IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

Dated : 14.09.2023

Coram:

The Hon'ble Mr.Justice V.SIVAGNANAM

Crl.O.P.No.19281 of 2021
and Crl.M.P.No.10578 of 2021

1.Dhanaraj N.Kochar
2.Inderchand

...Petitioners

Versus

1.The State Rep. by Inspector of Police,
Central Crime Branch – 1 (FPP),
Vepery, Chennai District.
Crime No.511 of 2018

2.A.Raja

...Respondents

This Criminal Original Petition is filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C praying to call for the records of Crime No.511 of 2018 dated 10.12.2018 for the alleged offence under Section 506(i) of I.P.C r/w. 3 & 4 of TNPCEI Act 2003 pending on the file of the respondent police and quash the same.

For Petitioners	:	Mr.Ramesh, Senior Counsel for M/s.K.Dhananjayan
For Respondent – 1	:	Mr.V.J.Priyadarsana Government Advocate (Crl.Side)
For Respondent – 2	:	Mr.R.Narendran

ORDER

This criminal original petition has been filed by the petitioners seeking to quash the FIR in Crime No.511 of 2018 dated 10.12.2018 for the alleged offence under Section 506(i) of I.P.C r/w. 3 & 4 of TNPCEI Act 2003 pending on the file of 1st respondent police.

2. The brief facts of the case are as follows:

The 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant obtained a sum of Rs.40,00,000/- as loan from the petitioners on various dates viz., Rs.30,00,000/- on 02.10.2016; Rs.7,00,000/- on 22.10.2016 and Rs.3,00,000/- on 20.12.2016 respectively by depositing the original title deeds vide Document Nos.1566/2001, 1151/2003, 3222/2003, 3223/2003, 5196/2006, 423/2007, 6315/2007, 7511/2007, 421/2008, 602/2008, 717/2008, 2473/2008, 402/2009, 1101/2009, 465/2012, 466/2012, 467/2012 & 537/2012 and some other documents along with signed blank cheque, promissory notes and green sheets. According to the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant, during the month of January 2018, he approached the petitioners and stated that he is ready to repay the loan amount of Rs.40,00,000/- along with interest and hence, he requested the petitioners to return the original documents, cheques, stamp papers and promissory notes to him. However, the petitioners demanded the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant to pay an additional amount of Rs.79,00,000/- and take back the original documents and also, they demanded the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant to register his land in their names. Though the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant agreed to repay the loan amount of Rs.40,00,000/- and interest (excluding the interest amount of Rs.7,00,000/- which was already paid by him), the petitioners threatened him that if he does not pay the demanded amount, they would murder him. Therefore, the aggrieved 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant lodged a complaint to the 1st respondent police seeking to take appropriate action against the petitioners & one Naveen (son of 2nd petitioner). On the basis of said complaint, on 10.12.2018, the 1st respondent police registered the FIR in Crime No.511 of 2018 against the petitioners & said Naveen for the offence under Sections 406, 420 & 506(i) of I.P.C and 3 & 4 of Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as 'TNPCEI Act'). Hence, the petitioners have filed the present petition before this Court.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that initially, the FIR in Crime No.511 of 2018 was registered for the offence under Sections 406, 420 & 506(i) of I.P.C and 3 & 4 of TNPCEI Act, but, later, the 1st respondent police had altered the said FIR under Sections 506(i) of I.P.C r/w. 3 & 4 of TNPCEI Act.

3.1. The learned counsel submitted that Section 2(6)(vi) of the Tamil Nadu Money-Lenders Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'TNML Act'), states that **"loan"** means an advance whether of money or in kind at interest, and includes any transaction which the Court finds in substance to amount to such an advance, but does not include an advance made on the basis of a negotiable instrument and defined in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (Central Act XXVI of 1881), exceeding Rs.10,000/-. In the present case, the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant had received Rs.40,00,000/- as loan from the petitioners. Hence, as per Section 2(6)(vi) of TNML Act, the amount of Rs.40,00,000/- obtained by the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant from the petitioners will not come under the definition of loan. He also submitted that Section 2(8) of TNML Act states that **"money lender"** means a person whose main or subsidiary occupation is the business of advancing and realizing loans, but excludes a bank or a co-operative society. Since the amount borrowed by the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant from the petitioners is not come under the definition of loan, the petitioners cannot be termed as money-lenders. Therefore, the learned counsel submitted that the TNML Act is not applicable to the petitioners' case.

3.2. Further, the learned counsel submitted that it is pertinent to extract Section 12 of TNPCEI Act hereunder:

> *"**12. Application of provisions of Tamil Nadu Money-lenders Act** – Subject to the provisions of this Act, the provisions of the Money-lenders Act, insofar as they are applicable to Money-lenders shall mutatis mutandis apply to a person referred to in Section 3 of this Act.*
>
> ***Explanation. -** Where an act of a person constitutes*

offences under this Act and under the Money-lenders Act, prosecution shall be launched under this Act."

A reading of the above provision makes it clear that subject to the provisions of TNPCEI Act, the provisions of TNML Act and rules made thereunder are applicable to money-lenders are also equally apply to the persons who are charging exorbitant interest on loan advance by them. Further, where an act of a person constitutes an offence under TNPCEI Act and also, under TNML Act, then, prosecution shall be launched under the TNPCEI Act only and not under the TNML Act. Therefore, the learned counsel submitted that since TNML Act is not applicable to the petitioners' case, Section 3 of TNPCEI Act is also not applicable.

3.3. The learned counsel also submitted that since Section 3 of TNPCEI Act is not applicable to the petitioners, the penalty specified under Section 4 of TNPCEI Act is also not applicable to them. Hence, it is crystal clear that the petitioners have not committed any offence under Sections 3 & 4 of the TNPCEI Act. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of ***Sri Kalpatharu Financiers Vs. V.Natarajan*** reported in

(2012) 4 MLJ 18*7*, wherein, it had held as follows:

*"**67.** Section 3 of the Act reads as follows:*

"3. Prohibition of charging exorbitant interest:

No person shall charge exorbitant interest on any loan advanced by him.

***68.** Section 4 deals with penalty which reads as follows:*

"4. Penalty:- Notwithstanding anything contained in the Money-Lenders Act, whoever contravenes the provisions of Section 3 or molests or abets the molestation of any debtor for recovery of any loan shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extent to three years and also with a 1 fine which may extent to thirty thousand rupees."

***69.** Therefore, contravention of the provisions of Act 38 of 2003 calls for a penalty u/s 4 subject to the provisions of Money Lenders Act. u/s 2(8) of the Tamil Nadu Money Lenders Act 1957, "Money Lender" means a person whose main or subsidiary occupation is the business of advancing and realising loans but excludes a bank or a cooperative society.*

***70.** Section 2(6) defines loan which reads as follows:*

""loan" means an advance whether of money or in kind at interest, and includes any transaction which the Court

finds in substance to amount to such an advance, but does not include

(i)....

(ii)...

(iii)...

(iv)...

(v)...

(vi) an advance made on the basis of a negotiable instrument and defined in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (Central Act No. XXVI of 1881), exceeding rupees (ten thousand);"

***71.** Therefore, when a loan is on the basis of a Negotiable Instrument viz., a promissory note which exceeds Rs. 10,000/-, it is not covered under the Money Lenders Act 1957."*

3.4. The learned counsel also submitted that the ingredients required for the offence punishable under Section 506(i) of I.P.C are not made out against the petitioners herein and that apart, the allegation referred in the FIR is not enough to punish the petitioners under Section 506(i) of I.P.C. Therefore, the learned counsel prayed this Court to quash the FIR in Crime No.511 of 2018 on the file of 1st respondent police.

4. *Per Contra,* the learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant submitted that though the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant was ready to repay the loan amount of Rs.40,00,000/- along with interest, the petitioners refused to return the original documents, cheques, stamp papers and promissory notes to him. Further, the petitioners demanded the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant to pay a sum of Rs.79,00,000/- and also, demanded him to register his land in their names and that apart, they threatened him that if he does not pay the demanded amount, they would murder him. He further submitted that 2nd petitioner's son Naveen had filed a suit in O.S.No.37 of 2019 before the District Munsif Court, Chengalpattu, seeking to grant a decree for permanent injunction directing the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant, his men, agents, servants, attorneys, successors from any way encumbering or alienating the suit property to anybody other than the plaintiff. However, the said suit is pending. He also submitted that though this Court vide order dated 12.01.2023 referred the matter to Mediation, the petitioners refused to settle the issue. The only intention of the petitioners is to grab more money

from the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant and hence, they demanded exorbitant interest from the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant. Therefore, the learned counsel prayed for dismissal of this petition.

5. The learned Government Advocate (Crl.Side) appearing for the 1st respondent police submitted that after the FIR was registered in Crime No.511 of 2018 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 406, 420 & 506(i) of I.P.C and 3 & 4 of TNPCEI Act, the 1st respondent police had enquired the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant. The statement of 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant reflects that the petitioners have cheated him. Hence, the 1st respondent police had altered the said FIR under Sections 506(i) of I.P.C r/w. 3 & 4 of TNPCEI Act. Thereafter, the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant sought time to produce the documents regarding the repayment and demand of exorbitant interest, but, after that, he did not came for enquiry.

6. Heard the learned counsel on either side and perused the materials available on record.

7. From a perusal of FIR in Crime No.511 of 2018 on the file of 1st respondent police, it is seen that the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant had obtained a sum of Rs.40,00,000/- as loan from the petitioners and he had handed over his original property documents, signed blank paper, blank cheques, promissory note and green sheets to the petitioners. It is also seen that though the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant was ready to repay the loan amount of Rs.40,00,000/- along with interest (excluding the interest of Rs.7,00,000/- which was already paid by him), the petitioners had demanded the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant to pay a sum of Rs.79,00,000/- and also, they had demanded him to register his land in their names. Moreover, the petitioners had threatened the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant that if he does not pay the demanded amount, they would murder him. Hence, the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant had lodged a complaint to the 1st respondent police.

8. Based on the complaint given by the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant, the 1st respondent police had registered the FIR in Crime

No.511 of 2018 against the petitioners and 2nd petitioner's son, for the offence under Sections 406, 420 & 506(i) of I.P.C and 3 & 4 of TNPCEI Act. The petitioners are A1 & A2 in Crime No.511 of 2018 on the file of 1st respondent police. Though the FIR was initially registered for the offence under Sections 406, 420 & 506(i) of I.P.C and 3 & 4 of TNPCEI Act, later, the 1st respondent police had altered the said FIR under Sections 506(i) of I.P.C r/w. 3 & 4 of TNPCEI Act.

9. As per Section 2(6)(vi) of TNML Act, an advance made on the basis of a negotiable instrument exceeding Rs.10,000/- would not fall under the definition of **'loan'** and as per Section 2(8) of TNML Act, **'money lender'** is a person whose main or subsidiary occupation is business of advancing and realizing loans. The proviso to Section 2(6)(vi) of TNML Act makes it clear that the amount of Rs.40,00,000/- i.e., exceeding Rs.10,000/- obtained by the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant from the petitioners would not come under the definition of loan. Since the amount borrowed by the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant itself is not a loan, it cannot be said that the petitioners are money-lenders.

10. It is pertinent to state that a money-lender who advances an amount on the basis of a Negotiable Instrument viz., a promissory note exceeding Rs.10,000/- is not a person referred to in Section 3 of TNPCEI Act. So, the provisions of Section 3 of TNPCEI Act is not applicable to the case on hand. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners, when Section 3 of TNPCEI Act itself is not applicable to this case, Section 4 of TNPCEI Act which deals with the penalty for a person who contravenes the provisions of Section 3 of TNPCEI Act, is also not applicable to the present case. Hence, this Court is of the opinion that the ingredients required for the offence under Sections 3 & 4 of TNPCEI Act are not made out against the petitioners.

11. So far as the offence alleged under Section 506 of I.P.C is concerned, this Court feels that it would be appropriate to extract Sections 503 & 506(i) of I.P.C hereunder:

> *"**503. Criminal intimidation.**--Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested,*

with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation. - A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section."

*"**506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.**--Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;*

***If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc. If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.**-- and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or [imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both."*

12. The allegation against the petitioners is that though the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant was ready to repay the loan amount of Rs.40,00,000/- along with interest, they demanded him to pay a sum of

Rs.79,00,000/-. When the 2nd respondent/de-facto complainant expressed his inability to pay such huge amount of Rs.79,00,000/-, the petitioners threatened him and demanded him to register his land in their names. However, this Court is of the opinion that the petitioners have not committed any offence under Section 506(i) of I.P.C.

13. At this juncture, it is pertinent to point out that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has discussed in detail about the inherent powers of the High Courts under Section 482 Cr.P.C in the following cases:

(i) R.P.Kapur Vs. The State of Punjab reported in ***AIR 1960 SC 866***

(ii) State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Ch.Bhajan Lal & Ors. reported in ***AIR 1992 SC 604***

(iii) M/s.Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Limited Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in ***2021 SCC Online SC 315***

13.1. In the case of ***R.P.Kapur Vs. The State of Punjab*** reported in ***AIR 1960 SC 866,*** the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:

"6. .... It is well-established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the first information report or

the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the first information report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the *accused would not be sustained."*

13.2. Further, in the case of ***State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Ch.Bhajan Lal & Ors.*** reported in ***AIR 1992 SC 604,*** the Hon'ble Supreme Court issued seven guidelines to be followed by the High Courts in the exercise of its inherent power vested by Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash the FIR/complaint, which are as follows:

"*(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.*

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a

cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

13.3. Similarly, in the case of ***M/s.Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Limited Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.*** reported in ***2021 SCC Online SC 315,*** the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as follows:

"80. ...., our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or "no coercive steps to

be adopted", during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or "no coercive steps to be adopted" during the investigation or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under:

i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence;

ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;

iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on;

iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the 'rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty).

v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the *reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;*

vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;

vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule;

viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere;

ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;

x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;

xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;

xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or *that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;*

xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;

xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint;

xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR;

xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in *exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or "no coercive steps to be adopted" and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or "no coercive steps" either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.*

xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the *higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order.*

xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of "no coercive steps to be adopted" within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by "no coercive steps to be adopted" as the term "no coercive steps to be adopted" can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied."

14. It is to be noted that the present case duly meets the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decisions cited *supra*.

15. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgments cited *supra*, this criminal original petition is allowed and the FIR in Crime No.511 of 2018 on the file of 1st respondent police is hereby quashed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.

14.09.2023

mrr
Index: Yes/No
Speaking Order (or) Non-Speaking Order

To

1.The Inspector of Police,
Central Crime Branch – 1 (FPP),
Vepery, Chennai District.

2.The Public Prosecutor,
High Court, Madras.

V.SIVAGNANAM, J.

mrr

Crl.O.P.No.19281 of 2021

14.09.2023