



the registration of the FIR (supra) is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Even the perusal of the FIR (supra) clearly indicates that no specific date, time or place is mentioned regarding the demand of dowry. Further no cause of action has arisen at Mahendergarh. Admittedly, the marriage was solemnized in Gurgaon and both petitioner and respondent No.2 are residing in Gurgaon. Even report under Section 202 Cr.P.C. was not called from jurisdictional police authorities by learned jurisdictional Magistrate and straight away the registration of the FIR was ordered. The complainant had withdrawn her allegations against the brother-in-law and on this ground alone, the FIR is liable to be quashed as the same set of allegations are levelled against the petitioner and even during investigation, the veracity of the allegations made by complainant/respondent No.2 were found to be false as mother of the petitioner was declared innocent.

3. Notice of motion.

4. Ms. Geeta Sharma, DAG, Haryana and Mr. Vikas Bhardwaj, AAG, Haryana, present in the Court, accept notice on behalf of respondent No.1-State and submit that these are all disputed question of facts as investigating agency has already concluded the investigation and filed the final report and even the learned trial Court has framed the charges against the petitioner and all the disputed questions of facts can only be decided by learned trial Court on the basis of evidence adduced before it and the probable defence of the petitioner, set up in the present petition, can only be appreciated during the course of trial.

5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the record of the case, this Court finds no merit in the present petition as the disputed question of facts can be determined only on the basis of the evidence



led by the parties. The probable defence set up by the petitioner in the present petition cannot be appreciated at this stage.

6. A Two Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in '**HMT Watches Limited vs M.A. Abida**' (2015) 11 SCC 776 has held that inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be extended for determining question of facts. It is only for the trial Court to determine the disputed questions of fact after examining the evidence on record and interference by this Court with regards to factual questions is impermissible in law.

7. Recently, in '**Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra**' AIR 2021 SC 1918, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the guiding principles to quash proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C and held as follow-:

“80. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or "no coercive steps to be adopted", during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C , 1973 and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or "no coercive steps to be adopted" during the investigation or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., 1973 while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under:

- i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence;*
- ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;*
- iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on;*
- iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the `rarest of rare*



cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty).

v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;

vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;

vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule;

viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere;

ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;

x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;

xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;

xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;

xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;

xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by



this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint;

xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR;

xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or "no coercive steps to be adopted" and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C., 1973 before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or "no coercive steps" either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., 1973 while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what



was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order.

xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of "no coercive steps to be adopted" within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by "no coercive steps to be adopted" as the term "no coercive steps to be adopted" can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied."

8. Therefore, in light of the above discussion, this Court cannot delve into disputed question of facts and examine the probable defence taken by the petitioner in the present petition while invoking the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

9. The present petition is dismissed accordingly. However, nothing observed hereinabove shall be construed as expression of opinion of this Court on merits of the case and the trial Court shall proceed without being prejudiced by observations of this Court.

10. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, are also disposed of accordingly.

May 22, 2024
manisha

(HARPREET SINGH BRAR)
JUDGE

(i)	Whether speaking/reasoned	Yes/No
(ii)	Whether reportable	Yes/No