

CRM-M-57367-2023

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH

CRM-M-57367-2023
Reserved on: 06.12.2023
Pronounced on: 12.12.2023

Jaspal Singh ...Petitioner

Versus

State of Haryana ...Respondent

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP CHITKARA

Present: Mr. Jasbir Dhaliwal, Advocate for the petitioner.

Mr. Rajat Gautam, Addl. AG, Haryana.

ANOOP CHITKARA, J.

FIR No.	Dated	Police Station	Sections
368	19.10.2021	Dabwali Sadar, District Sirsa, Haryana	15 of NDPS Act No. 61 of 1985

1. The petitioner incarcerated for violating the above-mentioned provisions of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) as per the FIR captioned above, on the allegations of jointly possession and transporting 100 kgs of poppy husk in a car, has come up before this Court under Section 439 CrPC seeking bail.
2. In paragraph 12 of the bail petition, the accused declares that he has no criminal antecedents.
3. The petitioner contends that the pre-trial incarceration would cause an irreversible injustice to the petitioner and family.
4. While opposing the bail, the contention on behalf of the State is that the quantity of contraband involved in the case falls in the commercial category.
5. Facts of the case are being taken from reply dated 02.12.2023 filed by the concerned DySP. Prosecution’s case is that on 19.10.2021, when the police officials were on patrolling duty to detect crime and they noticed that one car suddenly stopped and tried to take a U Turn and this raised suspicion and police officials apprehended the persons sitting in car. Then police officials noticed a Suzuki Maruti Car and on rear seat

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of that car was folded, in which five white plastic bags were lying. On the front seat of car, three persons were sitting. The driver told his name as Rajesh Kumar and person sitting in the middle, disclosed his name as Gurpreet Singh and other who was sitting on window side, told his name as Jaspal Singh (present petitioner). On opening the bags, investigator found 20 kg of poppy husk in each bag. Laboratory tested the substance as positive for poppy husk.

6. Possessing and transporting 100 kgs of poppy husk is a punishable offence under NDPS Act in the following terms:

Substance Name	Poppy straw
Quantity detained	100 Kg
Quantity type	Commercial
Drug Quantity in % to upper limit of Intermediate	200.00%

Specified as small & Commercial in S.2(viia) & 2(xxiii) NDPS Act, 1985	
Notification No	S.O.1055(E)
dated	10/19/2001
Sr. No.	110
Common Name (Name of Narcotic Drug and Psychotropic Substance (International non-proprietary name (INN)	Poppy straw
Other non-proprietary name	*****
Chemical Name	*****
Small Quantity	1000 Gram (i.e. equivalent to 1 Kg)
Commercial Quantity	50000 Gram (i.e. equivalent to 50 Kg)

Declared as punishable under NDPS Act and as per schedule defined in S.2(xi) & 2(xxiii) NDPS Act, 1985	
Notification No	S.15 & S.2(xviii) NDPS Act, S.O.821(E)
dated	11/14/1985
Sr. No.	S.2(xviii)
Common Name (Name of Narcotic Drug and Psychotropic Substance (International non-proprietary name (INN)	*****
Other non-proprietary name	*****
Chemical Name	S.2(xviii) “poppy straw” means all parts (except the seeds) of the opium poppy after harvesting whether in their original form or cut, crushed or powdered and whether or not juice has been extracted therefrom; S. 2(viib)] “illicit traffic”, in relation to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, means— (i) cultivating any coca plant or gathering any portion of coca plant;

	(ii) cultivating the opium poppy or any cannabis plant; (iii) engaging in the production, manufacture, possession, sale, purchase, transportation, warehousing, concealment, use or consumption, import inter-State, export inter-State, import into India, export from India or transshipment, of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances; S.2 (xvii) “opium poppy” means— (a) the plant of the species <i>Papaver somniferum</i> L; and (b) the plant of any other species of <i>Papaver</i> from which opium or any phenanthrene alkaloid can be extracted and which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be opium poppy for the purposes of this Act; S2. (xviii) “poppy straw” means all parts (except the seeds) of the opium poppy after harvesting whether in their original form or cut, crushed or powdered and whether or not juice has been extracted therefrom;
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7. Thus, the quantity allegedly involved in this case is commercial. Given this, the rigours of S. 37 of the NDPS Act apply in the present case. The burden is on the petitioner to satisfy the twin conditions put in place by the Legislature under Section 37 of the NDPS Act.

8. Petitioner’s counsel submits that since the petitioner was not a driver of the car, as such he had neither domain nor control over the contents. This argument is meaningless because five bags were lying and it is not a case of the petitioner that he had taken lift on the way and bags were already loaded in the car. Burden is on the petitioner to rise of Section 37 of NDPS Act and there is no averment in the bail petition to dispel the same, as such petitioner is not entitled to on this point.

9. Petitioner seeks bail on legal ground that he is in custody from last 1 ½ years and refers to judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in **Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan vs. The State of West Bengal SLP (Crl.) Nos.5769/2022 decided on 01.08.2022**. In the said judgment, Hon’ble Supreme Court deal with the cough syrup, whereas in the present case, the contraband is poppy husk. Although the quantity in the Nitish’s case (supra), total weight of the substance including cough syrup falls in the commercial quantity but in the present case on entire substance is poppy husk. In **Dheeraj Kumar Shukla v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [SLP (Crl) 6690-2022], decided on 25 Jan 2023**, Hon’ble Supreme Court had granted bail only after completion of 02 years & 06 months of custody, as such petitioner is not entitled for bail on this ground also.

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10. Ld. counsel for the petitioner submits that the investigator conducted search and seizure violating section 50 of the NDPS.

11. Whether the Investigator complied with the mandatory provision of section 50 of the NDPS Act is a question of fact to be adjudicated in the trial. However, before this court treats the compliances as illegal, the prosecution needs an opportunity to prove that they had complied with the mandatory provisions as per law. Such a stage would come only during the trial and certainly not at the bail stage, where it would be hit by the maxim *Audi alteram partem*. The exception to this would be applicable only when the non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of section 50 of the NDPS Act is apparent on the face of the special report under section 57 of the NDPS Act and other documents of search and seizure, and in the opinion of the court, the lapse is non-rectifiable, after recording a finding that it is an incurable defect, the court might consider granting bail on such violations.

12. In State of H.P. v. Prithi Chand, (1996) 2 SCC 37, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds,

[3]. The question is whether the learned Sessions Judge was justified, at the stage of taking cognizance of the offence, in discharging the accused, even before the trial was conducted on merits, on the ground that the provisions of Section 50 of the Act had not been complied with. This Court in State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh [(1994)3 SCC 299] : (AIR 1994 SCW 1802) has considered the provisions of the Act. Section 50 has been held to be mandatory. In paragraph 16, this Court has held that it is obligatory on the part of the empowered or the authorised officer to inform the suspect that, if so required, he would be produced before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate and search would be conducted in his presence. It was imperative on the part of the Officer to inform the person of the above right and if he failed to do the same, it amounted to violation of the requirement of Section 50 of the Act. It was held that when the person was searched he must have been aware of his right and that it could be done only if the authorised or empowered Officer informed him of the same. Accordingly, this Court by implication read the obligation on the part of authorised Officer to inform the person to be searched of his right to information that he could be searched in the presence of the Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate. In Saiyad Mohd. Saiyaad Umar Saiyed v. State of Gujarat [1995(3) JT SC 489] a three-Judge Bench of this Court had reiterated the above view and held that having regard to the grave consequences that might entail the possession of illicit articles under the Act, viz., the shifting of the onus to the accused and the severe punishment to which he became liable, the Legislature had enacted safeguards contained in Section 50. Compliance of the safeguards in Section 50 is mandatory obliging the Officer concerned to inform the person to be searched of his right to demand that search could be conducted in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. The possession of illicit article has to be satisfactorily established before the Court. The Officer who conducts search must state in his evidence that he had informed the accused of his right to demand, while he is searched, in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or

a Magistrate and that the accused had not chosen to so demand. If no evidence to that effect is given, the Court must presume that the person searched was not informed of the protection the law gives him and must find that possession of illicit articles was not established. The presumption under Article 114, illustration (e) of the Evidence Act, that the official duty was properly performed, therefore, does not apply. It is the duty of the Court to carefully scrutinise the evidence and satisfy that the accused had been informed by the concerned Officer that he had a right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate and that the person had not chosen to so demand.

[4]. It is to be seen whether the accused has been afforded such a right and whether the authorised Officer has violated the mandatory requirement, as a question of fact, has to be proved at the trial. In *Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection* [(1974) 1 SCC 345] : (AIR 1974 SC 348) a Constitution Bench of this Court had held that power of search and seizure, is, in any system of jurisprudence, an overriding power of the State for the protection of social security and that power is necessarily regulated by law. A search by itself is not a restriction on the right to hold and enjoy property, though seizure is a temporary restriction to the right of possession and enjoyment of the property seized. However, the seizure will be only temporary and limited for the purpose of the investigation. The power of search and seizure is an accepted norm in our criminal law envisaged in Sections 96 to 103 and 165 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 [for short, "the Code"]. The Evidence Act permits relevancy as the only test of admissibility of evidence. The evidence obtained under an illegal search and seizure does not exclude relevant evidence on that ground. It is wrong to invoke the spirit of Constitution to exclude such evidence. The decisions of the American Supreme Court spelling out certain Constitutional protections in regard to search and seizure are not applicable to exclude the evidence obtained on an illegal search. Courts in India refuse to exclude relevant evidence merely on the ground that it is obtained by illegal search and seizure. When the test of admissibility of evidence lies in relevancy, unless there is an express or necessarily implied prohibition in the Constitution or other law, evidence obtained as a result of illegal search and seizure, is not liable to be shut out. Search and seizure are not a new weapon in the armoury of those whose duty it is to maintain social security in its broadest sense. If the safeguards are generally on the lines adopted by the Code, they would be regarded as adequate and render the restrictions imposed as reasonable measures.

[7]. It would thus be settled law that every deviation from the details of the procedure prescribed for search, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that search by the police renders the recovery of the articles pursuant to the illegal search, irrelevant evidence nor the discovery of the fact inadmissible at the trial. Weight to be attached to such evidence depends on facts and circumstances in each case. The Court is required to scan the evidence with care and to act upon it when it is proved and the Court would hold that the evidence would be relied upon.

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13. The stand that the accused is in custody for sufficient time is also not legal ground to overcome the rigors of S. 37 of the NDPS Act at this stage.
14. The grounds taken in the bail petition do not shift the burden placed by the legislature on the accused under S. 37 of the NDPS Act. The petitioner has not stated anything to discharge the burden put by the stringent conditions placed in the statute by the legislature under section 37 of the NDPS Act. Thus, the petitioner has failed to make a case for bail at this stage.
15. A perusal of the bail petition and the documents attached, prima facie points towards the petitioner's involvement and does not make out a case for bail. Any further discussions are likely to prejudice the petitioner; this court refrains from doing so.
16. Any observation made hereinabove is neither an expression of opinion on the merits of the case nor shall the trial Court advert to these comments.

The petition is dismissed. All pending applications, if any, stand closed. However, considering the petitioner's right to speedy trial coupled with the pre-trial incarceration, this court requests the concerned trial court to make all endeavours to conclude the trial within six months, of which the prosecution evidence be completed preferably within five months and the remaining time to provide an opportunity to the accused to lead defence evidence, if so desired, and to conclude its hearing. To meet the deadline, an endeavour be made to speed up the process for service and to pass the necessary directions in this regard. It is clarified that if expediting this trial disturbs the docket of the concerned court, then a balance be struck, and if, on this account, any delay happens, then an extension can be sought by mentioning such reasons. It is clarified that this order speeding up the trial is subject to the condition that neither the petitioner shall seek any adjournment nor try to use any tactics to delay the trial. If they do so, this order of expediting the trial shall stand automatically recalled by resorting to Section 362, read with Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, without any further reference to this court. If any of the accused is on bail and fails to attend the trial without any sufficient cause, then they be dealt with strictly but in accordance with the law. It is clarified that if the trial is not concluded by the date mentioned above, and if the delay is not attributable to the petitioner, then the petitioner may file an application for bail before the trial court, which shall decide it expeditiously and consider the bail on the grounds of pre-trial custody, and all the previous orders of dismissal passed by the trial court or High Court shall not come in the way.

(ANOOP CHITKARA)
JUDGE

12.12.2023

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Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes

Whether reportable: No.