

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH**

(253)

CRM-M-7483-2023

Date of Decision: 17.05.2023

Pankaj @ Bhurli

--Petitioner

Versus

State of Haryana and another

--Respondents

CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH BHARDWAJ

Present:- Mr. Sukhcharan Singh, Advocate
for the petitioner.

Mr. Kirpal Singh Thakur, AAG, Haryana.

Mr. Pranshul Dhull, Advocate
for respondent No.2.

RAJESH BHARDWAJ.J (Oral)

Instant petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. praying for quashing of FIR No.397 dated 08.05.2015, under Sections 323, 506, 147, 149 of IPC (Section 326 IPC added later on), registered at Police Station Gurgaon Sadar, District Gurugram along with subsequent proceedings arising therefrom and to *set aside* the judgment dated 19.07.2018 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Gurugram whereby petitioner was convicted and sentenced for three years under Sections 323, 326 IPC on the basis of compromise deed (Annexure P-3).

Brief facts of the present case are that respondent No.2 i.e the complainant lodged the FIR in question against the petitioner-accused. It was alleged that he was going to give Kanyadan in Jharsa Village then, 7-8 boys sitting at the chaupal out of which one Pankaj son of Phool Singh came near him and he pointed towards 6-7 points and called them towards him. All of them nabbed him and Pankaj hit him at his left eye by a brick

and 6-7 boys started hitting him through fist and kicks. He received injuries on the back and head due to which his left eye got hurt and they threatened him. Thereafter, his statement was recorded. The FIR was lodged to take legal action against the accused. The investigation commenced and on completion of the same, the challan was presented. On the conclusion of the trial, accused Pankaj was convicted and sentenced under Sections 323 and 326 IPC for three years rigorous imprisonment by the trial Court vide its order dated 19.07.2018. The accused-petitioner challenged the same by filing an appeal before the learned Sessions Court at Gurugram and the same is pending adjudication. During pendency of the appeal, good sense prevailed and with the intervention of the respectables, the parties entered into a compromise and decided to bury the hatchet. The petitioner approached this Court by way the present petition for quashing of the FIR and consequent proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of the compromise arrived at.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the prosecution of the petitioner is nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court. He submits that though the petitioner has already been convicted by the Court of competent jurisdiction, however, during the pendency of the appeal before the Sessions Court, Gurugram, the parties have arrived at a compromise and respondent No.2 does not want to prosecute the petitioner any more. Thus, the FIR and the subsequent proceedings alongwith judgment and conviction order dated 19.07.2018 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Gurugram may kindly be quashed. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the Full Bench Judgment of this Court titled as *Kulwinder Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and*

another, 2007(3) RCR 1052; Ramgopal and another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021(4) RCR (Criminal) 322; and Sube Singh and another vs. State of Haryana and another, 2013(4) RCR (Criminal) 102.

Learned counsel for respondent No.2 has supported the contentions of learned counsel for the petitioner, whereas, learned State counsel has opposed the same by stating that the offence under Section 307 IPC is a serious one and same should not be allowed to be compounded.

This Court vide order dated 13.02.2023 directed the parties to appear before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gurugram for recording their statements, as contended before the Court, and the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gurugram was also directed to send its report.

In pursuance to the same, learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gurugram has sent his report dated 10.04.2023 to this Court. In the report he has reproduced the statement of complainant/respondent No.2-Mohit Kumar and petitioner-Pankaj @ Bhurli. On the basis of the statements, learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gurugram has concluded in the report that the compromise effected between the parties is without any force, coercion, fear or undue influence. It is also mentioned therein that the FIR was registered against accused-Pankaj @ Bhurli and 6-7 other boys also who caused injuries to complainant with fist and kick blows, however, the other accused have not been arrested.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the record and the report sent by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gurugram.

A bare perusal of statutory provision of the 482 Cr.P.C. would show that the High Court may make such orders, as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process

of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Section 320 Cr.P.C. is equally relevant for consideration, which prescribes the procedure for compounding of the offences under the Indian Penal Code.

Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Ramgopal and another V. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra)* has held as under:

“13. It appears to us that criminal proceedings involving non-heinous offences or where the offences are predominantly of a private nature, can be annulled irrespective of the fact that trial has already been concluded or appeal stands dismissed against conviction. Handing out punishment is not the sole form of delivering justice. Societal method of applying laws evenly is always subject to lawful exceptions. It goes without saying, that the cases where compromise is struck post conviction, the High Court ought to exercise such discretion with rectitude, keeping in view the circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, and with due regard to the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the conduct of the accused, before and after the incidence. The touchstone for exercising the extraordinary power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 would be to secure the ends of justice. There can be no hard and fast line constricting the power of the High Court to do substantial justice. A restrictive construction of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 may lead to rigid or specious justice, which in the given facts and circumstances of a case, may rather lead to grave injustice. On the other hand, in cases where heinous offences have been proved against perpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended, as cautiously observed by this Court in *Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors.*, (2014) 6 SCC 466 and *Laxmi Narayan (Supra)*.

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19. We thus sum-up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 Cr.P.C., 1973 where the Court is squarely guided by the

compromise between the parties in respect of offences 'compoundable' within the statutory framework, the extraordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 Cr.P.C., 1973. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations.”

Keeping in view the nature of offences allegedly committed and the fact that both the parties have amicably settled their dispute, the continuation of criminal prosecution would be a futile exercise. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a number of cases including ***Narinder Singh and others Versus State of Punjab and another, 2014 (6) SCC 466***; ***B.S.Joshi and others vs State of Haryana and another (2003) 4 Supreme Court Cases 675*** followed by this Court in Full Bench case of ***Kulwinder Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab and another, 2007(3) RCR 1052*** have dealt with the proposition involved in the present case and settled the law.

Thereafter, Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Gian Singh vs State of Punjab and another (2012) 10 Supreme Court Cases 303* further dealt with the issue and the earlier law settled by the Supreme Court for quashing of the FIR in ***State of Haryana vs Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335***. Para 61 of the judgment reads as under:-

“61. The position that emerges from the above

discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation

of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

Applying the law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in plethora of judgments and this High Court, it is apparent that when the parties have entered into a compromise, then continuation of the proceedings would be merely an abuse of process of the Court and by allowing and accepting the prayer of the petitioner by quashing the FIR would be securing the ends of justice, which is primarily the object of the legislature enacting under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

As a result, this Court finds that the case in hand squarely falls within the ambit and parameters settled by judicial precedents and hence, FIR No.397 dated 08.05.2015, under Sections 323, 506, 147, 149 of IPC (Section 326 IPC added later on), registered at Police Station Gurgaon Sadar, District Gurugram; judgment and conviction order dated 19.07.2018 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Gurugram along with subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are hereby quashed *qua* the petitioner on the basis of compromise.

The appeal pending before the learned Appellate Court would automatically stands infructuous.

Needless to say that the parties shall remain bound by the terms and conditions of the compromise and their statements recorded before the Court below.

Petition stands allowed.

17.05.2023
m.sharma

(RAJESH BHARDWAJ)
JUDGE

Whether speaking/reasoned:	Yes/No
Whether Reportable:	Yes/No