

251a **IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA**
AT CHANDIGARH

CRM-M-41682-2022

Date of Decision: 27.03.2023

Harjit Singh and others

..... Petitioners

Versus

State of Punjab and others

.....Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH BHARDWAJ

Present: Ms. Meena, Advocate for
Mr. Amit Arora, Advocate, for the petitioners.
Mr. Karunesh Kaushal, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab.
Mr. Jagjeet Singh, Advocate for
Mr. Parminder Singh Kanwar, Advocate,
for respondents No.2 and 3.

Rajesh Bhardwaj, J. (ORAL)

Instant petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. praying for quashing of DDR No.30 dated 20.08.2022, registered under Sections 336, 341, 506, 148, 149 IPC and Sections 25 and 27 Arms Act, 1959, at Police Station Goindwal Sahib in a case FIR No.321 dated 20.08.2022, registered under Sections 336, 506, 148, 149 IPC and Sections 25 and 27 of Arms Act 1959, at Police Station Goindwal Sahib, District Tarn Taran alongwith all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of compromise dated 03.09.2022 (Annexure P-3).

DDR in question was lodged by complainant-respondent No.2 and the investigation commenced thereon. However, with the intervention of respectables, finally the parties arrived at settlement and they resolved their inter se dispute, which is apparent from Compromise Deed, annexed as Annexure P-3. On the basis of the compromise, the petitioners are praying that continuation of these proceedings would be a futile exercise and an

abuse of process of the Court and thus, the DDR in question and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom may be quashed in the interest of justice.

This Court vide order dated 13.09.2022 directed the parties to appear before the trial Court/Illaq Magistrate for recording their statements, as contended before the Court, and the trial Court/Illaq Magistrate was also directed to send its report.

In pursuance to the same, learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Khadur Sahib has sent its report dated 05.12.2022. With the report, she has also annexed the original statements of respondent No.2-complainant Rajpal Kaur and respondent No.3 Gurmit Singh, and statements of the petitioners, namely, Harjit Singh, Gurjit Singh, Manjit Singh, Harpreet Singh @ Happy, Arshpreet Singh (wrongly mentioned as Arshdeep Singh in DDR), Gurpartap Singh, Gurjeet Singh @ Gura, Charanjit Singh and Jaideep Singh Randhawa and SI Iqbal Singh recorded on 16.11.2022. On the basis of the statements, learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Khadur Sahib has concluded in its report that the compromise is genuine, voluntarily, without any coercion or undue influence with their free will. It is further mentioned in the report that total nine accused i.e. the present petitioners are named in the DDR and none of them has been declared as proclaimed offender. It is further mentioned in the report that challan has not been presented in this case.

It has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that though there is offence under the Arms Act, however, gunshot was fired in the air and there is no injury caused to any person. He has submitted that offence under the Arms Act is not even made out. It is further submitted

that during the pendency of the case, the parties resolved the dispute amicably.

Learned counsel for respondents No.2 and 3 has also affirmed the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioners and has submitted that there was no injury pertaining to the offence under the Arms Act and gunshot was fired in the air and the parties have compromised the matter with their free will.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the record and the report sent by learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Khadur Sahib

A bare perusal of statutory provision of the 482 Cr.P.C. would show that the High Court may make such orders, as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Section 320 Cr.P.C. is equally relevant for consideration, which prescribes the procedure for compounding of the offences under the Indian Penal Code.

Keeping in view the nature of offences allegedly committed and the fact that both the parties have amicably settled their dispute, the continuation of criminal prosecution would be a futile exercise. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a number of cases including **Narinder Singh and others Versus State of Punjab and another, 2014 (6) SCC 466; B.S.Joshi and others vs State of Haryana and another (2003) 4 Supreme Court Cases 675** followed by this Court in Full Bench case of **Kulwinder Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab and another, 2007(3) RCR 1052** have dealt with the proposition involved in the present case and settled the law.

Thereafter, Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Gian Singh vs State of**

Punjab and another (2012) 10 Supreme Court Cases 303 further dealt with the issue and the earlier law settled by the Supreme Court for quashing of the FIR in **State of Haryana** vs **Bhajan Lal**, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. Para 61 of the judgment reads as under:-

“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like

transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

As alleged by learned counsel for the petitioner and affirmed by learned counsel for respondents No.2 and 3 that fire arm was never used and there is no injury caused on account of use of fire arm.

Applying the law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in plethora of judgments and this High Court it is apparent that when the parties have entered into a compromise, in the nature of cases as prescribed then continuation of the proceedings would be merely an abuse of process of the Court and by allowing and accepting the prayer of the petitioners by quashing the FIR would be securing the ends of justice, which is primarily the object of the legislature enacting under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

In the facts and circumstances, this Court finds that the case in

hand squarely falls within the ambit and parameters settled by judicial precedents and hence, DDR No.30 dated 20.08.2022, registred under Sections 336, 341, 506, 148, 149 IPC and Sections 25 and 27 Arms Act, 1959, at Police Station Goindwal Sahib in a case FIR No.321 dated 20.08.2022, registered under Sections 336, 506, 148, 149 IPC and Sections 25 and 27 of Arms Act 1959, at Police Station Goindwal Sahib, District Tarn Taran alongwith subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are hereby quashed qua the petitioners, on the basis of compromise (Annexure P-3).

Needless to say that the parties shall remain bound by the terms and conditions of the compromise and their statements recorded before the Court below.

Petition stands allowed.

27.03.2023		(RAJESH BHARDWAJ)
sharmila		JUDGE
	Whether Speaking/Reasoned	: Yes/No
	Whether Reportable	: Yes/No