



CWP-29245-2024

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**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH**

CWP-29245-2024**Date of Decision: 28.10.2024****SURJIT SINGH**

..... Petitioner

*Versus***STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS**

..... Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAGMOHAN BANSAL

Present : Mr. Gurinder Singh Lalli, Advocate
for the petitioner.

Mr. Aman Dhir, DAG, Punjab.

JAGMOHAN BANSAL, J. (Oral)

1. The petitioner through instant petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is seeking setting aside of order dated 19.06.2013 (Annexure P-1) and order dated 16.09.2019 (Annexure P-2) whereby petitioner was dismissed from service.

2. The petitioner is claiming that impugned orders may be modified to the extent that punishment of dismissal of service may be converted into compulsory retirement considering his length of service. He claims that he had worked for 21 years with respondent, thus, he was entitled to pension and other pensionary benefits. The respondents while passing impugned orders have not considered his length of service.

3. On being confronted with the fact that the impugned order was passed on 16.09.2019 and appeal itself was filed beyond prescribed period before Appellate Authority, Mr. Gurinder Singh Lalli, Advocate



submits that petitioner could not avail remedy within reasonable period on account of COVID-19 and is praying for pensionary benefits.

In ***Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Dugal Kumar (2008) 14 SCC 295***, supreme court has considered scope of interference in case of delay and laches. Court has held:

“24. As to delay and laches on the part of the writ petitioner, there is substance in the argument of learned counsel for the appellant Company. It is well settled that under Article 226 of the Constitution, the power of a High Court to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction is discretionary. One of the grounds to refuse relief by a writ court is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. It is imperative, where the petitioner invokes extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, that he should come to the court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ is indeed an adequate ground for refusing to exercise discretion in favour of the applicant.”

In ***Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi (1969) 1 SCC 110*** and ***Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 84***, Supreme Court has ruled that even in cases of violation or infringement of fundamental rights, a writ court may take into account delay and laches on the part of the petitioner in approaching the court and if there is gross or unexplained delay, the court may refuse to grant relief in favour of such petitioner.

In ***Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board V. T.T. Murali Babu (2014) 4 SCC 108***, Supreme Court has ruled:

‘16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to



weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant—a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, ‘procrastination is the greatest thief of time’ and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.’

In ***Union of India v. N. Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25***, court has observed that a neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires must stand in his way for getting the relief or remedy. The Court laid down two essential factors i.e. first, the length of the delay and second, the developments during the intervening period. Delay in availing the remedy would amount to waiver of such right. Relevant extracts of the judgment read as:

“20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence



are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create non-consideration of condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the court than of a strict application of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court.

21. The word “laches” is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness”. It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy.

22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.”



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5. In the absence of any plausible reason, this Court finds that present petition suffers from delay and laches, thus, cannot be entertained.

6. It is made clear that petitioner was dismissed from service and cannot be deprived from benefits which are available to a dismissed employee. The respondent shall release service benefits, if any, are due and not released.

7. Disposed of in above terms.

(JAGMOHAN BANSAL)
JUDGE

28.10.2024
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Whether speaking/reasoned	Yes/No
<i>Whether Reportable</i>	<i>Yes/No</i>