

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH

CRWP-11118-2023
Reserved on : 06.09.2024
Pronounced on : 30.09.2024

Mukesh Kumar ...Petitioner

Versus

State of Haryana and other ...Respondents

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KULDEEP TIWARI

Present: Mr. Vijay K. Jindal, Advocate
for the petitioner.

Mr. Rajesh Gaur, Addl. AG, Haryana.


KULDEEP TIWARI, J.(Oral)

1. The petitioner, who is convicted for life, by filing the instant petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, throws challenge to the administrative order dated 09.11.2023 (Annexure P-8), passed by the learned Additional Chief Secretary to Government Haryana, Jails Department, whereby, his application for premature release, was declined.

RIEF FACTS

2. Before this Court embark upon the issue raised by learned counsel for the petitioner, lets have a glimpse on the facts of the present matter which are essential for the adjudication of legality of the impugned order.

3. The allegations against the petitioner is that, he kidnapped the son of the complainant, namely Sushil (a B.A.final year student), and demanded




ransom of Rs.1.00 lakh in lieu of his release, with a threat that if the matter is informed to the police, his son would be cut into pieces. Later, the petitioner strangled and killed the kidnapped son of the complainant, Sushil, by causing injury with a broken bottle. Thereupon, a case FIR No.148, dated 07.03.2000 under Section 302/364-A/201 IPC, was registered against the petitioner at Police Station City Gurgaon.

4. Learned Sessions Judge, Gurgaon, vide judgment of conviction dated 04.10.2002, convicted the petitioner for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 364-A, 302 and 201 of the IPC, 1860, and was sentenced as hereunder :-

Sr. No.	Offence under which convict has been sentenced	Period of imprisonment	Amount of fine imposed	Imprisonment in default of payment of fine
1.	Section 302 IPC, 1860	Rigorous imprisonment for life	Rs.2,000/-	Rigorous imprisonment for three months
2.	Section 364 IPC, 1860	Rigorous imprisonment for 07 years	Rs.2,000/-	Rigorous imprisonment for two months
3.	Section 201 IPC, 1860	Rigorous imprisonment for 03 years	-	-

5. A statutory appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court, vide judgment dated 15.09.2014, passed in CRA-D-878-DB-2002.

6. The case of the petitioner was earlier not referred to the competent authority for grant of premature release in view of the para no.2(b) of the Premature Release Policy dated 12.04.2002 (hereinafter referred to as




the 'Policy of 2002'). As per the Policy of 2002, the petitioner is required to undergo 20 years of actual sentence and 25 years of total sentence for grant of premature release.

7. Having aggrieved with the action of the jail authority concerned for not recommending his case for consideration for premature release, the petitioner preferred a writ petition bearing No.CRWP-1750-2020. The said petition was disposed of by a co-ordinate bench of this Court vide order dated 27.07.2023, with a *mandamus* upon the competent authority concerned to consider the case of the present petitioner for his premature release within a period of six months from the date of the order, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in '***Rajan vs. The Home Secretary, Home Department of Tamil Nadu and others***', ***Writ Petition (Crl.) No.321 of 2018, decided on 25.04.2019.***

8. The competent authority concerned, did not comply with the directions, which compelled the petitioner to file a contempt petition, bearing COCP no.3148-2023, before this Court and vide order dated 09.10.2023, considering the fact that the case of the petitioner for grant of premature release has already been recommended, which is pending consideration, a *mandamus* was passed upon the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gurugram, to reconsider the claim of the petitioner for releasing him on interim bail. The operative part of the said order reads as under:-

“.....the documents, placed on record by learned State counsel, are taken on record as Mark 'A'(Colly).

Considering the fact that the premature release case of the petitioner has already been recommended, which is pending consideration, it would be appropriate to issue a direction to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gurugram, to reconsider the claim of the petitioner for releasing him on interim bail.



Ordered accordingly.....”

9. Thereupon, the petitioner was released on bail by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gurugram, in terms of the order dated 09.10.2023.


10. Finally, the competent authority concerned vide order dated 10.11.2023, after considering the case of the present petitioner rejected his case for premature release, with the observation that since the case of the petitioner falls in para 2(aa)(ii) of the Policy of 2002, therefore, his case can be considered only after completion of 20 years of actual sentence and 25 years of total sentence. This rejection order caused grievance to the present petitioner and propelled him to file the instant petition.

SUBMISSIONS MADE BY LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER

11. Learned counsel for the petitioner in asking for the relief (*supra*), submits that the petitioner, has in fact, already completed the sentence awarded to him under Sections 364-A, and 201 of the IPC, therefore, presently, the petitioner is undergoing sentence only under Section 302 IPC for rigorous imprisonment for life, and therefore, his case is required to be considered as a convict under Section 302 of IPC only, and not under the other provisions of IPC, wherein his sentence has already completed.

12. To lend vigor to the above submission, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in **Rajan’s** case (*supra*). The relevant extract thereof reads as under:-

“10. Reverting to the prayer clause (b), we have no difficulty in accepting the stand of the petitioner that section 27(3) of the Arms Act having been declared ultra vires in terms of the judgment of this Court in State of Punjab (*supra*), the conviction and sentence awarded to the petitioner in relation to the said offence cannot be reckoned in law. Even so, the petitioner is faced with the conviction and sentence awarded for other serious offences under




Section 395 for 7 years' rigorous imprisonment, as also under Section 3 read with Sections 25(1A) and 27(3) of the Indian Arms Act with sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 5 years for the said offences. However, in view of the exposition of the Constitution Bench in Muthuramalingam and Ors. v. State represented by Inspector of Police 2016(3) RCR (Criminal) 827: (2016) 8 SCC 313, we must immediately accept the stand of the petitioner that the sentences in respect of offences under Section 395 IPC and Section 3/25(1A) of the Arms Act also cannot be reckoned for considering the proposal for premature release of the petitioner. For, he has already undergone the sentence periods awarded for the said offences which were to run concurrently.

11. Indeed, the counsel for the respondents made a fervent effort to persuade us that the said sentences will also have to be taken into account for considering the proposal for premature release and in that case, consultation with the Central Government would be inevitable. We are not impressed by this submission. For, on a plain reading of the order passed by the Trial Court along with the modified sentence order passed by the High Court, it is indisputable that the sentences for offences punishable under Section 395 IPC and Section 3 read with Section 25(1A) of the Arms Act, were to run concurrently. The petitioner has already undergone the sentence awarded in relation to the said offences on expiry of 7 years and 5 years, respectively. This position is reinforced from the exposition of the Constitution Bench in Muthuramalingam (supra). It may be useful to reproduce paragraph 23 and the conclusion in paragraphs 34 & 35 of the said decision, which read thus:

"23. Parliament, it manifests from the provisions of section 427(2) CrPC, 1973 was fully cognizant of the anomaly that would arise if a prisoner condemned to undergo life imprisonment is directed to do so twice over. It has, therefore, carved out an exception to the general rule to clearly recognise that in the case of life sentences for two distinct offences separately tried and held proved the sentences cannot be directed to run consecutively. The provisions of section 427(2) CrPC, 1973 apart, i in Ranjit Singh case 1991 (3) RCR (Criminal) 470: (1991) 4 SCC 304, this Court has in terms held that since life sentence implies imprisonment for the remainder of the life of the convict, consecutive life sentences cannot be awarded as humans have only one life. That logic, in our view, must extend to section 31 CrPC, 1973 also no matter Section 31 does not in terms make a provision analogous to Section 427(2) of the Code. The provision must, in our opinion, be so interpreted as to prevent any anomaly or irrationality. So interpreted section 31(1) CrPC, 1973 must mean that sentences awarded by the court for several offences committed by the prisoner shall run consecutively (unless the court directs otherwise) except where such sentences include imprisonment for life which can and must run concurrently. We are also inclined to hold that if more than one life sentences are awarded to the prisoner, the same would get superimposed over each other. This will imply that in case the prisoner is granted the benefit of any remission or commutation qua one such sentence, the benefit of such remission would not ipso facto extend to the other.

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34. In conclusion our answer to the question is in the negative. We hold that while multiple sentences for imprisonment for life can be awarded for multiple murders or other offences punishable with imprisonment for life, the life sentences so awarded cannot be directed to run consecutively. Such sentences would, however, be superimposed over each other so that any remission or commutation granted by the competent authority in one does not ipso facto result in remission of the sentence awarded to the prisoner for the other.


35. We may, while parting, deal with yet another dimension of this case argued before us, namely, whether the court can direct life sentence and term sentences to run consecutively. That aspect was argued keeping in view the fact that the appellants have been sentenced to imprisonment for different terms apart from being awarded imprisonment for life. The trial court's direction affirmed by the High Court is that the said term sentences shall run consecutively. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that even this part of the direction is not legally sound, for once the prisoner is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, the term sentence awarded to him must run concurrently. We do not, however, think so. The power of the court to direct the order in which sentences will run is unquestionable in view of the language employed in section 31 CrPC, 1973. The court can, therefore, legitimately direct that the prisoner shall first undergo the term sentence before the commencement of his life sentence. Such a direction shall be perfectly legitimate and in tune with section 31 CrPC, 1973. The converse however may not be true for if the court directs the life sentence to start first it would necessarily imply that the term sentence would run concurrently. That is because once the prisoner spends his life in jail, there is no question of his undergoing any further sentence. Whether or not the direction of the court below calls for any modification or alteration is a matter with which we are not concerned. The regular Bench hearing the appeals would be free to deal with that aspect of the matter having regard to what we have said in the foregoing paragraphs.”

(emphasis supplied)

13. He further submits that the competent authority concerned, has wrongly interpreted the Policy of 2002. In fact the petitioner is only required to undergo only 10 years of actual sentence and 14 years of total sentence (including remissions) as he is now only undergoing sentence under Section 302 IPC.

SUBMISSIONS MADE BY LEARNED STATE COUNSEL

14. The instant petition was vociferously opposed by the learned State counsel. To lend vigor to his argument, learned State counsel relied upon



a reply, dated 13.02.2024 filed, by way of an affidavit of Sh.Mukesh Kumar, ACP, City, Gurugram, and also a reply filed by way of an affidavit of Sh.Jagjit Singh, Inspector General of Prisons, Sector-14, Panchkula.

15. Learned State counsel while referring to the Policy of 2002, submits that since the petitioner has been convicted for committing an offence for the purpose of extracting ransom money, therefore, his case is to be considered under Para 2(aa)(ii) of the said Act.


16. While drawing attention of this Court towards the custody period, learned State counsel submits that the petitioner has completed actual sentence of 12 years 06 months and 19 days, and total sentence of 15 years 10 months and 24 days (with remissions), as on 24.06.2024, therefore, his case was rightly and legally rejected by the competent authority concerned.

17. The details of the custody period as provided by the jail authority concerned in its reply(*supra*), is extracted hereinafter for ready reference:-

Sr.no.	Particulars	Period	Years	Mon.	Days
1.	Undertrial period	From 07.03.2000 to 02.04.2001 & From 21.04.2001 to 03.10.2002	02	06	09
2.	Conviction period	From 04.10.2002 to 13.09.2006 & From 05.03.2015 to 24.06.2024	13	03	00
	Total		15	09	09
3.	Overstay from parole period (-)	From 05.03.2003 to 05.11.2003	00	07	29
4.	Interim bail period (-)	From 12.10.2023 to 18.11.2003	00	01	06
5.	Parole availed(-)	126 weeks and 03 days	02	05	15
	Actual Sentence		12	06	19
6.	Remission earned (+)		03	04	05
	Total sentence		15	10	24

ANALYSIS

18. This Court has considered the rival submission made by learned counsel for the parties concerned, and perused the entire case file.




19. Before envicing any opinion on the issue raised by learned counsel for the petitioner it is important to travel through various precedent laws passed by the Supreme Court as well as by this Court.

20. It is not under dispute that the 'Prisons' is a State subject under the State List of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution of India. The management and the administration of the prisons falls exclusively in the State Government and is governed by the Prisons Act, 1894. Convicting and sentencing an accused person is purely falls within the judicial domain whereas the execution of sentence is within the domain of the executive as enshrined under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.

21. In the case of **Maru Ram vs. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 2147**, the Supreme Court has held as under:-

“Sentencing is a judicial function but the execution of the sentence, after the courts pronouncement, is ordinarily a matter for the Executive under the Procedure Code, going by Entry 2 in List III of the Seventh Schedule. Keeping aside the constitutional powers under Arts. 72 and 161 which are 'untouchable' and 'unapproachable' for any legislature, let us examine the law of sentencing, remission and release. Once a sentence has been imposed, the only way to terminate it before the stipulated term is by action under ss. 432/433 or Arts. 72/161. And if the latter power under the Constitution is not invoked, the only source of salvation is the play of power under ss. 432 and 433(a) so far as a 'lifer' is concerned. No release by reduction or remission of sentence is possible under the corpus juris as it stands, in any other way. The legislative power of the State under Entry 4 of List II, even if it be stretched to snapping point, can deal only with Prisons and Prisoners, never with truncation of judicial sentences.”

22. The grant of premature release/remissions, falls within the domain of the State Government. The respondent-State of Haryana, in order to obliterate the element of the discrimination framed premature release policies from time to time. In the policies, the Government of Haryana has carved out a classification of offence as per gravity, nature, manner and the circumstances under which the crime was committed. The policies of



premature release issued from time to time by the State Government, and the classification made as per the offences/crime committed by a convict, has been upheld by the Supreme Court in **State of Haryana vs. Mahender Singh and others, (2007) 12, SCALE 6691** and in the case of **the State of Haryana vs. Bhup Sing (Crl.Appeal Nos.2064-2066 of 2008)**.

23. The Supreme Court in its judgment passed in the case of **Swami Shardhanand @ Murli Manohar Mishra vs. State of Karnataka (SC) 2008 (3) RCR (Criminal) 772**, has held that the granting of premature release is the sole discretion the State Government to exercise the powers conferred upon it in accordance with law. A convict has no right to claim the premature release as life imprisonment means the whole life of a convict in the jail. The relevant extract of the judgment reads as under:-


“65. Earlier in this judgment it was noted that the decision in Shri Bhagwan (supra) there is a useful discussion on the legality of remission in the case of life convicts. The judgment in Shri Bhagwan, in paragraph 22, refers to and quotes from the earlier decision in State of M.P. vs. Ratan Singh (supra) which in turn quotes a passage from the Constitution Bench decision in Gopal Vinayek Godse (supra). It will be profitable to reproduce here the extract from Ratan Singh:

"4. As regards the first point, namely, that the prisoner could be released automatically on the expiry of 20 years under the Punjab Jail Manual or the Rules framed under the Prisons Act, the matter is no longer res integra and stands concluded by a decision of this Court in Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra, (1961) 3 SCR 440 where the Court, following a decision of the Privy Counsel in Pandit Kishori Lal v. King Emperor, AIR 1954 PC 64 observed as follows:

"Under that section a person transported for life or any other terms before the enactment of the said section would be treated as a person sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life or for the said term.

If so the next question is whether there is any provision of law whereunder a sentence for life imprisonment, without any formal remission by appropriate Government, can be automatically treated as one for a definite period. No such provision is found in the Indian Penal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure or the Prisons Act.

* * * * * A sentence of transportation for life or imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated as transportation or imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted person's natural life".



The Court further observed thus:

"But the Prisons Act does not confer on any authority a power to commute or remit sentences; it provides only for the regulation of prisons and for the treatment of prisoners confined therein. Section 59 of the Prisons Act confers a power on the State Government to make rules, inter alia, for rewards for good conduct. Therefore, the rules made under the Act should be construed within the scope of the ambit of the Act.....Under the said rules the order of an appropriate Government under Section 401 Criminal Procedure Code, are a pre-requisite for a release. No other rule has been brought to our notice which confers an indefeasible right on a prisoner sentenced to transportation for life to an unconditional release on the expiry of a particular term including remissions. The rules under the Prisons Act do not substitute a lesser sentence for a sentence of transportation for life.


The question of remission is exclusively within the province of the appropriate Government; and in this case it is admitted that, though the appropriate Government made certain remissions under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it did not remit the entire sentence. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner has not yet acquired any right to release'.

It is, therefore, manifest from the decision of this Court that the Rules framed under the Prisons Act or under the Jail Manual do not affect the total period which the prisoner has to suffer but merely amount to administrative instructions regarding the various remissions to be given to the prisoner from time to time in accordance with the rules. This Court further pointed out that the question of remission of the entire sentence or a part of it lies within the exclusive domain of the appropriate Government under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and neither Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code nor any Rules or local Acts can stultify the effect of the sentence of life imprisonment given by the court under the Indian Penal Code. In other words, this Court has clearly held that a sentence for life would ensure till the lifetime of the accused as it is not possible to fix a particular period the prisoner's death and remissions given under the Rules could not be regarded as a substitute for a sentence of transportation for life."

Further, in paragraph 23, the judgment in Shri Bhagwan observed as follows:

"In Maru Ram vs. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 107, a Constitution Bench of this Court reiterated the aforesaid position and observed that the inevitable conclusion is that since in Section 433A we deal only with life sentences, remissions lead nowhere and cannot entitle a prisoner to release. Further, in Laxman Naskar (Life Convict) vs. State of W.B. & Anr., (2000) 7 SCC 626, after referring to the decision of the case of Gopal Vinayak Godse vs. State of Maharashtra, (1961) 3 SCR 440, the court reiterated that sentence for "imprisonment for life"

ordinarily means imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted person's natural life; that a convict undergoing such sentence may earn remissions of his part of sentence under the Prison Rules but such remissions in the absence of an order of an appropriate Government remitting the entire balance of his sentence under this section does not entitle the convict to be released automatically before the full life term if served. It was observed that though under the relevant Rules a sentence for imprisonment for life is equated with the definite period of 20 years, there is no indefeasible right of such prisoner to be




unconditionally released on the expiry of such particular term, including remissions and that is only for the purpose of working out the remissions that the said sentence is equated with definite period and not for any other purpose."

The legal position as enunciated in Pandit Kishori Lal, Gopal Vinayak Godse, Mau Ram, Ratan Singh and Shri Bhagwan and the unsound way in which remission is actually allowed in cases of life imprisonment make out a very strong case to make a special category for the very few cases where the death penalty might be substituted by the punishment of imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term in excess of fourteen years and to put that category beyond the application of remission."

24. In the instant case, since the petitioner was convicted on 04.10.2002 by the learned Sessions Judge, Gurgaon, therefore, the Policy of 2002, is applicable. Under the said policy a person who has committed a murder with the intention to secure ransom and his case for premature release can only be considered only after completion of 20 years of actual sentence and 25 years of whole sentence (with remissions). The relevant extract of the Policy of 2002 reads as under:-

2(aa)	Convicts whose death sentence has been commuted to life imprisonment and convicts who have been imprisoned for life having committed a heinous crime as such:-	Their case may be considered after completion of 20 years actual sentence and 25 years total sentence with remissions
(i)		
(ii)	Murder with intention for the ransom	

25. This Court has examined the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in **Rajan**'s case (*supra*), and is of the view that the reliance placed by learned counsel for the petitioner is highly misplaced reliance. In the said judgment, the petitioner therein, has approached the Court with the submission that since Section 27(3) of the Arms Act, has been struck down being unconstitutional and void, in the case of **State of Punjab vs. Dalbir Singh,**




2012 (3) SCC 346, therefore, his conviction is survived only in Section 302 IPC.

26. Though the Supreme Court in **Rajan**'s case (*supra*) has observed that since the petitioner therein has already undergone the sentence in respect of Section 395 IPC, and Sections 3 and 25(1A) of the Arms Act, therefore, same cannot be reckoned *qua* considering the proposal for premature release. However, while disposing of the judgment, it is categorically observed that the grant and non-grant of remission is a prerogative of the State Government. It is not for the Court to supplant the procedure, and even the grant of premature release is not a matter of privilege, but is the power coupled with duty, conferred on the appropriate government in terms of Sections 432 and 433 of the Cr.P.C., 1973, to be exercised by the competent authority concerned after taking into account all the relevant factors, such as nature of the crime and impact of remission that may be concerned of the society as well as the State Government. The relevant extract of the said judgment reads as under:-

“16. The petitioner would, however, rely on the unreported decision of this Court in Ram Sewak (*supra*), to contend that this Court may direct the authorities to release the petitioner forthwith and that there is no point in directing further consideration by the State as the petitioner had already undergone over 30 years of sentence and with remission, over 36 years. The order passed by this Court in Ram Sewak (*supra*), is obviously in the facts of that case. As a matter of fact, it is well settled by now that grant or non-grant of remission is the prerogative to be exercised by the competent authority and it is not for the Court to supplant that procedure. Indeed, grant of premature release is not a matter of privilege but is the power coupled with duty conferred on the appropriate Government in terms of sections 432 and 433 of Cr.P.C., 1973 to be exercised by the competent authority after taking into account all the relevant factors, such as it would not undermine the nature of crime committed and the impact of the remission that may be the concern of the society as well as the concern of the State Government.

17. The petitioner would then rely on a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. v. P. Veera Bhaarathi, 2019(2) RCR (Criminal) 118: 2019 (2) SCALE 225 (Criminal Appeal No.120 of 2019 decided on 22nd January, 2019). Notably, in this case, the respondent was convicted for offence under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced to



rigorous imprisonment for life and also convicted under Sections 376 and 396 of IPC and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 7 years. Since both the sentences were to run concurrently, the respondent therein had claimed that he was entitled to be released prematurely having already undergone the actual sentence for over 16 years by invoking Rule 341 of the Tamil Nadu

Prison Rules, 1983. In the present case, however, the petitioner has been convicted for offence under Section 302 (3 counts) and Section 307 (4 counts) and has been sentenced to life imprisonment on each count. The question as to whether the petitioner should be granted remission and premature release in respect of all the counts at one stroke, is a matter to be considered by the appropriate Government in exercise of power under sections 432 and 433 of Cr.P.C., 1973 We do not wish to dilate on that aspect.”


27. In this case also the State Government in exercising its statutory powers, vest therein, adopted a uniform policy and made classifications of offences considering the nature, gravity, manner and circumstances in which the offence is committed and the impact thereof, on the society, etc.

28. The petitioner is claiming the relief of premature release on the basis of the Policy of 2002, therefore, the policy (*supra*), can be made applicable in its totality with all its rigors. In the absence of the policy, the petitioner cannot claim premature release, as discussed above.

29. The policy so framed by the State Government has also passed the test of legality as the same has been upheld by the Supreme Court of India, therefore, the case of the petitioner has rightly been considered in the apt policy and under the policy the petitioner is required to undergo 20 years actual sentence and 25 years total sentence (with remissions), which admittedly the petitioner has not undergone.

FINAL ORDER

30 Therefore, this Court does not find any illegality in the impugned order. Consequently, the same is ordered to be upheld and the instant petition is hereby, **dismissed**. From the record it reflects that the petitioner is on



interim bail, as his case was earlier under consideration before the authority concerned, and since his case for premature release has already been rejected by the competent authority, therefore, the petitioner is directed to surrender before the CJM/*Illaq*a Magistrate/Duty Magistrate concerned, to honour the sentence as imposed upon him, within one month from the pronounced of this judgment.

31. All pending application(s),if any, also stand disposed of accordingly.

(KULDEEP TIWARI)
JUDGE

September 30th, 2024
dharamvir

Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No