

CRM-M-19661-2024

2024:PHHC:058109

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH

221

CRM-M-19661-2024

Date of Decision : April 29, 2024

GAGAN @ GAGAN SHOOTER

.....Petitioner

VERSUS

STATE OF PUNJAB

.....Respondent

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KULDEEP TIWARI

Present : Mr. K.S.Sidhu, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Raghav Garg, AAG, Punjab.

KULDEEP TIWARI, J. (Oral)

1. Through the instant petition, the petitioner craves for indulgence of this Court for his being enlarged on regular bail, in case FIR No.112 dated 02.05.2021, under Sections 307, 452, 148 and 149 of IPC and under Sections 25/27/54/59 of Arms Act, registered at Police Station City Ferozepur.

ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE PETITIONER

2. The instant FIR has been registered on the complaint made by one Adarsh Sharma, son of Raman Kumar Sharma, that the petitioner along with other co-accused on 01.05.2021, at about 9:30 PM, armed with pistols, forcibly entered the complainant's house and started firing shots with an intention to kill the complainant. The complainant suffered four gunshot injuries, one hit the left thigh, one shot hit above scrotum, and one shot hit on the back of his right thigh. Thereafter, the petitioner, along with other co-accused fled away from the spot.

SUBMISSIONS OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner, in his asking for the

hereinabove extracted relief, has made the following submissions:-

- (i) That the petitioner was arrested on 8.9.2022 i.e. after about four months of registration of instant FIR;*
- (ii) There is no progress in the trial, as no witness has been examined so far, in fact the charges have also not been framed yet;*
- (iii) The petitioner has undergone incarceration of approximately 1 year, 8 months as on today;*
- (iv) Though the petitioner is involved in two other cases, but out of which, in one case, he is on bail;*
- (v) There is an affidavit dated 15.9.2021 (Annexure P-3) sworn by the complainant/injured, regarding compromise of the instant matter;*
- (vi) The co-accused of the petitioner has already been extended the benefit of regular bail by this Court while relying upon Annexure P-3.*

SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED STATE COUNSEL

4. Per contra, the learned State counsel, who is in receipt of advance notice, has placed on record the custody certificate of the petitioner, as issued by the Additional Superintendent of Central Jail, Ferozepur. Placing heavy reliance upon the criminal antecedents of the petitioner, as revealed in the custody certificate (supra), inasmuch as, his being involved in two other criminal cases, he has opposed the grant of regular bail to the petitioner. He further submits that the petitioner is the main accused, who opened fire upon the victim/complainant.

ANALYSIS

5. “Bail is the Rule and Jail is an Exception”. This basic principle of criminal jurisprudence was laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court, way back in 1978, in its landmark judgment titled “*State of Rajasthan V. Balchand alias Baliay*”, 1977 AIR 2447, 1978 SCR (1) 535. This principle finds its roots in one of the most distinguished fundamental rights, as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Though the underlying objective behind detention of a person is to ensure easy availability of an accused for trial, without any inconvenience, however, in case the presence of an accused can be secured otherwise, then detention is not compulsory.

6. The right to a speedy trial is one of the rights of a detained person. However, while deciding application for regular bail, the Courts shall also take into consideration the fundamental precept of criminal jurisprudence, which is “the presumption of innocence”, besides the gravity of offence(s) involved.

7. In “*Nikesh Tarachand Shah V. Union of India*”, (2018) 11 SCC 1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has recorded the following:-

“14. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 at 586-588, the purpose of granting bail is set out with great felicity as follows:-

“27. It is not necessary to refer to decisions which deal with the right to ordinary bail because that right does not furnish an exact parallel to the right to anticipatory bail. It is, however, interesting that as long back as in 1924 it was held by the High Court of Calcutta in Nagendra v. King-Emperor the object of bail is to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial, that the proper test to be applied in the solution of the question whether bail should be granted or

refused is whether it is probable that the party will appear to take his trial and that it is indisputable that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. In two other cases which, significantly, are the 'Meerut Conspiracy cases' observations are to be found regarding the right to bail which deserve a special mention. In K.N. Joglekar v. Emperor [AIR 1931 All 504 : 33 Cri LJ 94] it was observed, while dealing with Section 498 which corresponds to the present Section 439 of the Code, that it conferred upon the Sessions Judge or the High Court wide powers to grant bail which were not handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding Section 497 which corresponds to the present Section 437. It was observed by the court that there was no hard and fast rule and no inflexible principle governing the exercise of the discretion conferred by Section 498 and that the only principle which was established was that the discretion should be exercised judiciously. In Emperor v. Hutchinson [AIR 1931 All 356, 358 : 32 Cri LJ 1271] it was said that it was very unwise to make an attempt to lay down any particular rules which will bind the High Court, having regard to the fact that the legislature itself left the discretion of the court unfettered. According to the High Court, the variety of cases that may arise from time to time cannot be safely classified and it is dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases and to say that in particular classes a bail may be granted but not in other classes. It was observed that the principle to be deduced from the various sections in the Criminal Procedure Code was that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the

exception. An accused person who enjoys freedom is in a much better position to look after his case and to properly defend himself than if he were in custody. As a presumably innocent person he is therefore entitled to freedom and every opportunity to look after his own case. A presumably innocent person must have his freedom to enable him to establish his innocence.

28. *Coming nearer home, it was observed by Krishna Iyer, J., in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor [(1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115] that: (SCC p. 242, para 1)*

“... the issue of bail is one of liberty, justice, public safety and burden of the public treasury, all of which insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is integral to a socially sensitized judicial process. . . . After all, personal liberty of an accused or convict is fundamental, suffering lawful eclipse only in terms of procedure established by law. The last four words of Article 21 are the life of that human right.”

29. *In Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration) [(1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41] it was observed by Goswami, J., who spoke for the court, that: (SCC p. 129, para 29)*

“There cannot be an inexorable formula in the matter of granting bail. The facts and circumstances of each case will govern the exercise of judicial discretion in granting or cancelling bail.”

30. *In AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (2d, Volume 8, p. 806, para 39), it is stated:*

“Where the granting of bail lies within the discretion of the court, the granting or denial is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular

case. Since the object of the detention or imprisonment of the accused is to secure his appearance and submission to the jurisdiction and the judgment of the court, the primary inquiry is whether a recognizance or bond would effect that end.”

It is thus clear that the question whether to grant bail or not depends for its answer upon a variety of circumstances, the cumulative effect of which must enter into the judicial verdict. Any one single circumstance cannot be treated as of universal validity or as necessarily justifying the grant or refusal of bail.”

8. Also, in ***Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No.2271 of 2010***, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has insisted upon striking a perfect balance of sanctity of an individual’s liberty as well as the interest of the society, in grant or refusing bail. The relevant extract of the judgment (supra) is reproduced hereinafter:-

3. The society has a vital interest in grant or refusal of bail because every criminal offence is the offence against the State. The order granting or refusing bail must reflect perfect balance between the conflicting interests, namely, sanctity of individual liberty and the interest of the society. The law of bails dovetails two conflicting interests namely, on the one hand, the requirements of shielding the society from the hazards of those committing crimes and potentiality of repeating the same crime while on bail and on the other hand absolute adherence of the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence

regarding presumption of innocence of an accused until he is found guilty and the sanctity of individual liberty.

9. This Court has examined the role the present petitioner, though he is stated to be the main accused, however, considering the fact that the matter has been compromised *inter-se* the parties and the co-accused has already been extended the relief of regular bail by this Court vide CRM-M-22825-2023 and the present petitioner has suffered incarceration of 1 year, 7 months and 17 days as on today and the trial is at initial stage and the conclusion of trial would take a long time, this Court deems it fit and appropriate to grant the concession of regular bail to the petitioner. Therefore, without commenting upon the merits and circumstances of the present case, the present petition is **allowed**. The petitioner is ordered to be released on bail on furnishing of bail bond and surety bond to the satisfaction of concerned Chief Judicial Magistrate/trial Court/Duty Magistrate.

10. However, it is clarified that if in future, the petitioner is found indulging in commission of similar offences, as are involved herein, the respondent-State shall be at liberty to make an appropriate application seeking cancellation of regular bail, as granted by this Court. Moreover, anything observed here-in-above shall have no effect on the merits of the trial and is meant for deciding the present petition only.

April 29, 2024
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(KULDEEP TIWARI)
JUDGE

Whether speaking/reasoned. : Yes/No
Whether Reportable. : Yes/No