

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH**

Sr. No. 116

CRM-M-57578-2023
Reserved on 17.11.2023
Pronounced on 21.11.2023

Narinder Sharma

... Petitioner

Versus

State of Punjab

... Respondent

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR

Present:- Petitioner in person along with his son
Mr. Sajjan Sharma, Advocate.

HARPREET SINGH BRAR, J. (ORAL)

1. The petitioner has approached this Court by filing the present petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C for quashing the order dated 04.10.2023 (Annexure P-1) passed by Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Amritsar in case FIR No. 341 dated 21.12.2020 registered under Sections 323, 325, 294, 201 and 34 of IPC at Police Station B-Division, District Amritsar vide which the application under Section 239 of Cr.P.C seeking his discharge from the aforementioned FIR was dismissed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND:

2. The brief facts of the case are that the complainant-Ranjit Singh son of Gurdayal Singh, Resident of House No. 1-9-130 Kot Mahna Singh No. 2 Opposite Ice Factory, Tarn Taran Road, Amritsar stated that he is a resident of the said address and is in the business of sale & purchase of two wheeler. On 9-11-2020 at around 11 A.M., when he returned home with his wife on his Activa after praying obeisance at Golden Temple, their neighbour's three years old daughter came to him and started asking him for chips. He took her to the shop on his Activa to

buy chips. When the complainant reached the turn of his street, he saw Narendra Sharma and his son Vidya Bhushan and Sajan Sharma standing there. On seeing him, Narendra Sharma and Sajan Sharma started abusing him. On his asking as to why they were insulting the complainant, Narinder Sharma hit the complainant on his right hand with a *Panna*. It injured his right ring finger next to the little finger. The complainant raised alarm following which, his son (Harkirat Singh) came to that place. Then Sajan Sharma, the son of Narinder Sharma, picked a piece of floor tile from the street and hit his son on the head. Both of them raised alarm which caused Narinder Sharma and his son Sajan Sharma to run away from the place of the incident. Ranjit Singh and his son Harkirat Singh took a Docket from the Police Station and went to the Civil Hospital for doctor's inspection. The motive behind the incident was that the complainant had asked Narinder Sharma to park his car in the street in right way due to which a verbal dispute had erupted between them, causing Narinder Sharma to nurse a grudge.

CONTENTIONS :

3. The petitioner appearing in person along with his son Sajan Sharma inter alia contends that the impugned order dated 04.10.2023 (Annexure P-1) has been passed without complying with the provisions of Section 239 of Code of Criminal Procedure (herein after Cr.P.C) and the learned trial Court has failed to consider several significant facts which has violated the statutory right of the petitioner of getting discharged in the above mentioned FIR. The petitioner contends that he is suffering from cancer and does not have any criminal record. In fact, it was the complainant-Ranjit Singh who, along with 7 to 8 unnamed

persons, had trespassed into his house on 09.11.2020. The criminal law machinery was set into motion on the statement of the petitioner and Ranjit Singh & others were implicated under Section 323, 451, 506, 149 of IPC as reflected from the general diary details (Annexure P-2). The learned trial Court has failed to take into account the illegal acts of the complainant-Ranjit Singh.

3.1 It was further contended that there is a un-explained delay of 40 days in the registration of the FIR which goes to the root of the case and is fatal for the prosecution case. The petitioner relies upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***Hari Lal Vs. State of M.P.*** Crl Appeal No.2216-2217 of 2011 and contends that vague and omnibus allegations are made by the complainant who has approached this Court for registration of FIR by filing CRM-M-41632-2020 titled as '*Ranjeet Singh and another Vs. State of Punjab and others*' which has been disposed of being infructuous and there is a contradiction between the stand taken by complainant-Ranjit Singh in the petition before this Court and the allegations on the basis of which, the present FIR was lodged. The petitioner further amplified the role of the Investigating Officer Mr. Sham Sunder who had registered the FIR against the petitioner and his son to save himself from the allegations leveled by the complainant-Ranjit Singh against him in the above-mentioned petition filed before this Court.

3.2 The petitioner has also assailed the impugned order on the ground that Gurvinder Kaur, who is cited as witness, is the wife of the complainant-Ranjit Singh thereby making her an interested witness and also that her statement is hearsay in nature. The learned trial Court has

not considered all the attending circumstances and failed to notice that the present FIR is lodged as a counter-blast to the complaint made by the petitioner with regard to the incident dated 09.11.2020.

3.3 The petitioner further emphasized that the learned trial Court has erred in giving much focus to the medical reports of the injured witnesses which are in the shape of expert opinion and a very weak evidence which cannot be considered conclusive to indicate the complicity of the petitioners. Reliance in this regard is placed on the judgment rendered in ***S.Goppala Reddy Vs. State of Arunachal Pradesh*** (citation not given) to contend that the medical reports have no relevancy. The MLR of Ranjit Singh-complainant indicates that the injury is in the nature of '*lacerated wound*' which is the medical term for a deep cut whereas the injury mentioned in the paperbook is a fracture which means breakage of bone. The learned trial Court has totally ignored all these discrepancies while passing the impugned order.

3.4 Lastly, it was argued that the right of the petitioner under Section 239 of Cr.P.C is a statutory right and the trial Court has erred in hearing the third party who cannot have any say in the matter. The learned trial Court has fell into grave error on this account and reliance in this regard is placed on ***R.Balakrishna Pillari Vs. State of Kerala 1995 Cri LJ 1244 (Ker)*** and ***Ganpat Rai Hiralal and Another Vs. Aggarwal Chamber of Commerce 1952 AIR SC 409.***

OBSERVATION & ANALYSIS :

4. Having heard the petitioner along with his son present in person at length and after perusing the record, the following issue arises for the consideration of this Court in the present case:-

“What is the nature and degree of evaluation to be made by the trial Court of the documents and material attached with the report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C at the time of passing an order under Section 239 & 240 of Cr.P.C ?.”

5. Under Section 239 of Cr.P.C., a remedy is provided to the accused to seek discharge of the alleged offence if he is found to be falsely involved out of malice and sufficient material is not available on record for the purpose of framing of charges. After completion of investigation, a report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C is filed and the accused has a right to seek his discharge before the commencement of the trial by taking a recourse to the provisions of Section 227 and 239 of Cr.P.C. If upon due consideration of the police report and all the documents attached with the final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C, the Sessions Court finds the charges leveled against the accused to be groundless, it shall discharge the accused by recording the reasons for doing so under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. A similar recourse is provided under Section 239 of Cr.P.C in trial of warrants case by Magistrates. The law on the issue with regard to the nature and degree of evaluation of the evidence presented by the investigating agency before the trial Court at the time of framing of charge is well settled. The trial Court at this stage is only to form a presumptive opinion with regard to the existence of the factual ingredients breaching the threshold of the offence alleged. At the stage of formation of opinion under Section 227, 239 and 240 of Cr.P.C, the trial Court is not required to weigh the probative value of the material brought on record in the golden scale or to presume the prosecution story as gospel truth. The nature and degree of evaluation at this stage is limited to determine whether a *prima facie* case exists depending upon

the facts of each case and as such, there is no requirement to go deep into the probative value of material on record. The trial Court is only required to evaluate whether there is a ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence. The adequacy and sufficiency of the evidence is not to be considered at this stage. The veracity of the evidence can only be evaluated during the trial. In view of the legal literature and judgmental law on this issue, it could be safely concluded that at the stage of forming an opinion under Section 227, 239 and 240 of Cr.P.C, the learned trial Court is required to evaluate the material only with a purpose to ascertain whether the facts emerging from the record if taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the offence. The discharge of the accused is only permissible when the case set up by the investigating agency in the final report filed before the trial Court under 173 of Cr.P.C. has no basis or foundation. The trial Court cannot consider the probable defence of the accused in the case at this stage.

6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has in extenso laid down the principles for the purpose of framing of charges in ***P.Vijayan Vs. State of Kerala (2010) SCC 398***. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the issue involved in the present case in ***State through Deputy Superintendent of Police Vs. R.Soundirarasu etc. 2023 (2) RCR Criminal 206*** where a two Judge Bench, speaking through Justice J.B. Pardiwala, concluded that the primary consideration at this stage of framing of charges is the test of existence of a *prima facie* case and the probative value of the material available on record is not to be gone into.

The discharge of the accused under Section 239 of Cr.P.C is permissible

only when the case set up by the prosecution after the completion of investigation is found to be 'groundless'. Further, the following was observed in para 53 to 74, which is reproduced as under:-

"53. The aforesaid Sections indicate that the CrPC contemplates discharge of the accused by the Court of Sessions under Section 227 in a case triable by it, cases instituted upon a police report are covered by Section 239 and cases instituted otherwise than on a police report are dealt with in Section 245. The three Sections contain somewhat different provisions in regard to discharge of the accused. As per Section 227, the trial judge is required to discharge the accused if "the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused". The obligation to discharge the accused under Section 239 arises when the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless. The power to discharge under Section 245(1) is exercisable when the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted would warrant his conviction. Sections 227 and 239 respaly provide for discharge being made before the recording of evidence and the consideration as to whether the charge has to be framed or not is required to be made on the basis of the record of the case, including the documents and oral hearing of the accused and the prosecution or the police report. the documents sent along with it and examination of the accused and after affording an opportunity to the parties to be heard. On the other hand, the stage for discharge under Section 245 is reached only after the evidence referred to in Section 244 has been taken.

54. Despite the slight variation in the provisions with regard to discharge under the three pairs of Sections referred to above, the settled legal position is that the stage of framing of charge under either of these three situations, is a preliminary one and the test of "prima facie" case has to be applied if the trial court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out, charge has to be framed.

55. The nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of charge came up for consideration of this Court in Onkar Nath Mishra and others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and another, (2008) 2 SCC 561, and referring to its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659, and the State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338, it was held that at that stage, the Court has to form a presumptive opinion as to

the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the materials on record. The relevant observations made in the judgment are as follows:-

“11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.”

56. Then again in the case of Som Nath Thapa (supra), a three-judge Bench of this Court, after noting the three pairs of Sections Le. (1) Sections 227 and 228 reply in so far as the sessions trial is concerned; (ii) Sections 239 and 240 reply relatable to the trial of warrant cases; and (iii) Sections 245(1) and (2) qua the trial of summons cases, which dealt with the question of framing of charge or discharge, stated thus: (SCC p. 671, para 32).

"32...if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage."

57. *In a later decision in Mohanlal Soni (supra), this Court, referring to several of its previous decisions, held that: (SCC p. 342, para 7)*

“7. The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.”

58. *Reiterating a similar view in Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh. and another, (2013) 11 SCC 476, it was observed by this Court that while framing charges the court is required to evaluate the materials and documents on record to decide whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value would disclose existence of ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, the court is not required to go deep into the probative value of the materials on record. It needs to evaluate whether there is a ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence and it is not required to evaluate sufficiency of evidence to convict the accused. It was held that the Court at this stage cannot speculate into the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations and contradictions & inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses cannot be looked into at the stage of discharge.*

59. *In the context of trial of a warrant case, instituted on a police report, the provisions for discharge are to be governed as per the terms of Section 239 which provide that a direction for discharge can be made only for reasons to be recorded by the court where it considers the charge against the accused to be groundless. It would, therefore, follow that as per the provisions under Section 239 what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not that a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offences alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of that offence, and it is only in a case where the Magistrate considers the charge to be groundless, he is to discharge the accused after recording his reasons for doing so.*

60. Section 239 envisages a careful and objective consideration of the question whether the charge against the accused is groundless or whether there is ground for presuming that he has committed an offence. What Section 239 prescribes is not, therefore, an empty or routine formality. It is a valuable provision to the advantage of the accused, and its breach is not permissible under the law. But if the Judge, upon considering the record, including the examination, if any, and the hearing, is of the opinion that there is "ground for presuming" that the accused has committed the offence triable under the chapter, he is required by Section 240 to frame in writing a charge against the accused. The order for the framing of the charge is also not an empty or routine formality. It is of a far-reaching nature, and it amounts to a decision that the accused is not entitled to discharge under Section 239, that there is, on the other hand, ground for presuming that he has committed an offence triable under Chapter XIX and that he should be called upon to plead guilty to it and be convicted and sentenced on that plea, or face the trial. (See: V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI, AIR 1980 SC 962)

61. Section 239 of the CrPC, 1973 lays down that if the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused. The word groundless, in our opinion, means that there must be no ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence. The word groundless used in section 239 of the CrPC, 1973 means that the materials placed before the Court do not make out or are not sufficient to make out a *prima facie* case against the accused.

62. The learned author Shri Sarkar in his Criminal PC, 5th Edition, on page 427, has opined as:-

"The provision is the same as in S. 227, the only difference being that the Magistrate may examine the accused, if necessary, of also S. 245. The Magistrate shall discharge the accused- recording reasons, if after (i) considering the police report and documents mentioned in 5, 173; (1) examining the accused, if necessary and (iii) hearing the arguments of both sides he thinks the charge against him to be groundless, Le, either there is no legal evidence or that the facts do not make out any offence at all."

63. *In short, it means that if no prima facie case regarding the commission of any offence is made out, it would amount to a charge being groundless.*

64. *In Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 SC 545, this Court has stated about the ambit of section 251(A)(2) of the CrPC, 1973 1898, which is in pari materia with the wordings used in section 239 of the CrPC, 1973 as follows:-*

"It cannot be said that the Court at the stage of framing the charge has not to apply its judicial mind for considering whether or not there is a ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. The order framing the charges does substantially affect the person's liberty and it cannot be said that the Court must automatically frame the charge merely because the prosecuting authorities by relying on the documents referred to in S. 173 consider it proper to institute the case. The responsibility of framing the charges is that of the Court and it has to judicially consider the question of doing so. Without fully advertent to the material on the record it must not blindly adopt the decision of the prosecution.

In para 15, this Court has stated as under sub-sec. (2), if upon consideration of all the documents referred to in S. 173, Criminal PC and examining the accused, if considered necessary by the Magistrate and also after hearing both sides, the Magistrate considers the charge to be groundless, he must discharge the accused. This sub-section has to be read along with sub- sec. (3), according to which, if after hearing the arguments and hearing the accused, the Magistrate thinks that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under Chap. XXI of the Code within the Magistrate's competence and for which he can punish adequately, he has to frame in writing a charge against the accused. Reading the two sub-sections together, it clearly means that if there is no ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the charges must be considered to be groundless, which is the same thing as saying that there is no ground for framing the charges.

65. Thus the word groundless, as interpreted by this Court, means that there is no ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence.

66. This Court has again dealt with this aspect of the matter in *Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja*, AIR 1980 SC 52. This Court has stated in the said case as:-

"At this stage, even a very strong suspicion found upon materials before the Magistrate, which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged, may justify the framing of charges against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence."

67. The suspicion referred to by this Court must be founded upon the materials placed before the Magistrate which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged. Therefore, the words a very strong suspicion used by this Court must not be a strong suspicion of a vacillating mind of a Judge. That suspicion must be founded upon the materials placed before the Magistrate which leads him to form a presumptive opinion about the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged.

68. Section 239 has to be read along with section 240 of the CrPC, 1973. if the Magistrate finds that there is prima facie evidence or the material against the accused in support of the charger (allegations), he may frame charge in accordance with section 240 of the CrPC, 1973. But if he finds that the charge (the allegations or imputations) made against the accused does not make out a prima facie case and does not furnish basis for framing charge, it will be a case of charge being groundless, so he has no option but to discharge the accused. Where the Magistrate finds that taking cognizance of the offence itself was contrary to any provision of law, like section 468 of the CrPC, 1973 the complaint being barred by limitation, so he cannot frame the charge, he has to discharge the accused. Indeed, in a case where the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence without taking note of section 468 of the CrPC, 1973 the most appropriate stage at which the accused can plead for his discharge is the stage of framing the charge. He need not wait completion of trial. The Magistrate will

be committing no illegality in considering that question and discharging the accused at the stage of framing charge if the facts so justify.

69. The real test for determining whether the charge should be considered groundless under section 239 of the CrPC, 1973 is that whether the materials are such that even if unrebutted make out no case whatsoever, the accused should be discharged under section 239 of the CrPC, 1973. The trial court will have to consider, whether the materials relied upon by the prosecution against the applicant herein for the purpose of framing of the charge, if unrebutted make out any case at all.

70. The provisions of discharge under section 239 of the CrPC, 1973 fell for consideration of this Court in K. Ramakrishna and others v. State of Bihar and another, (2000) 8 SCC 547, and it was held that the questions regarding the sufficiency or reliability of the evidence to proceed further are not required to be considered by the trial court under Section 239 and the High Court under Section 482 It was observed as follows:-

“4. The trial court under Section 239 and the High Court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is not called upon to embark upon an inquiry as to whether evidence in question is reliable or not or evidence relied upon is sufficient to proceed further or not. However, if upon the admitted facts and the documents relied upon by the complainant or the prosecution and without weighing or sifting of evidence, no case is made out, the criminal proceedings instituted against the accused are required to be dropped or quashed. As observed by this Court in Rajesh Bajaj v State NCT of Delhi, 1999 (3) SCC 259 the High Court or the Magistrate are also not supposed to adopt a strict hypertechnical approach to sieve the complaint through a colander of finest gauzes for testing the ingredients of offence with which the accused is charge. Such an endeavour may be justified during trial but not during the initial stage.”

71. In the case of State by Karnataka Lokayukta, Police Station, Bengaluru v. MR. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515, this Court observed and held in paragraph 25 as under-

“25. The High Court ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of section 239 CrPC, 1973. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of TN. v. N. Suresh Rajan State of TN. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709, advertent to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held: (SCC pp. 721-22, para 29)

29. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge: though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.”

72. The ambit and scope of exercise of power under sections 239 and 240 of the CrPC, 1973 are therefore fairly well settled. The obligation to discharge the accused under Section 239 arises when the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be "groundless". The Section mandates that the Magistrate shall discharge the accused recording reasons, if after (i) considering the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173, (ii) examining the accused, if necessary, and (iii) giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, he considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, ie, either there is no legal evidence or that the facts are such that no offence is made out at all.

No detailed evaluation of the materials or meticulous consideration of the possible defences need be undertaken at this stage nor any exercise of weighing materials in golden scales is to be undertaken at this stage the only consideration at the stage of Section 239/240 is as to whether the allegation/charge is groundless.

73. This would not be the stage for weighing the pros and cons of all the implications of the materials, nor for sifting the materials placed by the prosecution- the exercise at this stage is to be confined to considering the police report and the documents to decide whether the allegations against the accused can be said to be "groundless".

74. The word "ground" according to the Black's Law Dictionary connotes foundation or basis, and in the context of prosecution in a criminal case, it would be held to mean the basis for charging the accused or foundation for the admissibility of evidence. Seen in the context, the word "groundless" would connote no basis or foundation in evidence. The test which may, therefore, be applied for determining whether the charge should be considered groundless is that where the materials are such that even if un rebutted, would make out no case whatsoever."

7. Now, this Court would like to examine the impugned order (Annexure P-1) in the light of the aforesaid pronouncements. Adverting to the facts of the case, it transpires that the learned trial Court has considered all the arguments raised by the petitioner and it has been duly recorded in the impugned order that MLR of complainant-Ranjit Singh indicates that he has suffered a grievous injury. The petitioner cannot be discharged only on the ground of delay and all the contentions raised by the petitioner are matter of evidence which can only be adjudicated by the trial Court after going through the evidence produced by both the parties. A careful perusal of the impugned order and the statements of complainant-Ranjit Singh and of his son Harkirat Singh along with the medical report dated 09.11.2020 would indicate that the learned trial Court has considered all the aspects in the right earnest and passed a well

reasoned order in the light of the settled law discussed hereinabove. No ground is made out for interference by this Court.

CONCLUSION:

8. Resultantly, the present petition is dismissed. However, keeping in view that the petitioner is a cancer patient and he is undergoing treatment from Tata Memorial Hospital, Mumbai his personal appearance before the learned trial Court is exempted in terms of the law laid down by this Court in *Suresh Kumar and another Vs. The State of Haryana and another 2023 (2) Law Herald 1498* subject to the following conditions:-

- i) Petitioner shall be represented through his counsel;
- ii) shall not delay/stall the trial proceedings;
- iii) shall not dispute his identity as accused;
- iv) shall have no objection if the prosecution evidence is recorded in his absence but in the presence of his counsel;
- v) shall appear before the trial Court as and when required; and
- vi) any other condition which the trial Court may impose.

21.11.2023
yogesh

(HARPREET SINGH BRAR)
JUDGE

Whether reasoned / speaking? Yes / No
Whether reportable? Yes / No