exercise of inherent powers are not equal or interchangeable in law.



12. In view of the observations of the Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgments, this Court finds no impediment in quashing the present FIR as the parties have amicably resolved their disputes and terms of settlement have been complied with. Since Respondent No. 2 categorically states that he does not wish to pursue the criminal proceedings, the chances of conviction being bleak, no purpose will be achieved in keeping the proceedings pending and it would be in the interest of justice that proceedings are terminated so that peace and harmony establish between the parties to the *lis* continues. This Court is fortified in its view by the orders of this Court in *Abhishek Sharma @ Rahul Sharma v. The State of Delhi & Ors.*, *CRL.M.C. 8676/2023* decided on 29.11.2023 and *Vijay Kumar v. State NCT of Delhi and Anr.*, *CRL.M.C. 2079/2023* dated 06.04.2023. Accordingly, FIR No.NWD-SB-000353/2022 dated 09.04.2022 under Section 379 IPC registered at PS: e-Police Station (Shalimar Bagh, North West) is quashed including all proceedings emanating therefrom.

13. Petition stands allowed and disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

**JYOTI SINGH, J**

**FEBRUARY 02, 2024/kks**