

136

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH**

**CRM-M-40966-2023
Date of Decision: 21.08.2023**

Kashmir Singh and another

..... Petitioners

Versus

State of Punjab and others

..... Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASGURPREET SINGH PURI

Present: Mr. Bikramjit Singh Baath, Advocate,
for the petitioner.

JASGURPREET SINGH PURI, J. (ORAL)

1. The present petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing of FIR No.136, dated 21.10.2022, under Sections 295, 427 & 34 of the IPC, registered at Police Station Division E, District Police Commissionerate Amritsar along with the consequent proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties.

2. The FIR is sought to be quashed on the basis of compromise by filing of the present petition. A translated copy of the FIR as so annexed along with the present petition as Annexure P-1 is reproduced as under:-

“FIRST INFORMATION REPORT

(Under Section 154 Cr.P.C.)

District: Police Commissionerate Amritsar, P.S.:

Division E, Year: 2022 FIR No.0136, Date and Time of

FIR 21.10.2022 17:10 hrs, u/s: 295/427/34 IPC 1860

Statement of Sukhdev Singh son of Piara

Singh resident of village Haria, Police Station Kathu Nangal, District Amritsar Rural, aged about 47 years, mobile no.99148-54596, Stated that I am resident of abovesaid address and serving as Granthi Singh at village Marari, Police Station Majitha. I came to know that on 20.10.2022 time about 9.00 p.m. Kashmir Singh and his son Jatinder Singh shop no.102/103 ghanta ghar market Sri Darbar Sahib have purchased model of Sri Darbar Sahib from the owner of shop no.171 Satinder Mohan son of Brij Mohan. When Surinder Mohan has approached to Kashmir Singh for getting money of purchased of model of Sri Darbar Sahib, then Kashmir Singh and his son Jatinder Singh have started quarrelling with Satinder Mohan. Kashmir Singh has picked model of Sri Darbar Sahib from the shop and threw on the ground and also gave kicks blows to the model of Sri Darbar Sahib. Kashmir Singh and his son have sacrilege by giving the kicks blow to the model of Sri Darbar Sahib as such the Sikhs sentiments are hurt. Action be taken against them. Sd/- Bhai Sukhdev Singh Haria 9914854596, certified Sd/- Satpal Singh ASI, Police Chowki Galiara, Amritsar, Police Proceedings...”

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the matter has been compromised between the parties after the lodging of the FIR and regarding which a compromise deed has been executed vide Annexure P-2 between both the petitioners, who are the accused in the present case on the one hand and the complainant-respondent No.2 as well as the person with whom quarrel had taken place i.e. respondent No.3 on the other hand. He further submitted that after the investigation in the case and the presentation of challan, a compromise has been effected between the parties on 26.07.2023 and

submitted that once the dispute itself has been settled between the parties and the aggrieved person is also impleaded as a party in the present petition and is also party to the compromise, the FIR is liable to be quashed based upon compromise.

4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners.

5. The present FIR was lodged on the basis of complaint made by one Sukhdev Singh son of Piara Singh by stating that he is serving as Granthi Singh at Village Marari P.S. Majitha. He came to know that on 20.10.2022 at about 9:00 PM, Kashmir Singh (Petitioner No.1) and his son, who is petitioner No.2 having shop No.102/103 Ghanta Ghar Market had purchased a model of Sri Darbar Sahib Amritsar (Golden Temple) from the owner of the shop No.171, namely, Satinder Mohan (Respondent No.3). When respondent No.3 approached the petitioner No.1 for getting money of the purchased model of Sri Darbar Sahib, then both the petitioners started quarrelling with respondent No.3. Thereafter, petitioner No.1 picked the model of Sri Darbar Sahib from the shop and threw it on the ground and gave kick blows to the model of Sri Darbar Sahib and in this way both the petitioners committed the act of sacrilege by giving kick blows to the model of Sri Darbar Sahib and sentiments of Sikhs have been hurt.

6. Before further considering the facts of the present case, it will be essential to consider the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court pertaining to the quashing of the FIR/complaint based upon compromise. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in "*Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab*" 2012(10) SCC 303, has discussed the proposition of law pertaining to quashing of the FIR/complaint based upon compromise under Section 482 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure by exercising inherent powers of the High Court. It was so held that in cases involving serious or heinous offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or the victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. It is only when the offences are private in nature such like commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like disputes or even matters arising out of matrimonial dispute or family disputes, where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature that the High Court can consider quashing of the FIR/complaint based upon compromise if it is of the view that the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. Para 61 of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:-

“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their

dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of

justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

7. Thereafter, in “**Narinder Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab**”, **2014(6) SCC 466**, the Hon’ble Supreme Court discussed the theory of ‘Correctional objective’ and ‘Deterrence philosophy’ in cases pertaining to serious and heinous offences or in it’s nature depicts depravity or lack of morality, the deterrence as purpose of punishment becomes paramount and even if the victim or his relatives have shown the virtue and gentility, agreeing to forgive the culprit, compassion of that private party would not move the Court in accepting the same as larger and more important public policy of showing the iron hand of law to the wrongdoers and to reduce the commission of such offences is more important. Cases of murder, rape or other sexual offences etc. would clearly fall in this category as justice requires long term vision. The other private offences pertaining to financial dispute and matrimonial dispute may have a correctional objective under criminal law but in serious and heinous offences more weightage is to be given to the theory of deterrence. Para 17 of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:-

“17. We would like to expand this principle in some more detail. We find, in practice and in reality, after recording the conviction and while awarding the sentence/punishment the Court is generally governed by

any or all or combination of the aforesaid factors. Sometimes, it is the deterrence theory which prevails in the minds of the Court, particularly in those cases where the crimes committed are heinous in nature or depicts depravity, or lack morality. At times it is to satisfy the element of “emotion” in law and retribution/vengeance becomes the guiding factor. In any case, it cannot be denied that the purpose of punishment by law is deterrence, constrained by considerations of justice. What, then, is the role of mercy, forgiveness and compassion in law? These are by no means comfortable questions and even the answers may not be comforting. There may be certain cases which are too obvious namely cases involving heinous crime with element of criminality against the society and not parties inter-se. In such cases, the deterrence as purpose of punishment becomes paramount and even if the victim or his relatives have shown the virtue and gentility, agreeing to forgive the culprit, compassion of that private party would not move the court in accepting the same as larger and more important public policy of showing the iron hand of law to the wrongdoers, to reduce the commission of such offences, is more important. Cases of murder, rape, or other sexual offences etc. would clearly fall in this category. After all, justice requires long term vision. On the other hand, there may be, offences falling in the category where “correctional” objective of criminal law would have to be given more weightage in contrast with “deterrence” philosophy. Punishment, whatever else may be, must be fair and conducive to good rather than further evil. If in a particular case the Court is of the opinion that the settlement between the parties would lead to more good; better relations between them; would

prevent further occurrence of such encounters between the parties, it may hold settlement to be on a better pedestal. It is a delicate balance between the two conflicting interests which is to be achieved by the Court after examining all these parameters and then deciding as to which course of action it should take in a particular case.”

8. Thereafter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “**State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan and others**”, 2019(2) SCC (Criminal) 706, while considering the earlier judgments as well observed as under:-

“15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:

15.1 that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;

15.2 such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society;

15.3 similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences

committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender;

15.4 offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation.

Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;

15.5 while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.”

9. Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Arun Singh and others Vs. State of U.P.”, 2020(3) SCC 736, again while referring to the earlier judgments dealing with the prayer of quashing of FIR based upon compromise under Section 493 IPC and Section 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 observed that offences with which the accused was charged were in fact offences against the society and not private in nature. Such offences have serious impact on the society and continuance of trial of such cases is founded on the overriding effect of public interest in punishing persons for such serious offences. The offence did not arise out of commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or such similar transactions and does not have any element of civil dispute and thus it stands on a distinct footing and therefore, a settlement even if arrived at between the complainant and accused, the same cannot constitute a valid ground to quash

the FIR or the chargesheet and therefore, the High Court is justified in refusing to quash the charge-sheet on the basis of compromise between the parties. Para 15 & 16 of the aforesaid judgments are reproduced as under:-

“15. Bearing in mind the above principles which have been laid down, we are of the view that offences for which the appellants have been charged are infact offences against society and not private in nature. Such offences have serious impact upon society and continuance of trial of such cases is founded on the overriding effect of public interests in punishing persons for such serious offences. It is neither an offence arising out of commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or such similar transactions or has any element of civil dispute thus it stands on a distinct footing. In such cases, settlement even if arrived at between the complainant and the accused, the same cannot constitute a valid ground to quash the F.I.R. or the charge sheet.

16. Thus the High Court cannot be said to be unjustified in refusing to quash the charge sheet on the ground of compromise between the parties.”

10. Now advertng to the facts of the present case, the present is a second petition filed by the petitioners for quashing of the FIR based upon compromise. They filed first petition before this Court bearing CRM-M-25748-2023, which was dismissed as withdrawn in order to enable the petitioners to file a fresh petition with better particulars and liberty was granted by this Court in this regard. In the aforesaid first petition, a compromise deed was attached as Annexure P-2, which was effected between the petitioners and respondent No.3, with whom quarrel had taken place as per the FIR, but the complainant, namely, Sukhdev Singh was not a party to the compromise. In the compromise

deed, it has been specifically stated that the dispute took place between the petitioners and respondent No.3, but no occurrence has taken place as alleged by the complainant and that respondent No.3 has no objection in case the FIR is quashed based upon compromise. As stated above, the complainant-respondent No.2 was neither a party to the compromise nor the signatory to the same although was impleaded as respondent No.3 in the memo of parties. In Para No.2 of the aforesaid first petition, it had been specifically stated by the petitioners that no such alleged occurrence ever took place.

11. Thereafter, the present second petition has been filed for quashing of the FIR based upon compromise and now a fresh compromise deed has been attached as Annexure P-2. A perusal of the same would show that it has been executed for the second time and attached with the present petition. The complainant, namely, Sukhdev Singh-respondent No.2 has also been shown to be a party to the compromise and he is also impleaded as respondent No.2. However, the contents of the compromise are not the same and are now changed. The recitation which was made in the first compromise which was attached in the first petition, in which the complainant-Sukhdev Singh was not a party, it was specifically stated that no such alleged offence took place. However, this recitation is conspicuously absent in the second compromise deed and nowhere it has been stated in the second compromise deed, which has been attached with the present petition that no such occurrence took place, but it proceeds only on the ground that the matter has been compromised between the parties. In other words, when the complainant-Sukhdev Singh, who is serving as Granthi Singh in Gurudwara Sahib had made a complaint to the Police that sacrilege has been committed, as stated in the FIR, then when he

becomes a party to the compromise as per Annexure P-2 in the present petition, then the recitation pertaining to non-occurrence is absent. In other words, when first compromise was made in which complainant was not a party, the occurrence was denied and when in second compromise which is attached with the present petition, its earlier recital is omitted and is absent. This would clearly show that so far as the occurrence is concerned, the complainant has not agreed that it did not take place and his consent for compromise quashing is only to the extent that the matter has been compromised between the parties. Therefore as per compromise attached with the petition, the occurrence of incidence is not denied by any one.

12. Furthermore, there is another remarkable departure in the pleadings of the present case as compared to the first petition filed by the same petitioners. In the present second petition there is no averment by the petitioners that no occurrence took place. Both the petitions have been filed by the same two petitioners, but now in the present petition when the complainant-Sukhdev Singh is party to the compromise, the averment which was made in the earlier petition with regard to the absence of the occurrence is missing. Therefore, it would clearly mean that occurrence of the incident which is so narrated in the FIR has not been denied by any of the parties in the present petition.

13. The present FIR has been lodged under Sections 295, 427 & 34 IPC. Section 295 IPC which is incorporated in Chapter XV pertaining to offences relating to religion provide for punishment for injuring or defiling place of worship with intent to insult the religion of any class. The aforesaid Section 295 IPC is reproduced as under:-

“295. Injuring or defiling place of worship with intent to insult the religion of any class.—Whoever destroys, damages or defiles any place of worship, or any object held sacred by any class of persons with the intention of thereby insulting the religion of any class of persons or with the knowledge that any class of persons is likely to consider such destruction, damage or defilement as an insult to their religion, shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”

14. A perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that it deals with the offences wherein anyone destroys, damages or defiles any place of worship, **or any object held sacred by any class of persons** with the intention of thereby insulting the religion of any class of persons **or with the knowledge that any class of persons is likely to consider** such destruction, damage or defilement as an insult to their religion, shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. The offence is a cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable offence. It takes within its ambit destroying, damaging or defiling of even any object held sacred by any class of persons with intention to insult the religion or even with the knowledge that any class of persons is likely to consider such destruction, damage or defilement as an insult to their religion. In the present case categorical allegations were pertaining to kicking of model of Sri Darbar Sahib (Golden Temple) by the petitioners and hurting of Sikh sentiments and there is nothing in compromise or petition itself to support the absence of intention or knowledge.

15. The investigation of the case has already been completed and challan has also been presented and now the trial Court has fixed the case for

consideration for framing of charges. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down various tests alongwith illustrations although not exhaustive as to when there can be a quashing of FIR/complaint based upon compromise. In *Gian Singh' case (supra)* one of the circumstances where the Court should be reluctant in quashing of the FIR based upon compromise should be when the offence has a serious impact on the society. The High Court may choose to quash the FIR when in the given facts and circumstances the chances of conviction are very remote and bleak and an extreme injustice will be caused in case the FIR is not quashed. These are those cases where compromise is effected with the victim and Hon'ble Supreme has laid much emphasis on the expression 'victim'. Thereafter, again in *Narinder Singh's case (supra)*, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid much emphasis on the expression 'victim' wherein a compromise has been effected between an offender and victim and in order to secure the ends of justice like in the case of financial dispute etc. the FIR can be quashed based upon compromise. In the present case, the primary allegation in the FIR is that religious feelings have been hurt and there is a class of persons who are the 'victim' and not one individual. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also discussed the theory of deterrence and correctional objective and it was observed that in certain heinous and serious cases which pertain to murder, rape, sexual offence etc., the theory of deterrence will have predominant effect. The list of offences which fall in the category of serious or heinous offences are not exhaustive in nature and it depends upon the nature of offence and therefore, it becomes the duty of the Court while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to comprehend as to whether the offence falls in the category of serious or heinous offence or not.

Thereafter, again in **Laxmi Naryan's case (supra)**, the proposition of law was reiterated whereby again the list of serious and heinous offences was never made exhaustive in nature and again it was held that in cases which have serious impact on society may not be quashed based upon compromise. In **Arun Singh's case (supra)**, it was so observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that such offences which were subject matter of that case have serious impact on the society and continuance of trial of such cases is founded on the overriding effect of public interest in punishing persons for such serious offences. This Court is of the view that in the act of sacrilege, the offence has serious impact on the society and therefore continuation of trial in such cases will be founded on the overriding effect of public interest in punishing persons for such serious offences.

16. This Court earlier also had an occasion to deal with a case in CRM-M-623-2022 titled as "**Nanu Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and others**", decided on 10.01.2022, wherein prayer was made for quashing of the FIR based upon compromise in an offence under Section 295-A IPC. The allegations in that case were that the accused deliberately hurt the religious sentiments of crores of Hindus on social media publicly with the motive of provoking riots and even made some dirty remarks on respected Lord Krishna on the Holy festival of Hindus i.e. Shri Krishna Janmashtami and had put obscene pictures publicly which were seen by millions of people all over India.

Para 7 & 8 of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:-

"7. A perusal of the aforesaid allegations against the petitioner would show that the present offence is an offence against the society at large and it is not a case of a private offence where only one person is affected

*whereas society at large is being affected by the aforesaid allegations. Furthermore, the law with regard to the quashing of FIR based upon compromise is no longer res integra. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in **The State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan and Others 2019 (2) SCC (CrL) 706**, while referring to the earlier judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down various parameters as to under what circumstances an FIR can be quashed based upon compromise. It is a settled law that the High Courts while exercising powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interests of justice to continue with the criminal proceedings or continuation of the criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of the process despite settlement and compromise arrived at between the victim and the wrong doer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it will be appropriate that criminal case be put to an end and if the answer to the same is in the affirmative then the High Courts shall be within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings. However, such a power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised very sparingly and with caution and can be used only to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process of Court and while exercising the powers, the High Court is to see as to whether the possibility of conviction is very less or remote and continuation of criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case. In nutshell, the decision as to whether an FIR is required to be quashed on the basis of compromise would be on the basis of facts and circumstances of each case and there can be no exhaustive elaboration of principles in this regard.*

8. While exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court has to see as to whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case it would be a fit case for quashing of the FIR and one of the basic parameter is to prevent the abuse of the process of law. In the present case, however, the offence is so serious in nature and involving large public interest and society at large and there is nothing to show that quashing of the FIR at this stage will prevent the abuse of the process of law.”

17. Section 295 IPC deals with the offence of sacrilege. It, therefore, has serious impact on the society. In the acts of sacrilege, the victim is the society at large or at the most a class of persons. In the acts of sacrilege, the offence has serious impact on the society at large and therefore, continuation of trial of such cases will be founded on the overriding effect of public interest in punishing the persons for such serious offences. The theory and philosophy of deterrence is fully applicable to the offences relating to sacrilege.

18. Therefore, it is held that an act of sacrilege pertaining to any religion falls in the category of serious and heinous offence and should not ordinarily be quashed on the basis of compromise notwithstanding the maximum sentence provided in the provision relating to sacrilege. However, if no conclusive evidence, oral or documentary is collected by the investigating agency during investigation for holding the accused guilty even after trial, then in those peculiar and special facts and circumstances, the High Court may invoke its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing of FIR based on compromise but with extreme care and caution.

19. Considering the allegations contained in the present FIR and the fact that the occurrence as so stated in the FIR has not been denied either in the

compromise deed (Annexure P-2) or in the present petition itself, this Court does not deem it fit and proper to quash the present FIR based upon compromise by invoking its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

20. Consequently, the present petition is hereby dismissed.

21. However, anything observed hereinabove shall not be treated as an expression of opinion on merits of the case and is only meant for the purpose of decision of present petition.

21.08.2023

Bhumika

(JASGURPREET SINGH PURI)
JUDGE

1. Whether speaking/reasoned:	Yes/No
2. Whether reportable:	Yes/No