

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH**

CWP-16767-2023 (O&M)
Date of Decision: 04.08.2023

BALU

...Petitioner

Versus

PRESIDING OFFICER, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-
LABOUR COURT-III, FARIDABAD AND OTHERS ...Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARSH BUNGER

Present : Mr. Deepak Sonak, Advocate
 for the petitioner.

HARSH BUNGER, J. (ORAL)

Petitioner-workman (Balu s/o Sohan Lal) has filed this petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or directions; especially a writ in the nature of *certiorari* for setting aside the impugned award dated 31.01.2023 (Annexure P-3) passed by respondent No.1-Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court-III, Faridabad; whereby the reference of the industrial dispute has been decided against him. A further prayer has been made for issuance of a writ in the nature of *mandamus* for directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner with continuity of service and full back wages.

2. Briefly, the petitioner raised an industrial dispute qua his illegal termination by serving a demand notice dated 25.01.2017. Thereafter, the following reference was made to the Labour Court for adjudication:

“Whether there exists any relationship of employee and employer between the claimant and respondents? If so, whether the termination of the services of workman Sh. Balu is legal and justified or not? If not so, to what relief he is entitled to?”

3. As per the claim statement filed by petitioner, he was working with respondent-Forest Department as *Mazdoor* in Reserve Forest Area of Hodal from July, 1990 and he continuously worked upto December, 2016 when suddenly his services were terminated in an illegal and arbitrary manner adopting unfair labour practice. It was stated that during the long tenure of 26 years of his service, the State of Haryana has framed Policy of regularization of employees, who were having service of more than 10 years in his/her credit, but the respondents have never considered the name of the petitioner, who remained as daily wager during this tenure. Petitioner alleged exploitation and claimed that though the respondent-Forest department is liable to regularize him as he fulfills the criteria, however when the petitioner asked for regularization of his services then his services were terminated. Petitioner stated that earlier respondents were paying wages to him on Muster Roll but later on, they stopped payment on Muster Roll. Petitioner claimed that his termination is illegal, unjustified and against principles of natural justice and contrary to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short 'the 1947 Act'). Accordingly, the petitioner prayed that he may be reinstated with full back wages and continuity of service.

4. On the other hand, the respondent-Forest department, contested the claim of the petitioner by filing its reply wherein, *inter-alia*, the following stand was taken :-

- a) *The petitioner was never appointed against any regular post;*
- b) *The petitioner has not been engaged for all twelve preceding calendar months continuously during any year.*

- c) *The petitioner has not worked for 240 days in twelve preceding calendar months from the date of dispute (December 2016) with the respondent-department.*
- d) *The petitioner-workman was never appointed as Mazdoor in Reserve Forest Area of Palwal from July, 2003 and never worked up to December 2016, as alleged by petitioner;*
- e) *There was no relation of employer and workman between the petitioner and the respondent-department;*
- f) *The Forest Department adopted piece rate contract system from the year 2003 and does not engage labour directly. The work is either executed through village Forest Committee or through contractors.*
- g) *The claimant (petitioner) through contractor or through village Forest Committee alongwith other persons worked with breaks as under: -*

Sr. No.	Cr. Vr. No.	Month of Work	Amount Paid	Paid to	No. of Days
1	23H of 03/2008	03/2008	6500	Balu & Party	25
2	25H of 07/2008	05/2008	10000	Balu & Party	30
	Total of 2008				55
1	17H of 08/2014	06/2014	9200	Balu & Party	30
2	19H of 07/2014	07/2014	19400	Balu & Party	31
3	19H of 02/2015	10/2014	36200	Balu & Party	30
4	25H of 02/2015	11/2014	18300	Balu & Party	30
	Total of 2014				121
1	77H of 03/2015	03/2015	11900	Balu & Party	25
2	33H of 08/2015	06/2015	6150	Balu & Party	30
3	104H of 08/2015	07/2015	18600	Balu & Party	31
4	35H of 09/2015	08/2015	3100	Balu & Party	13.5

5		10/2015	2394	Balu & Party	10.5
	Total of 2015				110
1	3H of 05/2016	01/2016	6415	Balu & Party	28
2	12H of 04/2015	02/2016	7200	Balu & Party	28
3		07/2016	2450	Balu & Party	8
4		12/2016	4900	Balu & Party	16
	Total of 2016				80

h) The regularization policies were withdrawn by the Government of Haryana.

5. From the pleadings of the parties, the learned Labour Court framed the following issues:

- “1. Whether the services of the workman were terminated illegally? If so, to what relief he is entitled to? OPW
2. Whether there exists no relationship of employee and employer between the workman and respondents? OPR
3. Whether the present claim is bad on account of non joining of the Village Forest Committee and the contractors, with whom, the workman had worked, as alleged in para no.5 of the preliminary objections of the written statement? OPR
4. Relief.”

6. In order to prove his case/claim, the petitioner/workman-Balu, examined himself as WW1 and also examined one Vikram (summoned witness) as WW2 and relied upon the following documents in his documentary evidence :-

<i>Sr. No.</i>	<i>Exhibit</i>	<i>Document</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>W1</i>	<i>Copies of muster roll</i>
<i>2</i>	<i>W2</i>	<i>Copy of failure report O/o Assistant Labour Commissioner, Palwal.</i>

3	W3	<i>Copy of statements of witnesses and record produced before Labour Court in case titled as Prem Pal vs D.F.O. Palwal& others.</i>
4	WW2/1	<i>Copy of letter dated 06.07.2000 for implementation of contract system in Forest Department (Haryana).</i>
5	WW2/2	<i>Copy of FIR dated 05.01.2017 lodged by Divisional Forest Officer.</i>
6	WW2/3	<i>Copy of certificate issued by Divisional Forest Officer, Palwal.</i>

Thereafter, the petitioner-Workman closed his evidence on 20.01.2022.

7. On the other hand, the respondents have examined one Raman Kumar Forest Ranger, Forest Department, Palwal as RW1 and have also adduced following documents in their documentary evidence :-

<i>Sr. No.</i>	<i>Exhibit/s</i>	<i>Document</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>R1 & R2</i>	<i>Copies of attendance record of Ballu alongwith copies of cash book.</i>
<i>2</i>	<i>R3</i>	<i>Copy of certificate issued by Sh. K.C. Meena, I.F.S. Chairman Forest Development Agency alongwith list of Village Forest Committees.</i>
<i>3</i>	<i>R4</i>	<i>Copies of bills.</i>
<i>4</i>	<i>R5</i>	<i>Copy of letter dated 06.07.2000 for implementation of contract system in Forest Department, Haryana.</i>
<i>5</i>	<i>R6</i>	<i>Copy of memo No.4295-FT-5-2003/23462 dated 22.10.2003.</i>

Thereafter, the respondents evidence was closed on 10.11.2022.

8. Vide impugned award dated 31.01.2023 (Annexure P-3) passed by Learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court-III, Faridabad; the reference of the industrial dispute has been decided against the petitioner-workman.

9. Being aggrieved against the impugned award dated 31.01.2023 (Annexure P-3) *ibid*, the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition.

10. Learned counsel for the petitioner while reiterating the stand of the petitioner before the Labour Court, submitted that the petitioner was appointed on daily wage basis in the respondent-Forest department as Labourer (Mazdoor) in the year 1990 and he continuously worked till December, 2016, when suddenly his services were terminated in an illegal and arbitrary manner without following the mandatory provisions of the Act, 1947. He submits that the petitioner worked in the respondent-Forest department for more than 240 days in preceding 12 months from the date of his termination in December 2016. It is submitted that the petitioner has worked continuously in the department from the date of his initial appointment and he was appointed directly and always worked under the direct control and supervision of the respondent-department and payment to the petitioner was always made by respondent-department. It is contended that the petitioner never worked under any contractor or Village Forest Committee. It is stated that the petitioner worked for more than 240 days in the last 12 months preceding his termination and no proper attendance register/Muster Roll was maintained by respondent-department nor any such record was produced by the respondent-department. It is further contended that in the absence of any contract between the contractor/Village Forest Committee and respondent-department, the workman is an employee of department not of the contractor. It is also contended that an adverse inference should have been drawn against respondent-department for not producing record. Accordingly, counsel for the petitioner prays that the impugned award dated 31.01.2023 (Annexure P-3) passed by Learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court-III, Faridabad, may be set aside and

necessary directions may be issued for reinstatement of petitioner with continuity of service and full back wages.

11. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the paper-book with his able assistance.

12. In the instant case, it is the pleaded case of petitioner that he was appointed on daily wage basis in the respondent-Forest department as Labourer (Mazdoor) in the year 1990 and he continuously worked till December, 2016, when suddenly his services were terminated in an illegal and arbitrary manner without following the mandatory provisions of the Act, 1947. Thus, in order to seek relief in terms of Section 25F of the Act, 1947, the petitioner was required to prove that he worked for 240 days in the 12 months preceding the date when he was allegedly illegally terminated by respondent-Forest Department. Therefore, the relevant period would be 12 months prior to December, 2016. In order to discharge the onus of proving the aforesaid fact of having worked for 240 days in the 12 months preceding the date of his allegedly termination, the petitioner gave his own testimony and also examined one Vikram but did not lead any other evidence in the form of proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or any order/record of appointment or engagement for the relevant period. It is well settled law that mere affidavits or self-serving statements made by the claimant/workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. In this regard, reference can be made to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of ***Municipal Corpn. v. Siri Niwas, 2004(4) S.C.T. 211***, wherein, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:

“12. The provisions of the Indian Evidence Act per se are not applicable in an industrial adjudication. The general

principles of it are, however, applicable. It is also imperative for the Industrial Tribunal to see that the principles of natural justice are complied with. The burden of proof was on the respondent herein to show that he had worked for 240 days in preceding twelve months prior to his alleged retrenchment. In terms of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, an order retrenching a workman would not be effective unless the conditions precedent therefor are satisfied. Section 25-F postulates the following conditions to be fulfilled by employer for effecting a valid retrenchment :

- (i) one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or wages in lieu thereof :*
- (ii) payment of compensation equivalent to fifteen days average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months.*

13. For the said purpose it is necessary to notice the definition of 'Continuous Service' as contained in Section 25-B of the Act. In terms of sub-section (2) of Section 25-B that if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer 240 days within a period of one year, he will be deemed to be in continuous service. By reason of the said provision, thus, a legal fiction is created. The retrenchment of the respondent took place on 17.5.1995. For the purpose of calculating as to whether he had worked for a period of 240 days within one year or not, it was, therefore, necessary for the Tribunal to arrive at a finding of fact that during the period between 5.8.1994 to 16.5.1995 he had worked for a period of more than 240 days. As noticed hereinbefore, the burden of proof was on the workman. From the Award it does not appear that the workman adduced any evidence whatsoever in

support of his contention that he complied with the requirements of Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act. Apart from examining himself in support of his contention he did not produce or call for any document from the office of the Appellant herein including the muster rolls. It is improbable that a person working in a Local Authority would not be in possession of any documentary evidence to support his claim before the Tribunal. Apart from muster rolls he could have shown the terms and conditions of his offer of appointment and the remuneration received by him for working during the aforementioned period. He even did not examine any other witness in support of his case.

14. A Court of Law even in a case where provisions of the Indian Evidence Act apply, may presume or may not presume that if a party despite possession of the best evidence had not produced the same, it would have gone against his contentions. The matter, however, would be different where despite direction by a court the evidence is withheld. Presumption as to adverse inference for non-production of evidence is always optional and one of the factors which is required to be taken into consideration in the background of facts involved in the lis. The presumption, thus, is not obligatory because notwithstanding the intentional non-production, other circumstances may exist upon which such intentional non-production may be found to be justifiable on some reasonable grounds. In the instant case, the Industrial Tribunal did not draw any adverse inference against the Appellant. It was within its jurisdiction to do so particularly having regard to the nature of the evidence adduced by the Respondent.

15. No reason has been assigned by the High Court as to why the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction of the Tribunal was bad in law. In a case of this nature, it is

trite, the High Court exercising the power of judicial review, would not interfere with the discretion of a Tribunal unless the same is found to be illegal or irrational...”

13. Further, in the case of ***Surendranagar District Panchayat v. Dahyabhai Amarsinh***, 2005(8) SCC 750, Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:

“19. In the light of the aforesaid, it was necessary for the workman to produce the relevant material to prove that he has actually worked with the employer for not less than 240 days during the period twelve calendar months preceding the date of termination. What we find is that apart from the oral evidence the workman has not produced any evidence to prove the fact that he has worked for 240 days. No proof of receipt of salary or wages or any record or order in that regard was produced; no co-worker was examined; muster roll produced by the employer has not been contradicted. It is improbable that workman who claimed to have worked with the appellant for such a long period would not possess any documentary evidence to prove nature of his engagement and the period of work he had undertaken with his employer. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the workman has failed to discharge his burden that he was in employment for 240 days during the preceding 12 months of the date of termination of his service. The Courts below have wrongly drawn an adverse inference for non production of the record of the workman for ten years. The scope of enquiry before the Labour Court was confined to only 12 months preceding the date of termination to decide the question of continuation of service for the purpose of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The workman has never contended that he was regularly employed in the Panchayat for one year to

claim the uninterrupted period of service as required under Section 25B(1) of the Act. In the fact and situation and in the light of the law on the subject, we find that the workman-respondent is not entitled for the protection or compliance of Section 25F of the Act before his service was terminated by the employer. As regards non-compliance of Sections 25G and 25H suffice is to say that witness Vinod Mishra examined by the appellant has stated that no seniority list was maintained by the department of daily wagers. In the absence of regular employment of the workman, the appellant was not expected to maintain seniority list of the employees engaged on daily wages and in the absence of any proof by the respondent regarding existence of the seniority list and his so called seniority no relief could be given to him for non-compliance of provisions of the Act. The Courts could have drawn adverse inference against the appellant only when seniority list was proved to be in existence and then not produced before the Court. In order to entitle the Court to draw inference unfavourable to the party, the Court must be satisfied that evidence is in existence and could have been proved...”

14. Further, vide impugned award dated 31.01.2023 (Annexure P-3), learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court-III, Faridabad; has returned the following findings:-

“15. On appreciation of the evidence led by both the parties and after hearing the rival contentions of learned ARs for the parties, the position which emerges is that it is the case of claimant that he was appointed as “Mazdoor” by the respondents in the Reserve Forest Area of Hodal, Palwal in the year 1990 and he had worked continuously till December 2016 and thereafter his services were terminated by respondents in an illegal and arbitrary manner. On the other hand, according to the

respondents, claimant was never engaged directly by the respondents. He had never been appointed on any sanctioned post. Rather he had worked with the respondents either through contractors or through Village Forest Committees. Respondents also claimed that the claimant had not worked with the respondents for a period of 240 days preceding twelve calendar months from the date of his alleged termination.

It is well settled law that the onus of proving the relationship of employee and employer and continuous working of 240 days during twelve calendar months immediately preceding the date of illegal termination of service, lies upon the workman.

16 to 21. xxx xxx xxx

22. In view of the above discussed legal position, now it is to be seen whether the claimant has succeeded to prove the relationship of employee and employer between him & the respondents and whether he had worked with respondents for 240 days in preceding 12 calendar months from the alleged date of termination of his services by the respondents. This Court finds that apart from his own oral testimony as WW1, claimant has not produced any other cogent and satisfactory oral or documentary evidence which could prove the fact that he had worked with respondents on daily wages since year 1990 till December 2016 or that he had worked continuously for a period of 240 days in a year preceding date of his alleged termination by the respondents. No doubt that claimant has also examined one other witness Vikram S/o Satbir Singh, however he is a formal witness from the office of D.F.O. Palwal who had produced the summoned record. Claimant has also proved photocopies of muster roll cards for the year 2001 & 2002 as Ex.W1. However executants of these muster roll cards have not been examined by claimant. Therefore, these documents

are not duly proved on record. There is no admission of respondents with respect to these muster roll cards. Therefore these documents cannot be looked into evidence being not duly proved. No appointment letter, wages slip or record of engagement of claimant by the Forest Department in year 1990 has been produced on record by the claimant. It is improbable that claimant who has claimed that he had worked with the respondents for such a long period would not possess any documentary proof of his engagement and period of work he had under taken with his employer. Even no co-worker has been examined by the claimant in support of his claim. Statement of claimant in the shape of affidavit Ex.WW1/A cannot be held sufficient evidence to come to the conclusion that claimant was engaged by the respondents in the year 1990 or tat he had worked continuously with the respondents till December 2016. Workman during his cross-examination admitted that he is not having any identity card or appointment letter issued by the department (Forest). He further stated that he was not appointed on any post by the Forest Department. However, he voluntarily stated that he had worked as a “Mazdoor”. He further admitted that he has not worked on any sanctioned post in the Department.

On the other hand respondents have proved details of attendance record of claimant from year 2007-08 till year 2016-17 (prepared as per cash book) alongwith copies of cash book as Ex.R1 & Ex.R2. A perusal of the same reveals that present claimant had worked with respondents during period March 2008 to December 2016 either through contractors or through Village Forest Committees. He had never worked continuously for 240 days in any year. In the year 2016, he had worked only for 80 days. WW2 Vikram categorically stated that the record prior to year 2002 was stolen from their office. In this regard department had lodged FIR No.08 dated

05.01.2017 in Police Station Palwal. It is pertinent to mention that claimant had filed demand notice on 25.01.2017 whereas FIR was lodged on 05.01.2017 i.e. prior to the filing of demand notice by the claimant.

It has been proved on record from the evidence led by the respondents that as per the directions of Haryana Government, after the year 2003 a piece rate of contract system was adopted by the Forest Department and the work was being executed either through contractors or through Village Forest Committees. Necessary entries were being made by the Forest Department in the cash book after making payment as per the details submitted of the contractors/Village Forest Committees. There is nothing on record to suggest that attendance record of claimant produced by respondents is false and fabricated. Hence, there is no reason to disbelieve the same.

23. In view of my above detailed discussion, this Court considers that the evidence led by the workman is not at all sufficient to prove his case/claim. Workman has failed to produce any cogent and satisfactory evidence which could prove that he was engaged by the respondents as daily wage labourer as per muster rolls system in year 1990 and he continuously worked till December 2016. Claimant has failed to prove that there was relationship of employee and employer between the claimant and respondents. He has also failed to prove that he had worked continuously for a period of 240 days in twelve calendar months preceding the date of his alleged termination by the respondents. Thus, he is not entitled to the protection of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act. Accordingly, issue No.1 is decided against the claimant and in favour of respondents and issue no.2 is decided in favour of respondents and against the claimant.”

15. As regards the plea of the petitioner that adverse inference be drawn against respondent-department for not producing Muster Rolls, it is

observed that apart from the bare plea of non-production of muster roll by respondent-department; there is no plea of the petitioner that respondent-department has suppressed the relevant record. In the absence of such plea of suppression, no adverse inference can be drawn against respondent-department. In this regard, reference can be made to the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in ***R.M. Yellatti v. The Asst. Executive Engineer, 2005(4) S.C.T. 695***, wherein it has been held as under:

“15...The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-serving statements made by the claimant/workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the labour court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon facts of each case...”

16. It is trite that this court, in such matters, exercises certiorari jurisdiction, the peripheries of which stand authoritatively delineated in the following classic expositions found in ***Syed Yakoob v. K. S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 Supreme Court 477*** :

"7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting

errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard, to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an Appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The

adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.

8. It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately describe what an error of law apparent on the face of the record means. What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the record. Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious mis-interpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said error of law is apparent on the face of the record. It may also be that in some cases, the impugned error of law may not be obvious or patent on the face of the record as such and the Court may need an argument to discover the said error; but there can be no doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is an error of law and the said error must, on the whole, be of such a character as would satisfy the test that it is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. If a statutory provision is reasonably capable of two constructions and one construction has been adopted by the inferior Court or Tribunal, its conclusion may not necessarily or

always be open to correction by a writ of certiorari. In our opinion, it neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or to describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record. Whether or not an impugned error is an error of law and an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record, must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the nature and scope of the legal provision which is alleged to have been misconducted or contravened."

17. No other point has been urged.

18. When the facts and circumstances of this case and also the findings returned by the learned Industrial Tribunal are considered in the light of the legal position indicated above, I do not find any illegality or infirmity with the impugned award dated 31.01.2023 (Annexure P-3), which may call for any interference by this Court, while exercising its writ jurisdiction. Accordingly, the instant writ petition is dismissed in *limine*.

19. All pending application/s, if any, shall also stand closed.

August 4th, 2023
gurpreet

(HARSH BUNGER)
JUDGE

Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No

Whether reportable: Yes/No