

**IN THE PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT AT
CHANDIGARH**

227

CRM-A-621-MA-2018 (O&M)
Date of Decision: 13.02.2023

JASVIR SINGH

... Appellant

VERSUS

BAHADUR SINGH

... Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP MOUDGIL

Present: Mr. Kulwant Singh, Advocate
for the appellant.

SANDEEP MOUDGIL, J. (ORAL)

By filing the present appeal, under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. the appellant has assailed the judgment dated 05.12.2017, passed by the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Ludhiana, dismissing the complaint and acquitting the respondent-accused therein of the notice of accusation served upon him under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short 'the Act').

It is contended that the judgment passed by the trial Court suffers from grave illegality, perversity and the same is based upon surmises and conjectures and as such the same is liable to be set aside. It is contended that the complainant has duly and fully proved the ingredients of Section 138 of the N.I. Act, 1881, but the learned trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence led by the complainant on record and returned a finding of acquittal while dismissing the complaint in question. The presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. At, 1881 is very strong in favour of the complainant in the present case, but still the impugned judgment has been passed ignoring all well settled legal positions and

as such, the judgment suffers from grave injustice, illegality and perversity. Hence, the same is liable to be set aside.

Heard.

I have perused the impugned judgment carefully and have also gone meticulously through the findings recorded by the trial Court. Upon perusal of the same, I do not find any perversity or illegality therein. It is the specific stand of the respondent-accused that he had never raised any loan from the complainant. Rather he had taken a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- from the father of the accused, which he had already repaid in two equal installments of Rs.50,000/- each, but the father of the complainant refused to return the blank signed cheque which was received from the accused respondent-accused for the purpose of security. The stand of the respondent accused is fortified from the fact that he had moved an application dated 27.07.2015 before the police alleging therein that the father of the complainant is not returning his alleged cheque. The respondent-accused had duly proved the said application by way of examining the concerned police official. Not only this, the respondent-accused duly sent reply to the legal notice served upon him by the complainant and specifically reiterated his stand therein. In the considered opinion of this Court, this is a probable defence and worthy credence, especially when, the complainant failed to prove any legally enforceable debt. It is well settled law that presumption under Section 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act, 1881 is that the cheque was issued in discharge of legal liability. This presumption is rebuttable. Stand of proof required for rebutting such presumption is not as high as that of the prosecution. So long as the accused can make his version reasonably probable, the burden of rebutting the presumption would stand discharged. In the present case also, the respondent-accused has raised a probable defence, which is duly

supported by documentary as well as oral evidence. Hence, it can safely be held that the impugned judgment does not suffer from any illegality or perversity.

It is a settled law as held in **C. Antony v. K.G. Raghavan Nair, 2002(4) RCR(Criminal) 750** that even if a second view on appreciation of evidence is possible, the Court will not interfere in the acquittal of the accused. In the cases of acquittal, there is double presumption in his favour; first the presumption of innocence, and secondly the accused having secured an acquittal, the Court will not interfere until it is shown conclusively that the inference of guilt is irresistible.

On perusal of the judgment passed by the trial Court dated 05.12.2017, this Court is of the considered view that the said judgment well reasoned and is based upon proper appreciation of evidence led by the parties. The ground of acquittal, as has been culled out by the trial Court, cannot be said to be faulty, contrary to law or requiring any interference by this Court. The accused-respondent has been duly able to rebut the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act, 1881 and as such, she has rightly been acquitted of the notice of accusation served upon her.

Accordingly, the leave to appeal stands declined.

Dismissed.

13.02.2023
sham

(SANDEEP MOUDGIL)
JUDGE

Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No