

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH

Date of decision: 20.11.2024

1. CWP No.13169 of 2024

Puneet Mittal
.....Petitioner
Versus
State of Haryana and another
.....Respondents

2. CWP No.13288 of 2024

Puneet Mittal
.....Petitioner
Versus
State of Haryana and another
.....Respondents

3. CWP No.13292 of 2024

Puneet Mittal
.....Petitioner
Versus
State of Haryana and another
.....Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAMIT KUMAR

Present: Mr. Sumeet Mahajan, Sr. Advocate
with Mr. Saksham Mahajan, Advocate
Mr. Shrey Sachdeva, Advocate
and Ms. Shruti Singla, Advocate
for the petitioner (in all the writ petitions)

Mr. Saurabh Mohunta, DAG, Haryana.
(in all the writ petitions)

NAMIT KUMAR J.

1. This judgment shall dispose of CWP Nos.13169, 13288 and
13292 of 2024, as common questions of law and facts are involved

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therein for adjudication. For the sake of convenience, facts are taken from CWP No.13169 of 2024, titled as “Puneet Mittal vs State of Haryana and another”.

2. The writ petition i.e. CWP No.13169 of 2024, has been filed by the petitioner under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of certiorari, quashing the show cause notices dated 13.03.2024 (Annexure P-8), dated 29.04.2024 (Annexure P-9), dated 06.12.2023 (Annexure P-17), dated 25.01.2022 (Annexure P-19) and dated 03.03.2022 (Annexure P-22), issued by respondent No.2 to the petitioner. Further a writ of mandamus has been sought for directing the respondent – State not to initiate any disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner for the following works (i) construction of building of Govt. College for Women at Ambala City in Ambala District, (ii) construction of Administrative Block, Phase 3 in the campus of Mini Secretariat, Ambala Cantt. and (iii) construction of residential accommodation for doctor/paramedical staff in Civil Hospital, Ambala Cantt.

3. The undisputed facts of the case are that the petitioner was recruited as Assistant Engineer (Civil) AT PSD-II Kurukshetra vide order dated 21.02.2014 and he was posted as Sub-Divisional Engineer in Ambala Circle, PWD (B&R) Department, Haryana, in the year 2016 and was promoted on 30.10.2021 to the post of Executive Engineer and was thereafter transferred to Kurukshetra. In the Ambala Circle, one Sukhbir Singh was posted as Superintending Engineer in the month of

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August, 2021 and he initiated action against the contractor namely M/s. Garg and Company and against the petitioner and many other officers posted in supervision of project being executed by the said contractor and there being animosity between the Superintending Engineer and the contractor due to some extraneous reasons and in order to squeeze the said contractor, the said Superintending Engineer started preparing reports without any evidence and justification against him and various government officials, who were Incharge at the site on various constructions work in order to give false impression that the contractor is hand in glove with various SDEs, Executive Engineer and Junior Engineers, to release payments to him against bills for which the material has not been utilized. The said contractor filed CWP No.6347 of 2022, titled as “M/s. Garg and Company vs State of Haryana and others” before this Court. In the said writ petition, Sukhbir Singh, Superintending Engineer, PWD (B&R), Haryana, was also impleaded as respondent No.5 and in the said petition, on 11.07.2022, the following order was passed:-

“Learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State of Haryana as well as the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners pray for further time as the endeavour for amicable resolution of the dispute is still in progress.

At this stage, Mr. Narula, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent-Sukhbir Singh, Superintending Engineer, PWD, Haryana submits that he has filed reply to the allegations made by the petitioners. He further submits

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that here is a case where the petitioner is guilty of having committed several frauds with the authorities.

At this stage, it is to be noted that this Court had dealt with several petitions filed by the petitioners and some of which have been referred for arbitration with the consent of the parties. We may point out that similar allegations were made against respondent-Sukhbir Singh, S.E. even in those petitions. And as shall be significant to observe, Mr. Anurag Rastogi, IAS, Additional Chief Secretary, Public Works Department, Haryana had appeared in Court on 27.04.2022 and had stated that the parties would conjointly discuss the matter and resolve the dispute amicably. Those proceedings are still pending. But respondent-Sukhbir Singh, Superintending Engineer, Ambala Circle, Public Works Department, B&R, District Ambala, who too was present in Court on 27.04.2022 and was conscious of the assurance given by the Additional Chief Secretary, still interjected and passed orders against the petitioners. Evidently the act of the Superintending Engineer, who is subordinate to the Additional Chief Secretary of the Public Works Department, is in contravention to the statement made by the Additional Chief Secretary before this Court as also the order passed on 27.04.2022.

Not just that, even though the Court had not yet issued any notice in the matter, and without any authorization from the State Government, the officer on his own, and contrary to the stand taken by the Additional Chief Secretary before this Court, has even filed the written statement.

When confronted with the aforesaid aspects, learned counsel appearing for respondent-Sukhbir Singh,

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Superintending Engineer, prays for and is permitted to withdraw the reply/response filed by him before this Court. He further undertakes that respondent No.5-Sukhbir Singh would not interfere in the matter. Taking note of the above, respondent-Sukhbir Singh, Superintending Engineer, is permitted to withdraw the reply/response filed by him.

List again on 13.09.2022.

A copy of this order be placed in the connected files.”

Thereafter, on the adjourned date i.e. 13.09.2022, the following order was passed:-

“Learned Senior Additional Advocate General, Haryana, on instructions from the Additional Chief Secretary, PWD (B&R), submits that in view of the statement, made before this Court, the authorities do not propose to take any action on the orders and recommendations of Sukhbir Singh, Superintending Engineer-respondent No.7. He further submits that in terms of the undertaking given before this Court, the parties are on the verge of resolving the disputes, most of which have since been settled and there is every likelihood that the entire dispute would be resolved by 15.11.2022.

Learned Senior counsel entering appearance on behalf of the contempner prays for and is granted time to file an affidavit.

Sukhbir Singh, Superintending Engineer-Respondent No.7, is directed to remain present in Court, on the next date of hearing.

Adjourned to 07.12.2022.

A photocopy of this order be placed on the files of other connected cases.”

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4. The grievance of the petitioner is that despite the undertaking given in the said writ petition, the petitioner has been issued show cause notices dated 13.03.2024 (Annexure P-8), dated 29.04.2024 (Annexure P-9), dated 06.12.2023 (Annexure P-17), dated 25.01.2022 (Annexure P-19) and dated 03.03.2022 (Annexure P-22), by respondent No.2, whereby explanation of the petitioner has been sought.

5. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned show cause notices dated 13.03.2024 (Annexure P-8), dated 29.04.2024 (Annexure P-9), dated 06.12.2023 (Annexure P-17), dated 25.01.2022 (Annexure P-19) and dated 03.03.2022 (Annexure P-22), have been issued to the petitioner without any justification and are against the undertaking given before this Court in CWP No.6347 of 2022. He further submits that the same have been issued with mala fide intention of Sh. Sukhbir Singh, the then Superintending Engineer and, therefore, the same are liable to be set-aside.

6. Per contra, learned State counsel has opposed the claim of the petitioner and submits that the instant petition, challenging show cause notices dated 13.03.2024 (Annexure P-8), dated 29.04.2024 (Annexure P-9), dated 06.12.2023 (Annexure P-17), dated 25.01.2022 (Annexure P-19) and dated 03.03.2022 (Annexure P-22), seeking explanation of the petitioner is not maintainable as no adverse order(s) have been passed against the petitioner. He further submits that although allegations have been levelled against the then Superintending Engineer

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Sukhbir Singh, however, he has not been impleaded as party respondent in the present petition.

7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

8. The only question which arises for consideration in the present petition is as to whether the show cause notices dated 13.03.2024 (Annexure P-8), dated 29.04.2024 (Annexure P-9), dated 06.12.2023 (Annexure P-17) dated 25.01.2022 (Annexure P-19) and dated 03.03.2022 (Annexure P-22) whereby explanation of the petitioner has been sought can be challenged in the present petition or not.

The said issue is not res integra as it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and by this Court in various judgments that the scope of interference by this Court in the cases i.e. challenging show cause notices is very limited. Firstly, if the show cause notice has been issued by the incompetent authority, other than the disciplinary authority and secondly, if it is issued due to mala fide intention of the authority concerned. The present show cause notices have not been challenged on these two grounds as it is not the case of the petitioners that the show cause notices have been issued by the incompetent authority or due to mala fide intention of the issuing authority. Moreover, writ does not lie against a charge-sheet or show-cause notice as it does not give any rise to the cause of action. Unless some adverse order is passed in pursuance to the said show cause notice/charge-sheet, employee has no right to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court or the Civil Court to impugn

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the same. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***Transport Commissioner, Madras Vs. Thiru A. Radha Krishna Moorthy : 1995(1) S.C.T. 728*** has held that the truth and correctness of the charges cannot be gone into by the Court, more particularly at a stage prior to conclusion of disciplinary inquiry as even after imposition of punishment, the Court has no jurisdiction to go into the truth of allegations/charges except in a case where they are based on no evidence. The Court can only examine the procedural correctness of the decision making process. The relevant portion from the said judgment reads as under:-

“7. So far as the truth and correctness of the charges is concerned, it was not a matter for the Tribunal to go into- more particularly at a stage prior to the conclusion of the disciplinary enquiry. As pointed out by this Court repeatedly, even when the matter comes to the Tribunal after the imposition of punishment, it has no jurisdiction to go into truth of the allegations/charges except in a case where they are based on no evidence i.e., where they are perverse. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is akin to that of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is power of judicial review. It only examines the procedural correctness of the decision-making-process. For this reason the order of the Tribunal insofar as it goes into or discusses the truth and correctness of the charges, is unsustainable in law.”

9. Further, in ***Union of India Vs. Upendra Singh : 1994(2) S.C.T. 771***, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under :-

“4. When the matter went back to the Tribunal, it went into the correctness of the charges on the basis of the

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*material produced by the respondent and quashed the charges holding that the charges do not indicate any corrupt motive or any culpability on the part of the respondent. We must say, we are not a little surprised at the course adopted by the Tribunal. In its order dated September 10, 1992 this Court specifically drew attention to the observations in A.N. Saxena that the Tribunal ought not to interfere at an interlocutory stage and yet the Tribunal chose to interfere on the basis of the material which was yet to be produced at the inquiry. In short, the Tribunal undertook the inquiry which ought to be held by the disciplinary authority (or the inquiry officer appointed by him) and found that the charges are not true. It may be recalled that the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal is akin to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, the principles, norms and the constraints which apply to the said jurisdiction apply equally to the Tribunal. If the original application of the respondent were to be filed in the High Court it would have been termed, properly speaking, as a writ of prohibition. A writ of prohibition is issued only when patent lack of jurisdiction is made out. It is true that a High Court acting under Article 226 is not bound by the technical rules applying to the issuance of prerogative writs like certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in United Kingdom, yet the basic principles and norms applying to the said writs must be kept in view, as observed by this Court in **T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and another, AIR 1954 Supreme Court 440**. It was observed by Mukherjea, J. speaking for the Constitution Bench :*

"The language used in Articles 32 and 226 of our Constitution is very wide and the powers of the Supreme Court as well as of all the High Courts in India extend to issuing of orders, writs or directions including writs in the nature of 'habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warrant, prohibition and certiorari' as may be considered necessary for enforcement of the fundamental rights and in the case of the High Courts, for other purposes as well. In view of the

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*express provisions in our Constitution we need not now look back to the early history or the procedural technicalities of these writs in English law, nor feel oppressed by any difference or change of opinion expressed in particular cases by English Judges. We can make an order or issue a writ in the nature of ,certiorari' in all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner, **so long as we keep to the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of granting such writs in English law.**"*

5. The said statement of law was expressly affirmed by a Seven-Judge Bench in **Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1621 at 1625**. The reason for this dictum is self evident. If we do not keep to the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of granting such writs in English law, the exercise of jurisdiction becomes rudderless and unguided, it tends to become arbitrary and capricious. There will be no uniformity of approach and there will be the danger of the jurisdiction becoming personalized. The parameters of jurisdiction would vary from Judge to Judge and from Court to Court. (Some say, this has already happened.) Law does advance. Jurisprudence does undoubtedly develop with the passage of time, but not by forgetting the fundamentals. You have to build upon the existing foundations and not by abandoning them. It leads to confusion; it does not assist in coherence in thought or action.

6. **In the case of charges framed in a disciplinary inquiry the tribunal or court can interfere only if on the charges framed (read with imputation or particulars of the charges, if any) no misconduct or other irregularity alleged can be said to have been made out or the charges framed are contrary to any law. At this stage, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the correctness or truth of the charges. The tribunal cannot take over the functions of the disciplinary authority. The truth or otherwise of the**

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charges is a matter for the disciplinary authority to go into. Indeed, even after the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, if the matter comes to court or tribunal, they have no jurisdiction to look into the truth of the charges or into the correctness of the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority as the case may be. The function of the court/tribunal is one of judicial review, the parameters of which are repeatedly laid down by this Court. It would be sufficient to quote the decision in H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karnal and other v. M/s Gopi Nath & Sons and other, (1992 Supp. (2) SCC 312). The Bench comprising M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) and A.M. Ahmadi, J., affirmed the principle thus :

"Judicial review, it is trite, is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision-making process. Judicial review cannot extend to the examination of the correctness or reasonableness of a decision as a matter of fact. The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority after according fair treatment reaches, on a matter which it is authorized by law to decide, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It will be erroneous to think that the Court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of the decision making process but also on the correctness of the decision itself."

7. Now, if a court cannot interfere with the truth or correctness of the charges even in a proceeding against the final order, it is un-understandable how can that be done by the tribunal at the stage of framing of charges? In this case, the Tribunal has held that the charges are not sustainable (the finding that no culpability is alleged and no corrupt motive attributed), not on the basis of the articles of charges and the statement of imputations but

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mainly on the basis of the material produced by the respondent before it, as we shall presently indicate.”

10. The abovesaid judgments have been followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ***State of Orissa and Another Vs. Sangam Keshari Misra and another : 2010(4) S.C.T. 591***, wherein it has been held as under:-

“9. The learned counsel for first respondent would further argue that the charge memorandum ought to have been quashed not only on a technical ground but even on merits without reserving any liberty to the State Government to proceed in accordance with law. He submitted that the following circumstances would make it clear that the said charge memorandum was mala fide and issued with ulterior motive to affect his career as a senior IAS officer: (a) The copy of the High Court order could be obtained by applying for a certified copy, and there was no need for any one, much less for him, to impersonate any one else to get a certified copy, (b) It is difficult to believe that an officer of a rank of Special Secretary would personally go to the office of an Additional Govt. Advocate just to receive a certified copy; (c) The first respondent was in no way concerned with either Misc. Case No. 238 of 2001 or Misc. Case No.236/2001 on the file of the High Court and he had nothing to do with the order dated 17.1.2002 therein. Receiving a free copy of the said order would not in any way benefit him or adversely affect anyone else; (d) The charge against him is so absurd and preposterous that it is liable to be rejected outright, and (e) The background facts would disclose the hand of one P.K. Nayak, IAS, who is inimically disposed towards the first respondent. Though

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there appears to be some merit in the said contentions of the first respondent, it is unnecessary to examine the correctness of these contentions as normally a charge sheet is not quashed prior to the conducting of the enquiry on the ground that the facts stated in the charge are erroneous. It is well settled that the correctness or truth of the charge is the function of the disciplinary authority. (vide Union of India vs. Upendra Singh, 1994(2) S.C.T. 771 : 1994(3) SCC page 357). Therefore we reject the contention that the charge to have been quashed without reserving to the State to proceed in accordance with law.”

11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in *The Special Director and another Vs. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and another : 2004(1) S.C.T. 671* has held that ordinarily no writ lies against the show-cause notice and the writ petition cannot be entertained as a matter of routine. The relevant portion from the said judgment is as under: -

“5. This Court in a large number of cases has deprecated the practice of the High Courts entertaining writ petitions questioning legality of the show causes notices stalling enquiries as proposed and retarding investigative process to find actual facts with the participation and in the presence of the parties. Unless, the High Court is satisfied that the show cause notice was totally non est in the eye of law for absolute want of jurisdiction of the authority to even investigate into facts, writ petitions should not be entertained for the mere asking and as a matter of routine, and the writ petitioner should invariably be directed to respond to the show cause notice and take all stands highlighted in the writ petition. Whether the show

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cause notice was founded on any legal premises is a jurisdictional issue which can even be urged by the recipient of the notice and such issues also can be adjudicated by the authority issuing the very notice initially, before the aggrieved could approach the Court. Further, when the Court passes an interim order it should be careful to see that the statutory functionaries specially and specifically constituted for the purpose are not denuded of powers and authority to initially decide the matter and ensure that ultimate relief which may or may not be finally granted in the writ petition is accorded to the writ petitioner even at the threshold by the interim protection, granted.”

12. To the same effect is the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ***Union of India and another Vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana : 2007(1) S.C.T. 452***, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: -

*“12. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge sheet or show-cause notice vide **Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramdesh Kumar Singh and others, JT 1995(8) SC 331, Special Director and another v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and another, 2004(1) SCT 671 (SC) : AIR 2004 Supreme Court 1467, Ulagappa and others v. Divisional Commissioner, Mysore and others, 2001(10) SCC 639, State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma and another, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 943 etc.***

13. *The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be*

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held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of any one. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance.

14. *Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge sheet.*

15. *No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter.”*

13. A Division Bench of this Court while examining the same issue in ***Ved Pal Gupta Vs. Punjab and Haryana High Court, Chandigarh : 2014(2) S.C.T. 793*** has held as under: -

“15. In Secretary, Ministry of Defence and others v. Prabhask Chandra Mirdha, 2012 (4) RSJ 484, it has been laid down by the Supreme Court that ordinarily a writ

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application does not lie against a charge sheet or show cause notice for the reason that it does not give rise to any cause of action. It does not amount to an adverse order which affects the right of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction/competence to do so. A writ lies when some right of a party is infringed. In fact, charge sheet does not infringe the right of a party. It is only when a final order imposing the punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, it may have a grievance and cause of action. Thus, a charge sheet or show cause notice in disciplinary proceedings should not ordinarily be quashed by the Court. It was further held that normally a charge sheet is not quashed prior to the conclusion of the inquiry on the ground that the facts stated in the charge sheet are erroneous for the reason that correctness or truth of the charge is the function of the disciplinary authority. It was also held that neither the disciplinary proceedings nor the charge sheet should be quashed at an initial stage as it would be a premature stage to deal with the issues. The position prevailing at present in the department inquiry is that a sitting Judge of the High Court on the Administrative side is seized of the inquiry and proceedings are going on. Evidence is being recorded. The petitioner would have every right to submit his point of view in accordance with law before the inquiry officer. Therefore, at this stage, it would be wholly inappropriate to interfere in the inquiry that is going on at an intermediary stage and nullifying or in any case keep in abeyance the proceedings that are going on. At this stage it would in fact even be inappropriate to comment one way or the other on the charges that have been levelled and the reply that has been filed by the petitioner to the same. This

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is solely domain of the Inquiry Officer who is seized of the matter.


16. *The learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has, however, referred to the case **State of Punjab v. V. K. Khanna, 2001(1) S.C.T. 933 : AIR 2001 Supreme Court 343**. In the said case the learned Senior counsel has laid emphasis on the aspect wherein it has been held that while it is true that justifiability of charges at the stage of initiating a disciplinary proceedings cannot possibly be delved into by any Court pending inquiry but it is equally well settled that in the event there is an element of malice or mala fide motive involved in the matter of issue of a charge sheet or the concerned authority is so biased that the inquiry would be a mere farcical show and the conclusions are well known then and in that event law courts are otherwise justified in interfering at the earliest stage so as to avoid the harassment and humiliation of a public official. It is not a question of shielding any misdeed that the Court would be anxious, it is the due process of law which should permeate in the society and in the event of there being any affectation of such process of law that law courts ought to rise up to the occasion. There is no dispute to said proposition, however, the same would more appropriately apply in case there is a charge of mala fide. In the present case though it has been alleged that the issuance of charge sheet and subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are completely mala fide, baseless and against the record, however, the allegations of mala fide have been made in a vague manner. In **State of Punjab v. Chamal Lal Goyal, 1995(2) S.C.T. 343 : JT 1995 (2) SC 18** with respect to the charge of mala fide, it was observed that the said charge was made in a vague manner. It was*

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not specified which officer was ill-disposed towards the respondent (delinquent official in the said case) and in what manner did he manage to see that the charges are served upon him when his case was to come up for consideration for promotion. It was held that in the absence of any clear allegation against any particular official and in the absence of impleading such person eo nomine so as to enable him to answer the charge against him, the charge of mala fide cannot be sustained. The ratio of the said judgment applies in the present case and in the absence of specific allegations of mala fide, the averment is unfounded and would not warrant any consideration.”

14. Now adverting to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the petitioner has not even filed any reply to any of the show cause notice. Although, allegations of mala fide have been levelled against Sh. Sukhbir Singh, the then Superintending Engineer but he has not been impleaded as party respondent. Another argument has been raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that if the proceedings in pursuance to the show cause notices are allowed to be proceeded further, then the respondents are likely to pass the order of punishment against the petitioner. The said argument is pre-emptive and cannot be accepted at this stage. In any case, even if, any order of punishment is ultimately passed by the respondents against the petitioner, after holding a regular departmental enquiry, the same can always be challenged by the affected employee in accordance with law. In all the writ petitions, the petitioner has approached this Court at the very initial stage of issuance of show cause notice. As of date, no punishment order has been passed



against the petitioner and, therefore, no cause has arisen to the petitioner to invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court.

15. In view of the above, no case to quash the show cause notices dated 13.03.2024 (Annexure P-8), dated 29.04.2024 (Annexure P-9), dated 06.12.2023 (Annexure P-17) dated 25.01.2022 (Annexure P-19) and dated 03.03.2022 (Annexure P-22), is made out. However, it is made clear that the petitioner shall be at liberty to take all the pleas which have been taken in the present petition(s) at an appropriate stage.

16. Consequently, all the petitions are dismissed being premature.

17. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, are also disposed of.

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(NAMIT KUMAR)
JUDGE

Whether speaking/reasoned:	Yes/No
Whether reportable:	Yes/No